| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"Immortalist" |
| Date: |
16 Apr 2004 11:34:40 AM |
| Object: |
You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that it
represents.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is consistent
with the facts of perception.
---------------------------
5. The Dimensions of Conscious Experience reveals the visual world to be
composed of, solid volumes, bounded by colored surfaces, embedded in a
spatial void.
Every point on every visible surface is experienced as a separate entity,
all of which are perceived simultaneously in the form of continuous surfaces
in depth. The phenomena of transparency, as well as the perception of empty
space between the observer and a visible object demonstrate that multiple
depth values can be experienced at every point in visual space. In other
words, perceptual experience is like a museum diorama, or theatre set, in
which continuous colored surfaces bound volumetric objects embedded in a
spatial void.
Whatever the neurophysiological mechanism underlying this perceptual
experience, the information content explicitly encoded in that perceptual
representation cannot be any less than the information content of the
corresponding subjective experience.
---------------------------
6. Four Initial Objections;
6.1 If perception involves "pictures in your
head", then who is it that is viewing
those pictures?
Return to Representationalist Site
The Homunculus Objection: This "picture-in-the-head" or "Cartesian theatre"
concept of visual representation has been criticized on the grounds that
there would have to be a miniature observer to view this miniature internal
scene, resulting in an infinite regress of observers within observers.
But this argument is invalid. For in fact there is no need for an internal
observer of the scene, since the internal representation is simply a data
structure like any other data in a computer, except that this data is
expressed in spatial form. For if a picture in the head required a
homunculus to view it, then the same argument would hold for any other form
of information in the brain, which would also require a homunculus to read
or interpret that information. In fact any information encoded in the brain
needs only to be available to other internal processes rather than to a
miniature copy of the whole brain.
The fact that the brain does go to the trouble of constructing a full
spatial analog of the external environment merely suggests that it has ways
to make use of this spatial data. In other words, the brain employes an
analogical paradigm of perceptual computation to make use of the analogical
data in spatial perception.
6.2 Neuroscience has found no evidence
of "pictures in the head".
Phenomenology presents the mind as a three-dimensional colored structure or
analogical representation, while neurophysiology presents the brain as an
assembly of billions of discrete quasi-independent local processors
interconnected in a massively parallel network.
Where in that mass of neural circuitry are the three-dimensional volumetric
real-time moving pictures that we know so well in conscious experience?
The object of our phenomenological investigation is conscious experience
itself and knowledge of that particular entity is very certain. Knowledge of
our own conscious state is more certain and reliable than any other
knowledge we can possibly have, even when our conscious experience is itself
only a hallucination.
6.3 Conscious experience is not a physical substance
or structure that exists in any particular place,
and therefore it is neither "in your head", nor
it it "out in the world". It is a pure experiential
entity that has no direct physical manifestation.
The vehicles of neural representation bear no
resemblance to the phenomenal contents of
those vehicles.
The mind is identically equal to physical patterns of energy in the physical
brain. To claim otherwise is to relegate the elaborate structure of
conscious experience to a mystical state beyond the bounds of science. The
dimensions of conscious experience, such as phenomenal color and phenomenal
space, are a direct manifestation of certain physical states of our physical
brain.
Things appear as they do because that is the way the world is represented in
the neurophysiological mechanism of our physical brain. The world of
conscious experience therefore is in principle accessible to scientific
scrutiny after all, both internally through introspection, and externally
through neurophysiological recording.
6.4 Even if there are "pictures in the head",
how do those pictures become conscious
of themselves?
If we accept the materialist view that mind is a physical process taking
place in the physical mechanism of the brain, and since we know that mind is
conscious, then that already is direct and incontrovertible evidence that a
physical process taking place in a physical mechanism can under certain
conditions be conscious.
Now it it true that the brain is a very special kind of mechanism. But what
makes the brain so special is not its substance, for it is made of the
ordinary substance of matter and energy. What sets the brain apart from
normal matter is its complex organization. The most likely explanation
therefore is that what makes our consciousness special is not its substance,
but its complex organization.
So the simplest, most parsimonious explanation is that our own conscious
qualia evolved from those of our animal ancestors, and differ from those
earlier forms more in its level of complex organization rather than in its
fundamental nature.
-------------------------
THEREFORE: Unless we wish to believe in some magical nomological dangler
that extends mind half way into the spirit world, we must face the
observational fact that there is a spatial representation in the brain.
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
Numerically Predicalationally Epistemologisized by Reanimater
.
|
|
| User: "717" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
17 Apr 2004 01:07:57 AM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that it
represents.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is consistent
with the facts of perception.
---------------------------
5. The Dimensions of Conscious Experience reveals the visual world to be
composed of, solid volumes, bounded by colored surfaces, embedded in a
spatial void.
Every point on every visible surface is experienced as a separate entity,
all of which are perceived simultaneously in the form of continuous
surfaces
in depth. The phenomena of transparency, as well as the perception of
empty
space between the observer and a visible object demonstrate that multiple
depth values can be experienced at every point in visual space. In other
words, perceptual experience is like a museum diorama, or theatre set, in
which continuous colored surfaces bound volumetric objects embedded in a
spatial void.
Whatever the neurophysiological mechanism underlying this perceptual
experience, the information content explicitly encoded in that perceptual
representation cannot be any less than the information content of the
corresponding subjective experience.
---------------------------
6. Four Initial Objections;
6.1 If perception involves "pictures in your
head", then who is it that is viewing
those pictures?
Return to Representationalist Site
The Homunculus Objection: This "picture-in-the-head" or "Cartesian
theatre"
concept of visual representation has been criticized on the grounds that
there would have to be a miniature observer to view this miniature
internal
scene, resulting in an infinite regress of observers within observers.
But this argument is invalid. For in fact there is no need for an internal
observer of the scene, since the internal representation is simply a data
structure like any other data in a computer, except that this data is
expressed in spatial form. For if a picture in the head required a
homunculus to view it, then the same argument would hold for any other
form
of information in the brain, which would also require a homunculus to read
or interpret that information. In fact any information encoded in the
brain
needs only to be available to other internal processes rather than to a
miniature copy of the whole brain.
The fact that the brain does go to the trouble of constructing a full
spatial analog of the external environment merely suggests that it has
ways
to make use of this spatial data. In other words, the brain employes an
analogical paradigm of perceptual computation to make use of the
analogical
data in spatial perception.
6.2 Neuroscience has found no evidence
of "pictures in the head".
Phenomenology presents the mind as a three-dimensional colored structure
or
analogical representation, while neurophysiology presents the brain as an
assembly of billions of discrete quasi-independent local processors
interconnected in a massively parallel network.
Where in that mass of neural circuitry are the three-dimensional
volumetric
real-time moving pictures that we know so well in conscious experience?
The object of our phenomenological investigation is conscious experience
itself and knowledge of that particular entity is very certain. Knowledge
of
our own conscious state is more certain and reliable than any other
knowledge we can possibly have, even when our conscious experience is
itself
only a hallucination.
6.3 Conscious experience is not a physical substance
or structure that exists in any particular place,
and therefore it is neither "in your head", nor
it it "out in the world". It is a pure experiential
entity that has no direct physical manifestation.
The vehicles of neural representation bear no
resemblance to the phenomenal contents of
those vehicles.
The mind is identically equal to physical patterns of energy in the
physical
brain. To claim otherwise is to relegate the elaborate structure of
conscious experience to a mystical state beyond the bounds of science. The
dimensions of conscious experience, such as phenomenal color and
phenomenal
space, are a direct manifestation of certain physical states of our
physical
brain.
Things appear as they do because that is the way the world is represented
in
the neurophysiological mechanism of our physical brain. The world of
conscious experience therefore is in principle accessible to scientific
scrutiny after all, both internally through introspection, and externally
through neurophysiological recording.
6.4 Even if there are "pictures in the head",
how do those pictures become conscious
of themselves?
If we accept the materialist view that mind is a physical process taking
place in the physical mechanism of the brain, and since we know that mind
is
conscious, then that already is direct and incontrovertible evidence that
a
physical process taking place in a physical mechanism can under certain
conditions be conscious.
Now it it true that the brain is a very special kind of mechanism. But
what
makes the brain so special is not its substance, for it is made of the
ordinary substance of matter and energy. What sets the brain apart from
normal matter is its complex organization. The most likely explanation
therefore is that what makes our consciousness special is not its
substance,
but its complex organization.
So the simplest, most parsimonious explanation is that our own conscious
qualia evolved from those of our animal ancestors, and differ from those
earlier forms more in its level of complex organization rather than in its
fundamental nature.
-------------------------
THEREFORE: Unless we wish to believe in some magical nomological dangler
that extends mind half way into the spirit world, we must face the
observational fact that there is a spatial representation in the brain.
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
Numerically Predicalationally Epistemologisized by Reanimater
I sometimes think I'm living in the body of giant me.
What I perceive of my body is a replication of the big
guy. The entire universe is a replication of his universe.
I don't have free will because I'm a replication of him and
whatever he does, I do. So right now he's thinking that
he's a replication of an even bigger guy. No actually
he's thinking that his big guy is thinking that he's a
replication of an even bigger guy....
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
17 Apr 2004 01:22:31 AM |
|
|
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:1R3gc.13076$ec1.11158@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see
in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect
Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that
the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate
that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that it
represents.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is
consistent
with the facts of perception.
---------------------------
5. The Dimensions of Conscious Experience reveals the visual world to be
composed of, solid volumes, bounded by colored surfaces, embedded in a
spatial void.
Every point on every visible surface is experienced as a separate
entity,
all of which are perceived simultaneously in the form of continuous
surfaces
in depth. The phenomena of transparency, as well as the perception of
empty
space between the observer and a visible object demonstrate that
multiple
depth values can be experienced at every point in visual space. In other
words, perceptual experience is like a museum diorama, or theatre set,
in
which continuous colored surfaces bound volumetric objects embedded in a
spatial void.
Whatever the neurophysiological mechanism underlying this perceptual
experience, the information content explicitly encoded in that
perceptual
representation cannot be any less than the information content of the
corresponding subjective experience.
---------------------------
6. Four Initial Objections;
6.1 If perception involves "pictures in your
head", then who is it that is viewing
those pictures?
Return to Representationalist Site
The Homunculus Objection: This "picture-in-the-head" or "Cartesian
theatre"
concept of visual representation has been criticized on the grounds that
there would have to be a miniature observer to view this miniature
internal
scene, resulting in an infinite regress of observers within observers.
But this argument is invalid. For in fact there is no need for an
internal
observer of the scene, since the internal representation is simply a
data
structure like any other data in a computer, except that this data is
expressed in spatial form. For if a picture in the head required a
homunculus to view it, then the same argument would hold for any other
form
of information in the brain, which would also require a homunculus to
read
or interpret that information. In fact any information encoded in the
brain
needs only to be available to other internal processes rather than to a
miniature copy of the whole brain.
The fact that the brain does go to the trouble of constructing a full
spatial analog of the external environment merely suggests that it has
ways
to make use of this spatial data. In other words, the brain employes an
analogical paradigm of perceptual computation to make use of the
analogical
data in spatial perception.
6.2 Neuroscience has found no evidence
of "pictures in the head".
Phenomenology presents the mind as a three-dimensional colored structure
or
analogical representation, while neurophysiology presents the brain as
an
assembly of billions of discrete quasi-independent local processors
interconnected in a massively parallel network.
Where in that mass of neural circuitry are the three-dimensional
volumetric
real-time moving pictures that we know so well in conscious experience?
The object of our phenomenological investigation is conscious experience
itself and knowledge of that particular entity is very certain.
Knowledge
of
our own conscious state is more certain and reliable than any other
knowledge we can possibly have, even when our conscious experience is
itself
only a hallucination.
6.3 Conscious experience is not a physical substance
or structure that exists in any particular place,
and therefore it is neither "in your head", nor
it it "out in the world". It is a pure experiential
entity that has no direct physical manifestation.
The vehicles of neural representation bear no
resemblance to the phenomenal contents of
those vehicles.
The mind is identically equal to physical patterns of energy in the
physical
brain. To claim otherwise is to relegate the elaborate structure of
conscious experience to a mystical state beyond the bounds of science.
The
dimensions of conscious experience, such as phenomenal color and
phenomenal
space, are a direct manifestation of certain physical states of our
physical
brain.
Things appear as they do because that is the way the world is
represented
in
the neurophysiological mechanism of our physical brain. The world of
conscious experience therefore is in principle accessible to scientific
scrutiny after all, both internally through introspection, and
externally
through neurophysiological recording.
6.4 Even if there are "pictures in the head",
how do those pictures become conscious
of themselves?
If we accept the materialist view that mind is a physical process taking
place in the physical mechanism of the brain, and since we know that
mind
is
conscious, then that already is direct and incontrovertible evidence
that
a
physical process taking place in a physical mechanism can under certain
conditions be conscious.
Now it it true that the brain is a very special kind of mechanism. But
what
makes the brain so special is not its substance, for it is made of the
ordinary substance of matter and energy. What sets the brain apart from
normal matter is its complex organization. The most likely explanation
therefore is that what makes our consciousness special is not its
substance,
but its complex organization.
So the simplest, most parsimonious explanation is that our own conscious
qualia evolved from those of our animal ancestors, and differ from those
earlier forms more in its level of complex organization rather than in
its
fundamental nature.
-------------------------
THEREFORE: Unless we wish to believe in some magical nomological dangler
that extends mind half way into the spirit world, we must face the
observational fact that there is a spatial representation in the brain.
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
Numerically Predicalationally Epistemologisized by Reanimater
I sometimes think I'm living in the body of giant me.
What I perceive of my body is a replication of the big
guy. The entire universe is a replication of his universe.
I don't have free will because I'm a replication of him and
whatever he does, I do. So right now he's thinking that
he's a replication of an even bigger guy. No actually
he's thinking that his big guy is thinking that he's a
replication of an even bigger guy....
Interesting idea but i wouldn't bet my life on the determinism part since it
goes out beyond our possible experience so far in history. But the little
guy as feeling things happening to the body and running feeling things,
yaaaaaaaaaaarrrrriiiieeeeeeeee-huh!
http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8&q=homunculus&spell=1
.
|
|
|
|
|
| User: "Edgar Svendsen" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
16 Apr 2004 08:25:28 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
What does this mean? No. 2, below, seems to contradict this. Aren't dreams
experience beyond the sensory surface?
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
Only if you define a "world" in which there are no dreams or hallucinations.
Of course, in *this* world there are dreams and hallucinations as well as
mountains and keyboards. I have dreams, my wife has dreams, so does my dog.
The dog clearly has dreams, he twitches and moves his feet as if running
during parts of his sleep. Dreams and hallucinations merely indicate that
some phenomena look odd when viewed from "the inside". I experience the
fact of his dreams pretty much the same way I experience other parts of 'the
world itself'.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that it
represents.
Of course not! One is a data structure, the other is the world, how could
they be the same?
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is consistent
with the facts of perception.
Without the capitalization, representationalism merely says that information
is not the same thing as the thing the information is about, seems obvious
to the computer generation.
---------------------------
5. The Dimensions of Conscious Experience reveals the visual world to be
composed of, solid volumes, bounded by colored surfaces, embedded in a
spatial void.
Every point on every visible surface is experienced as a separate entity,
all of which are perceived simultaneously in the form of continuous
surfaces
in depth. The phenomena of transparency, as well as the perception of
empty
space between the observer and a visible object demonstrate that multiple
depth values can be experienced at every point in visual space. In other
words, perceptual experience is like a museum diorama, or theatre set, in
which continuous colored surfaces bound volumetric objects embedded in a
spatial void.
Whatever the neurophysiological mechanism underlying this perceptual
experience, the information content explicitly encoded in that perceptual
representation cannot be any less than the information content of the
corresponding subjective experience.
---------------------------
6. Four Initial Objections;
6.1 If perception involves "pictures in your
head", then who is it that is viewing
those pictures?
Return to Representationalist Site
The Homunculus Objection: This "picture-in-the-head" or "Cartesian
theatre"
concept of visual representation has been criticized on the grounds that
there would have to be a miniature observer to view this miniature
internal
scene, resulting in an infinite regress of observers within observers.
But this argument is invalid. For in fact there is no need for an internal
observer of the scene, since the internal representation is simply a data
structure like any other data in a computer, except that this data is
expressed in spatial form. For if a picture in the head required a
homunculus to view it, then the same argument would hold for any other
form
of information in the brain, which would also require a homunculus to read
or interpret that information. In fact any information encoded in the
brain
needs only to be available to other internal processes rather than to a
miniature copy of the whole brain.
The fact that the brain does go to the trouble of constructing a full
spatial analog of the external environment merely suggests that it has
ways
to make use of this spatial data. In other words, the brain employes an
analogical paradigm of perceptual computation to make use of the
analogical
data in spatial perception.
6.2 Neuroscience has found no evidence
of "pictures in the head".
Phenomenology presents the mind as a three-dimensional colored structure
or
analogical representation, while neurophysiology presents the brain as an
assembly of billions of discrete quasi-independent local processors
interconnected in a massively parallel network.
Where in that mass of neural circuitry are the three-dimensional
volumetric
real-time moving pictures that we know so well in conscious experience?
The object of our phenomenological investigation is conscious experience
itself and knowledge of that particular entity is very certain. Knowledge
of
our own conscious state is more certain and reliable than any other
knowledge we can possibly have, even when our conscious experience is
itself
only a hallucination.
6.3 Conscious experience is not a physical substance
or structure that exists in any particular place,
and therefore it is neither "in your head", nor
it it "out in the world". It is a pure experiential
entity that has no direct physical manifestation.
The vehicles of neural representation bear no
resemblance to the phenomenal contents of
those vehicles.
The mind is identically equal to physical patterns of energy in the
physical
brain. To claim otherwise is to relegate the elaborate structure of
conscious experience to a mystical state beyond the bounds of science. The
dimensions of conscious experience, such as phenomenal color and
phenomenal
space, are a direct manifestation of certain physical states of our
physical
brain.
Things appear as they do because that is the way the world is represented
in
the neurophysiological mechanism of our physical brain. The world of
conscious experience therefore is in principle accessible to scientific
scrutiny after all, both internally through introspection, and externally
through neurophysiological recording.
6.4 Even if there are "pictures in the head",
how do those pictures become conscious
of themselves?
If we accept the materialist view that mind is a physical process taking
place in the physical mechanism of the brain, and since we know that mind
is
conscious, then that already is direct and incontrovertible evidence that
a
physical process taking place in a physical mechanism can under certain
conditions be conscious.
Now it it true that the brain is a very special kind of mechanism. But
what
makes the brain so special is not its substance, for it is made of the
ordinary substance of matter and energy. What sets the brain apart from
normal matter is its complex organization. The most likely explanation
therefore is that what makes our consciousness special is not its
substance,
but its complex organization.
So the simplest, most parsimonious explanation is that our own conscious
qualia evolved from those of our animal ancestors, and differ from those
earlier forms more in its level of complex organization rather than in its
fundamental nature.
-------------------------
THEREFORE: Unless we wish to believe in some magical nomological dangler
that extends mind half way into the spirit world, we must face the
observational fact that there is a spatial representation in the brain.
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
Numerically Predicalationally Epistemologisized by Reanimater
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
16 Apr 2004 11:48:53 PM |
|
|
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:cI%fc.11278$zj3.7509@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we see
in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect
Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
What does this mean? No. 2, below, seems to contradict this. Aren't
dreams
experience beyond the sensory surface?
The original author means by "beyond" external to the body but subjective
experience is within?
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that
the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
Only if you define a "world" in which there are no dreams or
hallucinations.
Of course, in *this* world there are dreams and hallucinations as well as
mountains and keyboards. I have dreams, my wife has dreams, so does my
dog.
The dog clearly has dreams, he twitches and moves his feet as if running
during parts of his sleep. Dreams and hallucinations merely indicate that
some phenomena look odd when viewed from "the inside". I experience the
fact of his dreams pretty much the same way I experience other parts of
'the
world itself'.
I agree that humans and animals dream, its pretty obvious as you say. And of
course dreams and hallucinations most likely take place as the activities of
nerve cells firing in the world.
But the original author is talking about how dreams at least sometimes
differ from what is going on external to the body and inner subjective
experience. He uses this distinction as some sort of evidence in support of
the common subject of representationalism.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate
that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that it
represents.
Of course not! One is a data structure, the other is the world, how could
they be the same?
You sound very critical for one who seems to be agreeing with the posters
views on representationalism. But to harken beack to one of your own points
these data structures occur in the world so they share that at least with
what they represent.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is
consistent
with the facts of perception.
Without the capitalization, representationalism merely says that
information
is not the same thing as the thing the information is about, seems obvious
to the computer generation.
The proposition after the "therefore;" is a complete sentence alone. But
when I copied and pasted it I cold have changed the R to an r. How is that
important?
And you claimed earlier that the representations are in the world and if
that is the case then if the representation represents the representation
wouldn't the representation be in that case the same as what it represents
in the world?
---------------------------
5. The Dimensions of Conscious Experience reveals the visual world to be
composed of, solid volumes, bounded by colored surfaces, embedded in a
spatial void.
Every point on every visible surface is experienced as a separate
entity,
all of which are perceived simultaneously in the form of continuous
surfaces
in depth. The phenomena of transparency, as well as the perception of
empty
space between the observer and a visible object demonstrate that
multiple
depth values can be experienced at every point in visual space. In other
words, perceptual experience is like a museum diorama, or theatre set,
in
which continuous colored surfaces bound volumetric objects embedded in a
spatial void.
Whatever the neurophysiological mechanism underlying this perceptual
experience, the information content explicitly encoded in that
perceptual
representation cannot be any less than the information content of the
corresponding subjective experience.
---------------------------
6. Four Initial Objections;
6.1 If perception involves "pictures in your
head", then who is it that is viewing
those pictures?
Return to Representationalist Site
The Homunculus Objection: This "picture-in-the-head" or "Cartesian
theatre"
concept of visual representation has been criticized on the grounds that
there would have to be a miniature observer to view this miniature
internal
scene, resulting in an infinite regress of observers within observers.
But this argument is invalid. For in fact there is no need for an
internal
observer of the scene, since the internal representation is simply a
data
structure like any other data in a computer, except that this data is
expressed in spatial form. For if a picture in the head required a
homunculus to view it, then the same argument would hold for any other
form
of information in the brain, which would also require a homunculus to
read
or interpret that information. In fact any information encoded in the
brain
needs only to be available to other internal processes rather than to a
miniature copy of the whole brain.
The fact that the brain does go to the trouble of constructing a full
spatial analog of the external environment merely suggests that it has
ways
to make use of this spatial data. In other words, the brain employes an
analogical paradigm of perceptual computation to make use of the
analogical
data in spatial perception.
6.2 Neuroscience has found no evidence
of "pictures in the head".
Phenomenology presents the mind as a three-dimensional colored structure
or
analogical representation, while neurophysiology presents the brain as
an
assembly of billions of discrete quasi-independent local processors
interconnected in a massively parallel network.
Where in that mass of neural circuitry are the three-dimensional
volumetric
real-time moving pictures that we know so well in conscious experience?
The object of our phenomenological investigation is conscious experience
itself and knowledge of that particular entity is very certain.
Knowledge
of
our own conscious state is more certain and reliable than any other
knowledge we can possibly have, even when our conscious experience is
itself
only a hallucination.
6.3 Conscious experience is not a physical substance
or structure that exists in any particular place,
and therefore it is neither "in your head", nor
it it "out in the world". It is a pure experiential
entity that has no direct physical manifestation.
The vehicles of neural representation bear no
resemblance to the phenomenal contents of
those vehicles.
The mind is identically equal to physical patterns of energy in the
physical
brain. To claim otherwise is to relegate the elaborate structure of
conscious experience to a mystical state beyond the bounds of science.
The
dimensions of conscious experience, such as phenomenal color and
phenomenal
space, are a direct manifestation of certain physical states of our
physical
brain.
Things appear as they do because that is the way the world is
represented
in
the neurophysiological mechanism of our physical brain. The world of
conscious experience therefore is in principle accessible to scientific
scrutiny after all, both internally through introspection, and
externally
through neurophysiological recording.
6.4 Even if there are "pictures in the head",
how do those pictures become conscious
of themselves?
If we accept the materialist view that mind is a physical process taking
place in the physical mechanism of the brain, and since we know that
mind
is
conscious, then that already is direct and incontrovertible evidence
that
a
physical process taking place in a physical mechanism can under certain
conditions be conscious.
Now it it true that the brain is a very special kind of mechanism. But
what
makes the brain so special is not its substance, for it is made of the
ordinary substance of matter and energy. What sets the brain apart from
normal matter is its complex organization. The most likely explanation
therefore is that what makes our consciousness special is not its
substance,
but its complex organization.
So the simplest, most parsimonious explanation is that our own conscious
qualia evolved from those of our animal ancestors, and differ from those
earlier forms more in its level of complex organization rather than in
its
fundamental nature.
-------------------------
THEREFORE: Unless we wish to believe in some magical nomological dangler
that extends mind half way into the spirit world, we must face the
observational fact that there is a spatial representation in the brain.
http://cns-alumni.bu.edu/~slehar/Representationalism.html
Numerically Predicalationally Epistemologisized by Reanimater
.
|
|
|
| User: "Edgar Svendsen" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
17 Apr 2004 07:27:26 AM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:LN6dne-YcISDJR3dRVn-hQ@comcast.com...
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:cI%fc.11278$zj3.7509@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we
see
in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect
Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
What does this mean? No. 2, below, seems to contradict this. Aren't
dreams
experience beyond the sensory surface?
The original author means by "beyond" external to the body but subjective
experience is within?
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate that
the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
Only if you define a "world" in which there are no dreams or
hallucinations.
Of course, in *this* world there are dreams and hallucinations as well
as
mountains and keyboards. I have dreams, my wife has dreams, so does my
dog.
The dog clearly has dreams, he twitches and moves his feet as if running
during parts of his sleep. Dreams and hallucinations merely indicate
that
some phenomena look odd when viewed from "the inside". I experience the
fact of his dreams pretty much the same way I experience other parts of
'the
world itself'.
I agree that humans and animals dream, its pretty obvious as you say. And
of
course dreams and hallucinations most likely take place as the activities
of
nerve cells firing in the world.
But the original author is talking about how dreams at least sometimes
differ from what is going on external to the body and inner subjective
experience. He uses this distinction as some sort of evidence in support
of
the common subject of representationalism.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly indicate
that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that it
represents.
Of course not! One is a data structure, the other is the world, how
could
they be the same?
You sound very critical for one who seems to be agreeing with the posters
views on representationalism. But to harken beack to one of your own
points
these data structures occur in the world so they share that at least with
what they represent.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is
consistent
with the facts of perception.
Without the capitalization, representationalism merely says that
information
is not the same thing as the thing the information is about, seems
obvious
to the computer generation.
The proposition after the "therefore;" is a complete sentence alone. But
when I copied and pasted it I cold have changed the R to an r. How is that
important?
And you claimed earlier that the representations are in the world and if
that is the case then if the representation represents the representation
wouldn't the representation be in that case the same as what it represents
in the world?
Good one!
It depends on what you mean by 'the same'. How about if we call what's in
the brain (or the mind) a description instead of a representation? A
description is not usually regarded as a replica of the thing described.
Since what's in the brain/mind is a data structure, it seems to make more
sense to call it a description. This seems to obviate some of the
complications of calling what's in the brain/mind a 'representation'.
Descriptions are like representations but there is the idea that they have a
different form or structure then what they describe; whereas representations
are identical in form to the thing they represent.
Ed
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
17 Apr 2004 11:49:37 PM |
|
|
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:Oo9gc.12446$zj3.7807@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:LN6dne-YcISDJR3dRVn-hQ@comcast.com...
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:cI%fc.11278$zj3.7509@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world we
see
in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect
Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
What does this mean? No. 2, below, seems to contradict this. Aren't
dreams
experience beyond the sensory surface?
The original author means by "beyond" external to the body but
subjective
experience is within?
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate
that
the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
Only if you define a "world" in which there are no dreams or
hallucinations.
Of course, in *this* world there are dreams and hallucinations as well
as
mountains and keyboards. I have dreams, my wife has dreams, so does
my
dog.
The dog clearly has dreams, he twitches and moves his feet as if
running
during parts of his sleep. Dreams and hallucinations merely indicate
that
some phenomena look odd when viewed from "the inside". I experience
the
fact of his dreams pretty much the same way I experience other parts
of
'the
world itself'.
I agree that humans and animals dream, its pretty obvious as you say.
And
of
course dreams and hallucinations most likely take place as the
activities
of
nerve cells firing in the world.
But the original author is talking about how dreams at least sometimes
differ from what is going on external to the body and inner subjective
experience. He uses this distinction as some sort of evidence in support
of
the common subject of representationalism.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly
indicate
that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that
it
represents.
Of course not! One is a data structure, the other is the world, how
could
they be the same?
You sound very critical for one who seems to be agreeing with the
posters
views on representationalism. But to harken beack to one of your own
points
these data structures occur in the world so they share that at least
with
what they represent.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is
consistent
with the facts of perception.
Without the capitalization, representationalism merely says that
information
is not the same thing as the thing the information is about, seems
obvious
to the computer generation.
The proposition after the "therefore;" is a complete sentence alone. But
when I copied and pasted it I cold have changed the R to an r. How is
that
important?
And you claimed earlier that the representations are in the world and if
that is the case then if the representation represents the
representation
wouldn't the representation be in that case the same as what it
represents
in the world?
Good one!
It depends on what you mean by 'the same'. How about if we call what's in
the brain (or the mind) a description instead of a representation? A
description is not usually regarded as a replica of the thing described.
Since what's in the brain/mind is a data structure, it seems to make more
sense to call it a description. This seems to obviate some of the
complications of calling what's in the brain/mind a 'representation'.
Descriptions are like representations but there is the idea that they have
a
different form or structure then what they describe; whereas
representations
are identical in form to the thing they represent.
Ed
I can go with that but it gets kinda hard when neurosurgeons have to deal
with real time scan movies of brain activities while asking the patient
questions, while preparing to operate so as not to cut out anything vital.
And neurologists have been calling what goes on in the brains
representations for more than 50 years. They could change their language but
then they synch out from Kant.
.
|
|
|
| User: "717" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
19 Apr 2004 01:14:41 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:quGdnWdRSfFWlB_dRVn-uQ@comcast.com...
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:Oo9gc.12446$zj3.7807@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:LN6dne-YcISDJR3dRVn-hQ@comcast.com...
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:cI%fc.11278$zj3.7509@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world
we
see
in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal
representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect
Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological
Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory surface.
What does this mean? No. 2, below, seems to contradict this. Aren't
dreams
experience beyond the sensory surface?
The original author means by "beyond" external to the body but
subjective
experience is within?
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate
that
the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
Only if you define a "world" in which there are no dreams or
hallucinations.
Of course, in *this* world there are dreams and hallucinations as
well
as
mountains and keyboards. I have dreams, my wife has dreams, so does
my
dog.
The dog clearly has dreams, he twitches and moves his feet as if
running
during parts of his sleep. Dreams and hallucinations merely indicate
that
some phenomena look odd when viewed from "the inside". I experience
the
fact of his dreams pretty much the same way I experience other parts
of
'the
world itself'.
I agree that humans and animals dream, its pretty obvious as you say.
And
of
course dreams and hallucinations most likely take place as the
activities
of
nerve cells firing in the world.
But the original author is talking about how dreams at least sometimes
differ from what is going on external to the body and inner subjective
experience. He uses this distinction as some sort of evidence in
support
of
the common subject of representationalism.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly
indicate
that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world that
it
represents.
Of course not! One is a data structure, the other is the world, how
could
they be the same?
You sound very critical for one who seems to be agreeing with the
posters
views on representationalism. But to harken beack to one of your own
points
these data structures occur in the world so they share that at least
with
what they represent.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as much
a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is
consistent
with the facts of perception.
Without the capitalization, representationalism merely says that
information
is not the same thing as the thing the information is about, seems
obvious
to the computer generation.
The proposition after the "therefore;" is a complete sentence alone.
But
when I copied and pasted it I cold have changed the R to an r. How is
that
important?
And you claimed earlier that the representations are in the world and
if
that is the case then if the representation represents the
representation
wouldn't the representation be in that case the same as what it
represents
in the world?
Good one!
It depends on what you mean by 'the same'. How about if we call what's
in
the brain (or the mind) a description instead of a representation? A
description is not usually regarded as a replica of the thing described.
Since what's in the brain/mind is a data structure, it seems to make
more
sense to call it a description. This seems to obviate some of the
complications of calling what's in the brain/mind a 'representation'.
Descriptions are like representations but there is the idea that they
have
a
different form or structure then what they describe; whereas
representations
are identical in form to the thing they represent.
Ed
I can go with that but it gets kinda hard when neurosurgeons have to deal
with real time scan movies of brain activities while asking the patient
questions, while preparing to operate so as not to cut out anything vital.
And neurologists have been calling what goes on in the brains
representations for more than 50 years. They could change their language
but
then they synch out from Kant.
From an external, though not necessarily objective
point of view, the mind is representations, but from
internal point of view the mind, the representation(s)
are reality.
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
19 Apr 2004 01:38:07 PM |
|
|
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:mGUgc.51476$ec1.14994@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:quGdnWdRSfFWlB_dRVn-uQ@comcast.com...
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:Oo9gc.12446$zj3.7807@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:LN6dne-YcISDJR3dRVn-hQ@comcast.com...
"Edgar Svendsen" <solon013@earthlink.net> wrote in message
news:cI%fc.11278$zj3.7509@newsread3.news.atl.earthlink.net...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:OO-dneU4NKGUkR3d4p2dnA@comcast.com...
Representationalism is the philosophical position that the world
we
see
in
conscious experience is not the real world itself, but merely a
miniature
virtual-reality replica of that world in an internal
representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology) as Indirect
Perception,
and (in philosophy) as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological
Dualism.
1. It is impossible to have experience beyond the sensory
surface.
What does this mean? No. 2, below, seems to contradict this.
Aren't
dreams
experience beyond the sensory surface?
The original author means by "beyond" external to the body but
subjective
experience is within?
2. Dreams, Hallucinations, and Visual Illusions clearly indicate
that
the
world of experience is not the same thing as the world itself.
Only if you define a "world" in which there are no dreams or
hallucinations.
Of course, in *this* world there are dreams and hallucinations as
well
as
mountains and keyboards. I have dreams, my wife has dreams, so
does
my
dog.
The dog clearly has dreams, he twitches and moves his feet as if
running
during parts of his sleep. Dreams and hallucinations merely
indicate
that
some phenomena look odd when viewed from "the inside". I
experience
the
fact of his dreams pretty much the same way I experience other
parts
of
'the
world itself'.
I agree that humans and animals dream, its pretty obvious as you
say.
And
of
course dreams and hallucinations most likely take place as the
activities
of
nerve cells firing in the world.
But the original author is talking about how dreams at least
sometimes
differ from what is going on external to the body and inner
subjective
experience. He uses this distinction as some sort of evidence in
support
of
the common subject of representationalism.
3. The observed Properties of Phenomenal Perspective clearly
indicate
that
the world of experience is not the same as the external world
that
it
represents.
Of course not! One is a data structure, the other is the world,
how
could
they be the same?
You sound very critical for one who seems to be agreeing with the
posters
views on representationalism. But to harken beack to one of your own
points
these data structures occur in the world so they share that at least
with
what they represent.
4. Perception operates like a guided hallucination that is as
much
a
matter
of active construction or generation, as it is a matter of
passive
detection
or recognition.
---------------------------
Therefore; Representationalism is the only alternative that is
consistent
with the facts of perception.
Without the capitalization, representationalism merely says that
information
is not the same thing as the thing the information is about, seems
obvious
to the computer generation.
The proposition after the "therefore;" is a complete sentence alone.
But
when I copied and pasted it I cold have changed the R to an r. How
is
that
important?
And you claimed earlier that the representations are in the world
and
if
that is the case then if the representation represents the
representation
wouldn't the representation be in that case the same as what it
represents
in the world?
Good one!
It depends on what you mean by 'the same'. How about if we call
what's
in
the brain (or the mind) a description instead of a representation? A
description is not usually regarded as a replica of the thing
described.
Since what's in the brain/mind is a data structure, it seems to make
more
sense to call it a description. This seems to obviate some of the
complications of calling what's in the brain/mind a 'representation'.
Descriptions are like representations but there is the idea that they
have
a
different form or structure then what they describe; whereas
representations
are identical in form to the thing they represent.
Ed
I can go with that but it gets kinda hard when neurosurgeons have to
deal
with real time scan movies of brain activities while asking the patient
questions, while preparing to operate so as not to cut out anything
vital.
And neurologists have been calling what goes on in the brains
representations for more than 50 years. They could change their language
but
then they synch out from Kant.
From an external, though not necessarily objective
point of view, the mind is representations, but from
internal point of view the mind, the representation(s)
are reality.
You mean what it feels like for my body to do such and such and feel
sensations such and such?
.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| User: "Keynes" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
17 Apr 2004 01:50:26 PM |
|
|
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
18 Apr 2004 12:01:39 AM |
|
|
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
.
|
|
|
| User: "717" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
19 Apr 2004 01:18:24 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
19 Apr 2004 01:46:19 PM |
|
|
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
You tryin' to sell me some over-extended monoism, sunny side up with a soft
yoke?
I contain a part of the world and I am a part in the whole. and of course
there is a whole in the part (but don't take it back you can fiddle with
your part-whole relationships!)
Mereology (from the Greek µe???, ‘part’) is the theory of parthood
relations: of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to
part within a whole.
Its roots can be traced back to the early days of philosophy, beginning with
the Presocratic atomists and continuing throughout the writings of Plato
(especially the Parmenides and the Thaetetus), Aristotle (especially the
Metaphysics, but also the Physics, the Topics, and De partibus animalium),
and Boethius (especially In Ciceronis Topica).
Mereology has also occupied a prominent role in the writings of medieval
ontologists and scholastic philosophers such as Garland the Computist, Peter
Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and Albert of Saxony, as well as in
Jungius's Logica Hamburgensis (1638), Leibniz's Dissertatio de arte
combinatoria (1666) and Monadology (1714), and Kant's early writings (the
Gedanken of 1747 and the Monadologia physica of 1756).
As a formal theory of parthood relations, however, mereology made its way
into modern philosophy mainly through the work of Franz Brentano and of his
pupils, especially Husserl's third Logical Investigation (1901). The latter
may rightly be considered the first attempt at a rigorous formulation of the
theory, though in a format that makes it difficult to disentagle the
analysis of mereological concepts from that of other ontologically relevant
notions (such as the relation of ontological dependence). It is not until
Lesniewski's Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds (1916, in Polish)
that the pure theory of part-relations as we know it today was given an
exact formulation. And because Lesniewski's work was largely inaccessible to
non-speakers of Polish, it is only with the publication of Leonard and
Goodman's The Calculus of Individuals (1940) that this theory has become a
chapter of central interest for modern ontologists and metaphysicians.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
Branch of logic, founded by Stanislaw Lesniewski, that studies class
expressions and the relations between parts and wholes.
It rejects the hierarchy of sets generated in set theory through the
member-of relation and instead proposes a part-whole relationship. It has
attracted philosophers of logic and mathematics who are nominalists (see
universal), those who suspect set theory of being inherently Platonistic,
and those who are otherwise suspicious of the complex entities proposed by,
and the complicated assumptions needed for, set theory.
jj http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=397203
.
|
|
|
| User: "Gray asphalt" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
26 Apr 2004 03:00:52 PM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:oKCdnbk6nZn1ghndRVn-tA@comcast.com...
:
: "717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
: news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
: >
: > "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
: > news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
: > >
: > > "Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
: > > news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
: > > >
: > > >
: > > > Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
: > > >
: > >
: > > The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
: > >
: > > >
: > > >
: > >
: > >
: >
: > Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
: > you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
: >
:
: You tryin' to sell me some over-extended monoism, sunny side up with a
soft
: yoke?
:
: I contain a part of the world and I am a part in the whole. and of course
: there is a whole in the part (but don't take it back you can fiddle with
: your part-whole relationships!)
:
: Mereology (from the Greek µe???, 'part') is the theory of parthood
: relations: of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to
: part within a whole.
:
: Its roots can be traced back to the early days of philosophy, beginning
with
: the Presocratic atomists and continuing throughout the writings of Plato
: (especially the Parmenides and the Thaetetus), Aristotle (especially the
: Metaphysics, but also the Physics, the Topics, and De partibus animalium),
: and Boethius (especially In Ciceronis Topica).
:
: Mereology has also occupied a prominent role in the writings of medieval
: ontologists and scholastic philosophers such as Garland the Computist,
Peter
: Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and Albert of Saxony, as well as in
: Jungius's Logica Hamburgensis (1638), Leibniz's Dissertatio de arte
: combinatoria (1666) and Monadology (1714), and Kant's early writings (the
: Gedanken of 1747 and the Monadologia physica of 1756).
:
: As a formal theory of parthood relations, however, mereology made its way
: into modern philosophy mainly through the work of Franz Brentano and of
his
: pupils, especially Husserl's third Logical Investigation (1901). The
latter
: may rightly be considered the first attempt at a rigorous formulation of
the
: theory, though in a format that makes it difficult to disentagle the
: analysis of mereological concepts from that of other ontologically
relevant
: notions (such as the relation of ontological dependence). It is not until
: Lesniewski's Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds (1916, in
Polish)
: that the pure theory of part-relations as we know it today was given an
: exact formulation. And because Lesniewski's work was largely inaccessible
to
: non-speakers of Polish, it is only with the publication of Leonard and
: Goodman's The Calculus of Individuals (1940) that this theory has become a
: chapter of central interest for modern ontologists and metaphysicians.
:
: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
:
:
: Branch of logic, founded by Stanislaw Lesniewski, that studies class
: expressions and the relations between parts and wholes.
:
: It rejects the hierarchy of sets generated in set theory through the
: member-of relation and instead proposes a part-whole relationship. It has
: attracted philosophers of logic and mathematics who are nominalists (see
: universal), those who suspect set theory of being inherently Platonistic,
: and those who are otherwise suspicious of the complex entities proposed
by,
: and the complicated assumptions needed for, set theory.
:
: jj http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=397203
:
:
: >
:
:
I think that what I said makes sense.
.
|
|
|
|
| User: "717" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
20 Apr 2004 02:25:06 AM |
|
|
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:oKCdnbk6nZn1ghndRVn-tA@comcast.com...
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
You tryin' to sell me some over-extended monoism, sunny side up with a
soft
yoke?
I contain a part of the world and I am a part in the whole. and of course
there is a whole in the part (but don't take it back you can fiddle with
your part-whole relationships!)
Mereology (from the Greek µe???, ‘part’) is the theory of parthood
relations: of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to
part within a whole.
Its roots can be traced back to the early days of philosophy, beginning
with
the Presocratic atomists and continuing throughout the writings of Plato
(especially the Parmenides and the Thaetetus), Aristotle (especially the
Metaphysics, but also the Physics, the Topics, and De partibus animalium),
and Boethius (especially In Ciceronis Topica).
Mereology has also occupied a prominent role in the writings of medieval
ontologists and scholastic philosophers such as Garland the Computist,
Peter
Abelard, Thomas Aquinas, Raymond Lull, and Albert of Saxony, as well as in
Jungius's Logica Hamburgensis (1638), Leibniz's Dissertatio de arte
combinatoria (1666) and Monadology (1714), and Kant's early writings (the
Gedanken of 1747 and the Monadologia physica of 1756).
As a formal theory of parthood relations, however, mereology made its way
into modern philosophy mainly through the work of Franz Brentano and of
his
pupils, especially Husserl's third Logical Investigation (1901). The
latter
may rightly be considered the first attempt at a rigorous formulation of
the
theory, though in a format that makes it difficult to disentagle the
analysis of mereological concepts from that of other ontologically
relevant
notions (such as the relation of ontological dependence). It is not until
Lesniewski's Foundations of a General Theory of Manifolds (1916, in
Polish)
that the pure theory of part-relations as we know it today was given an
exact formulation. And because Lesniewski's work was largely inaccessible
to
non-speakers of Polish, it is only with the publication of Leonard and
Goodman's The Calculus of Individuals (1940) that this theory has become a
chapter of central interest for modern ontologists and metaphysicians.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mereology/
Branch of logic, founded by Stanislaw Lesniewski, that studies class
expressions and the relations between parts and wholes.
It rejects the hierarchy of sets generated in set theory through the
member-of relation and instead proposes a part-whole relationship. It has
attracted philosophers of logic and mathematics who are nominalists (see
universal), those who suspect set theory of being inherently Platonistic,
and those who are otherwise suspicious of the complex entities proposed
by,
and the complicated assumptions needed for, set theory.
jj http://concise.britannica.com/ebc/article?eu=397203
That wasn't exactly a precise dissection of my simplistic
yet peaceful view of the mind/world relationship.
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
20 Apr 2004 10:22:55 AM |
|
|
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:nf4hc.59334$ec1.45635@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:oKCdnbk6nZn1ghndRVn-tA@comcast.com...
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
"to me" is a hypothesis and may or may not correspond to the notion of other
minds in a world external to me body.
That wasn't exactly a precise dissection of my simplistic
yet peaceful view of the mind/world relationship.
.
|
|
|
|
|
| User: "Keynes" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
20 Apr 2004 01:32:20 AM |
|
|
On Mon, 19 Apr 2004 11:46:19 -0700, "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com>
wrote:
"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
"Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
You tryin' to sell me some over-extended monoism, sunny side up with a soft
yoke?
I contain a part of the world and I am a part in the whole. and of course
there is a whole in the part (but don't take it back you can fiddle with
your part-whole relationships!)
Mereology (from the Greek µe???, ‘part’) is the theory of parthood
relations: of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to
part within a whole.
I suspect all theories apart from solipsism invoke the practicality
of assuming an 'external reality', without logically accounting for it.
.
|
|
|
| User: "Gray asphalt" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
26 Apr 2004 07:38:15 PM |
|
|
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:tqg9809i3rnp2m2l7q482s3sbmsdqt8vre@4ax.com...
: On Mon, 19 Apr 2004 11:46:19 -0700, "Immortalist"
<Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com>
: wrote:
:
: >
: >"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
: >news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
: >>
: >> "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
: >> news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
: >> >
: >> > "Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
: >> > news:a2v280tt21paod1b4bm0q7mm94kqoi8784@4ax.com...
: >> > >
: >> > >
: >> > > Is the mind in the world or is the world in the mind?
: >> > >
: >> >
: >> > The mind is the activities of some parts of the world?
: >> >
: >> > >
: >> > >
: >> >
: >> >
: >>
: >> Other people's minds are in the world. Your mind, to
: >> you contains the world. It's that simple, isn't it.... ?
: >>
: >
: >You tryin' to sell me some over-extended monoism, sunny side up with a
soft
: >yoke?
: >
: >I contain a part of the world and I am a part in the whole. and of course
: >there is a whole in the part (but don't take it back you can fiddle with
: >your part-whole relationships!)
: >
: >Mereology (from the Greek µe???, 'part') is the theory of parthood
: >relations: of the relations of part to whole and the relations of part to
: >part within a whole.
: >
:
: I suspect all theories apart from solipsism invoke the practicality
: of assuming an 'external reality', without logically accounting for it.
A true solipsist would not posit self since there is nothing
else and therefore self has no meaning. Only the one thing...
with nothing to contrast it to. I can see this in a sense but
the body has to be part of the self as does the brain. And
yes it is weird to consider the body without the brain...
but even more common is considering the brain without the
body, as if we could know something without sense organs
and that your sex hormones don't affect your thinking and
your perception of the world. On a horny day the world is
filled with tits, no question (for a non-homosexual guy)...
.
|
|
|
| User: "Immortalist" |
|
| Title: Re: You're a miniature virtual-reality replica of the world |
27 Apr 2004 04:12:40 PM |
|
|
"Gray asphalt" <goodidea1950SPAM-SPAM@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:_Xhjc.613$Qy.610@fed1read04...
"Keynes" <Keynes@earthlinkspam.net> wrote in message
news:tqg9809i3rnp2m2l7q482s3sbmsdqt8vre@4ax.com...
: On Mon, 19 Apr 2004 11:46:19 -0700, "Immortalist"
<Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com>
: wrote:
:
: >
: >"717" <no@spam.net> wrote in message
: >news:SJUgc.51533$ec1.36337@okepread01...
: >>
: >> "Immortalist" <Reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
: >> news:nvidnYDzA8sCkR_dRVn-sQ@comcast.com...
: >> >
: | | | | | | | |
