| Topic: |
Science > Philosophy |
| User: |
"MobyDikc" |
| Date: |
15 Aug 2005 04:01:20 PM |
| Object: |
Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
Hey,
I'm looking for critical errors with an idea sort of like Dennett's
consciousness, explained here:
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=51
Does it seem like an adequate explanation of the mind?
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
15 Aug 2005 09:51:11 PM |
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MobyDikc wrote:
Hey,
I'm looking for critical errors with an idea sort of like Dennett's
consciousness, explained here:
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=51
Does it seem like an adequate explanation of the mind?
Zenetics seems to be what the link you gave is about, please read and
describe precisely where you need the refutation and I will try and
slice and dice even if I am for the theory?
Is it a religious view like;
I submit that Mind is, for the want of a better term, a UNITARY
continuum such that there exists NO genuine dividing line between
Mind's conscious and sub-conscious attributes.
Rather, ALL of us come into the world at one end of the continuum and,
at once, begin to move towards the other end.
MOST of us pass on before reaching the other end - a FEW do reach it.
We call them Prophets, Sages, etc.
If I understand it correctly, THAT is what the ancient Greeks termed
our "race through life" - a "race" undertaken by the Human Spirit to
free itself from the fetters of Time and Space.
In the final act of Shakespeare's play, 'The Tempest', when Miranda
exults over a Brave New World, her father Prospero responds: "'Tis new
to thee."
As in: What else is new?
The continuum of Mind and Sex are alike in that, while at its immature
end, we cannot possibly envisage what lies at the other end.
....or is it like;
I. Introduction
A zene is any element of your conscious experience.
Right now, as you're reading this, you are seeing some medium with text
on it. The image you are seeing exists in your mind as a collection of
zenes.
When you read the text your mind deciphers the text into recognizable
words; the words are zenes. The words are given meaning by your mind;
the meaning of a word is a zene.
You might be feeling confused or skeptical or intrigued as you read
this. That feeling is a zene.
The world that exists in your mind is a zene composed of many smaller
zenes.
We can roughly classify all zenes into an experience of sense (for
example sight, sound, smell, touch), an experience of knowledge (for
example ideas, guesses, myths, assumptions, theories, facts, beliefs),
and an experience of emotion (for example love, fear, anger).
While we have scientific and philosophical studies for observation and
knowledge and emotion we have never quite successfully established a
study of all of these elements in terms of how they co-exist in our
conscious experience. That is the purpose of zenetics: by giving a
unique name to the fundamental element of our conscious experience we
acquire the ability to investigate and discuss our mind in a unique
way.
After examining zenes in more detail, the topics of how to test some of
the claims made by zenetics and its implication on studies beyond the
realm of mind will be discussed.
II. More on zenes
Often when talking about the conscious experience it is common to refer
to non-conscious or sub-conscious behavior. We know from common
experience that people act in non-genetic ways that they don't have to
think about[1].
What we call the conscious experience is broadened under zenetics to
include what is traditionally called sub-conscious. The reason is the
distinction between conscious and sub-conscious suggests that more than
one physical process is at work in the brain. Of course, there might in
fact be; but it has yet to be demonstrated; and until it is discovered
there will remain the possibility that the distinction does not exist
and thus a source for a great deal of confusion on the subject of mind.
Zenetics postulates that there is one physical process in the brain for
creating and manipulating zenes. Whether the zene is the involuntary
reaction to vomit at the smell of tequila after an outrageous trip to
Mexico, or the thought that it is time to ask the bartender for another
round, the physical process is the same.
What is that physical process? Without knowing very much about it at
this point, a vague hypothesis may be offered. The physical process is
electrical activity in patterns of neuronal wiring similar to Richard
Dawkins' description of the physical manifestation of memes[2]. Since
every meme is a zene then the biochemistry of memes will tell us a
great deal about the biochemistry of zenes.
The question remaining is if our conscious experience includes what was
traditionally referred to as the sub-conscious, then what does zenetics
have to say about the phenomena of thinking, voluntary decision making,
and other higher-level features of consciousness?
Unless there is some compelling evidence to suggest something deeper,
all that needs to be said is that in the vast network of the brain's
wiring these higher-level features are just that: higher-level zenes
exhibiting more sophistication but nothing fundamentally different from
other zenes. As an example, the zenes for language are patterns of
wiring that rely on more basic patterns of wiring to function, much the
same way that high-level software languages are expressive and complex
yet rest entirely on simpler languages and, in the end, execute the
same way by a microprocessor.
There is an important consequence of a single physical process for
zenes in the mind. The same process by which the mind interprets
knowledge and meaning is the same process by which observation occurs.
If this is true, it seems that the transformation of sensory
information into the conscious experience is not a simple encoding
process based on rigid rules, but rather a more sophisticated
problem-solving process.
This is a very subtle point which deserves some explanation.
First, a brief review of epistemology is required. How does knowledge
become knowledge? All knowledge is conjectural[3]; a thinker identifies
a problem and then creates a new hypothesis as a solution to this
problem. After critically examining the hypothesis the thinker will
either accept this conjectured answer as a "good enough" tentative
solution, or the thinker will find some critical flaw and abandon the
hypothesis in search of another. That is how knowledge becomes
knowledge. It is never certain from the perspective of the thinker that
the knowledge is absolutely true, simply that it is true enough until a
better answer comes along.
The important question to ask of this is, how does the thinker create a
new hypothesis? How are new ideas formed in the brain? It is not known,
but the existence of new ideas proves that it must occur, even if it is
purely by accident or probability. And thus it must be explained by the
physical process for zenes.
Just as it is not known how a new theory is created, it is not known
how information the brain receives from sense organs becomes qualia[4],
the sense zenes. The common assumption is that the sense organs
transmit it to the brain via electromagnetic signals. Those signals are
then translated by some sort of rigid objective, computer-like rules
into qualia like vision, hearing, and touch.
Zenetics offers a different suggestion: the process that creates qualia
is the same physical process that creates knowledge.
When the brain gets information from the sense organs it says to itself
(not using words, of course) "what is this?"
The information is then sent through problem-solving networks that are
very un-computer-like. They are based, perhaps, on some subjective
pattern matching. The result is the brain saying (again, without words)
"it is this" in the form of a vision, or a sound, or a sensation.
In other words, our conscious experience isn't some perfect translation
of sense into colors and noise, but rather a guess by the brain at what
has been sensed. The ability to guess accurately is refined over years
of testing the guess with experience and coming up with better guesses.
This is pretty different from our basic assumptions about how it all
works, and implementing such a process in a computer may be a major
step toward artificial intelligence.
Though the suggestion is a vague one, it is a unique hypothesis.
III. Conclusions
The recognition of zenes as the elements of our conscious experience
and the individual's preference toward a consistent system of zenes
inherently demands the following:
1. That knowledge is an evolutionary system
We can create or eliminate or modify the zenes of knowledge in order to
reconcile them into consistent and coherent theories and beliefs.
2. That knowledge and observation should be consistent
Not only are we encouraged to refine our knowledge to be consistent
with other knowledge, we are equally compelled to refine our knowledge
to be in agreement with all that is observed.
The combination of these two points means that a consistent zenetic
mind implicitly utilizes the scientific method.
While all this might sound like an interesting new philosophy of the
mind, is there any possibility of zenetics making real scientific
claims?
The first route to achieving this is describing the contrasting major
departures of zenetics from traditional views of consciousness. While
some in the field regard the sensory experience in our mind as content
organized by some internal spatial-temporal geometry[5], zenetics gives
a different picture. Any geometry of the mind, including time and
space, is actually a zene. Time and space as a zene would be created by
the mind as a conjectured explanation for information coming to the
brain from the sense organs. Opposed to the suggestion that
consciousness contains an inherited notion of time and space, in
zenetics time and space could be a crude idea in the developing mind
refined by experience with its environment.
It seems that this could be possible to test by examining an infant's
ability to perceive time and space.
Going even further with the zenetic view of time and space (and even
the possibility that matter is a zene) it seems possible to devise a
completely new system of physics[6] which could be testable, and thus
provide indirect testability for zenetics.
It is important to know that zenetics is not an attempt to define
consciousness. Instead, our notions of consciousness are used as a
launch pad for discussing zenetics. The careful reader will note that
zenetics encompasses more than what is traditionally referred to as the
conscious experience. Effectively dissolving consciousness as a real
phenomenon, zenetics is offered as a replacement.
Notes:
[1] For example, skilled craftsmen, athletes, or musicians appear to
act automatically
[2] From the end-notes to the 1989 version of The Selfish Gene:
"DNA is a self-replicating piece of hardware. Each piece has a
particular structure, which is different from rival pieces of DNA. If
memes in brains are analogous to genes they must be self-replicating
brain structures, actual patterns of neuronal wiring-up that
reconstitute themselves in one brain after another. I had always felt
uneasy spelling this out aloud, because we know far less about brains
than about genes, and are therefore necessarily vague about what such a
brain structure might actually be. So I was relieved to receive
recently a very interesting paper by Juan Delius of the University of
Konstanz in Germany, [who] is bold enough to ram home the point by
actually publishing a detailed picture of what the neuronal hardware of
a meme might look like" (Dawkins, 1989, p.323).
[3] See evolutionary epistemology
[4] See qualia
[5] See A Geometric Theory of Consciousness
[6] A good deal of this "new" system has been put forward by the 17th
century revolutionary Leibniz as "Monadology." Where Leibniz focused
mainly on the "monad," the metaphysical construct of existence beyond
our conscious experience, zenetics aims to complete the picture by
providing the zene as the counterpart to the monad. Also, see The
Multiple Natures Conjecture
http://www.techmocracy.net/mike/zenetics.htm
This paper describes a new theory of consciousness based on previous
work by C.D. Broad, H.H. Price, Andrei Linde and others. This
hypothesis states that the Universe consists of three fundamental
entities - space-time, matter and consciousness, each with their own
degrees of freedom. The paper pays particular attention to three areas
that impact on this theory: (1) the demonstration by neuroscience and
psychophysics that we do not perceive the world as it actually is but
as the brain computes it most probably to be; (2) the need to delineate
between phenomenal space-time and physical space-time. Recent theories
in physics that suggest that the Universe has more than three spatial
dimensions are relevant here; (3) the role of consciousness in the
block Universe described by Special Relativity. The integration of
these topics suggests a new physical theory of the nature of
consciousness...
Over the last century, however, a third theory has been developed. This
suggests that a human being consists of a physical body made of
ordinary matter extended in physical space and, in addition, a
consciousness module made of a different kind of matter extended in a
different space outside physical space. The meaning of 'outside'
here will be developed later. The two are connected by Humean causal
interactions. The impetus to the new theory has come partly from
philosophers such as C.D. Broad and H.H. Price, partly from advances in
introspective psychology, partly from a developing understanding of
certain findings in clinical neurology and partly from recent
developments in theoretical physics. The theoretical physicist Andrei
Linde (1990) has suggested that the world consists of three different
fundamental constituents - space-time, matter and consciousness, with
their own degrees of freedom.
http://www.imprint.co.uk/pdf/smythies.pdf
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| User: "Tim" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
16 Aug 2005 05:12:37 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> wrote in message
news:1124160671.402378.89910@g14g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...
MobyDikc wrote:
Hey,
I'm looking for critical errors with an idea sort of like Dennett's
consciousness, explained here:
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=51
Does it seem like an adequate explanation of the mind?
Zenetics seems to be what the link you gave is about, please read and
describe precisely where you need the refutation and I will try and
slice and dice even if I am for the theory?
Bwaaa haaa ha. You couldn't slice and dice a carrot let alone a theory of
mind - what a smokeologist - a deatache to the core - bwaaa
haaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa.
.
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| User: "MobyDikc" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
17 Aug 2005 06:44:42 PM |
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Immortalist wrote:
MobyDikc wrote:
Hey,
I'm looking for critical errors with an idea sort of like Dennett's
consciousness, explained here:
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=51
Does it seem like an adequate explanation of the mind?
Zenetics seems to be what the link you gave is about, please read and
describe precisely where you need the refutation and I will try and
slice and dice even if I am for the theory?
I wrote the article. As a philosopher, I am interested in what flaws
can be found in the idea and how serious they are. So I'm not looking
for any specific refutation on any specific point, but one that I
haven't thought of yet.
Is it a religious view like;
No.
It is a metaphysical view that is unique in that observation and
knowledge are one in the same and form an axiomatic system of neuronal
wiring. This system of axioms defines a set of truths which is our
conscious experience, where our experiments and theories reside.
<snip>
...or is it like;
I. Introduction
A zene is any element of your conscious experience.
Yes. The essay you reposted is an earlier (and poorer) write-up of the
idea.
The new write-up refers to articles about Ontology and Epistemology
that should be read before Mind. If you want to slice and dice, you'll
want to do so with the proper footing.
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=51
.
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
17 Aug 2005 07:53:27 PM |
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MobyDikc wrote:
Immortalist wrote:
MobyDikc wrote:
Hey,
I'm looking for critical errors with an idea sort of like Dennett's
consciousness, explained here:
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=3D51
Does it seem like an adequate explanation of the mind?
Zenetics seems to be what the link you gave is about, please read and
describe precisely where you need the refutation and I will try and
slice and dice even if I am for the theory?
I wrote the article. As a philosopher, I am interested in what flaws
can be found in the idea and how serious they are. So I'm not looking
for any specific refutation on any specific point, but one that I
haven't thought of yet.
Is it a religious view like;
No.
It is a metaphysical view that is unique in that observation and
knowledge are one in the same and form an axiomatic system of neuronal
wiring. This system of axioms defines a set of truths which is our
conscious experience, where our experiments and theories reside.
Is this a form of "direct realism?"
---------------------------------------
foundationalism
Doctrine that knowledge must have foundations; that is, if we are to
know anything at all there must be some things that we can know
incorrigibly, so that it is impossible - or perhaps does not even make
sense - for us to be mistaken.
The usual candidates for such knowledge have been facts about the
immediate data of the senses or of introspection, such as what colors,
tastes, and so on, are currently present to us, or what state of
feeling or state of mind we are in.
But probably the most famous foundationalist statement has been that of
Rene Descartes (1596-1650): 'Cogito ergo sum' ('I think therefore I
am'). One objection to foundationalism is that it is hard to make
knowledge incorrigible without constricting it so far that it ceases to
be knowledge at all (one can misclassify even one's own immediate
experiences).
-----------------------------------------
realism
Often associated with the work of Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid
(1710-1796), and German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).
Usually used in either of two ways:
(1) the view that abstract concepts have a real existence and can be
studied empirically;
(2) the doctrine that the physical world has a reality separate from
that of the mind.
Over the reality of universals (see Platonism) and other abstract
objects, realism contrasts mainly with nominalism and conceptualism
(see also: resemblance theories of universals).
In dealing with the reality and status of things around us, it
contrasts with idealism and phenomenalism. It contrasts with
anti-realism on the possibility of truths independent of our powers of
verifying them or manifesting knowledge of them.
All this suggests that realism (like 'real') is mainly defined by
contrast. As with many philosophical terms, 'realist' can apply to some
features of a view to other features of which some contrasting term
applies.
http://www.philosophyprofessor.com/philosophies.html
------------------------------------------
Direct realism
Direct realism is a theory of perception that claims that the senses
provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast,
indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly
aware only of internal representations of the external world.
Direct realists sometimes claim that indirect realists are confused
about conventional idioms of perceptions. Perception is an exemplar of
direct contact with something. Examples of indirect perception might be
seeing something in a photograph, or hearing a recording of a voice.
Direct realists often argue, contra representationalists, that the fact
that one becomes aware of a tree in perception through a complex
neurophysical process does not argue in favour of indirect perception.
It merely establishes the method, undoubtedly complex, by which direct
awareness of the world is secured. Arguing that perceiving a tree
directly requires a magical, acausal mirroring of the tree in the mind
is akin to arguing that traveling directly to grandmother's requires
that one magically appear at her doorstep. The inference from the fact
of a complex route to indirectness may be an instance of the genetic
fallacy.
http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/d/di/direct_realism.html
http://www.brainyencyclopedia.com/encyclopedia/p/ph/philosophy_of_perceptio=
n=2Ehtml
------------------------------------------
Indirect Realism
The indirect realist agrees that the coffee cup exists independently of
me. However, through perception I do not directly engage with this
cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me.
Ordinarily I see myself via an image in a mirror, or a football match
via an image on the TV screen. The indirect realist claim is that all
perception is mediated in something like this way. When looking at an
everyday object it is not that object that we directly see, but rather,
a perceptual intermediary. This intermediary has been given various
names, depending on the particular version of indirect realism in
question, including 'sense datum,' 'sensum,' 'idea,'
'sensibilium,' 'percept' and 'appearance.' We shall use
the term 'sense datum' and the plural 'sense data.' Sense data
are mental objects that possess the properties that we take the objects
in the world to have. They are usually considered to have two rather
than three dimensions. For the indirect realist, then, the coffee cup
on my desk causes in my mind the presence of a two-dimensional yellow
sense datum, and it is this object that I directly perceive.
Consequently, I only indirectly perceive the coffee cup, that is, I can
be said to perceive it in virtue of the awareness I have of the sense
data that it has caused in my mind. These latter entities, then, must
be perceived with some kind of inner analogue of vision. We shall
first look at some weak arguments for this stance. After dismissing
these we shall turn to the Argument From Illusion. This is a highly
influential argument that many see as persuasive. In addition to
supporting indirect realism, the other three theories of
perception-phenomenalism, intentionalism and disjunctivism=BEcan be
seen as responses to it.
As well as looking at my coffee cup, I can look out of my window and
see the stars in the night sky. However, it is a fact (one that can
amaze on first discovery) that the star at which I am currently looking
may have ceased to exist. The pinpoint of light that I see has taken
years to reach me, and in that time the star may have turned supernova.
How can I, then, be directly attending to that star when it is no
longer there? What must be happening is that the light rays that
originated from that star have caused in me the presence of a
perceptual intermediary, an intermediary that is still present in my
mind, and thus, an intermediary to which I can still attend.
This argument can be applied not just to far distant objects, but to
everything we perceive. Light also takes time to travel from the cup
to my eyes. Therefore, I am now perceiving the cup as it was a
fraction of a millisecond ago. The steam I see rising from it is
actually further from the cup than it now appears to me. So again, it
cannot be the steam that I directly see since I am not seeing it in the
state that it is now in. It must, therefore, be a perceptual
intermediary that I perceive.
This, however, is not a persuasive line of argument. One should reject
the assumption that the object of perception has to exist at the moment
we become perceptually aware of that object. Perception is a causally
mediated process, and causation takes time. Because of this, at the
time when perceptual processing is complete, the properties of
perceived objects may be distinct from those possessed by the object at
the time when their causal engagement with our perceptual apparatus
began. As said, in extreme cases the objects of perception may no
longer exist at the moment when the causal process of perception is
complete. One should, therefore, accept that all the events we
perceive are to some extent in the past.
The fact that perception is a complex causal process motivates some to
offer another weak argument for the indirect realist position. There
are many neurophysiological features and physiological entities such as
retinal images that are involved in perception. Some conclude that I
do not directly see the cup; I see it via such entities, and the
indirect realist should take these to be his perceptual intermediaries.
The correct response here is to agree (as one must) that such
physiological items are indeed intermediaries in the process of
perception. They are, however, intermediaries in a different sense.
The indirect realist claims that we perceive his intermediaries 3/4 we
attend to them 3/4 just as we do to our image in the mirror. His
intermediaries are perceptually accessible. This, however, is plainly
not true of the physiological components of the perceptual process.
They are not, therefore, perceptual intermediaries in the correct
sense. They are simply part of the causal mechanism that enables us to
perceptually engage with objects, both those around us, and those in
the far distance. So far, then, we do not have any reason to give up
direct realism. Many, however, have seen the following argument as
providing such a reason.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/perc-obj.htm#Indirect%20Realism
<snip>
...or is it like;
I. Introduction
A zene is any element of your conscious experience.
Yes. The essay you reposted is an earlier (and poorer) write-up of the
idea.
The new write-up refers to articles about Ontology and Epistemology
that should be read before Mind. If you want to slice and dice, you'll
want to do so with the proper footing.
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=3D51
I didn't mean to get ya'll aroused by the slice and dice comment, but
yea missed the point of refuting or defending arguments you may or may
not support.
..=2E.which is similar to Karl Popper's thesis in `Conjectures and
refutations', and which is related to the modern quantitative study of
verisimilitude. A body of thought which is not exposed to vigorous
counter-argument is in danger of losing its fitness. This is why I
believe strongly in the devil's advocate method of seeking truth,
otherwise known as Socratic dialectic. No matter how energetically one
may advocate one side of an argument, one should always be humble
enough to come back the next day and argue for the other side -- if one
believes it to be true.
http://www.topology.org/philo/sceptic.html
in debates for example one can play the devil's advocate and state as
true things he himself knows to be false, yet this clearly is not
lying.=20
http://forums.philosophyforums.com/thread/15777
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| User: "MobyDikc" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
18 Aug 2005 03:32:19 PM |
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Immortalist wrote:
MobyDikc wrote:
Immortalist wrote:
MobyDikc wrote:
<snip>
http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=51
Does it seem like an adequate explanation of the mind?
<snip>
Is it a religious view like;
No.
It is a metaphysical view that is unique in that observation and
knowledge are one in the same and form an axiomatic system of neuronal
wiring. This system of axioms defines a set of truths which is our
conscious experience, where our experiments and theories reside.
Is this a form of "direct realism?"
The answer is stated fairly explitcly in the article. Did you read the
whole thing?
The answer is, no, and it is also different from indirect perception.
<snip>
I didn't mean to get ya'll aroused by the slice and dice comment, but
yea missed the point of refuting or defending arguments you may or may
not support.
...which is similar to Karl Popper's thesis in `Conjectures and
refutations', and which is related to the modern quantitative study of
verisimilitude.
And I didn't mean to get you all aroused by humbly suggesting that
reading all three parts of the work will be beneficial in understanding
the work, which will be beneificial in criticizing the work.
By the way, the second part of the work, Epistemology
(http://www.cosmik-debris.net/?p=26), describes Popper's ideas about
conjectural knowledge at great length.
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| User: "Day Brown" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
20 Aug 2005 02:18:44 PM |
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MobyDikc wrote:
It is a metaphysical view that is unique in that observation and
knowledge are one in the same and form an axiomatic system of neuronal
wiring. This system of axioms defines a set of truths which is our
conscious experience, where our experiments and theories reside.
Ramachandranesque.
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| User: "MobyDikc" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
22 Aug 2005 01:00:18 PM |
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Day Brown wrote:
MobyDikc wrote:
It is a metaphysical view that is unique in that observation and
knowledge are one in the same and form an axiomatic system of neuronal
wiring. This system of axioms defines a set of truths which is our
conscious experience, where our experiments and theories reside.
Ramachandranesque.
Really?
Is there some specific writing of his that you see some similarities
with?
Just interested.
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| User: "Day Brown" |
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| Title: Re: Zenetics, a good theory of the mind? |
23 Aug 2005 04:28:48 PM |
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MobyDikc wrote:
Day Brown wrote:
MobyDikc wrote:
It is a metaphysical view that is unique in that observation and
knowledge are one in the same and form an axiomatic system of neuronal
wiring. This system of axioms defines a set of truths which is our
conscious experience, where our experiments and theories reside.
Ramachandranesque.
Really?
Is there some specific writing of his that you see some similarities
with?
Well, aint he mapping what happens where in the brain? And showing us
the subroutines that process patterns, as well as that region of the
brain which is active when we experience enlightenment? And dont he
show us that cheese is sharp because of bleed-thru crosstalk between
adjacent regions that process patterns? The ultimate extension of
synesthesia is a sense of existing.
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