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| User: "Paul" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
26 Feb 2007 04:22:54 AM |
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On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not? What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
26 Feb 2007 12:34:04 PM |
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"Paul" <pgrieg@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1172485374.303273.38840@a75g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not? What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
I suppose the main thing is we are set up to act as though we have freewill.
It really feels like you can choose, if you can't this is a highly complex
illusion generated in some way. This would be very interesting.
Also if we discover we do not have freewill might it be possible that just
discovering this would give us freewill or someway of gaining it?
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| User: "Paul" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
26 Feb 2007 01:22:32 PM |
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On 26 Feb, 18:34, "jusholm" <jus1@talktalk_REMOVETHIS_.net> wrote:
"Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1172485374.303273.38840@a75g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not? What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?>
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
I suppose the main thing is we are set up to act as though we have freewill.
It really feels like you can choose...
Yeah I tend to just accept (assume) i can, like the average Joe. You
can't
get a subjective grasp on even a free movement of your arm. Try it
now.
Decide whether to move your right hand up in the air or not. Did you
move it?
Did it feel like a free choice? Can you describe what went on in your
mind, nervous system, and arm in the movement process, in subjective
terms? The feeling of what happens" is that it just happens with no
feeling. If wonder if any of these Tibetan meditators can focus in on
this and get more idea of what is going on mentally?
... if you can't this is a highly complex
illusion generated in some way. This would be very interesting.
It's an interesting idea. Not original, of course. But if you can come
up with a mechanism of generation, that no one can gainsay, then you
may beat Kant to the "best philosopher since Plato" title. I wasn't
just shrugging my shoulders after reading this thread, but after
several decades of (now and again) reading about this problem, and
pondering it. I think it falls into the category of "can't be solved
this century, if ever" problems so I spend time
pondering other matters (except you dragged me in again! :-) Anyway,
it's always fun to revisit these problems as long as you don't take
them too seriously or allow them to cause you any serious stress.
I'm just reading Plato's Thaetetus again and pondering whether
knowledge is just perception. If so, how can you know if the will is
free or not? Because, free or not, your arm movement is inspired
internally (in the brain/mind) and therefore is not a perception and
therefore cannot be the subject of knowledge. I guess, through
intermediate instruments, you could perceive the neural impulses but
you would always go back to a point where the impulses started. Did
they start freely or not? The potental for starting might have been
there, but did a free choice or quantum activity cause the activation
of the potential?
Shrugs shoulders.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
26 Feb 2007 02:19:42 PM |
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"Paul" <pgrieg@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1172517752.833097.206190@h3g2000cwc.googlegroups.com...
On 26 Feb, 18:34, "jusholm" <jus1@talktalk_REMOVETHIS_.net> wrote:
"Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1172485374.303273.38840@a75g2000cwd.googlegroups.com...
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not?
What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?>
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
I suppose the main thing is we are set up to act as though we have
freewill.
It really feels like you can choose...
Yeah I tend to just accept (assume) i can, like the average Joe. You
can't
get a subjective grasp on even a free movement of your arm. Try it
now.
Decide whether to move your right hand up in the air or not. Did you
move it?
Did it feel like a free choice?
Yes, except it was done on your suggestion : )
Can you describe what went on in your
mind, nervous system, and arm in the movement process, in subjective
terms?
Only that 'I' did it.
The feeling of what happens" is that it just happens with no
feeling. If wonder if any of these Tibetan meditators can focus in on
this and get more idea of what is going on mentally?
... if you can't this is a highly complex
illusion generated in some way. This would be very interesting.
It's an interesting idea. Not original, of course.
But this is what is implied by those that deny freewill. That our brain is
designed to generate the illusion that we are in control, consciously. How
would that come about through evolution?
But if you can come
up with a mechanism of generation, that no one can gainsay, then you
may beat Kant to the "best philosopher since Plato" title.
That we genuinely have freewill (BTW what about Descartes?)
I wasn't
just shrugging my shoulders after reading this thread,
I was kind of more generally reading the messages and then joining in rather
than responding directly to your expressive post. I agree, even people who
say they do not beleive in freewill still have to go through all the same
agonies of decision making as those that don't. They just beleive the result
was already predictable since the big bang.
but after
several decades of (now and again) reading about this problem, and
pondering it. I think it falls into the category of "can't be solved
this century, if ever" problems so I spend time
pondering other matters (except you dragged me in again! :-)
Pleasure!
Anyway,
it's always fun to revisit these problems as long as you don't take
them too seriously or allow them to cause you any serious stress.
Absolutely. I expect we have no choice except to make choices anyway
I'm just reading Plato's Thaetetus again and pondering whether
knowledge is just perception. If so, how can you know if the will is
free or not? Because, free or not, your arm movement is inspired
internally (in the brain/mind) and therefore is not a perception and
therefore cannot be the subject of knowledge. I guess, through
intermediate instruments, you could perceive the neural impulses but
you would always go back to a point where the impulses started. Did
they start freely or not?
I suppose that assumes you could find one place where such initialm impulses
start. However the brain is continually full of various electrical activity
so I imagine it would be impossible to trace back such a line of causes and
effect like that associated with my decision to steal or not, say. And this
is what is interesting to most ethics discussions.
The potental for starting might have been
there, but did a free choice or quantum activity cause the activation
of the potential?
Once you get down to the quantum level then you can even forget cause and
effect all together and anyway when you try to measure some variable it
changes.
Shrugs shoulders.
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| User: "Paul" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 07:24:16 AM |
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It's an interesting idea. Not original, of course.
But this is what is implied by those that deny freewill. That our brain is
designed to generate the illusion that we are in control, consciously. How
would that come about through evolution?
Good question. Maybe it is just a side effect that happened by
accident.
They just beleive the result
was already predictable since the big bang.
Why do they feel the need to belive this, or the opposite, or why do I
believe that shrugging my shoulders is the best response?
Pleasure!
And meaning - to me the meaningf life is to find out if life has a
meaning,
or failing that a 'meaning that will do for now'. Also flow - reading
philosophy
gets me into a state of flow. That's all the happiness boxes
ticked :-) That's
the main thing.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 11:51:43 AM |
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"Paul" <pgrieg@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1172582655.893825.301450@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
It's an interesting idea. Not original, of course.
But this is what is implied by those that deny freewill. That our brain
is
designed to generate the illusion that we are in control, consciously.
How
would that come about through evolution?
Good question. Maybe it is just a side effect that happened by
accident.
However it would need to give some advantage to be passed on throught he
generations?
They just beleive the result
was already predictable since the big bang.
Why do they feel the need to belive this, or the opposite, or why do I
believe that shrugging my shoulders is the best response?
I think some are convinced by the arguments against freewill. I guess you
feel the argument is still open, perhaps irrelevant and quite possibly
irresolvable.
Pleasure!
And meaning - to me the meaningf life is to find out if life has a
meaning,
or failing that a 'meaning that will do for now'. Also flow - reading
philosophy
gets me into a state of flow. That's all the happiness boxes
ticked :-) That's
the main thing.
Same here, nothing like tackling a really big question.
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| User: "Gary Childress" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
26 Feb 2007 07:13:05 PM |
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On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not? What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity? I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 11:54:20 AM |
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"Gary Childress" <grchildrss@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172538785.758145.64340@t69g2000cwt.googlegroups.com...
On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not?
What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity? I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
really don't think it has much implication for everyday decision making.
Those who beleive freewill is an illusion only really beleive that it would
be in principle possible to predict your decision if enough was know about
any preceding state of the entire universe and all the laws that govern its
singular progression line.
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| User: "Paul" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 07:35:37 AM |
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On 27 Feb, 01:13, "Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote:
On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not? What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity?
It's not worth worrying about, if worrying implies irritation or
suffering.
Nothing is! Bit it's an amusing problem that crops up now and again
in my ordinary life. -- mainly bacuased I find reading philosophy
pleasurable and that it may give meaning (what could do this better?)
In fact by thinking it might give meaning, it automatically gives
meaning,
although not 'ultimate meaning'.
I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
Again, no one should worry about such matters. Just see there is no
solutiin either way and relax. Come back if Joe Blow says he might
have a solution, and you can't find anything better to do at that
moment. And don't read Dennett's book on this problem, that is
painful. Which brings up another problem. If a book is supposed to be
'the best' on a problem that concerns you but iot beocmes painful; to
read after a couple of chapters shsould you persevere? If you think
ther emight be gold later in you should contuinue t o wad ethroughthe
mud. Perhsopa if you can detach fropm the pain of the mud wading? Is
there a Buddhist approach to reading 'difficult' books? I got through
Kant's CofP this way, just about, but you could always 'say "he's
supposedly the best", persevere. Can't do that with Dennett.
.
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| User: "SleepyHead" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 07:40:29 AM |
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On 27 Feb, 01:13, "Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote:
On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not? What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity? I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
Well the circumstances under which you might start to get concerned is
the area of law and enforcement thereof.
If it's the case that we don't have the ability to make choices (i.e.
don't have free will) - that it's all determined by our genetics and
childhood training - then there can be no such thing as culpability,
as the whole concept of being responsible and being punished or re-
trained (depending on your outlook) for irresponsible choices (i.e.
being culpable for your actions), is predicated around the idea that
you did, in fact, have a choice not to bite someone in the neck.
IOW: Get rid of free-will and you get rid of lawyers.
But you also have no come-back if someone drives their car into your
house because they were just programmed to do what they did.
.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 11:59:55 AM |
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"SleepyHead" <simonharpham@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:1172583629.345694.24070@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
On 27 Feb, 01:13, "Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote:
On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not?
What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity? I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
Well the circumstances under which you might start to get concerned is
the area of law and enforcement thereof.
If it's the case that we don't have the ability to make choices
But we can make choices, however anti-freewillers (for want of a better term
(determinists?)), just think those choices are pre-determined by the state
of the universe and internal states. However those internal states are part
of the offender. Even though their causes can be traced back to the big bang
still the offender is responsible because it is states within them that have
led to the offence. They maybe can't be blamed in the same way but they are
still responsible.
(i.e.
don't have free will) - that it's all determined by our genetics and
childhood training - then there can be no such thing as culpability,
as the whole concept of being responsible and being punished or re-
trained (depending on your outlook) for irresponsible choices (i.e.
being culpable for your actions), is predicated around the idea that
you did, in fact, have a choice not to bite someone in the neck.
IOW: Get rid of free-will and you get rid of lawyers.
But you also have no come-back if someone drives their car into your
house because they were just programmed to do what they did.
.
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| User: "SleepyHead" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
28 Feb 2007 04:32:41 AM |
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On 27 Feb, 17:59, "jusholm" <jus1@talktalk_REMOVETHIS_.net> wrote:
"SleepyHead" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:1172583629.345694.24070@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
On 27 Feb, 01:13, "Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote:
On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not?
What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity? I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
Well the circumstances under which you might start to get concerned is
the area of law and enforcement thereof.
If it's the case that we don't have the ability to make choices
But we can make choices
I would say we can too.
however anti-freewillers (for want of a better term (determinists?)), just think those choices are pre-determined by the state of the universe and internal states.
They do.
However those internal states are part of the offender.
Even though their causes can be traced back to the big bang still the offender is responsible because it is states within them that have led to the offence.
They maybe can't be blamed in the same way but they are still responsible.
What if I was to say "a rock has it within itself to crack and fall
from a cliff at a predetermined moment"? Why does the fact that a
given state is internal to a given object make any difference to its
behaviour being determined? And anyway - does this rather long-winded
statement amount to anything other than saying "the object's behaviour
is determined"?
If something's already been settled ahead of time then all you can do
is 'ride the wave' whether or not you're sentient, whether or not you
want to say that some of your properties are [mystical hand-waving]
'internal' [/mystical hand-waving].
One way out of the 'free-will rids us of lawyers' argument might
simply be to say "Yeah, well if everything's determined - then it's /
all/ determined - legal system, lawyers, your deviant behaviour with
the boss's secretary - the whole kit and kaboodle".
The problem is that - unless you're a fatalist of unwholesome
proportions - no-one really likes to believe they're just some kind of
biological automaton - we like to believe we can settle things for
ourselves even if it turns out that we have less control over our own
choices than we might like to believe.
Of course the real problem might be that we've got different language-
games all interfering with one another here and creating an
unwholesome muddle - perhaps the physics language-games (with their
ability to predict) exert a such a fascination for us that we get
blinded to the fact that we still can't tell exactly what the weather
will be like 2 weeks in advance.
And maybe that's what the whole problem revolves around - if we can as
a matter of practical fact predict something ahead of time then it's
already been settled n'est ce pas? If we can't predict something ahead
of time then it hasn't already been settled. Or rather - if we can as
a matter of practical fact predict something ahead of time, then we
have surely made a prediction - the question is: Will that prediction
come true? Even scientific determinism can't answer that question
(isn't this one reason why we keep testing physics predictions and
don't just go with the maths?) although it's certainly bullish about
the odds!
I wonder - as a consequence of the foregoing - whether a lot of this
worry about whether or not things are determined simply amounts to
conveniently forgetting all those predictions we make that go wrong,
including predictions based on physical theories! I guess I think at
bottom this kind of worry is somewhat artificial - a bit like worrying
yourself to distraction about what you'll do with the lottery money
you're going to win this week.
(i.e.
don't have free will) - that it's all determined by our genetics and
childhood training - then there can be no such thing as culpability,
as the whole concept of being responsible and being punished or re-
trained (depending on your outlook) for irresponsible choices (i.e.
being culpable for your actions), is predicated around the idea that
you did, in fact, have a choice not to bite someone in the neck.
IOW: Get rid of free-will and you get rid of lawyers.
But you also have no come-back if someone drives their car into your
house because they were just programmed to do what they did.
.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
28 Feb 2007 12:36:51 PM |
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"SleepyHead" <simonharpham@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:1172658761.911715.222680@8g2000cwh.googlegroups.com...
On 27 Feb, 17:59, "jusholm" <jus1@talktalk_REMOVETHIS_.net> wrote:
"SleepyHead" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in message
news:1172583629.345694.24070@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com...
On 27 Feb, 01:13, "Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote:
On Feb 26, 5:22 am, "Paul" <pgr...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 26 Feb, 05:33, "Mark Earnest" <gmearn...@yahoo.com> wrote:
"Gary Childress" <grchild...@aol.com> wrote in message
news:1172456617.260787.90380@p10g2000cwp.googlegroups.com...
Why do we humans worry about whether we have "free will" or not?
What
difference does it make if we do or if we don't?
To not have a free will is to be controlled.
No one wishes to be controlled.
Shrugs shoulders, cooks dinner.
That is sort of what I am getting at. If we go about our ordinary
lives, don't we find that we seldom sit down and worry whether we have
free will or not except as a kind of intellectual curiosity? I mean,
no one pauses a moment to determine whether he has free will or not
before he does something does he? If not then why or under what
circumstances should we worry about it?
Well the circumstances under which you might start to get concerned is
the area of law and enforcement thereof.
If it's the case that we don't have the ability to make choices
But we can make choices
I would say we can too.
however anti-freewillers (for want of a better term (determinists?)),
just think those choices are pre-determined by the state of the universe
and internal states.
They do.
However those internal states are part of the offender.
Even though their causes can be traced back to the big bang still the
offender is responsible because it is states within them that have led to
the offence.
They maybe can't be blamed in the same way but they are still
responsible.
What if I was to say "a rock has it within itself to crack and fall
from a cliff at a predetermined moment"? Why does the fact that a
given state is internal to a given object make any difference to its
behaviour being determined? And anyway - does this rather long-winded
statement amount to anything other than saying "the object's behaviour
is determined"?
I would offer another example or two. If a dog bites someone we still deal
with the dog (retraining, wearing a muzzle, putting-down) even though we may
not blame the dog or hold it responsible in the same way as an adult human.
The same could be said with the way mentally ill people and children are
dealt with. All the above examples I think are very relevant to 'adult'
criminal behaviour whether freewill exists or not.
If something's already been settled ahead of time then all you can do
is 'ride the wave' whether or not you're sentient, whether or not you
want to say that some of your properties are [mystical hand-waving]
'internal' [/mystical hand-waving].
Decision making or lack-thereof.
One way out of the 'free-will rids us of lawyers' argument might
simply be to say "Yeah, well if everything's determined - then it's /
all/ determined - legal system, lawyers, your deviant behaviour with
the boss's secretary - the whole kit and kaboodle".
Determinists would say that of course (and do). Including our tendency to
blame.
The problem is that - unless you're a fatalist of unwholesome
proportions - no-one really likes to believe they're just some kind of
biological automaton - we like to believe we can settle things for
ourselves even if it turns out that we have less control over our own
choices than we might like to believe.
Of course the real problem might be that we've got different language-
games all interfering with one another here and creating an
unwholesome muddle - perhaps the physics language-games (with their
ability to predict) exert a such a fascination for us that we get
blinded to the fact that we still can't tell exactly what the weather
will be like 2 weeks in advance.
And maybe that's what the whole problem revolves around - if we can as
a matter of practical fact predict something ahead of time then it's
already been settled n'est ce pas? If we can't predict something ahead
of time then it hasn't already been settled. Or rather - if we can as
a matter of practical fact predict something ahead of time, then we
have surely made a prediction - the question is: Will that prediction
come true? Even scientific determinism can't answer that question
(isn't this one reason why we keep testing physics predictions and
don't just go with the maths?) although it's certainly bullish about
the odds!
I wonder - as a consequence of the foregoing - whether a lot of this
worry about whether or not things are determined simply amounts to
conveniently forgetting all those predictions we make that go wrong,
including predictions based on physical theories! I guess I think at
bottom this kind of worry is somewhat artificial - a bit like worrying
yourself to distraction about what you'll do with the lottery money
you're going to win this week.
Maybe the truth is if you beleive you have freewill you do and if you
beleive you don't then you don't, and this is the reall worry.
(i.e.
don't have free will) - that it's all determined by our genetics and
childhood training - then there can be no such thing as culpability,
as the whole concept of being responsible and being punished or re-
trained (depending on your outlook) for irresponsible choices (i.e.
being culpable for your actions), is predicated around the idea that
you did, in fact, have a choice not to bite someone in the neck.
IOW: Get rid of free-will and you get rid of lawyers.
But you also have no come-back if someone drives their car into your
house because they were just programmed to do what they did.
.
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| User: "Don Stockbauer" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 07:44:51 AM |
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But free will is a time dependent concept. Before your choice you
have free will. After your choice determinism rules.
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| User: "SleepyHead" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 08:01:48 AM |
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On 27 Feb, 13:44, "Don Stockbauer" <donstockba...@hotmail.com> wrote:
But free will is a time dependent concept. Before your choice you
have free will. After your choice determinism rules.
If I had no choice then my biting someone in the neck isn't a matter
of choice (obviously).
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 08:31:29 AM |
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On Feb 27, 8:44 am, "Don Stockbauer" <donstockba...@hotmail.com>
wrote:
But free will is a time dependent concept. Before your choice you
have free will. After your choice determinism rules.
How could that be? Don't your actions 10 minutes from now all have
antecedent causes (which have anteedent causes (which ...))). Since
the set of all those is the sufficent cause of your future acts, then
it's a fact that all of the sufficient causes of what you do in the
future already exist; therefore 'determinism rules' wrt them, and
therefore also for all of your future acts.
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| User: "jusholm" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 12:01:25 PM |
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"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1172586689.360718.324070@q2g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
On Feb 27, 8:44 am, "Don Stockbauer" <donstockba...@hotmail.com>
wrote:
But free will is a time dependent concept. Before your choice you
have free will. After your choice determinism rules.
How could that be? Don't your actions 10 minutes from now all have
antecedent causes (which have anteedent causes (which ...))). Since
the set of all those is the sufficent cause of your future acts, then
it's a fact that all of the sufficient causes of what you do in the
future already exist; therefore 'determinism rules' wrt them, and
therefore also for all of your future acts.
I thought quantum physics (at least as far as it understood) is
non-deterministic and therefore so is the universe as a whole.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 05:06:18 PM |
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On Feb 27, 1:01 pm, "jusholm" <jus1@talktalk_REMOVETHIS_.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote in message
news:1172586689.360718.324070@q2g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...> On Feb 27, 8:44 am, "Don Stockbauer" <donstockba...@hotmail.com>
wrote:
But free will is a time dependent concept. Before your choice you
have free will. After your choice determinism rules.
How could that be? Don't your actions 10 minutes from now all have
antecedent causes (which have anteedent causes (which ...))). Since
the set of all those is the sufficent cause of your future acts, then
it's a fact that all of the sufficient causes of what you do in the
future already exist; therefore 'determinism rules' wrt them, and
therefore also for all of your future acts.
I thought quantum physics (at least as far as it understood) is
non-deterministic and therefore so is the universe as a whole.
Well, don't get the idea that I was asserting that position. I was
just giving the standard account of determinism, and pointing out that
the idea of 'determinism regarding the past but not the future' was
incompatible with it.
As for quantum physics, it may be that it's all indeterministic;
though there's a slim chance that there are overlooked causes (one
can't conclude that there is no cause of an event, simply from failure
to find a cause). However, causation does seem to operate just fine
on a macro (sensory) level; describing that as indeterminate goes
against all the evidence.
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
both free will and universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
27 Feb 2007 08:39:30 PM |
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"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in
news:1172617578.451737.24090@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
both free will and universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
.
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| User: "SleepyHead" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
28 Feb 2007 03:50:30 AM |
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On 28 Feb, 02:39, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1172617578.451737.24090@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
both free will and universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Depends what you mean by both terms. If "Universal causation" is
construed to mean "Everything has a cause" and "Determinism" to mean
"We know the outcome of a given series of events" then sure - not
everything is determined as far as we're concerned because there are
practical limits to human knowledge.
One way this argument might develop is along practical -vs-
theoretical lines - perhaps some matters can be determined, only not
by us (I think it was Liebniz who dreamt up the idea that the universe
can be considered to be basically mechanistic - and therefore already
determined from a theoretical point of view - but seeing as we don't
have all the requisite data we can't tell ahead of time how that's
going to play out, except in a limited sense - we can watch apples
fall to the ground and know they'll fall down, but /exactly/ where
will they come to rest after having bounced a few times? No-one
knows).
Interestingly enough the use of the word 'determine' to mean "the
doctrine that everything that happens is determined by a necessary
chain of causation" is quite a late use of the word - from 1876
according to http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=determine&searchmode=none.
What we are doing here is debating something the Victorians invented.
(Tut! Bloody Victorians.)
Anyway, before then it used to mean something much simpler - "to come
to a decision", "to settle or decide". In /that/ sense quantum physics
is telling us that the /exact/ outcomes of the interactions of small
particles / waves / whatever can't be settled ahead of time (although
the macro effects of such outcomes might be), although each event /
can/ be considered to be the determined outcomes of a chain of
causation.
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
28 Feb 2007 04:27:37 PM |
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"SleepyHead" <simonharpham@hotmail.co.uk> wrote in
news:1172656230.607613.73810@k78g2000cwa.googlegroups.com:
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Depends what you mean by both terms. If "Universal causation" is
construed to mean "Everything has a cause" and "Determinism" to mean
"We know the outcome of a given series of events" then sure - not
everything is determined as far as we're concerned because there are
practical limits to human knowledge.
One way this argument might develop is along practical -vs-
theoretical lines - perhaps some matters can be determined, only not
by us (I think it was Liebniz who dreamt up the idea that the universe
can be considered to be basically mechanistic - and therefore already
determined from a theoretical point of view - but seeing as we don't
have all the requisite data we can't tell ahead of time how that's
going to play out, except in a limited sense - we can watch apples
fall to the ground and know they'll fall down, but /exactly/ where
will they come to rest after having bounced a few times? No-one
knows).
Interestingly enough the use of the word 'determine' to mean "the
doctrine that everything that happens is determined by a necessary
chain of causation" is quite a late use of the word - from 1876
according to
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=determine&searchmode=none.
What we are doing here is debating something the Victorians invented.
(Tut! Bloody Victorians.)
Anyway, before then it used to mean something much simpler - "to come
to a decision", "to settle or decide". In /that/ sense quantum physics
is telling us that the /exact/ outcomes of the interactions of small
particles / waves / whatever can't be settled ahead of time (although
the macro effects of such outcomes might be), although each event /
can/ be considered to be the determined outcomes of a chain of
causation.
The term may not have come into use until 1876, but the concept was
articulated by LaPlace in 1814. Of course, analogous concepts, e.g.,
fatalism, were ancient.
In LaPlace's formulation all later states of a system are predictable from
any prior state, given complete knowledge of that prior state. But there
are numerous reasons why the future states of a system may not be
predictable from prior states, including singularities, computational
intractability, and impossibility in principle of gaining complete
knowledge of the prior state. When looking backward there are usually many
possible prior states S0 which could lead to a present state S1. As long as
all those possible prior states are allowable under the laws of the system,
then we can say the system is fully causal, though not determined. Likewise
when looking forward: though we may not be able to predict a particular
future state from a present state (for any of the above reasons), if there
are valid causal paths from the known present state to some set of possible
future states (no matter how large) we can still say the system is fully
causal, though not determined.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
28 Feb 2007 04:16:23 PM |
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On Feb 28, 4:50 am, "SleepyHead" <simonharp...@hotmail.co.uk> wrote:
On 28 Feb, 02:39, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1172617578.451737.24090@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
both free will and universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Depends what you mean by both terms. If "Universal causation" is
construed to mean "Everything has a cause" and "Determinism" to mean
"We know the outcome of a given series of events" then sure - not
everything is determined as far as we're concerned because there are
practical limits to human knowledge.
One way this argument might develop is along practical -vs-
theoretical lines - perhaps some matters can be determined, only not
by us (I think it was Liebniz who dreamt up the idea that the universe
can be considered to be basically mechanistic - and therefore already
determined from a theoretical point of view - but seeing as we don't
have all the requisite data we can't tell ahead of time how that's
going to play out, except in a limited sense - we can watch apples
fall to the ground and know they'll fall down, but /exactly/ where
will they come to rest after having bounced a few times? No-one
knows).
Umm, yes, but if we define 'determinism' as 'We know the outcome of a
eries of events,' then showing the falsity of that does not show the
truth of free will. Free will and determinism can both be false, as
it could be that (a) every action is caused (and therefore no one can
act freely) and (b) some of those actions are not predictable.
Interestingly enough the use of the word 'determine' to mean "the
doctrine that everything that happens is determined by a necessary
chain of causation" is quite a late use of the word - from 1876
according tohttp://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=determine&searchmode=none.
What we are doing here is debating something the Victorians invented.
(Tut! Bloody Victorians.)
No, we're only using terminology the Victorians invented; the debate
goes much farter back. Even if we stop using the term 'determinism'
for the concept (that all actions are caused, and therefore there is
no free will), the concept will remain, and can be given another name
('predestination' or whatever).
Anyway, before then it used to mean something much simpler - "to come
to a decision", "to settle or decide". In /that/ sense quantum physics
is telling us that the /exact/ outcomes of the interactions of small
particles / waves / whatever can't be settled ahead of time (although
the macro effects of such outcomes might be), although each event /
can/ be considered to be the determined outcomes of a chain of
causation.
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
03 Mar 2007 08:47:36 AM |
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On Feb 27, 9:39 pm, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1172617578.451737.24090@z35g2000cwz.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
bothfree willand universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Not if determinism is equivalent to predictability. However, as
Holbach argued in /The System of Nature/ (1770), and as is still being
argued today, universal causation is mutually exclusive of free will:
<quote>
Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he is
considered, he is connected to universal Nature: submitted to the
necessary, to the immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings
she contains, according to their peculiar essences; conformable to the
respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows
each particular species. Man's life is a line that Nature commands him
to describe upon the surface of the earth: without his ever being able
to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his own
consent; his organizations does in no wise depend upon himself; his
ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those
who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes,
whether visible or concealed, over which he has no controul; give the
hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He is
good or bad--happy or miserable--wise or foolish--reasonable or
irrational, without his will going for anything in these various
states. </q>
http://faculty.uca.edu/~rnovy/Meta%20DHolbach.htm
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
04 Mar 2007 10:19:54 PM |
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"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in
news:1172933256.583359.190760@30g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
bothfree willand universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Not if determinism is equivalent to predictability. However, as
Holbach argued in /The System of Nature/ (1770), and as is still being
argued today, universal causation is mutually exclusive of free will:
<quote>
Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he is
considered, he is connected to universal Nature: submitted to the
necessary, to the immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings
she contains, according to their peculiar essences; conformable to the
respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows
each particular species. Man's life is a line that Nature commands him
to describe upon the surface of the earth: without his ever being able
to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his own
consent; his organizations does in no wise depend upon himself; his
ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those
who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes,
whether visible or concealed, over which he has no controul; give the
hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He is
good or bad--happy or miserable--wise or foolish--reasonable or
irrational, without his will going for anything in these various
states. </q>
http://faculty.uca.edu/~rnovy/Meta%20DHolbach.htm
That is the metaphysical conception of free will. Like metaphysical
determinism, it is vacuous, like the proposition that the universe and
everything in it is doubling in size every second. It has nothing to do
with the ordinary conception of free will.
The "threatening" version of determinism is scientific determinism, which
assumes predictability. It involves the claim that human behaviors are
caused (are and predictable) given factors external to the agent, usually
the laws of physics.
In its ordinary sense there is no claim that behavior is uncaused:
Prosecutor: "Why did you rob the liquor store?"
Defendant: "Because I wanted money and booze."
The defendant is giving a cause for his actions by referring to certain
internal states of his. But there is no question that he acted "of his own
free will."
Free will in the ordinary sense need only defend itself against scientific
determinism. The latter can easily be shown false, although defenders may
retreat to metaphysical determinism. But the latter is vacuous.
.
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| User: "1Z" |
|
| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
05 Mar 2007 01:48:48 PM |
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On 5 Mar, 04:19, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1172933256.583359.190760@30g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
bothfree willand universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Not if determinism is equivalent to predictability. However, as
Holbach argued in /The System of Nature/ (1770), and as is still being
argued today, universal causation is mutually exclusive of free will:
<quote>
Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he is
considered, he is connected to universal Nature: submitted to the
necessary, to the immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings
she contains, according to their peculiar essences; conformable to the
respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows
each particular species. Man's life is a line that Nature commands him
to describe upon the surface of the earth: without his ever being able
to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his own
consent; his organizations does in no wise depend upon himself; his
ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those
who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes,
whether visible or concealed, over which he has no controul; give the
hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He is
good or bad--happy or miserable--wise or foolish--reasonable or
irrational, without his will going for anything in these various
states. </q>
http://faculty.uca.edu/~rnovy/Meta%20DHolbach.htm
That is the metaphysical conception of free will. Like metaphysical
determinism, it is vacuous, like the proposition that the universe and
everything in it is doubling in size every second. It has nothing to do
with the ordinary conception of free will.
The "threatening" version of determinism is scientific determinism, which
assumes predictability. It involves the claim that human behaviors are
caused (are and predictable) given factors external to the agent, usually
the laws of physics.
In its ordinary sense there is no claim that behavior is uncaused:
Prosecutor: "Why did you rob the liquor store?"
Defendant: "Because I wanted money and booze."
The defendant is giving a cause for his actions by referring to certain
internal states of his. But there is no question that he acted "of his own
free will."
Free will in the ordinary sense need only defend itself against scientific
determinism. The latter can easily be shown false, although defenders may
retreat to metaphysical determinism. But the latter is vacuous.
It is not easy to show that our behaviour is not ultimately caused by
external factors. You are perhaps confusing this claim with the claim
that our behaviour is in practice predictable, which *is* difficult to
prove.
The fact that people are able to produce reasons for their actions
does not show their actions are free, nor does it show
that FW is compatible with the principle that everything a cause,
since libertarians can still claim that only freely-chosen
reasons stand as causes of freely-chosen actions.
.
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| User: "Publius" |
|
| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
05 Mar 2007 03:48:37 PM |
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"1Z" <peterdjones@yahoo.com> wrote in
news:1173124127.625375.321240@30g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
Free will in the ordinary sense need only defend itself against
scientific determinism. The latter can easily be shown false, although
defenders may retreat to metaphysical determinism. But the latter is
vacuous.
It is not easy to show that our behaviour is not ultimately caused by
external factors. You are perhaps confusing this claim with the claim
that our behaviour is in practice predictable, which *is* difficult to
prove.
The burden of proof rests with he who holds the affirmative. If the
(scientific) determinist holds that all behavior is caused by factors
external to the agent, then it is his obligation to elucidate that causal
chain. And to do that he must be able to predict behavior B from external
factor(s) x. If he is unable to do that, yet continues to hold that B is
caused by x, then he has abandoned scientific determinism for metaphysical
determinism. The deterministic thesis is now merely an article of faith.
The fact that people are able to produce reasons for their actions
does not show their actions are free, nor does it show
that FW is compatible with the principle that everything a cause,
since libertarians can still claim that only freely-chosen
reasons stand as causes of freely-chosen actions.
It is free (in the ordinary sense of "free will") if the causes cited are
internal to the agent. E.g., caused by his values, desires, beliefs, goals,
preferences, etc. It is unfree if it is caused by external factors, such as
(typically) force or duress. A "freely chosen action" is one chosen on the
basis of those internal factors.
Construing "free will" to be the thesis that behavior has no causes is the
metaphysical conception, which is just as vacuous as metaphysical
determinism. It is not only unprovable, but contrary to ordinary
understanding, whereby behavior *does* have causes. But they are causes of
the sort mentioned above.
Behaviors with no causes whatsoever, internal or external, would be random
behavior. And that is also incompatible with the ordinary understanding of
"free will."
.
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| User: "George Dance" |
|
| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
05 Mar 2007 09:56:14 PM |
|
|
On Mar 5, 2:48 pm, "1Z" <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
On 5 Mar, 04:19, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1172933256.583359.190760@30g2000cwc.googlegroups.com:
The problem is, that all human action depends on the assumption of
bothfree willand universal causation; all our evidence points to the
truth of both; yet they cannot both be true.
Sure they can. Universal causation is not equaivalent to determinism.
Not if determinism is equivalent to predictability. However, as
Holbach argued in /The System of Nature/ (1770), and as is still being
argued today, universal causation is mutually exclusive of free will:
<quote>
Thus man is a being purely physical; in whatever manner he is
considered, he is connected to universal Nature: submitted to the
necessary, to the immutable laws that she imposes on all the beings
she contains, according to their peculiar essences; conformable to the
respective properties with which, without consulting them, she endows
each particular species. Man's life is a line that Nature commands him
to describe upon the surface of the earth: without his ever being able
to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his own
consent; his organizations does in no wise depend upon himself; his
ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those
who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes,
whether visible or concealed, over which he has no controul; give the
hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting. He is
good or bad--happy or miserable--wise or foolish--reasonable or
irrational, without his will going for anything in these various
states. </q>
http://faculty.uca.edu/~rnovy/Meta%20DHolbach.htm
That is the metaphysical conception of free will. Like metaphysical
determinism, it is vacuous, like the proposition that the universe and
everything in it is doubling in size every second. It has nothing to do
with the ordinary conception of free will.
The "threatening" version of determinism is scientific determinism, which
assumes predictability. It involves the claim that human behaviors are
caused (are and predictable) given factors external to the agent, usually
the laws of physics.
In its ordinary sense there is no claim that behavior is uncaused:
Prosecutor: "Why did you rob the liquor store?"
Defendant: "Because I wanted money and booze."
The defendant is giving a cause for his actions by referring to certain
internal states of his. But there is no question that he acted "of his own
free will."
Free will in the ordinary sense need only defend itself against scientific
determinism. The latter can easily be shown false, although defenders may
retreat to metaphysical determinism. But the latter is vacuous.
It is not easy to show that our behaviour is not ultimately caused by
external factors. You are perhaps confusing this claim with the claim
that our behaviour is in practice predictable, which *is* difficult to
prove.
The fact that people are able to produce reasons for their actions
does not show their actions are free, nor does it show
that FW is compatible with the principle that everything a cause,
since libertarians can still claim that only freely-chosen
reasons stand as causes of freely-chosen actions.- Hide quoted text -
I'd like to butt in here, since you two gentlemen have turned to the
question I'm interested in, about the relation of reason and
causation. I've been slowly working on an argument of my own, believe
it's passed all my own attempts to refute it, and think that it's time
to give it a more general critique (and who better than present
company 8). Since my intent is to distinguish reasons and causes of
behavior, I'm going to use a generic term, 'motivator', to refer to
both.
Premises are indicated by *.
1. Every action is motivated (in part) by a want. *
2. Every want is (in part) motivated by a potential state of affairs
subsequent to the action. *
3. Every action is motivated (in part) by a potential state of affairs
subsequent to the acton. (1,2)
4. An action at time t1 is motivated (in part) by a potential state of
affairs at time t2. (3)
5. An action at t1 is an actual state of affairs at t1. *
6. A potential state of affairs cannot cause an actual state of
affairs. *
7. A potential state of affairs at t2 cannot cause an action at t1.
(5,6)
8. A state of affairs at t2 cannot cause a state of affairs at t1. *
9. A potential state of affairs at t2 cannot cause an action at t1.
(5,8)
10. One of the motivators of an action at t1 cannot be a cause of the
action at t1. (4,8,9)
There's a redundancy in the argument (6-7 and 8-9) because, if one
premise fails, the other may still stand.
As both you and Publius are sympathetic, in general, to the idea of
free will, I'd appreciate your comments, questions, and critique.
4. A want (at time t0) is motivated by an potential state of affairs
at time t2. (from 3)
5. A potential state of affairs cannot cause an actual state of
affairs. *
6. A
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
05 Mar 2007 10:33:40 PM |
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"George Dance" <georgedance04@yahoo.ca> wrote in
news:1173153374.761073.133470@t69g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
Premises are indicated by *.
1. Every action is motivated (in part) by a want. *
2. Every want is (in part) motivated by a potential state of affairs
subsequent to the action. *
3. Every action is motivated (in part) by a potential state of affairs
subsequent to the acton. (1,2)
4. An action at time t1 is motivated (in part) by a potential state of
affairs at time t2. (3)
5. An action at t1 is an actual state of affairs at t1. *
6. A potential state of affairs cannot cause an actual state of
affairs. *
7. A potential state of affairs at t2 cannot cause an action at t1.
(5,6)
8. A state of affairs at t2 cannot cause a state of affairs at t1. *
9. A potential state of affairs at t2 cannot cause an action at t1.
(5,8)
10. One of the motivators of an action at t1 cannot be a cause of the
action at t1. (4,8,9)
There's a redundancy in the argument (6-7 and 8-9) because, if one
premise fails, the other may still stand.
As both you and Publius are sympathetic, in general, to the idea of
free will, I'd appreciate your comments, questions, and critique.
The problem is with Premise #6. There is a 4-term fallacy. A "potential state
of affairs" may indicate a logically possible state of affairs, or a future
state of affairs envisioned and regarded as attainable by the agent. Although
a logically possible future state of affairs cannot cause an action in the
present, the envisioned future state of affairs occurs in the agent's
present.
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| User: "George Dance" |
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| Title: Re: Question About Free Will Arguments |
12 Mar 2007 09:26:39 AM |
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On Mar 6, 12:33 am, Publius <m.publ...@nospam.comcast.net> wrote:
"George Dance" <georgedanc...@yahoo.ca> wrote innews:1173153374.761073.133470@t69g2000cwt.googlegroups.com:
Premises are indicated by *.
1. Every action is motivated (in part) by a want. *
2. Every want is (in part) motivated by a potential state of affairs
subsequent to the action. *
3. Every action is motivated (in part) by a potential state of affairs
subsequent to the acton. (1,2)
4. An action at time t1 is motivated (in part) by a potential state of
affairs at time t2. (3)
5. An action at t1 is an actual state of affairs at t1. *
6. A potential state of affairs cannot cause an actual state of
affairs. *
7. A potential state of affairs at t2 cannot cause an action at t1.
(5,6)
8. A state of affairs at t2 cannot cause a state of affairs at t1. *
9. A potential state of affairs at t2 cannot cause an action at t1.
(5,8)
10. One of the motivators of an action at t1 cannot be a cause of the
action at t1. (4,8,9)
There's a redundancy in the argument (6-7 and 8-9) because, if one
premise fails, the other may still stand.
As both you and Publius are sympathetic, in general, to the idea of
free will, I'd appreciate your comments, questions, and critique.
The problem is with Premise #6. There is a 4-term fallacy. A "potential state
of affairs" may indicate a logically possible state of affairs, or a future
state of affairs envisioned and regarded as attainable by the agent. Although
a logically possible future state of affairs cannot cause an action in the
present, the envisioned future state of affairs occurs in the agent's
present.-
I think I see what you're saying; and by the same token, premise 8
fails as well.
It looks like the two things I have to do here are;
1) More sharply distinguish between form and content - between the
idea, as a brain event, and the state of affairs as the mental
vision. That's hard, when there's no account of what brain events
correspond to which visions - for instance, one can't use Leibniz's
law to show that the same brain events corrrespond to different
visions, or vice versa. Do you think that could pass muster as merely
a plausible hypothesis; on the ground that two childen, say, growing
up in completely different environments would have completely
different visions or content of thought, but it's not plausible to
think that they'd be using completely different sections of their
brain?
2) Look for one or two clear cases where the envisioned event is not
simply the same event as one that's previously occurred in the agent's
experience (in which case the content would most plausibly just be the
memory of the previous event), but is clearly a mental fabrication.
Do you think those would work around the problem in 6 and 8?
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