| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Craig Franck" |
| Date: |
04 Dec 2005 06:03:42 PM |
| Object: |
Re: Whence Qualia? |
"andy-k" wrote
"a niece of the Oak Lady" wrote:
I wouldn't be surprised if we're stuck at appealing to large brain
structures rather narrowing it down to specific types of neurons and
their networks. The condition of blind-sight has been induced in people
with normal vision by disrupting the visual cortex briefly, indicating
that it is indeed the generator of visual sensations. IMO, qualia
aren't just the neutral qualities of sentience, they are the qualities
of existence for humans. Without them to represent both our private
*world* and the public one, there is no experience of a *world* or
ourselves.
What bothers me is the jump from considering the neural correlates of
consciousness to considering the neural *causes* of consciousness -- I
don't yet see how that jump is justified.
It's justified because disruption of the neural correlates always disrupts
consciousness.
Anesthesiologists can tell with a high degree of accuracy, as confirmed by
their patients, whether a person is conscious or not by the presence of a
particular 40 Hz brain wave:
http://brain.web-us.com/40hz/default.htm
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
04 Dec 2005 06:08:15 PM |
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"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:ytLkf.3205$Yh2.2705@trndny01...
"andy-k" wrote
"a niece of the Oak Lady" wrote:
I wouldn't be surprised if we're stuck at appealing to large brain
structures rather narrowing it down to specific types of neurons and
their networks. The condition of blind-sight has been induced in people
with normal vision by disrupting the visual cortex briefly, indicating
that it is indeed the generator of visual sensations. IMO, qualia
aren't just the neutral qualities of sentience, they are the qualities
of existence for humans. Without them to represent both our private
*world* and the public one, there is no experience of a *world* or
ourselves.
What bothers me is the jump from considering the neural correlates of
consciousness to considering the neural *causes* of consciousness -- I
don't yet see how that jump is justified.
It's justified because disruption of the neural correlates always disrupts
consciousness.
Anesthesiologists can tell with a high degree of accuracy, as confirmed by
their patients, whether a person is conscious or not by the presence of a
particular 40 Hz brain wave:
http://brain.web-us.com/40hz/default.htm
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
--
"By-passing the normal paralyzing agent"? What does this mean, exactly?
regards
Milan
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 05:44:15 PM |
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"Milan" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
"By-passing the normal paralyzing agent"? What does this mean, exactly?
IIRC, it means they put something like a blood pressure cuff on the
upper arm so you can still move your hand because the paralyzing
agent has to get into the muscles to work.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 07:06:04 PM |
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"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:jh4lf.3709$7G5.2431@trndny03...
"Milan" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
"By-passing the normal paralyzing agent"? What does this mean, exactly?
IIRC, it means they put something like a blood pressure cuff on the
upper arm so you can still move your hand because the paralyzing
agent has to get into the muscles to work.
This makes no sense. Muscle paralysis has nothing to do with anesthesia.
General anesthetics cause loss of consciousness and absence of pain. Muscle
paralysis is achieved by the administration of skeletal muscle blockers. If
the patient is anesthetized he is unconscious. I dont understand what this
has to do with the assessment of unconsciousness by the 40 Hz wave.
regards
Milan
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 07:59:20 PM |
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"Milan" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
"By-passing the normal paralyzing agent"? What does this mean, exactly?
IIRC, it means they put something like a blood pressure cuff on the
upper arm so you can still move your hand because the paralyzing
agent has to get into the muscles to work.
This makes no sense. Muscle paralysis has nothing to do with anesthesia.
General anesthetics cause loss of consciousness and absence of pain.
Muscle
paralysis is achieved by the administration of skeletal muscle blockers.
If
the patient is anesthetized he is unconscious. I dont understand what this
has to do with the assessment of unconsciousness by the 40 Hz wave.
The problem is anesthetics seems to kill short-term memory. So
someone could be paralyzed but conscious, and forget about
experiencing the surgery since anesthetics act sort of like a date-rape
drug.
So you need a paralyzed patient that can communicate if they are
conscious in real time; you can't simply ask them if they were awake
since they may not remember. That's where bypassing the paralyzing
agent comes in: they can control their hand.
So they are two different things, but being unable to communicate is the
main part of the problem. So the person monitoring the patient sees the
40Hz go away, and then tries to get a response out of the patient. If they
can't, they are truly under.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 02:03:33 AM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
What bothers me is the jump from considering the neural correlates of
consciousness to considering the neural *causes* of consciousness -- I
don't yet see how that jump is justified.
It's justified because disruption of the neural correlates always disrupts
consciousness.
Anesthesiologists can tell with a high degree of accuracy, as confirmed by
their patients, whether a person is conscious or not by the presence of a
particular 40 Hz brain wave:
http://brain.web-us.com/40hz/default.htm
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation available as
to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we can't
claim causation.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 01:42:08 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:pvSkf.16793$7p5.10805@newsfe4-win.ntli.net...
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
What bothers me is the jump from considering the neural correlates of
consciousness to considering the neural *causes* of consciousness -- I
don't yet see how that jump is justified.
It's justified because disruption of the neural correlates always
disrupts
consciousness.
Anesthesiologists can tell with a high degree of accuracy, as confirmed
by
their patients, whether a person is conscious or not by the presence of
a
particular 40 Hz brain wave:
http://brain.web-us.com/40hz/default.htm
It's also been confirmed that it's not an issue of not remembering
experiences because they can interact with the patients real-time by
bypassing the normal paralyzing agent they give them.
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation available
as
to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we
can't
claim causation.
Until a couple of decades ago there was no explanation as to how sugar
caused a sweet taste. I guess that until then we could not claim that adding
sugar to coffee caused the coffee to get sweeter. There was just a
correlation between sugar and sweetness. Fancy that.
regards
Milan
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 02:39:17 PM |
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"Milan" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation available
as to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we
can't claim causation.
Until a couple of decades ago there was no explanation as to how sugar
caused a sweet taste. I guess that until then we could not claim that
adding sugar to coffee caused the coffee to get sweeter. There was just a
correlation between sugar and sweetness. Fancy that.
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that adding sugar to coffee will
cause the coffee to taste sweeter. If your claim is correct that a mechanism
has been revealed as to how a simple carbohydrate *causes* a conscious
experience then that would put the whole issue to bed, but I suspect that
you have (or your information source has) slipped up.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 04:02:24 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:Vz1lf.8285$xP2.3131@newsfe2-gui.ntli.net...
"Milan" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation
available
as to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so
we
can't claim causation.
Until a couple of decades ago there was no explanation as to how sugar
caused a sweet taste. I guess that until then we could not claim that
adding sugar to coffee caused the coffee to get sweeter. There was just
a
correlation between sugar and sweetness. Fancy that.
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that adding sugar to coffee
will
cause the coffee to taste sweeter.
Why do you propose that adding sugar to coffee will "cause" the coffee to
taste sweeter? Why do you think that a causative link can be claimed to
exist between sugar and a sweet taste? Why do you think there is more than
just a correlation at work?
If your claim is correct that a mechanism
has been revealed as to how a simple carbohydrate *causes* a conscious
experience then that would put the whole issue to bed, but I suspect that
you have (or your information source has) slipped up.
regards
Milan
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 04:31:28 PM |
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"Milan" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
"Milan" wrote:
Until a couple of decades ago there was no explanation as to how sugar
caused a sweet taste. I guess that until then we could not claim that
adding sugar to coffee caused the coffee to get sweeter. There was just
a correlation between sugar and sweetness. Fancy that.
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that adding sugar to coffee
will cause the coffee to taste sweeter.
Why do you propose that adding sugar to coffee will "cause" the coffee to
taste sweeter? Why do you think that a causative link can be claimed to
exist between sugar and a sweet taste? Why do you think there is more than
just a correlation at work?
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that an increase in the amount of
sugar in the coffee will have the consequence that there will be an increase
in the sweetness of the coffee. What the physicalist paradigm fails to
explain is why the neural data processing that follows from the gustatory
signals is accompanied by any conscious experience at all.
Is that better?
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 05:16:31 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:4d3lf.18185$Cj5.9657@newsfe6-win.ntli.net...
"Milan" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
"Milan" wrote:
Until a couple of decades ago there was no explanation as to how
sugar
caused a sweet taste. I guess that until then we could not claim that
adding sugar to coffee caused the coffee to get sweeter. There was
just
a correlation between sugar and sweetness. Fancy that.
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that adding sugar to coffee
will cause the coffee to taste sweeter.
Why do you propose that adding sugar to coffee will "cause" the coffee
to
taste sweeter? Why do you think that a causative link can be claimed to
exist between sugar and a sweet taste? Why do you think there is more
than
just a correlation at work?
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that an increase in the amount
of
sugar in the coffee will have the consequence that there will be an
increase
in the sweetness of the coffee. What the physicalist paradigm fails to
explain is why the neural data processing that follows from the gustatory
signals is accompanied by any conscious experience at all.
Is that better?
Not a bit, I'm afraid. In a previous post you stated: "So there's a
correlation. But at present there's no explanation available as to how
neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we can't claim
causation." This implies that a mechanistic explanation is needed to claim
that there is a causative link. If such is the case you cannot claim that
"adding sugar to coffee will cause the coffee to taste sweeter." For what is
"sweetness", but the conscious experience of sweetness? So you are left with
having to claim there is simply a correlation between sugar and sweetness,
but not necessarily a causative link. A funny claim, but the only one you
can make, given your line of argument.
regards
Milan
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 06:08:15 PM |
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"Milan" wrote
"andy-k" wrote
Given the correlation between sugar (a simple carbohydrate) and a sweet
taste (a conscious experience), it follows that an increase in the amount
of
sugar in the coffee will have the consequence that there will be an
increase
in the sweetness of the coffee. What the physicalist paradigm fails to
explain is why the neural data processing that follows from the gustatory
signals is accompanied by any conscious experience at all.
Is that better?
Not a bit, I'm afraid. In a previous post you stated: "So there's a
correlation. But at present there's no explanation available as to how
neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we can't claim
causation." This implies that a mechanistic explanation is needed to claim
that there is a causative link. If such is the case you cannot claim that
"adding sugar to coffee will cause the coffee to taste sweeter." For what
is
"sweetness", but the conscious experience of sweetness? So you are left
with
having to claim there is simply a correlation between sugar and sweetness,
but not necessarily a causative link. A funny claim, but the only one you
can make, given your line of argument.
I ran into something like this in another thread: Light of a certain
frequency
causes us to perceive red. There is no question about the causation. The
question is now why are there phenomenal properties to the experience of
seeing red?
It's like you can explain heat until you need to explain consciousness of
heat.
We can only explain it by subtracting out the conscious experience. I think
andy-k means there is something more to be explained. You could say
sugar causes certain events to occur in parts of the brain associated with
taste and smell and leave it at that.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
06 Dec 2005 07:19:15 AM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"Milan" wrote
Not a bit, I'm afraid. In a previous post you stated: "So there's a
correlation. But at present there's no explanation available as to how
neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we can't
claim causation." This implies that a mechanistic explanation is needed
to
claim that there is a causative link. If such is the case you cannot
claim that "adding sugar to coffee will cause the coffee to taste
sweeter." For what is "sweetness", but the conscious experience of
sweetness? So you are left with having to claim there is simply a
correlation between sugar and sweetness, but not necessarily a causative
link. A funny claim, but the only one you can make, given your line of
argument.
Quite right. It's often difficult to avoid using words as everyone else
does, even though one understands the confusion it invites. Language is a
habit.
I ran into something like this in another thread: Light of a certain
frequency causes us to perceive red. There is no question about the
causation. The question is now why are there phenomenal properties to the
experience of seeing red?
It's like you can explain heat until you need to explain consciousness of
heat. We can only explain it by subtracting out the conscious experience.
I think andy-k means there is something more to be explained. You could
say sugar causes certain events to occur in parts of the brain associated
with taste and smell and leave it at that.
Nail on the head :-)
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
05 Dec 2005 05:56:21 PM |
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"andy-k" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
What bothers me is the jump from considering the neural correlates of
consciousness to considering the neural *causes* of consciousness -- I
don't yet see how that jump is justified.
It's justified because disruption of the neural correlates always
disrupts
consciousness.
Anesthesiologists can tell with a high degree of accuracy, as confirmed
by
their patients, whether a person is conscious or not by the presence of a
particular 40 Hz brain wave:
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation available
as
to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we
can't
claim causation.
Why not? It's a valid inference to the most likely explanation. That's like
saying because we don't know exact how cigarette smoking causes
cancer, it's not a valid claim that it does. Precise mechanisms aren't
required.
If neural data processing doesn't in some meaningful sense of the word
cause consciousness, what does? I agree consciousness may be is a
totally novel thing, but there is only so much to work with.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
06 Dec 2005 07:19:04 AM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation available
as to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we
can't claim causation.
Why not? It's a valid inference to the most likely explanation. That's
like saying because we don't know exact how cigarette smoking causes
cancer, it's not a valid claim that it does. Precise mechanisms aren't
required.
I don't think the analogy works. Cigarette smoking, cancer, and the
relationship between them demand no metaphysical investment. But to claim
that conscious experience is *caused* by neural data processing demands a
metaphysical investment in the physicalist paradigm. I don't think we're in
a position to make that jump yet, and therefore not yet in a position to
discount alternative metaphysical positions.
If neural data processing doesn't in some meaningful sense of the word
cause consciousness, what does? I agree consciousness may be is a
totally novel thing, but there is only so much to work with.
I don't know whether it's meaningful to ask what causes consciousness
-- the data of consciousness are our starting point.
.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
06 Dec 2005 01:09:02 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:cdglf.20576$Cj5.19785@newsfe6-win.ntli.net...
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation
available
as to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so
we
can't claim causation.
Why not? It's a valid inference to the most likely explanation. That's
like saying because we don't know exact how cigarette smoking causes
cancer, it's not a valid claim that it does. Precise mechanisms aren't
required.
I don't think the analogy works. Cigarette smoking, cancer, and the
relationship between them demand no metaphysical investment. But to claim
that conscious experience is *caused* by neural data processing demands a
metaphysical investment in the physicalist paradigm. I don't think we're
in
a position to make that jump yet, and therefore not yet in a position to
discount alternative metaphysical positions.
Well, I would say that the jump is to suggest that consciousness is
something "metaphysical" (whatever that might mean). Why do you think this
jump is justified?
regards
Milan
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
06 Dec 2005 06:29:21 PM |
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"andy-k" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
So there's a correlation. But at present there's no explanation
available
as to how neural data processing becomes conscious experience, and so we
can't claim causation.
Why not? It's a valid inference to the most likely explanation. That's
like saying because we don't know exact how cigarette smoking causes
cancer, it's not a valid claim that it does. Precise mechanisms aren't
required.
I don't think the analogy works. Cigarette smoking, cancer, and the
relationship between them demand no metaphysical investment. But to claim
that conscious experience is *caused* by neural data processing demands a
metaphysical investment in the physicalist paradigm.
I see the problem with the analogy in that claiming consciousness is a
physical process is a new type of extraordinary claim. However,
explaining what makes the sun shine required a revolution in physics, but
no one doubted there was a strictly physical explanation.
Also, most physicalists WRT consciousness agree there are metaphysical
issues that must be overcome; the first being the admission that we are
radically mistaken about what it is to be conscious. We can't explain
consciousness because we've populated it with things that have no
correspondence to reality.
I don't think we're in
a position to make that jump yet, and therefore not yet in a position to
discount alternative metaphysical positions.
It is possible that all matter is conscious to some degree, but the
problem with ideas like this is they are not testable even in principle.
If neural data processing doesn't in some meaningful sense of the word
cause consciousness, what does? I agree consciousness may be is a
totally novel thing, but there is only so much to work with.
I don't know whether it's meaningful to ask what causes consciousness
-- the data of consciousness are our starting point.
I think it's enormously meaningful in that we have a galaxy of
psychotropic drugs based on the physical correlates of consciousness.
And anyone interested in consciousness needs to study phenomenology;
I'm currently reading Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception."
But using that as a starting point is only helpful if you have a program to
translate experience into something other than pure experience or you are
stuck at square one. Consciousness must decompose into something
that's not conscious or you haven't really explained anything.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
07 Dec 2005 02:01:35 AM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
I don't think the analogy works. Cigarette smoking, cancer, and the
relationship between them demand no metaphysical investment. But to claim
that conscious experience is *caused* by neural data processing demands a
metaphysical investment in the physicalist paradigm.
I see the problem with the analogy in that claiming consciousness is a
physical process is a new type of extraordinary claim. However,
explaining what makes the sun shine required a revolution in physics, but
no one doubted there was a strictly physical explanation.
It would be absurd to suggest that a strictly physical explanation will
never emerge, but prior to any such event, the physicalist assumption is
nothing more than a prejudice.
Also, most physicalists WRT consciousness agree there are metaphysical
issues that must be overcome; the first being the admission that we are
radically mistaken about what it is to be conscious. We can't explain
consciousness because we've populated it with things that have no
correspondence to reality.
This section needs expanding if I'm to understand it.
I don't think we're in a position to make that jump yet, and therefore
not yet in a position to discount alternative metaphysical positions.
It is possible that all matter is conscious to some degree, but the
problem with ideas like this is they are not testable even in principle.
Neither is the idea that there is any consciousness other then that which I
am, though this is a claim that I reject in full knowledge that I'm being
prejudiced (hence my acceptance of the idea of "neural correlates of
consciousness").
I don't know whether it's meaningful to ask what causes consciousness
-- the data of consciousness are our starting point.
I think it's enormously meaningful in that we have a galaxy of
psychotropic drugs based on the physical correlates of consciousness.
I accept that there's a correlation. It may be that eating pizza *causes* a
good taste in consciousness, and it may be that a good taste in
consciousness *causes* more eating, but until a causal link is found all we
can say is that there are correlations.
And anyone interested in consciousness needs to study phenomenology;
I'm currently reading Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception."
But using that as a starting point is only helpful if you have a program
to translate experience into something other than pure experience or you
are stuck at square one.
Given that 'physical' is a category of the data of experience, there's
nothing that isn't experience -- this *is* square one. The assumption that
there's something that *isn't* experience is a metaphysical postulate.
Consciousness must decompose into something that's not conscious or you
haven't really explained anything.
And what must the "not conscious" decompose into in order to explain
anything? Explanation must end somewhere.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
07 Dec 2005 07:01:25 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:zFwlf.58$zt1.49@newsfe5-gui.ntli.net...
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
I don't think the analogy works. Cigarette smoking, cancer, and the
relationship between them demand no metaphysical investment. But to
claim
that conscious experience is *caused* by neural data processing demands
a
metaphysical investment in the physicalist paradigm.
I see the problem with the analogy in that claiming consciousness is a
physical process is a new type of extraordinary claim. However,
explaining what makes the sun shine required a revolution in physics,
but
no one doubted there was a strictly physical explanation.
It would be absurd to suggest that a strictly physical explanation will
never emerge, but prior to any such event, the physicalist assumption is
nothing more than a prejudice.
Also, most physicalists WRT consciousness agree there are metaphysical
issues that must be overcome; the first being the admission that we are
radically mistaken about what it is to be conscious. We can't explain
consciousness because we've populated it with things that have no
correspondence to reality.
This section needs expanding if I'm to understand it.
I don't think we're in a position to make that jump yet, and therefore
not yet in a position to discount alternative metaphysical positions.
It is possible that all matter is conscious to some degree, but the
problem with ideas like this is they are not testable even in principle.
Neither is the idea that there is any consciousness other then that which
I
am, though this is a claim that I reject in full knowledge that I'm being
prejudiced (hence my acceptance of the idea of "neural correlates of
consciousness").
I don't know whether it's meaningful to ask what causes consciousness
-- the data of consciousness are our starting point.
I think it's enormously meaningful in that we have a galaxy of
psychotropic drugs based on the physical correlates of consciousness.
I accept that there's a correlation. It may be that eating pizza *causes*
a
good taste in consciousness, and it may be that a good taste in
consciousness *causes* more eating, but until a causal link is found all
we
can say is that there are correlations.
And anyone interested in consciousness needs to study phenomenology;
I'm currently reading Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception."
But using that as a starting point is only helpful if you have a program
to translate experience into something other than pure experience or you
are stuck at square one.
Given that 'physical' is a category of the data of experience, there's
nothing that isn't experience -- this *is* square one. The assumption that
there's something that *isn't* experience is a metaphysical postulate.
Consciousness must decompose into something that's not conscious or you
haven't really explained anything.
And what must the "not conscious" decompose into in order to explain
anything? Explanation must end somewhere.
Explanation must end somewhere, but it shouldnt end too early. The
following is a paragraph from Weinberg's essay, Reductionism Redux, which I
think is fitting here:
"When Edelman says that a person cannot be reduced to molecular
interactions, is he saying anything different (except in degree) than a
botanist or a meteorologist who says that a rose or a thunderstorm cannot be
reduced to molecular interactions? It may or may not be silly to pursue
reductionist programs of research on complicated systems that are strongly
conditioned by history, like brains or roses or thunderstorms. What is never
silly is the perspective, provided by reductionism, that apart from
historical accidents these things ultimately are the way they are because of
the fundamental principles of physics."
regards
Milan
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| User: "Sleepyhead" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
08 Dec 2005 10:28:37 AM |
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It all rather depends on the meaning you give to the word 'person' in
the phrase "When Edelman says that a person cannot be reduced to
molecular interactions".
If what you mean is something like: Humans have bodies, human's bodies
are physical entities, and therefore a human's body can be analysed
using standard physical analyses" then I would agree with you. (There
might be other sorts of thoughts going along with this - things like
"If you damage someone's brain you alter their personality, so to some
extent one's personality depends upon one's brain"). I would say these
are relatively uncontroversial claims.
Where we get controversy is when someone interprets 'person' along the
lines of "Who I am". Thus "Who someone is" cannot be reduced to
molecular interactions. And this is true, but only because the role of
the phrase "Who someone is" is different from the role of the phrase
"molecular interaction"; we play different language-games with "Who
someone is" than we do with "molecular interaction". We might say some
has a great personality and that this is what makes them what they are,
whereas this statement makes no sense (currently has no place in our
language-game) if you apply it to molecules.
So yeah - in one sense a person cannot be reduced to molecules, and in
another they can.
Clear?
.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
07 Dec 2005 06:41:24 PM |
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"andy-k" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote:
I see the problem with the analogy in that claiming consciousness is a
physical process is a new type of extraordinary claim. However,
explaining what makes the sun shine required a revolution in physics, but
no one doubted there was a strictly physical explanation.
It would be absurd to suggest that a strictly physical explanation will
never emerge, but prior to any such event, the physicalist assumption is
nothing more than a prejudice.
I don't see this as a prejudice. It's like the thread in another group on
the status of "supernatural events." I'm not claiming naturalism as a
prejudice, I'm claiming the concept of a "super"-natural event is logically
incoherent.
I'm claiming consciousness requires a strictly physical explanation
because any other kind is a non-explanation. If you want to know how
the hardware works, you need to leave software concepts behind. "Line
345 of mouse.c had an extra semicolon in an if-statement" is not a strictly
physical explanation; it's a computer language explanation.
Also, most physicalists WRT consciousness agree there are metaphysical
issues that must be overcome; the first being the admission that we are
radically mistaken about what it is to be conscious. We can't explain
consciousness because we've populated it with things that have no
correspondence to reality.
This section needs expanding if I'm to understand it.
Dennett makes a big deal about this. There is nothing magical, ineffable, or
even necessarily private about qualia. We can't explain qualia physically
because qualia don't exist.
So a pattern of neurons in the visual cortex is not correlated with sense
experience: it *is* sense experience. Qualia are just tags to represent
experiences to ourselves. What trips us up is we don't experience
consciousness, but rather we experience an opaque representation of
consciousness that we see the world through.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/
I don't think we're in a position to make that jump yet, and therefore
not yet in a position to discount alternative metaphysical positions.
It is possible that all matter is conscious to some degree, but the
problem with ideas like this is they are not testable even in principle.
Neither is the idea that there is any consciousness other then that which
I
am, though this is a claim that I reject in full knowledge that I'm being
prejudiced (hence my acceptance of the idea of "neural correlates of
consciousness").
You can infer others are conscious because they act like you do and
you're conscious. It's not clear that I can infer a rock is conscious
because I am.
I don't know whether it's meaningful to ask what causes consciousness
-- the data of consciousness are our starting point.
I think it's enormously meaningful in that we have a galaxy of
psychotropic drugs based on the physical correlates of consciousness.
I accept that there's a correlation. It may be that eating pizza *causes*
a
good taste in consciousness, and it may be that a good taste in
consciousness *causes* more eating, but until a causal link is found all
we
can say is that there are correlations.
I suspect a robust enough correlation could qualify as causation. In
fact, I'd be willing to concede we might never get beyond correlation
because consciousness is a just brain seen from the inside out.
And anyone interested in consciousness needs to study phenomenology;
I'm currently reading Merleau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception."
But using that as a starting point is only helpful if you have a program
to translate experience into something other than pure experience or you
are stuck at square one.
Given that 'physical' is a category of the data of experience, there's
nothing that isn't experience -- this *is* square one. The assumption that
there's something that *isn't* experience is a metaphysical postulate.
I can't agree with that. The big bang obviously happened even though
there was no one around to experience it. Causal chains of events
independent of experience is central to a rational explanation of the
world.
Consciousness must decompose into something that's not conscious or you
haven't really explained anything.
And what must the "not conscious" decompose into in order to explain
anything? Explanation must end somewhere.
It decomposes into agents like Minsky described in his "Society
of Mind." They decompose into neural structures.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
08 Dec 2005 08:02:48 AM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
It would be absurd to suggest that a strictly physical explanation will
never emerge, but prior to any such event, the physicalist assumption is
nothing more than a prejudice.
I don't see this as a prejudice. It's like the thread in another group on
the status of "supernatural events." I'm not claiming naturalism as a
prejudice, I'm claiming the concept of a "super"-natural event is
logically incoherent.
I'm claiming consciousness requires a strictly physical explanation
because any other kind is a non-explanation. If you want to know how
the hardware works, you need to leave software concepts behind. "Line
345 of mouse.c had an extra semicolon in an if-statement" is not a
strictly physical explanation; it's a computer language explanation.
The data of consciousness is a brute fact -- there's nothing more
fundamental than that. The idea that there is anything beyond the data of
consciousness is a postulate, and one that I accept. The idea that this
'beyond' is non-conscious, along with the idea that this 'beyond' is just
more consciousness, are both metaphysical postulates, and either can be
recruited to account for the data of consciousness. Why is the "conscious
beyond" logically incoherent whilst the "non-conscious beyond" is logically
coherent?
Dennett makes a big deal about this.
Well you have the advantage over me there Simon -- I don't understand
Dennett. In fact eliminative materialism is a complete enigma to me.
There is nothing magical, ineffable, or even necessarily private about
qualia. We can't explain qualia physically because qualia don't exist.
The *word* 'qualia' exists, and it has a readily understandable use.
So a pattern of neurons in the visual cortex is not correlated with sense
experience: it *is* sense experience.
Now you've lost me. Eliminative materialism is a complete enigma to me.
Qualia are just tags to represent experiences to ourselves.
"Qualia are just tags to represent experiences" *to what*? There's nothing
*but* experiences.
What trips us up is we don't experience consciousness,
I agree that there is no *experience of* consciousness except as an idea,
a conceived attribute that is conferred upon some objects in the data of
consciousness, and by extension upon the concept of self too.
but rather we experience an opaque representation of consciousness that we
see the world through.
Can't make much sense of this statement.
It is possible that all matter is conscious to some degree, but the
problem with ideas like this is they are not testable even in principle.
Neither is the idea that there is any consciousness other then that which
I am, though this is a claim that I reject in full knowledge that I'm
being prejudiced (hence my acceptance of the idea of "neural correlates
of consciousness").
You can infer others are conscious because they act like you do and
you're conscious. It's not clear that I can infer a rock is conscious
because I am.
You can infer that others have *cognition* because they act like you do and
you have cognition, but behavior doesn't enable you to draw inferences about
conscious experience.
I don't know whether it's meaningful to ask what causes consciousness
-- the data of consciousness are our starting point.
I think it's enormously meaningful in that we have a galaxy of
psychotropic drugs based on the physical correlates of consciousness.
I accept that there's a correlation. It may be that eating pizza *causes*
a good taste in consciousness, and it may be that a good taste in
consciousness *causes* more eating, but until a causal link is found all
we can say is that there are correlations.
I suspect a robust enough correlation could qualify as causation.
In fact, I'd be willing to concede we might never get beyond correlation
because consciousness is a just brain seen from the inside out.
As long as explanation is lacking, correlation will never be synonymous with
causation.
Given that 'physical' is a category of the data of experience, there's
nothing that isn't experience -- this *is* square one. The assumption
that there's something that *isn't* experience is a metaphysical
postulate.
I can't agree with that. The big bang obviously happened even though
there was no one around to experience it. Causal chains of events
independent of experience is central to a rational explanation of the
world.
All we can justifiably say is that the data of experience are consistent
with the Big Bang theory.
Consciousness must decompose into something that's not conscious or you
haven't really explained anything.
And what must the "not conscious" decompose into in order to explain
anything? Explanation must end somewhere.
It decomposes into agents like Minsky described in his "Society
of Mind." They decompose into neural structures.
If one is not happy to let explanation end at conscious experience then one
is free to postulate that there is something other than conscious experience
(call it 'matter' if you will), something that is more fundamental than
conscious experience and that somehow explains conscious experience and the
inhomogeneities that arise within it. But in the absence of that explanation
all that one has done is to add an entity ('matter') and arrive at the same
absence of explanation. Eliminative materialism is not an explanation so
much as simplification by denial of the obvious.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
08 Dec 2005 02:35:24 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:c2Xlf.2488$va6.1680@newsfe3-win.ntli.net...
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
So a pattern of neurons in the visual cortex is not correlated with
sense
experience: it *is* sense experience.
Now you've lost me. Eliminative materialism is a complete enigma to me.
Eliminative materialism is actually very simple to understand. Let me give
you a couple of examples to illustrate the point. Many people say that the
electrical current in a wire is caused by moving electrons; but it is not:
the electrical current *is* moving electrons. Some people say that heat is
caused by the kinetic energy of molecules; but it is not: heat *is*
molecular kinetic energy.
The statements that heat is *caused* by moving molecules or that an
electrical current is caused by electrons reflects the intuitive -though
mistaken- view that heat and currents are just what they are, and not
another thing.
Now, moving to the issue at hand, it seems obvious that explanatory power,
coherence and economy lead to the hypothesis that consciousness is not
caused by neuronal activity, but that it *is* some pattern of neuronal
activity.
regards
Milan
.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
08 Dec 2005 04:10:34 PM |
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"Milan" wrote:
Eliminative materialism is actually very simple to understand. Let me give
you a couple of examples to illustrate the point. Many people say that
the electrical current in a wire is caused by moving electrons; but it is
not: the electrical current *is* moving electrons. Some people say that
heat is caused by the kinetic energy of molecules; but it is not: heat
*is* molecular kinetic energy.
The statements that heat is *caused* by moving molecules or that an
electrical current is caused by electrons reflects the intuitive -though
mistaken- view that heat and currents are just what they are, and not
another thing.
Now, moving to the issue at hand, it seems obvious that explanatory power,
coherence and economy lead to the hypothesis that consciousness is not
caused by neuronal activity, but that it *is* some pattern of neuronal
activity.
Electrical current and electron flow are different ways of describing the
same thing. Heat and the kinetic energy of molecules/atoms are different
ways of describing the same thing. It's wrong to claim causation in these
cases, and it's even wrong to claim correlation. Consciousness and neuronal
activity are *not* different ways of describing the same thing. It's right
to claim correlation in this case. Claiming that two genuinely correlated
aspects are the same thing is a false move. It may be economical, but it's
not obvious, it offers no explanatory power, and it is incoherent. Economy
must not be purchased at the expense of integrity.
.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
08 Dec 2005 09:27:20 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:ub2mf.24117$a15.23941@newsfe5-win.ntli.net...
"Milan" wrote:
Eliminative materialism is actually very simple to understand. Let me
give
you a couple of examples to illustrate the point. Many people say that
the electrical current in a wire is caused by moving electrons; but it
is
not: the electrical current *is* moving electrons. Some people say that
heat is caused by the kinetic energy of molecules; but it is not: heat
*is* molecular kinetic energy.
The statements that heat is *caused* by moving molecules or that an
electrical current is caused by electrons reflects the intuitive -though
mistaken- view that heat and currents are just what they are, and not
another thing.
Now, moving to the issue at hand, it seems obvious that explanatory
power,
coherence and economy lead to the hypothesis that consciousness is not
caused by neuronal activity, but that it *is* some pattern of neuronal
activity.
Electrical current and electron flow are different ways of describing the
same thing. Heat and the kinetic energy of molecules/atoms are different
ways of describing the same thing. It's wrong to claim causation in these
cases, and it's even wrong to claim correlation.
We know now that they are the same thing. It wasnt so in the past.
Consciousness and neuronal
activity are *not* different ways of describing the same thing.
In your opinion.
It's right
to claim correlation in this case. Claiming that two genuinely correlated
aspects are the same thing is a false move.
If they are not the same thing.
It may be economical, but it's
not obvious, it offers no explanatory power, and it is incoherent. Economy
must not be purchased at the expense of integrity.
If you wish to keep dualism at arm's length and claim that consciousness is
"caused" or "correlated" with neuronal activity, by all means please
yourself, but there is no doubt that the eliminativist view is indeed
coherent, economical and offers much more explanatory power than your view
(as illustrated by the examples of heat and current). By the way, have you
understood what eliminativist materialism is now?
.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
09 Dec 2005 01:19:51 AM |
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"Milan" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Electrical current and electron flow are different ways of describing the
same thing. Heat and the kinetic energy of molecules/atoms are different
ways of describing the same thing. It's wrong to claim causation in these
cases, and it's even wrong to claim correlation.
We know now that they are the same thing. It wasnt so in the past.
If ever the day arrives when we *know* that neural activity and
consciousness are the same thing then it will be wrong to claim causation,
and even wrong to claim correlation.
Consciousness and neuronal activity are *not* different ways of
describing the same thing.
In your opinion.
My opinion is that we shouldn't jump the gun.
It's right to claim correlation in this case. Claiming that two genuinely
correlated aspects are the same thing is a false move.
If they are not the same thing.
So we must await confirmation of your hypothesis before we can claim
anything more than correlation.
It may be economical, but it's not obvious, it offers no explanatory
power, and it is incoherent. Economy must not be purchased at the expense
of integrity.
If you wish to keep dualism at arm's length and claim that consciousness
is "caused" or "correlated" with neuronal activity, by all means please
yourself, but there is no doubt that the eliminativist view is indeed
coherent, economical and offers much more explanatory power than your view
(as illustrated by the examples of heat and current). By the way, have you
understood what eliminativist materialism is now?
Yes -- eliminative materialism is simplification by denial of the obvious.
.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
09 Dec 2005 02:15:45 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:reamf.25940$7p5.12336@newsfe4-win.ntli.net...
"Milan" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote:
Electrical current and electron flow are different ways of describing
the
same thing. Heat and the kinetic energy of molecules/atoms are
different
ways of describing the same thing. It's wrong to claim causation in
these
cases, and it's even wrong to claim correlation.
We know now that they are the same thing. It wasnt so in the past.
If ever the day arrives when we *know* that neural activity and
consciousness are the same thing then it will be wrong to claim causation,
and even wrong to claim correlation.
And if the day arrives when we establish that consciousness is not a certain
pattern of neural activity, then the hypothesis that they are the same thing
will have been shown to be wrong. However, explanatory power, coherence and
economy favour the hypothesis that awareness is indeed some pattern of
neural activity.
Consciousness and neuronal activity are *not* different ways of
describing the same thing.
In your opinion.
My opinion is that we shouldn't jump the gun.
It is not jumping the gun -it is simply an inference to the most obvious
explanation; it is the way science works.
It's right to claim correlation in this case. Claiming that two
genuinely
correlated aspects are the same thing is a false move.
If they are not the same thing.
So we must await confirmation of your hypothesis before we can claim
anything more than correlation.
Things that seem obvious to us now were surprising news less than a
generation ago. If we persevere in looking at things highlighting the
mysterious aspects of phenomena, solutions may appear impossible (and
perhaps even unwanted to many). On the understanding side, however,
solutions seem almost obvious and hard to miss. Progress can only be
achieved by shifting the status of questions from Mysteries to problems we
can solve. This is the way science works.
It may be economical, but it's not obvious, it offers no explanatory
power, and it is incoherent. Economy must not be purchased at the
expense
of integrity.
If you wish to keep dualism at arm's length and claim that consciousness
is "caused" or "correlated" with neuronal activity, by all means please
yourself, but there is no doubt that the eliminativist view is indeed
coherent, economical and offers much more explanatory power than your
view
(as illustrated by the examples of heat and current). By the way, have
you
understood what eliminativist materialism is now?
Yes -- eliminative materialism is simplification by denial of the obvious.
You are being absurd. Eliminative materialism doesnt deny anything -it
simply attempts to identify folk psychology terms with basic molecular and
cellular processes. This is what we call understanding.
regards
Milan
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
09 Dec 2005 06:02:05 PM |
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"Milan" <mtklima@yahoo.com> wrote in
news:3vu76uF17thjjU2@individual.net:
Yes -- eliminative materialism is simplification by denial of the
obvious.
You are being absurd. Eliminative materialism doesnt deny anything -it
simply attempts to identify folk psychology terms with basic molecular
and cellular processes. This is what we call understanding.
There is a promising avenue of approach to these issues, namely, the
notion of emergent phenomena. In general, patterns and structures may
emerge in a complex substrate which are not predictable from, nor
reducible to, the underlying "laws of motion" governing the substrate.
The obvious example is organic evolution. The laws of chemistry and
physics permit matter to become organized in various ways. If they become
organized in *certain* ways, however, adaptive, self-replicating
molecules may appear. Those give rise to a whole realm of phenomena with
its own set of laws, e.g., the laws of genetics and ecosystems, which are
quite independent of those governing the substrate. The appearance of
elephants or humans on Earth is not predictable, even in principle, from
the laws of chemistry.
Hence it may be possible to create ecosystems based on silicon nanobots,
or even abstract data structures in a computer ---entirely different
substrates, but behaving in perfect accordance with biological laws.
Those kinds of phenomena underly the current interest in "information
physics" --- the basic ontological unit is the "bit," and if bits become
organized in certain structures, they behave according laws intrinsic to
that structure, or the family of structures to which they belong,
regardless of the medium which carries that information.
From this perspective, consciousness is something quite distinct from the
neurological substrate which is its only known source at present. It may
exist --- or it may be possible to create it --- using radically
different means.
My own hypothesis (perhaps "prejudice" is a better word) is that
consciousness is a phenomena quite distinct from the neurological
processes which give rise to it, just as the signal broadcast from a
radio transmitter is quite distinct, and completely unpredictable from,
the circuit design of that transmitter. The transmitter is required to
generate the signal, but when one tunes in that station, one can deduce
nothing about the circuitry of that transmitter. Nor can one deduce a
thing about the 9th Symphony one is hearing on the radio by examining the
circuit diagram.
Consciousness may be similar. The brain generates an incredibly complex
electromagnetic field which is constantly modulated by control signals
received from the environment. That dynamic field organizes itself into
stable data structures which model both the environment and itself in
relation to that environment. Conscious phenomena are likely not
reducible to any particular subset of neurons or discrete patterns of
discharges; they merely generate the "carrier wave" --- the base
structure of the field. All the phenomena of consciousness appear when
environmental signals begin interacting with that base field.
This approach, I think, accounts both for the conceptual independence of
consciousness from physical processes, and the causal connection between
them.
.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
09 Dec 2005 07:22:57 PM |
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"Publius" <m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
news:AdSdnQzjWo9ghwfeRVn-tQ@comcast.com...
"Milan" <mtklima@yahoo.com> wrote in
news:3vu76uF17thjjU2@individual.net:
Yes -- eliminative materialism is simplification by denial of the
obvious.
You are being absurd. Eliminative materialism doesnt deny anything -it
simply attempts to identify folk psychology terms with basic molecular
and cellular processes. This is what we call understanding.
There is a promising avenue of approach to these issues, namely, the
notion of emergent phenomena. In general, patterns and structures may
emerge in a complex substrate which are not predictable from, nor
reducible to, the underlying "laws of motion" governing the substrate.
The obvious example is organic evolution. The laws of chemistry and
physics permit matter to become organized in various ways. If they become
organized in *certain* ways, however, adaptive, self-replicating
molecules may appear. Those give rise to a whole realm of phenomena with
its own set of laws, e.g., the laws of genetics and ecosystems, which are
quite independent of those governing the substrate. The appearance of
elephants or humans on Earth is not predictable, even in principle, from
the laws of chemistry.
Hence it may be possible to create ecosystems based on silicon nanobots,
or even abstract data structures in a computer ---entirely different
substrates, but behaving in perfect accordance with biological laws.
Those kinds of phenomena underly the current interest in "information
physics" --- the basic ontological unit is the "bit," and if bits become
organized in certain structures, they behave according laws intrinsic to
that structure, or the family of structures to which they belong,
regardless of the medium which carries that information.
From this perspective, consciousness is something quite distinct from the
neurological substrate which is its only known source at present. It may
exist --- or it may be possible to create it --- using radically
different means.
My own hypothesis (perhaps "prejudice" is a better word) is that
consciousness is a phenomena quite distinct from the neurological
processes which give rise to it, just as the signal broadcast from a
radio transmitter is quite distinct, and completely unpredictable from,
the circuit design of that transmitter. The transmitter is required to
generate the signal, but when one tunes in that station, one can deduce
nothing about the circuitry of that transmitter. Nor can one deduce a
thing about the 9th Symphony one is hearing on the radio by examining the
circuit diagram.
Of course. Nor can we know the contents of a phone conversation by
analyzing the circuits inside the phone. The transmitter is just that -a
transmitter -it doesnt generate the contents of the transmission. Your
analogy is fallacious -at best.
Consciousness may be similar. The brain generates an incredibly complex
electromagnetic field which is constantly modulated by control signals
received from the environment. That dynamic field organizes itself into
stable data structures which model both the environment and itself in
relation to that environment. Conscious phenomena are likely not
reducible to any particular subset of neurons or discrete patterns of
discharges; they merely generate the "carrier wave" --- the base
structure of the field. All the phenomena of consciousness appear when
environmental signals begin interacting with that base field.
The neurons are the generators of the signals. They are not simply the
transmitters. Whatever pattern is there is generated by the neurons.
Whatever "stable data structures" (whatever this might mean) develop are a
consequence of the neural activity.
This approach, I think, accounts both for the conceptual independence of
consciousness from physical processes, and the causal connection between
them.
The "conceptual independence of consciousness from physical processes"? You
got me there.
regards
Milan
.
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| User: "Publius" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
10 Dec 2005 02:22:12 AM |
|
|
"Milan" <mtklima@yahoo.com> wrote in
news:3vup6vF17qsvfU1@individual.net:
My own hypothesis (perhaps "prejudice" is a better word) is that
consciousness is a phenomena quite distinct from the neurological
processes which give rise to it, just as the signal broadcast from a
radio transmitter is quite distinct, and completely unpredictable
from, the circuit design of that transmitter. The transmitter is
required to generate the signal, but when one tunes in that station,
one can deduce nothing about the circuitry of that transmitter. Nor
can one deduce a thing about the 9th Symphony one is hearing on the
radio by examining the circuit diagram.
Of course. Nor can we know the contents of a phone conversation by
analyzing the circuits inside the phone. The transmitter is just that
-a transmitter -it doesnt generate the contents of the transmission.
Your analogy is fallacious -at best.
The radio station is a transducer and transmitter. It transforms
microscopic pits on a CD into a complex waveform overlaid upon the
underlying carrier. The various physical signals impinging on the nervous
system --- photons, chemical molecules, minute pressure changes in ther
atmosphere --- are the pits. They are transduced by the nervous system
into complex waveform generated by the interaction of that signal data
with underlying base waveforms produced by the "hardware." The resulting
signal, while dependent upon both the carrier and the signal data, is
identical with neither.
The neurons are the generators of the signals. They are not simply the
transmitters. Whatever pattern is there is generated by the neurons.
Some neurons are *transducers*. They don't generate signal data *ex
nihilo*. The shape of the waveforms generated represent, or model, a
dynamic external data stream.
Whatever "stable data structures" (whatever this might mean) develop
are a consequence of the neural activity.
A data structure is a pattern of bits, arrayed in a suitably defined
space, which can be expressed with an algorithm and instantiated in some
medium or system.
This approach, I think, accounts both for the conceptual independence
of consciousness from physical processes, and the causal connection
between them.
The "conceptual independence of consciousness from physical
processes"? You got me there.
"Consciousness" embraces such concepts as interests, goals, feelings,
impressions, memories, preferences, moods, etc. --- not to mention
"qualia." It is very difficult to explain how such things might arise
from the biochemical or electrochemical properties of brain cells, or
even to correlate them with any discrete cells, groups of cells, or
states of cells.
It is not enough to show that brains are required for consciousness to be
manifested. It is a given that the brain must be "up and running" for
consciousness to appear. But to make the reductionist case, you have to
show that my memory of my grandfather, or my fondness for oysters, or the
qualia representing lime green to me is embodied in certain cells or
groups or states of certain cells. You have to be able to specifically
alter those cells and selectively extinguish that memory (but not the
memory of my grandmother, or my grandfather's house), or induce a false
but equally vivid and convincing memory by specifically altering certain
cells. Or alter other cells so that I no longer perceive lime green, but
have no trouble with any other color qualia.
I suspect that program cannot be carried out --- because all of those
"mental" phenomena are data patterns which are more or less independent
of any particular cells. The complex data structure that appears when the
brain is "up and running" has a life of its own, so to speak. The cells
and their firing patterns which may give rise to a certain qualia at one
moment may not represent it in the next moment. Moreover, patterns may
persist in the field even when the generating cells cease firing, because
of capacitance effects. And signal patterns in the field may induce
effects in other cells, which then propagate new qualia, or elicit latent
patterns --- memories --- which may be instantiated by a firing pattern
among any subset of some huge set of neurons.
In other words, viewing consciousness as a data structure which can be
manifested in various physical systems allows escape from some the
embarassments of reductionism.
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| User: "Milan" |
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| Title: Re: Whence Qualia? |
10 Dec 2005 07:00:21 AM |
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"Publius" <m.publius@nospam.comcast.net> wrote in message
news:sbmdnYyZr8OpDQfenZ2dnUVZ_tidnZ2d@comcast.com...
"Milan" <mtklima@yahoo.com> wrote in
news:3vup6vF17qsvfU1@individual.net:
My own hypothesis (perhaps "prejudice" is a better word) is that
consciousness is a phenomena quite distinct from the neurological
processes which give rise to it, just as the signal broadcast from a
radio transmitter is quite distinct, and completely unpredictable
from, the circuit design of that transmitter. The transmitter is
required to generate the signal, but when one tunes in that station,
one can deduce nothing about the circuitry of that transmitter. Nor
can one deduce a thing about the 9th Symphony one is hearing on the
radio by examining the circuit diagram.
Of course. Nor can we know the contents of a phone conversation by
analyzing the circuits inside the phone. The transmitter is just that
-a transmitter -it doesnt generate the contents of the transmission.
Your analogy is fallacious -at best.
The radio station is a transducer and transmitter. It transforms
microscopic pits on a CD into a complex waveform overlaid upon the
underlying carrier. The various physical signals impinging on the nervous
system --- photons, chemical molecules, minute pressure changes in ther
atmosphere --- are the pits. They are transduced by the nervous system
into complex waveform generated by the interaction of that signal data
with underlying base waveforms produced by the "hardware." The resulting
signal, while dependent upon both the carrier and the signal data, is
identical with neither.
The nervous system has a *tonic* basal activity. The radio transmitter
doesnt. Think about it. Your analogy is not an analogy.
The neurons are the generators of the signals. They are not simply the
transmitters. Whatever pattern is there is generated by the neurons.
Some neurons are *transducers*. They don't generate signal data *ex
nihilo*. The shape of the waveforms generated represent, or model, a
dynamic external data stream.
Some neurons may be transducers. But a lot of neurons generate their own
signals.
Whatever "stable data structures" (whatever this might mean) develop
are a consequence of the neural activity.
A data structure is a pattern of bits, arrayed in a suitably defined
space, which can be expressed with an algorithm and instantiated in some
medium or system.
This approach, I think, accounts both for the conceptual independence
of consciousness from physical processes, and the causal connection
between them.
The "conceptual independence of consciousness from physical
processes"? You got me there.
"Consciousness" embraces such concepts as interests, goals, feelings,
impressions, memories, preferences, moods, etc. --- not to mention
"qualia." It is very difficult to explain how such things might arise
from the biochemical or electrochemical properties of brain cells, or
even to correlate them with any discrete cells, groups of cells, or
states of cells.
It is difficult indeed, but they must be generated by neurons, dont you
think? What other candidate is there?
It is not enough to show that brains are required for consciousness to be
manifested. It is a given that the brain must be "up and running" for
consciousness to appear. But to make the reductionist case, you have to
show that my memory of my grandfather, or my fondness for oysters, or the
qualia representing lime green to me is embodied in certain cells or
groups or states of certain cells. You have to be able to specifically
alter those cells and selectively extinguish that memory (but not the
memory of my grandmother, or my grandfather's house), or induce a false
but equally vivid and convincing memory by specifically altering certain
cells. Or alter other cells so that I no longer perceive lime green, but
have no trouble with any other color qualia.
I dont think that so much detail is necessary to substantiate a valid
hypothesis. We dont know exactly which neurons are involved in all the types
and subtypes of epileptic fits, or schizophrenia, we don't know exactly why
neurons behave in this way, we dont know all the signal transduction
mechanisms involved, we dont know the genes which are deficient, etc etc,
but this doesnt make us think that epilepsy or schizophrenia are anything
more than some malfunctioning of a group of neurons.
I suspect that program cannot be carried out --- because all of those
"mental" phenomena are data patterns which are more or less independent
of any particular cells. The complex data structure that appears when the
brain is "up and running" has a life of its own, so to speak. The cells
and their firing patterns which may give rise to a certain qualia at one
moment may not represent it in the next moment. Moreover, patterns may
persist in the field even when the generating cells cease firing, because
of capacitance effects. And signal patterns in the field may induce
effects in other cells, which then propagate new qualia, or elicit latent
patterns --- memories --- which may be instantiated by a firing pattern
among any subset of some huge set of neurons.
In other words, viewing consciousness as a data structure which can be
manifested in various physical systems allows escape from some the
embarassments of reductionism.
LOL. You obviously prefer the wonders of mysterianism to the understanding
that reductionism provides. Reductionism so far has been successful in each
and every issue it has tackled. I guess some people prefer to keep some
things mysterious so they can remain in Awe at the Great Mysteries of
Existence. It is a natural and understandable feeling, I guess. But it
doesnt give you understanding. It just gives you Awe. If you want Awe, and
not understanding, it is fine.
regards
Milan
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