| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"andy-k" |
| Date: |
13 Sep 2006 08:53:55 AM |
| Object: |
Reason and its Limitation |
The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
All speculation is conceptual and therefore part of that framework.
It has been demonstrated that all concepts within the framework have only
a conventional existence and no inherent existence (terms already defined).
Concepts have meaning only by virtue of their embeddedness within the
conceptual framework -- i.e. any particular concept gains support from,
and lends support to, all other concepts. The postulation of a substrate
that grounds the framework is not necessary, not useful, and not coherent.
Reason, as the word is being used here, is a process that operates
on seemingly disparate parts of the framework to yield a more
encompassing view that unites those parts -- this is what I will call
"explanation". Explanation enables prediction, and correct prediction
engenders confidence in the explanation -- this is the closed-loop
that is at the heart of the Baconian model of science.
But note that this process operates on *parts of the framework*.
Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
(the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
and of internal and external.
Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
(i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
just another "thing" in a world full of things.
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| User: "gibbs" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
13 Sep 2006 10:44:31 AM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:T3UNg.1104$2g5.161@newsfe7-win.ntli.net...
Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
(i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
just another "thing" in a world full of things.
It sounds to me like you've talked yourself into a hole that you can't climb
out.
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| User: "Bill Snyder" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
13 Sep 2006 04:27:50 PM |
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"andy-k" <spam.free@last> wrote in message
news:T3UNg.1104$2g5.161@newsfe7-win.ntli.net...
The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
All speculation is conceptual and therefore part of that framework.
It has been demonstrated that all concepts within the framework have only
a conventional existence and no inherent existence (terms already
defined).
Concepts have meaning only by virtue of their embeddedness within the
conceptual framework -- i.e. any particular concept gains support from,
and lends support to, all other concepts. The postulation of a substrate
that grounds the framework is not necessary, not useful, and not coherent.
Reason, as the word is being used here, is a process that operates
on seemingly disparate parts of the framework to yield a more
encompassing view that unites those parts -- this is what I will call
"explanation". Explanation enables prediction, and correct prediction
engenders confidence in the explanation -- this is the closed-loop
that is at the heart of the Baconian model of science.
But note that this process operates on *parts of the framework*.
Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
(the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the
decisive
step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and
end,
and of internal and external.
Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
(i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
just another "thing" in a world full of things.
I have no problem with what you say above; it is what you do not say. If
THE "conceptual framework is not to be treated as just another "thing" in a
world full of things," how is it to be treated? Most of what you have done
in this series of posts has a negativistic flavor to it (that is not a
criticism; that is inevitable when one tries to do to Western philosophical
concepts what Nagajuna did to Buddhist concepts). But should I not be
looking forward to some expression of a positive take on "difference and
sameness" (things really are different from one another!) and the rest of
the concepts which you have discussed; and, in reference to this post, do we
not need a positive take on the proper use and function of reason.
You know my take on this, being the unapologetic pragmatist that I am. We
need to take the world as a structured collection of concrete, individual
things because our activity will not bear fruit if we do not (and yes,
within those assumptions we inevitably arrive at scientific theories which
point in other directions). One needs, at times, as a teacher to tell that
person to shut up (in one of the various ways one can do that; how I would
have loved to have available the paddle - I forget the Japanese - in my
classes at times, or to have been able to yell "Kwatz"), or else no progress
will be made in the endeavor at hand. But, is everything relative, then, to
this non-being (anatman) which is me? ?????????
BS
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
13 Sep 2006 06:05:58 PM |
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"Bill Snyder" wrote:
<snip>
You make a valid point Bill -- the view does need balancing with a positive
take. However, it wasn't my aim to make a presentation of a rounded view but
rather to see if I could defend my understanding of the demolition process.
If I can't do that then I'm not in a strong position to start rebuilding.
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| User: "Anthony G. Rubino" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
13 Sep 2006 10:19:08 AM |
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andy-k wrote:
The conceptual framework, as far as it >extends, is all that is known.
Is there a knower, or knowers, within the extension of the conceptual
framework?
Is its extension limited, or unlimited?
Is there anything external to it?
If the conceptual framework is all that is known, would that exclude
unknowns and new knowledge?
Tony, philosopher
http://www.geocities.com/trisector/
So many misconceptions, so little time.
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
13 Sep 2006 04:26:12 PM |
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"Anthony G. Rubino" wrote:
andy-k wrote:
The conceptual framework, as far as it extends, is all that is known.
Is there a knower, or knowers, within the extension of the conceptual
framework?
Yes -- knower, knowing, and known arise in mutual dependence
within that framework -- i.e. they have a *conventional* existence
and not an *inherent* existence.
Is its extension limited, or unlimited?
Is there anything external to it?
Since the conceptual framework is comprised of parts (i.e. concepts),
and parts are conceived as entering into the part/whole relationship,
the framework is conceived of as an extrapolation of that relationship
(the apex of the hierarchy as it were) -- i.e. as a conventional whole.
The framework has then been modeled within itself, and this is the decisive
step in the reasoning process where reason has overstepped its bounds.
And having taken that step, it is then considered reasonable to treat the
framework as though it has the conventional properties of beginning and end,
and of internal and external.
Only then can we ask misguided questions like "how did the world begin?",
and argue about whether or not there is a world that is independent of
(i.e. external to) our ideas about it. Such seemingly reasonable questions
are specious, and they are not so much "answered" as obviated by
understanding that the conceptual framework is not to be treated as
just another "thing" in a world full of things.
If the conceptual framework is all that is known,
would that exclude unknowns and new knowledge?
*Look* at how words are *used*. We might want to say, e.g.,
"the identity of the assailant is unknown". In algebra we represent
the "unknowns" by symbols. Known and unknown exist by virtue
of their mutual dependence -- it would be meaningless to speak
of the "known" if it weren't for the unknown, and vice versa.
New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
13 Sep 2006 07:38:51 PM |
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"andy-k" wrote
"Anthony G. Rubino" wrote:
If the conceptual framework is all that is known,
would that exclude unknowns and new knowledge?
*Look* at how words are *used*. We might want to say, e.g.,
"the identity of the assailant is unknown". In algebra we represent
the "unknowns" by symbols. Known and unknown exist by virtue
of their mutual dependence -- it would be meaningless to speak
of the "known" if it weren't for the unknown, and vice versa.
New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
But sometimes you need to deal with new knowledge that goes
beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
This is a problem for your system because the criteria for meaningful-
ness is so strict. Algebra itself is a generalization of arithmetic.
2 + 3 = 3 + 2 is conceptually different than a + b = b + a. You
can't get one from the other without a conceptual leap. Which is
fine for most systems; but according to you, a + b = b + a should
be meaningless if it's doesn't work in the old conceptual system.
A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
color sentences should be completely meaningless and
correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
a sighted person.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
14 Sep 2006 10:24:56 AM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
But sometimes you need to deal with new knowledge that goes
beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
You're working to a *picture* -- the picture of all things having an inside
and an outside. You're treating the conceptual framework as just another
"thing", and thereby picturing it as having an inside and an outside.
I'm saying that the picture is wrong because the conceptual framework
must not be treated as just another thing in a world full of things.
This is a problem for your system because the criteria for meaningful-
ness is so strict. Algebra itself is a generalization of arithmetic.
2 + 3 = 3 + 2 is conceptually different than a + b = b + a. You
can't get one from the other without a conceptual leap. Which is
fine for most systems; but according to you, a + b = b + a should
be meaningless if it's doesn't work in the old conceptual system.
A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
color sentences should be completely meaningless and
correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
a sighted person.
I don't understand why you think these examples are analogous to my claim.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
14 Sep 2006 05:38:58 PM |
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"andy-k" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
New knowledge is continually arising within the framework in the form
of new perceptions and in the form of new connections between ideas.
But sometimes you need to deal with new knowledge that goes
beyond the framework itself. If the framework evolved over time,
there must have been things external to it that became integrated.
You're working to a *picture* -- the picture of all things having an
inside
and an outside. You're treating the conceptual framework as just another
"thing", and thereby picturing it as having an inside and an outside.
I'm saying that the picture is wrong because the conceptual framework
must not be treated as just another thing in a world full of things.
So it was given all at once, with no development? How does a child
develop into an adult with no framework expansion? This seems to
be an irrefutable objection (assuming I "get it," of course) Einstein
was born knowing relativity theory?
Perhaps reading Wittgenstein wasn't hasn't helped, after all. I don't
see why, logically, I can't have a concept that includes all concepts
or one that is external to all concepts. It seems you should be able
to manipulate conceptual frameworks the same way you do sets.
By making the external world is a logical construction you are freed
from metaphysical considerations. It seems the conceptual framework
is a logical construction, as well. It's certainly not an empirical reality
because I can't imagine an experiment to see if it is correct or not.
A great example is the concept of "color" to a congenitally blind
person. It is phenomenological external to him; but he learns to
use color words such as "Grass is green." It's completely beyond
the conceptual system, but the words are used properly. His
color sentences should be completely meaningless and
correspond to nothing; but they obviously work perfectly fine for
a sighted person.
I don't understand why you think these examples are analogous to my claim.
To a person blind since birth, the concept of color is external to
their conceptual framework. Yet color-statements are not nonsense.
If they were given vision at some point later in life: bingo! you just
expanded the conceptual framework since it now include colors.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "andy-k" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
14 Sep 2006 05:57:18 PM |
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"Craig Franck" wrote:
"andy-k" wrote
You're working to a *picture* -- the picture of all things having an
inside and an outside. You're treating the conceptual framework as just
another "thing", and thereby picturing it as having an inside and an
outside. I'm saying that the picture is wrong because the conceptual
framework must not be treated as just another thing in a world full of
things.
So it was given all at once, with no development? How does a child
develop into an adult with no framework expansion? This seems to
be an irrefutable objection (assuming I "get it," of course) Einstein
was born knowing relativity theory?
Einstein is a *part* of the conceptual framework (see below).
Perhaps reading Wittgenstein wasn't hasn't helped, after all. I don't
see why, logically, I can't have a concept that includes all concepts
or one that is external to all concepts. It seems you should be able
to manipulate conceptual frameworks the same way you do sets.
You not only *can* have such a concept, but you *do* have. That is the root
of the problem -- once the conceptual framework has been conceived, then of
course it has an inside and an outside like any other concept. Then the
process proliferates -- you go on to say that this is "my" conceptual
framework, and that is "your" conceptual framework, as though there were
more than one conceptual framework, whilst all the time "mine" and "yours"
are simply more concepts in the conceptual framework.
By making the external world is a logical construction you are freed
from metaphysical considerations.
The postulate of the external world *is* a metaphysical construction,
so to adopt that postulate is certainly not to be freed from metaphysical
considerations.
It seems the conceptual framework is a logical construction, as well.
It's certainly not an empirical reality because I can't imagine an
experiment to see if it is correct or not.
There are concepts, and concepts relate to one another in a network
or framework. Which part of this claim would you dispute and why?
To a person blind since birth, the concept of color is external to
their conceptual framework. Yet color-statements are not nonsense.
If they were given vision at some point later in life: bingo! you just
expanded the conceptual framework since it now include colors.
The problem here is that the example you cite is not the conceptual
framework but *part* of the conceptual framework, so the internal/external
division is appropriately conferred. It is misappropriated when it is
applied to *the conceptual framework*.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
14 Sep 2006 07:07:04 PM |
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"andy-k" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote:
To a person blind since birth, the concept of color is external to
their conceptual framework. Yet color-statements are not nonsense.
If they were given vision at some point later in life: bingo! you just
expanded the conceptual framework since it now include colors.
The problem here is that the example you cite is not the conceptual
framework but *part* of the conceptual framework, so the internal/external
division is appropriately conferred. It is misappropriated when it is
applied to *the conceptual framework*.
Okay, I think I understand you perfectly now:
Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
framework. I'm surprised it took so long because I just read a book
that went along these lines.
The book I read (I mentioned it in a reply to gibbs) resolved this by
having any absolutely-anything-you-could-conceive-of" system as
being able to support paradoxes, for the technical reason logic within
the system breaks down when applied to the system as a whole,
but it is almost irresistible to try and apply it since it works so well
on anything within the system.
So talk of an external world seems to makes perfect sense, but is in
fact nonsensical because "the framework" is a unique category with
no analogy due to being everything capable of being thought of.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "gibbs" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
14 Sep 2006 10:00:49 PM |
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"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:I8mOg.2531$SQ1.1889@trndny09...
Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
framework.
It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not refer to
anything or that my experiences of the world are of things that are not
themselves my experiences or my concepts.
The thought of "the conceptual scheme" is a concept. If this concept
represents something external to itself than a concept can represent what is
external to it. If it doesn't represent something external to itself, then
there is no "the conceptual scheme"; i.e., it represents nothing.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
15 Sep 2006 06:17:51 PM |
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"gibbs" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
Every conceivable thought you could possibly have is part of the
framework.
It doesn't follow from this by any logic that those thought do not refer
to anything
Those thoughts are experiences that refer to other experiences.
The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
The closest logical analogy I can think of is that of integers and the
set of all integers, which is an infinity.What introduces the paradoxes
is the set of all integers doesn't behave like an integer. I can add one
to it, and it doesn't get any larger, for example.
or that my experiences of the world are of things that are not themselves
my experiences or my concepts.
My interpretation is, because this is a paradox, it is meaningless
and in some sense "true" or "special nonsense." The phrase "not
themselves my experiences or my concepts" is as useless as saying
"The state of California is not a prime number." It's true, but you can
only apply prime-ness to numbers, so it's nonsense all the same.
The thought of "the conceptual scheme" is a concept. If this concept
represents something external to itself than a concept can represent what
is external to it. If it doesn't represent something external to itself,
then there is no "the conceptual scheme"; i.e., it represents nothing.
The least attractive thing about this sort of system is it is totally
self-referential. I have memories of past events, but there is no way
I can go back in time and compare the memory with the event itself.
This makes statements about past events paradoxical as well. All
I am saying is the present is a walled-off as the past.
But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false. Representations
can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
logical fiction.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "gibbs" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
16 Sep 2006 08:58:55 AM |
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"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:zwGOg.15$_k1.1@trndny01...
The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
experience). Experience is experience of something, that is, consciousness
is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we don't have to look for
anything behind experiences because experiences are already the revelation
of what is experience. In English, this means that, for example, if I see a
cat, I see a cat. I don't see an experience of a cat. That's the sort of
mistaken understanding that generates the unsavory notions of "things in
themselves" and all the rest of the Kantian hullabaloo. Of course, how
experiences are from a human point of view and are colored by human
concepts. From this we can't conclude though that we have to imagine or go
looking for something behind experiences.
But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
Representations
can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
logical fiction.
The very phrase "representations can refer to other representations" is just
another way of saying that concepts can represent something other than
themselves. It doesn't matter what is represented. If we didn't have the
concept of "the conceptual scheme" would there still be a conceptual scheme?
Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are independent
of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a claim as to
exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a logical
construction but a background for rationality. The grand conveyor of our
concepts, language, operates assumes this background so that we can make
sense of one another when we communicate.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies that
there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
16 Sep 2006 05:45:10 PM |
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"gibbs" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we don't
have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an experience
of a cat.
It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
states of our nervous systems. So we have an experience of a cat.
But that experience is not the cat itself. So it must be on the basis of
animal intuition (no pun intended) that we experience a cat external
to our own mind.
That's the sort of mistaken understanding that generates the unsavory
notions of "things in themselves" and all the rest of the Kantian
hullabaloo. Of course, how experiences are from a human point of view and
are colored by human concepts. From this we can't conclude though that we
have to imagine or go looking for something behind experiences.
But the way those statements are being interpreted by andy-k
suggests we do.
But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
Representations
can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
logical fiction.
The very phrase "representations can refer to other representations" is
just another way of saying that concepts can represent something other
than themselves. It doesn't matter what is represented. If we didn't
have the concept of "the conceptual scheme" would there still be a
conceptual scheme?
I believe so, because most of it, even in reflective people, is
unconsciously expressed. That's why so much of it is in the form
of intuitions of some sort or another: A baby *knows* its mother has
a mind similar to its own, even though such a *conception* requires a
massive philosophical leap.
Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are independent
of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a claim as to
exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a logical
construction but a background for rationality. The grand conveyor of our
concepts, language, operates assumes this background so that we can make
sense of one another when we communicate.
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system. This is why Russell
claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
a huge number of possible "way things are." Two scientific theories
can contradict one another and both seem to work perfectly fine.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "gibbs" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
16 Sep 2006 10:31:01 PM |
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"Craig Franck" <craig.franck@verizon.net> wrote in message
news:W7%Og.69$x11.60@trndny02...
It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
states of our nervous systems. So we have an experience of a cat.
But that experience is not the cat itself. So it must be on the basis of
animal intuition (no pun intended) that we experience a cat external
to our own mind.
Geez, Craig, this is a philosophic error, not a scientific one. No doubt we
have nervous states that we describe as "experiences". But if you and I are
talking about a book we read or a girl we see we're talking about things in
the world we've experienced and know about. Our scientific analysis will
describe how this gets done (it doesn't now, except in a very rough way),
but to make the claim that the best science available says that all we know
are states of our nervous systems is mistaken. The mistake isn't about
nervous systems, but what we mean by "knowledge". (The reliance on a
mysterious "intuition" sounds to me like hand-waving.)
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a cat,
why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
That's the sort of mistaken understanding that generates the unsavory
notions of "things in themselves" and all the rest of the Kantian
hullabaloo. Of course, how experiences are from a human point of view
and are colored by human concepts. From this we can't conclude though
that we have to imagine or go looking for something behind experiences.
But the way those statements are being interpreted by andy-k
suggests we do.
But the notion that "the conceptual scheme" must represent some-
thing external to itself or it represents nothing is false.
Representations
can refer to other representations. There doesn't have to be terminal
points which points to something beyond. The "outside world" is
simply a logical construction inside the scheme. The mathematization
of space turned it into a set of points, but that made it simply a
logical fiction.
The very phrase "representations can refer to other representations" is
just another way of saying that concepts can represent something other
than themselves. It doesn't matter what is represented. If we didn't
have the concept of "the conceptual scheme" would there still be a
conceptual scheme?
I believe so, because most of it, even in reflective people, is
unconsciously expressed. That's why so much of it is in the form
of intuitions of some sort or another: A baby *knows* its mother has
a mind similar to its own, even though such a *conception* requires a
massive philosophical leap.
Does a baby know that??
Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are
independent of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a
claim as to exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a
logical construction but a background for rationality. The grand
conveyor of our concepts, language, operates assumes this background so
that we can make sense of one another when we communicate.
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system. This is why Russell
claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
The problem with Russell is that his system really never explained how we
know about the world. The logically coherent alternative, that we actually
perceive things instead of sense-data, does.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
a huge number of possible "way things are." Two scientific theories
can contradict one another and both seem to work perfectly fine.
The fact that you can compare two scientific theories assumes that there is
an external are that they successfully talk about. Realism is essential for
intelligibility; it is not a truth condition.
.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
17 Sep 2006 05:43:45 PM |
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"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
"Craig Franck" wrote:
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system. This is why Russell
claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
The problem with Russell is that his system really never explained how we
know about the world. The logically coherent alternative, that we
actually perceive things instead of sense-data, does.
When he was advocating his sense-data theory he believed causal
chains of events caused us to have perceptions of objects in the
environment. There were separate perceptual and physical spaces
that interacted.
You also need to take into account the environment he formed his
philosophical opinions in. Wittgenstein was holding that when you
dream of a cat, there is an actual cat present. Not having dogmatic
metaphysical beliefs forces you to address the logic of an argument
rather than responding in what you believe are revealed truths about
the world
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
18 Sep 2006 07:21:28 AM |
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Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real. But that's not really intuition.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
18 Sep 2006 05:16:47 PM |
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"1Z" wrote
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real.
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
But that's not really intuition.
I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
consideration.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
18 Sep 2006 07:34:13 PM |
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Craig Franck wrote:
"1Z" wrote
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real.
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
But that's not really intuition.
I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
consideration.
Maybe the intuition is just a short-cut. Maybe it is possible
to reconstruct the intuitive proces as an explicit, rational process.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "Sphere" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
18 Sep 2006 08:25:08 PM |
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1Z wrote:
Craig Franck wrote:
"1Z" wrote
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real.
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
What is this 'idealism' such that you can divide
"the fabric" in terms of either 'realism' or idealism'?
It seems to me that perceptions arise, and that doing
other than accepting this arising is pure folly. Beyond
that, everything is a creation of human culture (even
the human culture). Any description will have to be
in terms of words, and is therefore restricted by what
words are capable of conveying. We simply cannot
provide an exact and complete description of anything
at all. To talk of something being 'real' outside our
space of thought is to pretend that our absolute
statements can be both perfect and privileged; which
is absurd. We can only provide useful descriptions which
capture some aspects of our arisen perceptions, and
claiming more is metaphysics.
A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
But that's not really intuition.
I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
consideration.
Maybe the intuition is just a short-cut. Maybe it is possible
to reconstruct the intuitive proces as an explicit, rational process.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
.
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
19 Sep 2006 08:29:55 AM |
|
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Sphere wrote:
1Z wrote:
Craig Franck wrote:
"1Z" wrote
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real.
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
What is this 'idealism' such that you can divide
"the fabric" in terms of either 'realism' or idealism'?
"idealism:
the view that the existence of objects depends wholly or in part on the
minds of those perceiving them or that reality is composed of minds and
their states. There are many varieties of idealism, ranging from
Plato's doctrine of independently existing ideas or forms to Berkeley's
subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism. Kant attempted to
combine empirical realism with transcendental idealism."
It seems to me that perceptions arise, and that doing
other than accepting this arising is pure folly. Beyond
that, everything is a creation of human culture (even
the human culture). Any description will have to be
in terms of words, and is therefore restricted by what
words are capable of conveying.
Words are capable of conveying the existence -- however
deplorably "conventional" -- of chairs and tables. That is
all I am seeking to establish.
We simply cannot
provide an exact and complete description of anything
at all.
So what ? Who said we can ?
To talk of something being 'real' outside our
space of thought is to pretend that our absolute
statements can be both perfect and privileged;
Being able to say something is real at all,
is quite different rom being able to describe it perfectly.
which
is absurd. We can only provide useful descriptions which
capture some aspects of our arisen perceptions, and
claiming more is metaphysics.
Claiming *that* is metpahysics, and none the worse
for it. Claiming the opposite is metaphsyics too.
A spider exists in another kind of reality, but that standard.
But that's not really intuition.
I believe it is because most people intuit what's real and what's not.
This sort of philosophical analysis doesn't enter into most people's
consideration.
Maybe the intuition is just a short-cut. Maybe it is possible
to reconstruct the intuitive proces as an explicit, rational process.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
.
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| User: "Sphere" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
19 Sep 2006 07:58:15 PM |
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1Z wrote:
Sphere wrote:
1Z wrote:
Craig Franck wrote:
"1Z" wrote
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real.
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
What is this 'idealism' such that you can divide
"the fabric" in terms of either 'realism' or idealism'?
"idealism:
the view that the existence of objects depends wholly or in part on the
minds of those perceiving them or that reality is composed of minds and
their states. There are many varieties of idealism, ranging from
Plato's doctrine of independently existing ideas or forms to Berkeley's
subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism. Kant attempted to
combine empirical realism with transcendental idealism."
While I view 'existence' as depending wholly, and
not just in part, upon mind -- for 'existence' is an
idea -- this says nothing at all about whatever is
without our thinking it so. You are going to have
to be much clearer in your definition.
I am not a solipsist. I do not hold that I alone
exist. I do not even hold that I exist. I hold that
descriptions can never be totally exact, and I
hold that our descriptions are not privileged. Just
because we choose to partition "the world" into
objects does not mean that this is the only,
or necessarily even the best, way of describing
"the world." To say that the Sun exists even
without our thinking that the Sun exists is to say
that our choice to partition into Sun and non-Sun
is privileged; which I reject.
I also hold that there are no perfect circles, but only
the idea of perfect circles, that pi does not exist,
but only the idea of pi, and that the Real Numbers
is the most completely misnamed notion out
there. While circles, pi, and Reals do not exist,
the ideas are frequently very useful.
It seems to me that perceptions arise, and that doing
other than accepting this arising is pure folly. Beyond
that, everything is a creation of human culture (even
the human culture). Any description will have to be
in terms of words, and is therefore restricted by what
words are capable of conveying.
Words are capable of conveying the existence -- however
deplorably "conventional" -- of chairs and tables. That is
all I am seeking to establish.
The title of this newsgroup is alt.philosophy. Words
may be just fine for establishing existence in
day-to-day usage, but I don't think words can be
used to establish any sort of fundamental truth
about the existence or non-existence of chairs
and tables. I'll happily agree that it is a fact that
chairs and tables exist, but I reject the claim that
it is an absolute truth that chairs and tables exist.
We simply cannot
provide an exact and complete description of anything
at all.
So what ? Who said we can ?
To talk of something being 'real' outside our
space of thought is to pretend that our absolute
statements can be both perfect and privileged;
Being able to say something is real at all,
is quite different rom being able to describe it perfectly.
If by 'real' you are attempting to assert some
sort of essence, permanence, or perfection --
either to an idea or to some object of an idea --
then I claim there is nothing which is real.
If by 'real' you are merely asserting that the
perception arises and that there is no known
reason to suspect the perception then I'm
happy to accept something as real. However,
this is saying that Reality is socially
constructed.
which
is absurd. We can only provide useful descriptions which
capture some aspects of our arisen perceptions, and
claiming more is metaphysics.
Claiming *that* is metpahysics, and none the worse
for it. Claiming the opposite is metaphsyics too.
I'm not sure what 'opposite' is here. I'm
not even sure what your point is here.
....
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
.
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
20 Sep 2006 05:58:50 AM |
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Sphere wrote:
1Z wrote:
Sphere wrote:
1Z wrote:
Craig Franck wrote:
"1Z" wrote
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
Why isn't it an experience of a cat? If you and I are talking about a
cat, why aren't we talking about a cat instead of our "intuitions"?
The argument is when we dream of a cat or have a hallucination of
a cat, *there is no cat present*. So now I must intuit which of my
experiences are "real" as opposed to imaginary.
The maximal consistent set is real.
I agree with that; but then there is the issue of whether another
state of consciousness that was just as consistent as our normal
waking state would render a different reality.
It's not much of an issue unless such a state can be produced.
Again, the fact that various alternatives to realism are (just about)
possible does not mean we should take them seriously, or
that realism vs. idealism is a 50:50 issue.
What is this 'idealism' such that you can divide
"the fabric" in terms of either 'realism' or idealism'?
"idealism:
the view that the existence of objects depends wholly or in part on the
minds of those perceiving them or that reality is composed of minds and
their states. There are many varieties of idealism, ranging from
Plato's doctrine of independently existing ideas or forms to Berkeley's
subjective idealism and Hegel's absolute idealism. Kant attempted to
combine empirical realism with transcendental idealism."
While I view 'existence' as depending wholly, and
not just in part, upon mind -- for 'existence' is an
idea --
ideas have referents
this says nothing at all about whatever is
without our thinking it so. You are going to have
to be much clearer in your definition.
Of what ? Realism ? I suppose it is worth pointing
out that there is a difference between the claim
"there is a world-in-the-raw which we conceptualise
in
various ways"
and "not only is the world a give, but the correct
conceptual scehmea is given by nature too".
I am not a solipsist. I do not hold that I alone
exist. I do not even hold that I exist.
Congratulaitions, you have just entered my all-time
bizarre comments list, along with the guy
who could prove women don't exist, the guy
who could prove he was god, the guy
who don't have enough time to wrie
out his disproof of time, etc.
I hold that
descriptions can never be totally exact,
True, but doesn't support your conclusion.
and I
hold that our descriptions are not privileged.
Pomo buzzword. Still doesn't support your conclusion.
Just
because we choose to partition "the world" into
objects does not mean that this is the only,
or necessarily even the best, way of describing
"the world."
Still doesn't support your conclusion.
For one thing, there must be a world to be partitioned, some pastry
for the pastry-cutter to cut shapes out of.
For another, arbitrarily defined objects can still be said to exist.
To say that the Sun exists even
without our thinking that the Sun exists is to say
that our choice to partition into Sun and non-Sun
is privileged; which I reject.
No it isn't. It is to say that IF you partition things that way, THEN
the object so partitioned still exists. It doesn't necessarily negate
other paritioning schemes, and it isn't trivial, since
some partions -- phlogiston/not phlogiston -- are failures.
You don't have to have the Perfect Essential Absolute
partitioning scheme in order to say things do or don't exist.
A merely conventionl existence, defined in terms
of an imperfect , underpriveleged and inessential
scheme is enough to refute idealism.
I also hold that there are no perfect circles, but only
the idea of perfect circles, that pi does not exist,
but only the idea of pi, and that the Real Numbers
is the most completely misnamed notion out
there. While circles, pi, and Reals do not exist,
the ideas are frequently very useful.
Not all ideas have referents. But the idealist claims, incorrectly,
that none of them do.
It seems to me that perceptions arise, and that doing
other than accepting this arising is pure folly. Beyond
that, everything is a creation of human culture (even
the human culture). Any description will have to be
in terms of words, and is therefore restricted by what
words are capable of conveying.
Words are capable of conveying the existence -- however
deplorably "conventional" -- of chairs and tables. That is
all I am seeking to establish.
The title of this newsgroup is alt.philosophy.
There have always been philosophers of common-sense.
Words
may be just fine for establishing existence in
day-to-day usage, but I don't think words can be
used to establish any sort of fundamental truth
about the existence or non-existence of chairs
and tables.
I'll happily agree that it is a fact that
chairs and tables exist, but I reject the claim that
it is an absolute truth that chairs and tables exist.
No-one has made any "absolute" claim.
We simply cannot
provide an exact and complete description of anything
at all.
So what ? Who said we can ?
To talk of something being 'real' outside our
space of thought is to pretend that our absolute
statements can be both perfect and privileged;
Being able to say something is real at all,
is quite different rom being able to describe it perfectly.
If by 'real' you are attempting to assert some
sort of essence, permanence, or perfection --
either to an idea or to some object of an idea --
then I claim there is nothing which is real.
No essence or perfection. Chairs and tables.
If by 'real' you are merely asserting that the
perception arises and that there is no known
reason to suspect the perception then I'm
happy to accept something as real.
No. More than a perception, less than a perfection.
Common-sense takes place in the extensive middle ground.
betwen the two. You seem to be in the grip of a faklse dichotomy.
However,
this is saying that Reality is socially
constructed.
It most certainly is not.
which
is absurd. We can only provide useful descriptions which
capture some aspects of our arisen perceptions, and
claiming more is metaphysics.
Claiming *that* is metpahysics, and none the worse
for it. Claiming the opposite is metaphsyics too.
I'm not sure what 'opposite' is here. I'm
not even sure what your point is here.
Things exist. I exist, You exist. Concepts have referents.
You can have a modest sort of
realism that isn't encumbered by essences or perfections.
...
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
.
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| User: "Sphere" |
|
| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
20 Sep 2006 06:28:25 AM |
|
|
1Z wrote:
Sphere wrote:
1Z wrote:
Sphere wrote:
1Z wrote:
....
this says nothing at all about whatever is
without our thinking it so. You are going to have
to be much clearer in your definition.
Of what ? Realism ? I suppose it is worth pointing
out that there is a difference between the claim
"there is a world-in-the-raw which we conceptualise
in
various ways"
and "not only is the world a give, but the correct
conceptual scehmea is given by nature too".
Can you take "world-in-the-" out of that?
I am not a solipsist. I do not hold that I alone
exist. I do not even hold that I exist.
Congratulaitions, you have just entered my all-time
bizarre comments list, along with the guy
who could prove women don't exist, the guy
who could prove he was god, the guy
who don't have enough time to wrie
out his disproof of time, etc.
....
I haven't held that I do not exist either, however...
Thoughts arise. These thoughts at first
glance seem to come from a thinker -- a locus
of thought. Upon closer inspection, these
thoughts have no central controlling essence.
There are thoughts, but no thinker. The
thinker is only a story created by the interaction
of these thoughts. I am only a story -- neither
existing nor non-existing by some definitions
of 'exist'. Certainly, I am not the sort of
thing which could have an immortal soul, and
within this notion of 'exist' I do not exist.
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
20 Sep 2006 06:45:25 AM |
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Sphere wrote:
I hold that
descriptions can never be totally exact,
So that is not a totally exact discription of what you hold?
To say that the Sun exists even
without our thinking that the Sun exists is to say
that our choice to partition into Sun and non-Sun
is privileged; which I reject.
Well of course you would, you cant be totally exact about your
descriptions of anything remember.
The sun exists whether you think it does or not.
I also hold that there are no perfect circles,
So what does the perfect circle look like, i.e. give a perfect
description of what it is that you claim doesn't exist, what does it
actually look like and how can you know that it does look like that,
given that you dont hold perfect circles exist and cant give perfect
descriptions of anything?
and tables. I'll happily agree that it is a fact that
chairs and tables exist, but I reject the claim that
it is an absolute truth that chairs and tables exist.
Oh, you'll be feeling like that due to you not being able to give a
perfect description of what it is that you are not saying doesn't
exists or were you?
then I claim there is nothing which is real.
Therefore that is not a real statement, that's real it isn't, its
fucking stupid, ever considered becoming a catholic priest?
I'm not sure what 'opposite' is here. I'm
not even sure what your point is here.
Well of course you aren't, you're not even certai of anything you say
and who the ***** could blame you, bizarre absolutely bizarre is an
extremely accurate description of your idiotic nonsense.
Michael Gordge
Michael Gordge
.
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| User: "Sphere" |
|
| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
20 Sep 2006 05:40:33 PM |
|
|
wrote:
Sphere wrote:
I hold that
descriptions can never be totally exact,
So that is not a totally exact discription of what you hold?
Even the Three Characteristics are subject
to the Three Characteristics.
To say that the Sun exists even
without our thinking that the Sun exists is to say
that our choice to partition into Sun and non-Sun
is privileged; which I reject.
Well of course you would, you cant be totally exact about your
descriptions of anything remember.
The sun exists whether you think it does or not.
So far, we haven't an agreed upon definition
of 'exists', so clearly the Sun doesn't even
exist now.
(More correctly, it depends upon which definition
of 'exist' you use as to whether I will agree that
the Sun currently exists.)
I also hold that there are no perfect circles,
So what does the perfect circle look like, i.e. give a perfect
description of what it is that you claim doesn't exist, what does it
actually look like and how can you know that it does look like that,
given that you dont hold perfect circles exist and cant give perfect
descriptions of anything?
If you insist upon being worthless then I
shall view you as such. Goodbye.
---
No essence. No permanence. No perfection.
.
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
22 Sep 2006 12:38:25 AM |
|
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Sphere wrote:
So far, we haven't an agreed upon definition
of 'exists', so clearly the Sun doesn't even
exist now.
Who the ***** is this *we* sunshine ?
Who, aside from yourself of course, cant agree whether or not that
statement now exists, albeit as mindless nonsensical Kantian
Randaphobic piffle?
(More correctly, it depends upon which definition
of 'exist' you use as to whether I will agree that
the Sun currently exists.)
Does it? but you just said you cant agree with yourself as to a meaning
of exists anyway. FFS get a life.
So what does the perfect circle look like, i.e. give a perfect
description of what it is that you claim doesn't exist, what does it
actually look like and how can you know that it does look like that,
given that you dont hold perfect circles exist and cant give perfect
descriptions of anything?
If you insist upon being worthless then I
shall view you as such. Goodbye.
Oh so you didn't think of that obvious contradiction before you
regurgitated?
So you now choose instead, to run away hide and blame me for your
fucking stupidity, typical leftist behaviour.
How can someone ever say that a perfect circle doesn't exist without
contradicting himself in defining one?
Michael Gordge
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
16 Sep 2006 06:31:52 PM |
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Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
"Craig Franck" wrote
The logic involved is such that looking for "an external world behind
my experiences" makes as much sense as looking for "an external
world at right angles to my experiences"; it is simply not defined.
This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we don't
have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an experience
of a cat.
It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
states of our nervous systems.
Completely wrong.
If you look at someone else's nervous system
through a microscope, or an MRI scan,
you are looking at an external object. Nervous systems
are not revealed by introspection. Neuroloscience is posited
on the real existence of external objects.
Realism boils down to the claim that there is a way things are independent
of how we represent the way things are. It doesn't make a claim as to
exactly what makes up the world. The "outside world" isn't a logical
construction but a background for rationality. The grand conveyor of our
concepts, language, operates assumes this background so that we can make
sense of one another when we communicate.
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system.
I have always found him to be highly refutable.
This is why Russell
claimed the external world was a logical construction: it then
becomes irrefutable itself because it makes no metaphysical claims.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
a huge number of possible "way things are."
Not representing a single determinate world, and not representing a
an external world at all ,are two completely different issues.
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| User: "Craig Franck" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
16 Sep 2006 07:47:56 PM |
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"1Z" wrote
..
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we
don't
have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an
experience
of a cat.
It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
states of our nervous systems.
Completely wrong.
I've been told that before.
If you look at someone else's nervous system
through a microscope, or an MRI scan,
you are looking at an external object. Nervous systems
are not revealed by introspection. Neuroloscience is posited
on the real existence of external objects.
I grasp your point.
My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
You see with your brain.
You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
representation of a state of affairs:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system.
I have always found him to be highly refutable.
I'm sure, but I believe most of your refutations rest on one sort of
misunderstanding or another. Witness above.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
a huge number of possible "way things are."
Not representing a single determinate world, and not representing a
an external world at all ,are two completely different issues.
That's true, but it raises the point of what it means to "represent the
world." "Hasn't been demonstrated not to be the case yet" is often as
close as we can get.
--
Craig Franck
craig.franck@verizon.net
Cortland, NY
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| User: "1Z" |
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| Title: Re: Reason and its Limitation |
17 Sep 2006 06:07:08 AM |
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Craig Franck wrote:
"1Z" wrote
.
Craig Franck wrote:
"gibbs" wrote
This betrays a misunderstanding of what experience is (and the logic of
experience). Experience is experience of something, that is,
consciousness is intentional. We don't experience experiences, we
don't
have to look for anything behind experiences because experiences are
already the revelation of what is experience. In English, this means
that, for example, if I see a cat, I see a cat. I don't see an
experience
of a cat.
It is true that we don't experience our experiences; all there is is an
experience. I also believe that objects as external entities are given
phenomenalogically. But the notion of consciousness as an opaque
representation is not given. That comes from analysis.
According to the best science available, all we can really know is the
states of our nervous systems.
Completely wrong.
I've been told that before.
If you look at someone else's nervous system
through a microscope, or an MRI scan,
you are looking at an external object. Nervous systems
are not revealed by introspection. Neuroloscience is posited
on the real existence of external objects.
I grasp your point.
My point was the volume of space that makes up the visual field
that you perceive object embedded in -- is inside your visual cortex.
No, there isn't a volume of space inside my brain -- at least I hopne
not, as it would be a sign of severe dgenerative condition.
You see with your brain.
"With", yes. That does does not mean I see neural activity instead
of objects. In fact neural activity does not show up
introspectively at all. The ancients believed thought took plac
eint he heart.
You infer that external objects cause most of the perceptions you
experience when you look about you. So the MRI scan is a
representation of a state of affairs:
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html#DEBATES
Yes -- a representation of something, a representationof something
external.
That's how I look at it myself. But there is no refuting andy-k once
you've completely understood his system.
I have always found him to be highly refutable.
I'm sure, but I believe most of your refutations rest on one sort of
misunderstanding or another. Witness above.
I haven't misunderstood anything.
Even to say that "the conceptual scheme" is just a description implies
that there is a way things are that can be described using concepts.
Yes, but the relationship between the conceptual scheme and "the way
things are" is such that any particular conceptual scheme can represent
a huge number of possible "way things are."
Not representing a single determinate world, and not representing a
an external world at all ,are two completely different issues.
That's true, but it raises the point of what it means to "represent the
world." "Hasn't been demonstrated not to be the case yet" is often as
close as we can get.
The Andy/Russel position is incoherent because it is based on
3rd-persons descriptions
of external objects such as brains and neurons, although it ultimately
concludes that they are as non-existent as any other external object.
(And then there is the error problem, the causal stability | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
