Science > Philosophy > Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate]
| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Publius" |
| Date: |
02 Nov 2005 08:09:14 PM |
| Object: |
Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:31caf.756$f_5.267@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net:
I don't find this concept of 'self' so easy to pin down. Most of the
time some things seem definitely included and others definitely
excluded, but I wouldn't know where to place something like the
knee-jerk response. Additionally, sometimes my partner seems to be
part of this self, and at other times this self seems to disappear
completely in the beauty of a breath-taking visual scene.
You're still conflating self-awareness and the self-concept there,
methinks. Awareness of the knee-jerk response is an awareness of self (a
stimulus you'll classify as internal), regardless of whatever external
stimulus caused it, of which you may not be aware.
What happens with the partner and the visual scene is the temporary
disappearance or suppression of the self-concept. That can happen in lots
of ways --- whenever you're intensely focussed on something else.
Daydreaming, concentrating on a problem, watching a movie or just the
clouds overhead, etc. The self concept retreats from attention. Hunger
pangs or a bee sting bring it back.
the word has many uses in common speech, but when I deliberately try
to pin down what this 'me' is, I don't seem to find anything -- there
seems to be nothing essential to the concept at all.
That may be the mistake Hume is making. In what sense are you trying to
"pin it down?" Pin it down how? More below re: Hume.
In short, then, this boundary between
the 'internal' and the 'external' seems a bit shifty to me, sometimes
bloating to encompass everything, and sometimes contracting into
nothing (though mostly it seems rather stable even though the boundary
is nebulous).
Are the boundaries between any other identified sets of stimuli any less
shifty? That's why we invent concepts, to firm them up. The self is an
idealization, like all other concepts.
"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe
any thing but the perception.
Hume assumes the self is an observable object, which should be
perceptible. But it's not --- is a concept, not a percept. It is an ideal
object defined by internal stimuli and point-of-view (that which accounts
for the changing perspective of a scene as I move about). Hume was
looking for the wrong sort of thing.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
03 Nov 2005 01:06:00 PM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
I don't find this concept of 'self' so easy to pin down. Most of the
time some things seem definitely included and others definitely
excluded, but I wouldn't know where to place something like the
knee-jerk response. Additionally, sometimes my partner seems to be
part of this self, and at other times this self seems to disappear
completely in the beauty of a breath-taking visual scene.
You're still conflating self-awareness and the self-concept there,
methinks. Awareness of the knee-jerk response is an awareness of self (a
stimulus you'll classify as internal), regardless of whatever external
stimulus caused it, of which you may not be aware.
It's not something that "I do", though it is something that happens "to me".
Another example might be that it would be strange to claim that "I pump
blood through my arteries", though I might say that the activity is
something that happens "in me".
What happens with the partner and the visual scene is the temporary
disappearance or suppression of the self-concept. That can happen in lots
of ways --- whenever you're intensely focussed on something else.
Daydreaming, concentrating on a problem, watching a movie or just the
clouds overhead, etc. The self concept retreats from attention. Hunger
pangs or a bee sting bring it back.
Those other things are quite ordinary, but my original examples are quite
extraordinary and therefore notable. It's not that the concept of self goes
absent as it often does, but rather that it coalesces with something that
would normally be regarded as 'other', or that its complete absence is
notable (which normally wouldn't happen without reinstating it).
the word has many uses in common speech, but when I deliberately try
to pin down what this 'me' is, I don't seem to find anything -- there
seems to be nothing essential to the concept at all.
That may be the mistake Hume is making. In what sense are you trying to
"pin it down?" Pin it down how? More below re: Hume.
As noted above, it certainly has uses in everyday language when referring to
the host organism, but seems to disappear into the shadows when attempts are
made to identify the 'doer'.
In short, then, this boundary between
the 'internal' and the 'external' seems a bit shifty to me, sometimes
bloating to encompass everything, and sometimes contracting into
nothing (though mostly it seems rather stable even though the boundary
is nebulous).
Are the boundaries between any other identified sets of stimuli any less
shifty? That's why we invent concepts, to firm them up. The self is an
idealization, like all other concepts.
Quite right -- there is nothing in the data of perception that corresponds
with this concept, but rather the concept gives the appearance of having
been abstracted from perception in order to account for some aspects of the
data of perception. But unlike rational concepts, this one seems to be
instinctive in that it appears well before the maturity of abstract
reasoning.
"For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I
always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or
cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can
catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe
any thing but the perception.
Hume assumes the self is an observable object, which should be
perceptible. But it's not --- is a concept, not a percept. It is an ideal
object defined by internal stimuli and point-of-view (that which accounts
for the changing perspective of a scene as I move about). Hume was
looking for the wrong sort of thing.
I don't think Hume was so easily misled. He's saying that the self is *not*
a perception, despite our propensity to treat it on par with perceptions. I
think his main point lies in his statement that "He may, perhaps, perceive
something simple and continu'd, which he calls himself; tho' I am certain
there is no such principle in me."
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
03 Nov 2005 09:38:59 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:sctaf.829$8R6.466@newsfe1-gui.ntli.net:
It's not something that "I do", though it is something that happens
"to me". Another example might be that it would be strange to claim
that "I pump blood through my arteries", though I might say that the
activity is something that happens "in me".
Yes. The knee-jerk is not something one does. But one is more often aware
of it than the pumping of blood.
Those other things are quite ordinary, but my original examples are
quite extraordinary and therefore notable. It's not that the concept
of self goes absent as it often does, but rather that it coalesces
with something that would normally be regarded as 'other', or that its
complete absence is notable (which normally wouldn't happen without
reinstating it).
What would be the difference between coalescing and disappearing? The
concept of self can go absent when the internal stimuli that define it go
absent (recede into the background). Just as any other concept vanishes
from attention until some of the stimuli which invoke it appear. Then
that concept is brought forward.
Are the boundaries between any other identified sets of stimuli any
less shifty? That's why we invent concepts, to firm them up. The self
is an idealization, like all other concepts.
Quite right -- there is nothing in the data of perception that
corresponds with this concept, but rather the concept gives the
appearance of having been abstracted from perception in order to
account for some aspects of the data of perception. But unlike
rational concepts, this one seems to be instinctive in that it appears
well before the maturity of abstract reasoning.
So do many other concepts. An infant will forge the concept "mother" long
before any conscious reasoning takes place. It will not have a name for
that concept, but it will have constructed that data structure.
Hume assumes the self is an observable object, which should be
perceptible. But it's not --- is a concept, not a percept. It is an
ideal object defined by internal stimuli and point-of-view (that
which accounts for the changing perspective of a scene as I move
about). Hume was looking for the wrong sort of thing.
I don't think Hume was so easily misled. He's saying that the self is
*not* a perception, despite our propensity to treat it on par with
perceptions. I think his main point lies in his statement that "He
may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls
himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me."
And he's right there. The self is not a perception. But that does not
mean there is "no such principle." It is a conception, just as is an
electromagnetic field. Those are not perceived either. They are only
conceived. And like the self, they allow us to impose some order on a set
of percepts.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
04 Nov 2005 01:42:20 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Those other things are quite ordinary, but my original examples are
quite extraordinary and therefore notable. It's not that the concept
of self goes absent as it often does, but rather that it coalesces
with something that would normally be regarded as 'other', or that its
complete absence is notable (which normally wouldn't happen without
reinstating it).
What would be the difference between coalescing and disappearing?
The feeling that "it's me".
Are the boundaries between any other identified sets of stimuli any
less shifty? That's why we invent concepts, to firm them up. The self
is an idealization, like all other concepts.
Quite right -- there is nothing in the data of perception that
corresponds with this concept, but rather the concept gives the
appearance of having been abstracted from perception in order to
account for some aspects of the data of perception. But unlike
rational concepts, this one seems to be instinctive in that it appears
well before the maturity of abstract reasoning.
So do many other concepts. An infant will forge the concept "mother" long
before any conscious reasoning takes place. It will not have a name for
that concept, but it will have constructed that data structure.
Perceptual categories exist for all animals. A human infant will have an
instinctive propensity to recognize a particularly significant individual in
the data of perception just as many other species of animal do, most of
which have no capacity for abstract thought.
Hume assumes the self is an observable object, which should be
perceptible. But it's not --- is a concept, not a percept. It is an
ideal object defined by internal stimuli and point-of-view (that
which accounts for the changing perspective of a scene as I move
about). Hume was looking for the wrong sort of thing.
I don't think Hume was so easily misled. He's saying that the self is
*not* a perception, despite our propensity to treat it on par with
perceptions. I think his main point lies in his statement that "He
may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu'd, which he calls
himself; tho' I am certain there is no such principle in me."
And he's right there. The self is not a perception. But that does not
mean there is "no such principle." It is a conception, just as is an
electromagnetic field. Those are not perceived either. They are only
conceived. And like the self, they allow us to impose some order on a set
of percepts.
I guess this all hangs on how Hume is using the word 'principle' then.
I tend to think of beliefs as pathways that guide our thoughts and actions
and that also, to some extent, determine our perceptions. And just like a
river follows a pathway that the river itself has forged, so our thoughts,
actions and perceptions are guided by beliefs that our thoughts, actions and
perceptions themselves have forged. It's clear that there's a mechanism here
for locking into a stable state, whether or not that stable state is
well-founded or ill-founded. I understand Hume to be claiming that on close
analysis the concept of self is discovered to be an ill-founded stable
state. There is nothing "simple and continued" corresponding to that
concept in the way that there is something simple and continued
corresponding to, say, an electron.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
04 Nov 2005 11:04:13 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:whEaf.4951$Ua6.3103@newsfe6-win.ntli.net:
What would be the difference between coalescing and disappearing?
The feeling that "it's me".
In that case the self-concept remains present, and the differences between
internal and external stimuli are suppressed.
Perceptual categories exist for all animals. A human infant will have
an instinctive propensity to recognize a particularly significant
individual in the data of perception just as many other species of
animal do, most of which have no capacity for abstract thought.
But they do have a capacity for abstract thought, though no capacity for
verbal thought (the ability to assign symbols to concepts and manipulate
the symbols).
Turtoni posted this link, which you might find of interest (I did):
http://www.physorg.com/news7879.html
I guess this all hangs on how Hume is using the word 'principle' then.
I tend to think of beliefs as pathways that guide our thoughts and
actions and that also, to some extent, determine our perceptions. And
just like a river follows a pathway that the river itself has forged,
so our thoughts, actions and perceptions are guided by beliefs that
our thoughts, actions and perceptions themselves have forged. It's
clear that there's a mechanism here for locking into a stable state,
whether or not that stable state is well-founded or ill-founded. I
understand Hume to be claiming that on close analysis the concept of
self is discovered to be an ill-founded stable state. There is nothing
"simple and continued" corresponding to that concept in the way that
there is something simple and continued corresponding to, say, an
electron.
As long as one does not expect that which is simple and continued to be a
percept. Different subsets of percepts can elicit the pattern (the
concept). Those subsets may have no common elements. That is true of most
concepts. A view of an automobile from underneath, while it is on a lube
rack, will have no elements in common with a view of the automobile from an
aircraft. But either view will elicit the concept "automobile."
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
05 Nov 2005 09:07:13 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
What would be the difference between coalescing and disappearing?
The feeling that "it's me".
In that case the self-concept remains present, and the differences between
internal and external stimuli are suppressed.
The self-concept remains present, and the boundary between internal and
external expands to encompass something that was previously considered
external.
Perceptual categories exist for all animals. A human infant will have
an instinctive propensity to recognize a particularly significant
individual in the data of perception just as many other species of
animal do, most of which have no capacity for abstract thought.
But they do have a capacity for abstract thought, though no capacity for
verbal thought (the ability to assign symbols to concepts and manipulate
the symbols).
Most animals have no capacity for abstract thought. Exceptions are chimps
and dolphins, and some families of birds like parrots and crows. Although
domestic animals are often reported by their owners to have "thought
something through" (i.e. created a hypothesis), the explanation is almost
always down to operant conditioning. I say 'almost' because of the likes of
chimps and parrots.
Turtoni posted this link, which you might find of interest (I did):
http://www.physorg.com/news7879.html
Seems to be about the conditioned response rather than reasoning (it does
mention that the animals were 'trained').
I understand Hume to be claiming that on close analysis the concept of
self is discovered to be an ill-founded stable state. There is nothing
"simple and continued" corresponding to that concept in the way that
there is something simple and continued corresponding to, say, an
electron.
As long as one does not expect that which is simple and continued to be a
percept. Different subsets of percepts can elicit the pattern (the
concept). Those subsets may have no common elements. That is true of most
concepts. A view of an automobile from underneath, while it is on a lube
rack, will have no elements in common with a view of the automobile from
an aircraft. But either view will elicit the concept "automobile."
True enough that Hume does use the word 'perceive' as though he were looking
for a percept, but I find it difficult to believe that Hume would have been
so naive as to exclude ideas from his assessment of what he finds when he
looks into himself. I would say that he is using the word 'perceive' in a
broader sense.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
05 Nov 2005 03:46:44 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:BU3bf.3547$f_5.390@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net:
Most animals have no capacity for abstract thought. Exceptions are
chimps and dolphins, and some families of birds like parrots and
crows. Although domestic animals are often reported by their owners to
have "thought something through" (i.e. created a hypothesis), the
explanation is almost always down to operant conditioning. I say
'almost' because of the likes of chimps and parrots.
We may be using "abstract" differently. My meaning was, isolating elements
from a complex array of stimuli and constructing an ideal object from them,
e.g., noting roughly circular patterns in an array, or a series of arrays,
and conceiving the ideal object, "circle." Most animals render their
sensory streams orderly by abstracting from them in that way, by sorting
the percepts into "things" and classes of things. E.g., a cat can recognize
another cat as a cat even though she may never have seen the other animal
before, because a pattern in the percepts before her match the ideal object
closely enough.
As for hypothesis testing, even bees can do it.
http://www.cyberbee.net/news/beebright.html
True enough that Hume does use the word 'perceive' as though he were
looking for a percept, but I find it difficult to believe that Hume
would have been so naive as to exclude ideas from his assessment of
what he finds when he looks into himself. I would say that he is using
the word 'perceive' in a broader sense.
It was not naivete; it was just his relentless empiricism. He understood
concepts, but not the role they play in making experience comprehensible.
He could not make sense of causality for the very same reason.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
05 Nov 2005 05:53:01 PM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Most animals have no capacity for abstract thought. Exceptions are
chimps and dolphins, and some families of birds like parrots and
crows. Although domestic animals are often reported by their owners to
have "thought something through" (i.e. created a hypothesis), the
explanation is almost always down to operant conditioning. I say
'almost' because of the likes of chimps and parrots.
We may be using "abstract" differently. My meaning was, isolating elements
from a complex array of stimuli and constructing an ideal object from
them, e.g., noting roughly circular patterns in an array, or a series of
arrays, and conceiving the ideal object, "circle." Most animals render
their sensory streams orderly by abstracting from them in that way, by
sorting the percepts into "things" and classes of things. E.g., a cat can
recognize another cat as a cat even though she may never have seen the
other animal before, because a pattern in the percepts before her match
the ideal object closely enough.
Yes, as per my earlier statement that perceptual categories exist for all
animals.
By "abstract reasoning" I mean the creation and testing of hypotheses.
As for hypothesis testing, even bees can do it.
http://www.cyberbee.net/news/beebright.html
I think the word 'even' is out of place here, but the statement is correct.
If you had said "As for hypothesis testing, even woodlice can do it" I would
have said that the word 'even' was not out of place, but the statement was
incorrect. The social insects are a fascinating study, bees perhaps the most
fascinating of all. I would class them amongst the exceptions that I made
earlier.
True enough that Hume does use the word 'perceive' as though he were
looking for a percept, but I find it difficult to believe that Hume
would have been so naive as to exclude ideas from his assessment of
what he finds when he looks into himself. I would say that he is using
the word 'perceive' in a broader sense.
It was not naivete; it was just his relentless empiricism. He understood
concepts, but not the role they play in making experience comprehensible.
He could not make sense of causality for the very same reason.
He could not make sense of causality because there is no sense in it.
But regarding his views on the self, in his thread "Being No One" Turtoni
gives quotes from Metzinger's new book wherein the same point is argued in a
much more up-to-date fashion.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
06 Nov 2005 04:25:13 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:xBbbf.3891$f_5.2477@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net...
Yes, as per my earlier statement that perceptual categories exist for
all animals.
By "abstract reasoning" I mean the creation and testing of hypotheses.
I think they are the same process, but at different levels of generality.
As for hypothesis testing, even bees can do it.
http://www.cyberbee.net/news/beebright.html
I think the word 'even' is out of place here, but the statement is
correct. If you had said "As for hypothesis testing, even woodlice can
do it" I would have said that the word 'even' was not out of place,
but the statement was incorrect. The social insects are a fascinating
study, bees perhaps the most fascinating of all. I would class them
amongst the exceptions that I made earlier.
I don't think bees are really exceptions. Most higher animals (birds and
mammals) have similar abilities. But they would not all do as well on a
given kind of test. Bees, like primates and many rodents, have trichromatic
vision. Colors and fine patterns are important to them. They're not as
important to some other mammals, so you'd need different kinds of tests.
"The g factor in non-human animals
"Britt Anderson
"Neurology Service, Birmingham VA Medical Center, Birmingham, USA
"Animals possess the attributes we label as 'intelligent' in humans.
‘Insight’ and ‘reasoning’ have been demonstrated in chimpanzees, monkeys,
racoons, rats, mice, ravens and pigeons. In the rat, the animal species best
characterized psychologically and neuroanatomically, reasoning ability
correlates with other cognitive capacities and brain size. Other learning
task paradigms tested on mice and rats have confirmed consistent individual
differences, indicated a neuroanatomical network for learning, and shown the
presence of genetic influences for cognitive ability."
http://www.novartisfound.org.uk/catalog/233abs.htm
It was not naivete; it was just his relentless empiricism. He
understood concepts, but not the role they play in making experience
comprehensible. He could not make sense of causality for the very
same reason.
He could not make sense of causality because there is no sense in it.
Aaargh!
But regarding his views on the self, in his thread "Being No One"
Turtoni gives quotes from Metzinger's new book wherein the same point
is argued in a much more up-to-date fashion.
I spent couple hours last nite on Metzinger's thesis --- don't have the
book, but there is a lengthy precis (by Metzinger) and a colloquium at
*Psyche*.
http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/symposia/metzinger/
His analysis of the self parallels quite closely what we have been exploring
in this thread. So I don't disagree with the analysis. The "self" is the
self-concept; it is a construct of the mind (although he would say it is a
construct of the brain, which it is, but only because the brain must be "up
and running" to create the mind).
But the interpretation he places on that analysis is unwarranted, and indeed
incoherent.
"This is a book about consciousness, the phenomenal self,
and the, first-person perspective. Its main thesis is that no such things as
selves exist in the world: Nobody ever was or had a self. All that ever
existed were conscious self-models that could not be recognized as models.
The phenomenal self is not a thing, but a process-and the subjective
experience of being someone emerges if a conscious information-processing
system operates under a transparent self-model.
[ . . .]"
And,
"Phenomenal experience during the waking state is an
online hallucination. This hallucination is online because the autonomous
activity of the system is permanently being modulated by the information
flow from the sensory organs; it is a hallucination because it depicts a
possible reality as an actual reality."
The problem is that saying that "no such things as selves exist in the
world," and "it depicts a possible reality as an actual reality" is a
version of the naive realism he thinks he is debunking. The conceived
reality, and the conceived selves inhabiting it, are the only realities we
know. There is no "actual reality" to which we contrast it and pronounce it
an "hallucination." At most we can contrast it with other concepts, which,
being models also, are just as much "hallucinations."
In other words, selves (and causes, for that matter) are as "real" as any
other entities and processes we construct to organize and predict
experience, such as trees and cats and the Theory of Relativity.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
06 Nov 2005 10:47:00 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Yes, as per my earlier statement that perceptual categories exist for
all animals.
By "abstract reasoning" I mean the creation and testing of hypotheses.
I think they are the same process, but at different levels of generality.
I think the latter involves the capacity to entertain speculative scenarios,
whereas the former involves nothing more a selection pressure.
As for hypothesis testing, even bees can do it.
http://www.cyberbee.net/news/beebright.html
I think the word 'even' is out of place here, but the statement is
correct. If you had said "As for hypothesis testing, even woodlice can
do it" I would have said that the word 'even' was not out of place,
but the statement was incorrect. The social insects are a fascinating
study, bees perhaps the most fascinating of all. I would class them
amongst the exceptions that I made earlier.
I don't think bees are really exceptions. Most higher animals (birds and
mammals) have similar abilities. But they would not all do as well on a
given kind of test. Bees, like primates and many rodents, have
trichromatic vision. Colors and fine patterns are important to them.
They're not as important to some other mammals, so you'd need different
kinds of tests.
I spend a lot of time with horses and I can state categorically that I've
never seen a horse figure something out. I've frequently observed classical
and operant conditioning, and indeed make use of them on a daily basis, but
I'm constantly amused by how stupid these animals are. A horse is nothing
more than an association machine with flight instincts. I often hear
horse-owners tell tales of how clever their horse is, and how it works
things out for itself, but I think this just demonstrates the human
propensity for anthropomorphisation (a cautionary tale is the story of
Clever Hans -- if you haven't heard it then it's worth looking it up on the
web). Animals that can figure something out for themselves are in a tiny
minority given the number of species on the planet, but there is no cut-off
point -- the transition is not discrete. Some species are better at it than
others, and some individuals within a species are better than others. I
suspect it has something to do with the social complexity of the species,
and that it is more prevalent in predator species than in prey species (and
particularly than in herbivores).
The problem is that saying that "no such things as selves exist in the
world," and "it depicts a possible reality as an actual reality" is a
version of the naive realism he thinks he is debunking. The conceived
reality, and the conceived selves inhabiting it, are the only realities we
know. There is no "actual reality" to which we contrast it and pronounce
it an "hallucination." At most we can contrast it with other concepts,
which, being models also, are just as much "hallucinations."
In other words, selves (and causes, for that matter) are as "real" as any
other entities and processes we construct to organize and predict
experience, such as trees and cats and the Theory of Relativity.
I'm inclined to regard the concept of self similarly to that of 'matter'
conceived as the substrate underlying all qualities attributed to it. As
such it must itself be itself devoid of qualities, and thus we can know
nothing about it, so why even postulate the existence of such a substrate?
There are only collections of qualities that cohere for a period of time and
then dissolve, and no 'essences' as such -- no 'things' but only processes.
The structure of language tends to make us think in terms of 'things' --
i.e. to ascribe simplicity and continuity to them as though they were
forever distinct and separate from the rest of the world in which they
inhere (incidentally I think this is the basis of the word 'exist'). Whilst
this is of practical utility when interacting with "things in the world",
when scrutinized some of these 'things' disappear into the shadows. Like the
word 'matter' and the word 'cause', the word 'self' is a useful linguistic
device and nothing more. The problem is that the organism upon which this
"virtual machine" runs (to use Metzinger's metaphor) convinces itself that
the self is a substantial thing. There is no 'self' in control of the
organism, but the *idea* that there is contributes to the organism's modes
of behavior.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
07 Nov 2005 12:07:15 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:8sqbf.6879$lJ.6171@newsfe5-win.ntli.net...
I spend a lot of time with horses and I can state categorically that
I've never seen a horse figure something out. I've frequently observed
classical and operant conditioning, and indeed make use of them on a
daily basis, but I'm constantly amused by how stupid these animals
are. A horse is nothing more than an association machine with flight
instincts. I often hear horse-owners tell tales of how clever their
horse is, and how it works things out for itself, but I think this
just demonstrates the human propensity for anthropomorphisation (a
cautionary tale is the story of Clever Hans -- if you haven't heard it
then it's worth looking it up on the web).
Heh. Clever Hans is notorious.
But general problem-solving abilities seem to be strongly correlated with
the variability of the animal's diet and habitat. Animals tightly dependent
on a particular habitat or food source are efficient in that habitat, but
quite at a loss if displaced. The brightest critters seem to be those who
are ecological generalists (found in all kinds of habitats), and omnivorous.
Nature seems to have hit on two strategies: animals closely adapted to a
particular niche, and others with more abstract problem-solving abilities
who can flourish in many scenarios. Many of the those generalists (primates,
rats, mice, raccoons) also have prehensile hands.
I suspect it has something to do with the social complexity of the
species, and that it is more prevalent in predator species than in
prey species (and particularly than in herbivores).
Well, the primates are all social, as are many of the rodents. But raccoons
are loners, although kits hang around with Mom quite a while.
And predators do seem to be better problem-solvers in general than
herbivores. They tend to be loners also. I've had several cats who have
learned to open doors. The latch bolt on my basement door barely caught in
the mortise, and one cat, Katy, would leap and grab at the knob with both
paws, turning it only slightly, but enough to release the latch. The door
would pop open, she'd drop back, push it open wider with her paw, and
proceed to explore in the basement.
I eventually fixed that door so the knob needed a half-turn to open, and
Katy can no longer manage it. She just doesn't have good enough hands. She
still tries, though, but now, after a couple of tries, she gives up, looks
at me, and meows. I always relent and open it for her. Should have left it
alone so she could open it herself. :-)
But I still think the basic abstraction mechanism is the same. In the
"clever" animals, it embraces wider patterns, or patterns among patterns.
The bee report is interesting because it implies that mechanism can be
implemented with a very small set of neurons.
I'm inclined to regard the concept of self similarly to that of
'matter' conceived as the substrate underlying all qualities
attributed to it. As such it must itself be itself devoid of
qualities, and thus we can know nothing about it, so why even
postulate the existence of such a substrate?
Only because it may have explanatory power for some purposes. We needn't
take it too seriously.
The structure of language tends to make us think in terms of 'things'
-- i.e. to ascribe simplicity and continuity to them as though they
were forever distinct and separate from the rest of the world in which
they inhere (incidentally I think this is the basis of the word
'exist'). Whilst this is of practical utility when interacting with
"things in the world", when scrutinized some of these 'things'
disappear into the shadows.
It is more than an artifact of language, however. The language has that
structure because that conceptual picture was highly useful.
Like the word 'matter' and the word
'cause', the word 'self' is a useful linguistic device and nothing
more.
Same comment.
The problem is that the organism upon which this "virtual
machine" runs (to use Metzinger's metaphor) convinces itself that the
self is a substantial thing. There is no 'self' in control of the
organism, but the *idea* that there is contributes to the organism's
modes of behavior.
The self is as substantial a thing as "the organism upon which the virtual
machine runs." Both are concepts, and have explanatory value within their
own domains.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
07 Nov 2005 04:00:03 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
<snip>
But I still think the basic abstraction mechanism is the same. In the
"clever" animals, it embraces wider patterns, or patterns among patterns.
I think there's a tremendous leap in some animals when the capacity for the
speculative entertainment of possibilities makes its appearance, though, as
we are both at pains to acknowledge, there is no discrete transition point.
The bee report is interesting because it implies that mechanism can be
implemented with a very small set of neurons.
It's debatable as to whether the 'organism' in this case is the individual
bee or the colony (like some vast array of distributed processors all
sharing the task).
I'm inclined to regard the concept of self similarly to that of
'matter' conceived as the substrate underlying all qualities
attributed to it. As such it must itself be itself devoid of
qualities, and thus we can know nothing about it, so why even
postulate the existence of such a substrate?
Only because it may have explanatory power for some purposes.
We needn't take it too seriously.
But that's precisely what some are inclined to do -- to ascribe it some kind
of 'essence'. It is the task of philosophy to debunk such nonsense.
The structure of language tends to make us think in terms of 'things'
-- i.e. to ascribe simplicity and continuity to them as though they
were forever distinct and separate from the rest of the world in which
they inhere (incidentally I think this is the basis of the word
'exist'). Whilst this is of practical utility when interacting with
"things in the world", when scrutinized some of these 'things'
disappear into the shadows.
It is more than an artifact of language, however. The language has that
structure because that conceptual picture was highly useful.
There can be no doubt that the ability for an organism to model its
environment has utility, and that this utility is greatly extended if the
organism can insert a model of itself (the host organism) into that model of
the environment. The problem arises when the organism identifies completely
with that self-model as though it were a "simple and continued" 'thing'
separate and distinct from a world full of other 'things'. It is not a
'thing' at all but a *process*, and no process stands alone -- all processes
are inter-related in the whole 'movement'. There is no substantial 'me'
separate and distinct from the 'not-me'.
Like the word 'matter' and the word
'cause', the word 'self' is a useful linguistic device and nothing
more.
Same comment.
It is the task of philosophy to debunk such nonsense (same reply).
The problem is that the organism upon which this "virtual
machine" runs (to use Metzinger's metaphor) convinces itself that the
self is a substantial thing. There is no 'self' in control of the
organism, but the *idea* that there is contributes to the organism's
modes of behavior.
The self is as substantial a thing as "the organism upon which the virtual
machine runs." Both are concepts, and have explanatory value within their
own domains.
Precisely so -- there is only the whole 'movement'.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
08 Nov 2005 01:57:45 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:DAFbf.4033$mF5.1495@newsfe4-gui.ntli.net:
It's debatable as to whether the 'organism' in this case is the
individual bee or the colony (like some vast array of distributed
processors all sharing the task).
Not sure that would simplify things much. A distributed processing network
may require more neurons per bee for communication, signal decoding, etc.
There can be no doubt that the ability for an organism to model its
environment has utility, and that this utility is greatly extended if
the organism can insert a model of itself (the host organism) into
that model of the environment. The problem arises when the organism
identifies completely with that self-model as though it were a "simple
and continued" 'thing' separate and distinct from a world full of
other 'things'. It is not a 'thing' at all but a *process*, and no
process stands alone -- all processes are inter-related in the whole
'movement'. There is no substantial 'me' separate and distinct from
the 'not-me'.
Is that saying any more than that all things are connected?
I don't think anyone doubts that. People are sometimes tempted to attach
more significance to that fact than it warrants, however.
The self is as substantial a thing as "the organism upon which the
virtual machine runs." Both are concepts, and have explanatory value
within their own domains.
Precisely so -- there is only the whole 'movement'.
But unless you can analyze it into parts, it remains incomprehensible.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
08 Nov 2005 09:20:07 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
It's debatable as to whether the 'organism' in this case is the
individual bee or the colony (like some vast array of distributed
processors all sharing the task).
Not sure that would simplify things much. A distributed processing network
may require more neurons per bee for communication, signal decoding, etc.
Works well for man-made distributed array processing systems,
though there is the overhead to be considered as you rightly indicate.
There can be no doubt that the ability for an organism to model its
environment has utility, and that this utility is greatly extended if
the organism can insert a model of itself (the host organism) into
that model of the environment. The problem arises when the organism
identifies completely with that self-model as though it were a "simple
and continued" 'thing' separate and distinct from a world full of
other 'things'. It is not a 'thing' at all but a *process*, and no
process stands alone -- all processes are inter-related in the whole
'movement'. There is no substantial 'me' separate and distinct from
the 'not-me'.
Is that saying any more than that all things are connected?
I don't think anyone doubts that. People are sometimes tempted to attach
more significance to that fact than it warrants, however.
It puts to bed the idea that there is a substantial 'me' separate and
distinct from the 'not-me'.
The self is as substantial a thing as "the organism upon which the
virtual machine runs." Both are concepts, and have explanatory value
within their own domains.
Precisely so -- there is only the whole 'movement'.
But unless you can analyze it into parts, it remains incomprehensible.
That seems to be a bit of a tautology, if what you mean by "comprehensible"
is "analyzable into parts".
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
09 Nov 2005 12:43:58 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:Hm3cf.8153$f_5.5628@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net:
Is that saying any more than that all things are connected?
I don't think anyone doubts that. People are sometimes tempted to
attach more significance to that fact than it warrants, however.
It puts to bed the idea that there is a substantial 'me' separate and
distinct from the 'not-me'.
Isn't that distinction as "substantial" as that between any other two
things? What would it take to qualify it as "substantial"?
But unless you can analyze it into parts, it remains
incomprehensible.
That seems to be a bit of a tautology, if what you mean by
"comprehensible" is "analyzable into parts".
It is a tautology. But an illuminating one. To understand a system we have
to analyze it into parts (entities and processes) and then relate those in
ideal structures.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
09 Nov 2005 06:32:04 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Is that saying any more than that all things are connected?
I don't think anyone doubts that. People are sometimes tempted to
attach more significance to that fact than it warrants, however.
It puts to bed the idea that there is a substantial 'me' separate and
distinct from the 'not-me'.
Isn't that distinction as "substantial" as that between any other two
things? What would it take to qualify it as "substantial"?
I interpret the word 'substantial', as used in philosophy, to signify an
absence of change. In the extreme that would mean substances are 'eternal'
like Plato's Forms, but I don't subscribe to such a notion (in the case of
the 'self' this would carry over to an immortal 'soul').
But unless you can analyze it into parts, it remains
incomprehensible.
That seems to be a bit of a tautology, if what you mean by
"comprehensible" is "analyzable into parts".
It is a tautology. But an illuminating one. To understand a system we have
to analyze it into parts (entities and processes) and then relate those in
ideal structures.
That's right -- the only way the part can understand the whole is to shatter
the whole into parts and then attempt to re-constitute it from those parts.
'Understand' is an interesting word -- to stand 'under' what?
As with 'exist' (_ex istere_: to stand outside of) -- to stand 'outside'
what?
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
10 Nov 2005 02:19:54 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:8%lcf.10427$lJ.7673@newsfe5-win.ntli.net:
Isn't that distinction as "substantial" as that between any other two
things? What would it take to qualify it as "substantial"?
I interpret the word 'substantial', as used in philosophy, to signify
an absence of change. In the extreme that would mean substances are
'eternal' like Plato's Forms, but I don't subscribe to such a notion
(in the case of the 'self' this would carry over to an immortal
'soul').
What does that leave, then, other than "important" or "useful"?
That's right -- the only way the part can understand the whole is to
shatter the whole into parts and then attempt to re-constitute it from
those parts.
Reconstitute it with idealized parts which can be eternal and unchanging,
because they are concepts. They can also be manipulated deductively, and
thus made predictable.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
10 Nov 2005 11:17:22 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Isn't that distinction as "substantial" as that between any other two
things? What would it take to qualify it as "substantial"?
I interpret the word 'substantial', as used in philosophy, to signify
an absence of change. In the extreme that would mean substances are
'eternal' like Plato's Forms, but I don't subscribe to such a notion
(in the case of the 'self' this would carry over to an immortal
'soul').
What does that leave, then, other than "important" or "useful"?
Quite right -- it leaves only the ways the word is used in common speech,
and the philosophical use is, as Hume pointed out, nonsense.
That's right -- the only way the part can understand the whole is to
shatter the whole into parts and then attempt to re-constitute it from
those parts.
Reconstitute it with idealized parts which can be eternal and unchanging,
because they are concepts. They can also be manipulated deductively, and
thus made predictable.
Yes, the idealized parts can be eternal and unchanging because they are
concepts. This is the mode of processing that concepts entail -- considering
them to be 'substantial' in the nonsensical philosophical use of the word.
And yes, they can also be manipulated deductively, and thus made
predictable. Reductionism works to a degree, but has a limited domain of
applicability that eventually bites back. Eventually the ideas become
confused, as was the case with the atomic theory of matter prior to the
quantum theory. A new paradigm takes over for a while before the same thing
happens again. This is what happens when processes are regarded as 'things'.
All such paradigms are naught but simplifications having limited context.
That's all well and good to the extent that it works, but reductionism, as
an attempt to divide what is fundamentally indivisible, continually leaves
out the whole, and so will always be incomplete.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
11 Nov 2005 03:31:42 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:CgLcf.12387$wh7.8966@newsfe2-gui.ntli.net:
And yes, they can also be manipulated deductively, and thus made
predictable. Reductionism works to a degree, but has a limited domain
of applicability that eventually bites back. Eventually the ideas
become confused, as was the case with the atomic theory of matter
prior to the quantum theory. A new paradigm takes over for a while
before the same thing happens again. This is what happens when
processes are regarded as 'things'. All such paradigms are naught but
simplifications having limited context. That's all well and good to
the extent that it works, but reductionism, as an attempt to divide
what is fundamentally indivisible, continually leaves out the whole,
and so will always be incomplete.
Completeness is an unobtainable goal. We'll always have to be content with
limited explanations, I'm afraid.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
11 Nov 2005 04:58:13 PM |
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"Publius" wrote:
Completeness is an unobtainable goal. We'll always have to be content with
limited explanations, I'm afraid.
That's because explanations are characteristic of the mode of dividedness,
and that mode can do no better than to *approach* the mode of undividedness.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
12 Nov 2005 12:09:52 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:9m9df.12704$fe6.8610@newsfe2-win.ntli.net:
Completeness is an unobtainable goal. We'll always have to be content
with limited explanations, I'm afraid.
That's because explanations are characteristic of the mode of
dividedness, and that mode can do no better than to *approach* the
mode of undividedness.
What is the value of the latter mode?
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
12 Nov 2005 08:29:25 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
Completeness is an unobtainable goal. We'll always have to be content
with limited explanations, I'm afraid.
That's because explanations are characteristic of the mode of
dividedness, and that mode can do no better than to *approach* the
mode of undividedness.
What is the value of the latter mode?
Values and practical utility are characteristic of the mode of dividedness.
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| User: "Jim07D5" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
09 Nov 2005 01:48:47 AM |
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Publius <m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> said:
"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:Hm3cf.8153$f_5.5628@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net:
Is that saying any more than that all things are connected?
I don't think anyone doubts that. People are sometimes tempted to
attach more significance to that fact than it warrants, however.
It puts to bed the idea that there is a substantial 'me' separate and
distinct from the 'not-me'.
Isn't that distinction as "substantial" as that between any other two
things? What would it take to qualify it as "substantial"?
A difference in the substances involved?
--- Jim07D5
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
09 Nov 2005 01:59:51 AM |
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Jim07D5 <Jim07D5@nospam.net> wrote in
news:0ea3n11kil6h16gb0cah3d5krbdqagehtp@4ax.com:
It puts to bed the idea that there is a substantial 'me' separate and
distinct from the 'not-me'.
Isn't that distinction as "substantial" as that between any other two
things? What would it take to qualify it as "substantial"?
A difference in the substances involved?
That would beg the question. It is the existence of different substances
that he is questioning.
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| User: "Dianelos Georgoudis" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
07 Nov 2005 08:36:26 AM |
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andy-k wrote:
[snip]
I spend a lot of time with horses and I can state categorically that I've
never seen a horse figure something out. I've frequently observed classical
and operant conditioning, and indeed make use of them on a daily basis, but
I'm constantly amused by how stupid these animals are.
Just as an aside and motivated by my desire to defend these beautiful
animals: If horses are conscious in the way we are, one could suggest
that they have on average a better life experience than we have. If so,
probably horses are amused by how stupid we are.
[snip]
The problem is that saying that "no such things as selves exist in the
world," and "it depicts a possible reality as an actual reality" is a
version of the naive realism he thinks he is debunking. The conceived
reality, and the conceived selves inhabiting it, are the only realities we
know. There is no "actual reality" to which we contrast it and pronounce
it an "hallucination." At most we can contrast it with other concepts,
which, being models also, are just as much "hallucinations."
In other words, selves (and causes, for that matter) are as "real" as any
other entities and processes we construct to organize and predict
experience, such as trees and cats and the Theory of Relativity.
Needless to say I agree with Publius here. I am still thinking about
what the self is though.
I'm inclined to regard the concept of self similarly to that of 'matter'
conceived as the substrate underlying all qualities attributed to it. As
such it must itself be itself devoid of qualities, and thus we can know
nothing about it, so why even postulate the existence of such a substrate?
Because it is the deeper pattern that is found in all individual
patterns about physical existents. We know a lot about it. For example
we know that any physical existent (i.e. any existent that belongs to
"matter") will fit pretty strongly with scientific knowledge. I am not
sure if you want to call this a "quality of matter" but it certainly is
knowledge about it.
There are only collections of qualities that cohere for a period of time and
then dissolve, and no 'essences' as such -- no 'things' but only processes.
Concepts such as "essence" or "substance" are difficult to pin down.
When coming across vague concepts I find it useful to do this: I
consider the web of patterns we call knowledge about reality and try to
find how, depending on the way concept X is normally used, concept X
can be projected as a pattern (or pattern of patterns) onto this web.
This works because most people seem to construct more or less the same
web of knowledge, but then use different words to describe deeper
patterns. So I find that this is an effective trick when trying to
understand what people mean when they say X. That's what I am currently
trying to do with the concept of "self".
The structure of language tends to make us think in terms of 'things' --
i.e. to ascribe simplicity and continuity to them as though they were
forever distinct and separate from the rest of the world in which they
inhere (incidentally I think this is the basis of the word 'exist').
Well, all existents can be called things. So all experience and all
explanation of experience can be called a thing. On the other hand
existents are characterized by "simplicity and continuity" (I would
have said "stability" and "usefulness"). They are in a sense timelessly
distinct from the rest of the web of knowledge.
Whilst
this is of practical utility when interacting with "things in the world",
when scrutinized some of these 'things' disappear into the shadows. Like the
word 'matter' and the word 'cause', the word 'self' is a useful linguistic
device and nothing more.
All useful knowledge is expressed through useful linguistic devices -
which is fine and good, so I don't understand the "and nothing more"
bit. If you mean that one does not need the hypothesis of a "real
objective world" beyond our model for making sense of our experience,
then I agree.
The problem is that the organism upon which this
"virtual machine" runs (to use Metzinger's metaphor) convinces itself that
the self is a substantial thing. There is no 'self' in control of the
organism, but the *idea* that there is contributes to the organism's modes
of behavior.
The "self" clearly denotes a meta-pattern (a pattern of patterns),
namely what "connects" (or is a common quality of) all those existents
one normally organizes under the concept of oneself. Publius suggests
that what is common in these "internal stimuli", as he puts it, is that
they are perceived as pleasant or unpleasant, comfortable or
uncomfortable, rewarding or punishing - whereas external stimuli are
effectively neutral and can be perceived with detachment. I am not sure
I agree with this, because even though an unpleasant headache would
count as an internal stimulus pertaining to self, an unpleasant odor
would count as external stimulus not pertaining to self (most of the
time ;-)
Incidentally, to explain what "self" is does not depend on one's
ontology, but rather depends on one's ability to know oneself. It's not
really an issue over which people can disagree, it's only an issue
about finding out what pattern in one's web patterns is denoted by
"self". To find this is kind of difficult, because we discover the
"self" pattern long before speech or memory. To answer this kind of
questions we must try to think like a baby again: We are immersed in a
soup of stimuli, some visual, some auditory, some tactile, some
rumblings of our stomach; we find that by willing our hand to move we
see some shape moving; we find that by crawling around the perspective
of the room changes and that we can bump into a wall. Somewhere within
this soup we detect a pattern which we find especially useful and which
we much latter describe as "self". I wonder if it's anything more than
discovering the "my body" pattern.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
07 Nov 2005 12:16:27 PM |
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"Dianelos Georgoudis" wrote:
andy-k wrote:
[snip]
I spend a lot of time with horses and I can state categorically that I've
never seen a horse figure something out. I've frequently observed
classical and operant conditioning, and indeed make use of them on a
daily basis, but I'm constantly amused by how stupid these animals are.
Just as an aside and motivated by my desire to defend these beautiful
animals: If horses are conscious in the way we are, one could suggest
that they have on average a better life experience than we have. If so,
probably horses are amused by how stupid we are.
Do you have a dog Dianelos? Have you ever been amused by it's antics and
laughed out aloud "you stupid dog!"? Well that's all I meant by the word.
Horses are perfectly adapted to the environment they evolved in, and it's no
discredit to them that they aren't more like other species.
I'm inclined to regard the concept of self similarly to that of 'matter'
conceived as the substrate underlying all qualities attributed to it. As
such it must itself be itself devoid of qualities, and thus we can know
nothing about it, so why even postulate the existence of such a
substrate?
Because it is the deeper pattern that is found in all individual
patterns about physical existents. We know a lot about it. For example
we know that any physical existent (i.e. any existent that belongs to
"matter") will fit pretty strongly with scientific knowledge. I am not
sure if you want to call this a "quality of matter" but it certainly is
knowledge about it.
I see no deeper pattern attaching to the word 'matter' -- just a family
resemblance between its various uses in common speech.
There are only collections of qualities that cohere for a period of time
and then dissolve, and no 'essences' as such -- no 'things' but only
processes.
Concepts such as "essence" or "substance" are difficult to pin down.
When coming across vague concepts I find it useful to do this: I
consider the web of patterns we call knowledge about reality and try to
find how, depending on the way concept X is normally used, concept X
can be projected as a pattern (or pattern of patterns) onto this web.
This works because most people seem to construct more or less the same
web of knowledge, but then use different words to describe deeper
patterns. So I find that this is an effective trick when trying to
understand what people mean when they say X. That's what I am currently
trying to do with the concept of "self".
Regarding concepts, you may find this helpful:
http://originresearch.com/sd/sd4.cfm
The structure of language tends to make us think in terms of 'things' --
i.e. to ascribe simplicity and continuity to them as though they were
forever distinct and separate from the rest of the world in which they
inhere (incidentally I think this is the basis of the word 'exist').
Well, all existents can be called things. So all experience and all
explanation of experience can be called a thing. On the other hand
existents are characterized by "simplicity and continuity" (I would
have said "stability" and "usefulness"). They are in a sense timelessly
distinct from the rest of the web of knowledge.
I would say that is only "one side of the coin", and ignores the other side
which is the interconnectedness of everything. I would go further by saying
that the failure to consider this "other side" sustains a kind of error --
the error of fragmentation -- an error that locks experience into a stable
state wherein this fragmentation "holds office" as it were. The result is
reductionism.
Whilst this is of practical utility when interacting with "things in the
world", when scrutinized some of these 'things' disappear into the
shadows. Like the word 'matter' and the word 'cause', the word 'self' is
a useful linguistic device and nothing more.
All useful knowledge is expressed through useful linguistic devices -
which is fine and good, so I don't understand the "and nothing more"
bit. If you mean that one does not need the hypothesis of a "real
objective world" beyond our model for making sense of our experience,
then I agree.
I don't agree that "all useful knowledge is expressed through useful
linguistic devices" -- it's useful to know that when the tiger disappears
behind the rock, it hasn't ceased to exist. What I mean is that we are
hoodwinked into conceiving the world according to the way we use language.
Many linguistic boundaries confer a practical advantage, but some merely
misdirect us into erroneously conceiving problems with the world that are
really only problems with the way we use language. The word 'self' has its
everyday uses and practical advantages, but the concept is also a source of
strife (or 'unsatisfactoriness') because it is accompanied by the insatiable
sentiment "I want".
The problem is that the organism upon which this
"virtual machine" runs (to use Metzinger's metaphor) convinces itself
that the self is a substantial thing. There is no 'self' in control of
the organism, but the *idea* that there is contributes to the organism's
modes of behavior.
The "self" clearly denotes a meta-pattern (a pattern of patterns),
namely what "connects" (or is a common quality of) all those existents
one normally organizes under the concept of oneself. Publius suggests
that what is common in these "internal stimuli", as he puts it, is that
they are perceived as pleasant or unpleasant, comfortable or
uncomfortable, rewarding or punishing - whereas external stimuli are
effectively neutral and can be perceived with detachment. I am not sure
I agree with this, because even though an unpleasant headache would
count as an internal stimulus pertaining to self, an unpleasant odor
would count as external stimulus not pertaining to self (most of the
time ;-)
Incidentally, to explain what "self" is does not depend on one's
ontology, but rather depends on one's ability to know oneself. It's not
really an issue over which people can disagree, it's only an issue
about finding out what pattern in one's web patterns is denoted by
"self". To find this is kind of difficult, because we discover the
"self" pattern long before speech or memory.
*What* discovers it? I would suggest that the self concept is not the
product of reasoned enquiry, but like the capacity for language acquisition,
it has become instinctive within our species, and it emerges quite naturally
at an early age.
To answer this kind of
questions we must try to think like a baby again: We are immersed in a
soup of stimuli, some visual, some auditory, some tactile, some
rumblings of our stomach; we find that by willing our hand to move we
see some shape moving; we find that by crawling around the perspective
of the room changes and that we can bump into a wall. Somewhere within
this soup we detect a pattern which we find especially useful and which
we much latter describe as "self". I wonder if it's anything more than
discovering the "my body" pattern.
What is this 'we' that discovers all this?
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
08 Nov 2005 02:10:56 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:%RMbf.7567$lJ.3337@newsfe5-win.ntli.net:
Many linguistic boundaries confer a practical
advantage, but some merely misdirect us into erroneously conceiving
problems with the world that are really only problems with the way we
use language. The word 'self' has its everyday uses and practical
advantages, but the concept is also a source of strife (or
'unsatisfactoriness') because it is accompanied by the insatiable
sentiment "I want".
Why is it "unsatisfactory"? It is that individuation that drives evolution.
Species survive only because each individual member of the species seeks
its own survival, and seeks to mate. Species evolve and adapt only because
individuals differ (individual variations). Hence it is advantangeous, from
an evolutionary point of view, for organisms to be self-aware and to
develop self-concepts.
*What* discovers it? I would suggest that the self concept is not the
product of reasoned enquiry, but like the capacity for language
acquisition, it has become instinctive within our species, and it
emerges quite naturally at an early age.
Not only in our own species, but many others also.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
08 Nov 2005 09:19:01 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Many linguistic boundaries confer a practical
advantage, but some merely misdirect us into erroneously conceiving
problems with the world that are really only problems with the way we
use language. The word 'self' has its everyday uses and practical
advantages, but the concept is also a source of strife (or
'unsatisfactoriness') because it is accompanied by the insatiable
sentiment "I want".
Why is it "unsatisfactory"? It is that individuation that drives
evolution. Species survive only because each individual member of the
species seeks its own survival, and seeks to mate. Species evolve and
adapt only because individuals differ (individual variations). Hence it is
advantangeous, from an evolutionary point of view, for organisms to be
self-aware and to develop self-concepts.
I would make a distinction between genetically determined biological
drives such as the four 'f's (feeding, fight/flight, and reproduction), and
psychological drives grounded in the self concept. The "I want" is a
psychological drive, and is the source of unsatisfactoriness because the
'me' feels threatened by the 'not-me' and feels the need to defend itself
against it, thereby engaging in continual strife. The world isn't, never
was, and never will be just how "I want" it to be, regardless of what
changes it undergoes, and the only lasting way to alleviate the situation
in which the 'me' finds itself is to erode away the "I want".
*What* discovers it? I would suggest that the self concept is not the
product of reasoned enquiry, but like the capacity for language
acquisition, it has become instinctive within our species, and it
emerges quite naturally at an early age.
Not only in our own species, but many others also.
That all depends on how big 'many' is, but that is a tangential issue
anyway -- the species that is of real interest to me is the species that I'm
a member of.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
09 Nov 2005 12:39:29 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:Fl3cf.8145$f_5.6991@newsfe6-gui.ntli.net:
I would make a distinction between genetically determined biological
drives such as the four 'f's (feeding, fight/flight, and
reproduction), and psychological drives grounded in the self concept.
Well, they are all grounded in the self-concept, and are all psychological
(the self-concept itself is psychological). I doubt you can make that
distinction in any principled way.
The "I want" is a psychological drive, and is the source of
unsatisfactoriness because the 'me' feels threatened by the 'not-me'
and feels the need to defend itself against it, thereby engaging in
continual strife.
Isn't that a bit strong? There is occasional strife, but most of the
interactions which occur between "selves" everyday are not only peaceful,
but are mutually beneficial.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
09 Nov 2005 06:32:45 AM |
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"Publius" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
I would make a distinction between genetically determined biological
drives such as the four 'f's (feeding, fight/flight, and
reproduction), and psychological drives grounded in the self concept.
Well, they are all grounded in the self-concept, and are all psychological
(the self-concept itself is psychological). I doubt you can make that
distinction in any principled way.
I don't agree -- basic instincts are present in the most simple of
organisms, even those without a brain. Our disagreement here seems to hinge
on the difference between a percept and a concept. I'd be interested to hear
your criteria for distinguishing them.
The "I want" is a psychological drive, and is the source of
unsatisfactoriness because the 'me' feels threatened by the 'not-me'
and feels the need to defend itself against it, thereby engaging in
continual strife.
Isn't that a bit strong? There is occasional strife, but most of the
interactions which occur between "selves" everyday are not only peaceful,
but are mutually beneficial.
I was being more general than interactions between 'selves' -- I was
referring to the dynamic between the self as conceived and the rest of the
conceptual model (the 'not-self'). The world is forever presenting the self
with predicaments that the self would rather not be in ("I want" again), and
the self regards these as 'problems' (note that I'm not referring to
academic 'problems' but to the problems of daily life). The self may resolve
to rid itself of these 'problems', but the world keeps changing, and all
that happens is that the current problems get replaced by new problems. So
strife is a continual dynamic, the "human condition".
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Ontology in the Age of Science [was: Free will is of a hollow debate] |
10 Nov 2005 03:06:29 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in
news:N%lcf.10428$lJ.57@newsfe5-win.ntli.net:
I would make a distinction between genetically determined biological
drives such as the four 'f's (feeding, fight/flight, and
reproduction), and psychological drives grounded in the self
concept.
Well, they are all grounded in the self-concept, and are all
psychological (the self-concept itself is psychological). I doubt you
can make that distinction in any principled way.
I don't agree -- basic instincts are present in the most simple of
organisms, even those without a brain.
But in those with a brain, they become conceptualized into the self-
concept.
Our disagreement here seems to
hinge on the difference between a percept and a concept. I'd be
interested to hear your criteria for distinguishing them.
I use the terms "standardly" (or I hope I do so). Percepts are sense
data. Concepts are idealized models derived from patterns noted in the
sense data.
I was being more general than interactions between 'selves' -- I was
referring to the dynamic between the self as conceived and the rest of
the conceptual model (the 'not-self'). The world is forever presenting
the self with predicam | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
