| Topic: |
Science > Physics |
| User: |
"Immortalist" |
| Date: |
22 Aug 2005 11:57:08 AM |
| Object: |
All science was once philosophy |
Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy. Philosophy concerning matter encompassed what we now think
of as physics and chemistry; philosophy concerning mind covered the
subject of psychology and adjacent areas. In short, philosophy was once
construed so broadly as to cover any field of theoretical inquiry. Any
subject matter for which some general explanatory theory might be
offered would have been a branch of philosophy. However, once a field
of study came to be dominated by some main theory and developed
standard methods of criticism and confirmation, then the field was cut
off from the mother country of philosophy and became independent.
For example, philosophers once advanced a variety of theories to
explain the nature of matter. One suggested that everything was made of
water; another, somewhat closer to current conceptions, proposed that
matter was composed of tiny, homogeneous, indivisible atoms. Once
certain theories of matter, as well as experimental methods for testing
such theories, became well established in the community of scholars,
the philosophy of matter became the sciences of physics and chemistry.
Another example of a philosophical problem that has been converted to a
scientific one is the problem of the nature of life. At one time, life
was conjectured to be an entity that enters the body at birth and
departs at death. Currently, the nature of life is explained in terms
of biochemistry.
Thus, it is a peculiarity of philosophy that, once argument and
disputation have brought us to some theory, accompanied by a
methodology, adequate to cope successfully with some issues in
philosophy, the theory and methodology become separated from philosophy
and are considered part of another discipline. Certain subjects are
currently in transition. One such example is the field of linguistics,
and, more particularly, the subject of semantics within that field.
Philosophers have articulated a variety of theories to explain how
words and other representations can have meaning, and what constitutes
the meaning of words and other representations. In semantics, there is
no sharp distinction between a philosopher and a linguist. In a field
in transition, whether an investigator is a philosopher or a scientist
characteristically becomes a moot question. In philosophy the
successful development of an area often leads to the independence and
autonomy of the developed part. For this reason, any specification of
philosophy in terms of subject matter is likely to be both
controversial today and out of date tomorrow.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
.
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| User: "Jim07D5" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 01:28:31 PM |
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"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> said:
Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy. Philosophy concerning matter encompassed what we now think
of as physics and chemistry; philosophy concerning mind covered the
subject of psychology and adjacent areas. In short, philosophy was once
construed so broadly as to cover any field of theoretical inquiry. Any
subject matter for which some general explanatory theory might be
offered would have been a branch of philosophy. However, once a field
of study came to be dominated by some main theory and developed
standard methods of criticism and confirmation, then the field was cut
off from the mother country of philosophy and became independent.
For example, philosophers once advanced a variety of theories to
explain the nature of matter. One suggested that everything was made of
water; another, somewhat closer to current conceptions, proposed that
matter was composed of tiny, homogeneous, indivisible atoms. Once
certain theories of matter, as well as experimental methods for testing
such theories, became well established in the community of scholars,
the philosophy of matter became the sciences of physics and chemistry.
Another example of a philosophical problem that has been converted to a
scientific one is the problem of the nature of life. At one time, life
was conjectured to be an entity that enters the body at birth and
departs at death. Currently, the nature of life is explained in terms
of biochemistry.
Thus, it is a peculiarity of philosophy that, once argument and
disputation have brought us to some theory, accompanied by a
methodology, adequate to cope successfully with some issues in
philosophy, the theory and methodology become separated from philosophy
and are considered part of another discipline. Certain subjects are
currently in transition. One such example is the field of linguistics,
and, more particularly, the subject of semantics within that field.
Philosophers have articulated a variety of theories to explain how
words and other representations can have meaning, and what constitutes
the meaning of words and other representations. In semantics, there is
no sharp distinction between a philosopher and a linguist. In a field
in transition, whether an investigator is a philosopher or a scientist
characteristically becomes a moot question. In philosophy the
successful development of an area often leads to the independence and
autonomy of the developed part. For this reason, any specification of
philosophy in terms of subject matter is likely to be both
controversial today and out of date tomorrow.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
This essay misses fails to deal with one key factor that converts an
area of structured thought from a part of philosophy to a part of
science. That key factor is the role of the experiment, a structured
process of hypothesis formation, experimental design, collection of
measurements and observations, and interpretation. Philosophy focuses
more on the rational analysis of thoughts that are obtained by
introspection based on relatively unstructured experiences. The Greek
philosophers did rely on a relatively unstructured experience of the
world; this was eclipsed by the age of faith, which culminated in
medieval scholasticism.
A central figure in the emergence of science as we know it from the
philosophy of his time was Francis Bacon. He had to take the first
step.
http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Bacon.htm
"Francis Bacon's major contribution to philosophy was his application
of induction, the approach used by modern science, rather than the a
priori method of medieval scholasticism.
"Up to and during Bacon's time there existed philosophies rooted not
so much in reason but in pure faith; philosophies promoted by the
church. [See Saint Anselm (1033-1109) and Thomas Aquinas' (1225-1274)
and, more generally, the Scholastic School.] Bacon was "violently
opposed to speculative philosophies and the syllogistic quibbling of
the Schoolman ..., Bacon argued that the only knowledge of importance
to man was empirically rooted in the natural world."
"There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering
truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most
general axioms: this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms
from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken
ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all.
This is the true way, but as yet untried."
Thus, Bacon delineated the principles of the inductive thinking
method, which, while as a method goes back to the times of Aristotle,
constituted a breakthrough in the approach to science. It was just
these kind of materialist theories that brought about the great
discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo. Bacon could see that the only
knowledge of importance to man was empirically rooted in the natural
world; and that a clear system of scientific inquiry would assure
man's mastery over the world."
--- Jim07D5
.
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| User: "mountain man" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 07:53:25 PM |
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"Jim07D5" <Jim07D5@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:4l5kg11ftjoe3j9mjloka2rnpq0rbe2g8s@4ax.com...
"Immortalist" <reanimater_2000@yahoo.com> said:
Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy. Philosophy concerning matter encompassed what we now think
of as physics and chemistry; philosophy concerning mind covered the
subject of psychology and adjacent areas. In short, philosophy was once
construed so broadly as to cover any field of theoretical inquiry. Any
subject matter for which some general explanatory theory might be
offered would have been a branch of philosophy. However, once a field
of study came to be dominated by some main theory and developed
standard methods of criticism and confirmation, then the field was cut
off from the mother country of philosophy and became independent.
For example, philosophers once advanced a variety of theories to
explain the nature of matter. One suggested that everything was made of
water; another, somewhat closer to current conceptions, proposed that
matter was composed of tiny, homogeneous, indivisible atoms. Once
certain theories of matter, as well as experimental methods for testing
such theories, became well established in the community of scholars,
the philosophy of matter became the sciences of physics and chemistry.
Another example of a philosophical problem that has been converted to a
scientific one is the problem of the nature of life. At one time, life
was conjectured to be an entity that enters the body at birth and
departs at death. Currently, the nature of life is explained in terms
of biochemistry.
Thus, it is a peculiarity of philosophy that, once argument and
disputation have brought us to some theory, accompanied by a
methodology, adequate to cope successfully with some issues in
philosophy, the theory and methodology become separated from philosophy
and are considered part of another discipline. Certain subjects are
currently in transition. One such example is the field of linguistics,
and, more particularly, the subject of semantics within that field.
Philosophers have articulated a variety of theories to explain how
words and other representations can have meaning, and what constitutes
the meaning of words and other representations. In semantics, there is
no sharp distinction between a philosopher and a linguist. In a field
in transition, whether an investigator is a philosopher or a scientist
characteristically becomes a moot question. In philosophy the
successful development of an area often leads to the independence and
autonomy of the developed part. For this reason, any specification of
philosophy in terms of subject matter is likely to be both
controversial today and out of date tomorrow.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
This essay misses fails to deal with one key factor that converts an
area of structured thought from a part of philosophy to a part of
science. That key factor is the role of the experiment, a structured
process of hypothesis formation, experimental design, collection of
measurements and observations, and interpretation. Philosophy focuses
more on the rational analysis of thoughts that are obtained by
introspection based on relatively unstructured experiences. The Greek
philosophers did rely on a relatively unstructured experience of the
world; this was eclipsed by the age of faith, which culminated in
medieval scholasticism.
A central figure in the emergence of science as we know it from the
philosophy of his time was Francis Bacon. He had to take the first
step.
http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Bacon.htm
"Francis Bacon's major contribution to philosophy was his application
of induction, the approach used by modern science, rather than the a
priori method of medieval scholasticism.
"Up to and during Bacon's time there existed philosophies rooted not
so much in reason but in pure faith; philosophies promoted by the
church. [See Saint Anselm (1033-1109) and Thomas Aquinas' (1225-1274)
and, more generally, the Scholastic School.] Bacon was "violently
opposed to speculative philosophies and the syllogistic quibbling of
the Schoolman ..., Bacon argued that the only knowledge of importance
to man was empirically rooted in the natural world."
"There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering
truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most
general axioms: this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms
from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken
ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all.
This is the true way, but as yet untried."
Thus, Bacon delineated the principles of the inductive thinking
method, which, while as a method goes back to the times of Aristotle,
constituted a breakthrough in the approach to science. It was just
these kind of materialist theories that brought about the great
discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo. Bacon could see that the only
knowledge of importance to man was empirically rooted in the natural
world; and that a clear system of scientific inquiry would assure
man's mastery over the world."
--- Jim07D5
You who appreciate the value of the philosophical also
need to understand that many of the primitive ideas of the
western world transmigrated from the eastern world,
and many of these were related to the beginnings of science
and/or the fields of mathematics.
Here is a starting point to the greater half:
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0310001
--
Pete Brown
Falls Creek
OZ
www.mountainman.com.au/aetherqr.htm
.
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 08:44:08 PM |
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On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 00:53:25 GMT, in alt.atheism , "mountain man"
<hobbit@southern_seaweed.com.op> in
<9suOe.7607$FA3.3911@news-server.bigpond.net.au> wrote:
[snip]
You who appreciate the value of the philosophical also
need to understand that many of the primitive ideas of the
western world transmigrated from the eastern world,
and many of these were related to the beginnings of science
and/or the fields of mathematics.
Here is a starting point to the greater half:
http://arxiv.org/abs/physics/0310001
And I am sure many went the other way as well. There was plenty of
trade for quite some time.
--
Matt Silberstein
And now our bodies are oh so close and tight
It never felt so good, it never felt so right
And we're glowing like the metal on the edge of a knife
C'mon! Hold on tight!
C'mon! Hold on tight!
Though it's cold and lonley in the deep dark night
I can see paradise by the dashboard light
Paradise by the dashboard light
Jim Steinman
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| User: "Matt Silberstein" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 02:21:16 PM |
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On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 18:28:31 GMT, in alt.atheism , Jim07D5
<Jim07D5@nospam.net> in <4l5kg11ftjoe3j9mjloka2rnpq0rbe2g8s@4ax.com>
wrote:
[snip]
This essay misses fails to deal with one key factor that converts an
area of structured thought from a part of philosophy to a part of
science. That key factor is the role of the experiment, a structured
process of hypothesis formation, experimental design, collection of
measurements and observations, and interpretation.
A set of notions explored and developed by philosophers.
What the essay fails to discuss is whether "once was" means "is" in
analysis of thought. That is, do we apply a cladistic taxonomy to
human thoughts?
Philosophy focuses
more on the rational analysis of thoughts that are obtained by
introspection based on relatively unstructured experiences.
Not really. That was a long term debated question in philosophy, not a
defining quality.
[snip]
--
Matt Silberstein
And now our bodies are oh so close and tight
It never felt so good, it never felt so right
And we're glowing like the metal on the edge of a knife
C'mon! Hold on tight!
C'mon! Hold on tight!
Though it's cold and lonley in the deep dark night
I can see paradise by the dashboard light
Paradise by the dashboard light
Jim Steinman
.
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| User: "Jim07D5" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 03:54:12 PM |
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Matt Silberstein <RemoveThisPrefixmatts2nospam@ix.netcom.com> said:
On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 18:28:31 GMT, in alt.atheism , Jim07D5
<Jim07D5@nospam.net> in <4l5kg11ftjoe3j9mjloka2rnpq0rbe2g8s@4ax.com>
wrote:
[snip]
This essay misses fails to deal with one key factor that converts an
area of structured thought from a part of philosophy to a part of
science. That key factor is the role of the experiment, a structured
process of hypothesis formation, experimental design, collection of
measurements and observations, and interpretation.
A set of notions explored and developed by philosophers.
What the essay fails to discuss is whether "once was" means "is" in
analysis of thought. That is, do we apply a cladistic taxonomy to
human thoughts?
Cool. How do we do it elsewhere? Perhaps our purposes need to be
considered. Unfortunately I am off to Alaska in the AM for a week, and
likely won't be able to see followup. I may repost this upon return,
if the thread seems lively.,
Philosophy focuses
more on the rational analysis of thoughts that are obtained by
introspection based on relatively unstructured experiences.
Not really. That was a long term debated question in philosophy, not a
defining quality.
This may separate those who regard science as a species in the genus
philosophy, from those who think of it as sui generis.
--- Jim07D5
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 04:03:56 PM |
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"Rene, would you like to go into that coffeeshop and discuss
philosophy????"
"I think not."
Poof! No more Rene!
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| User: "Witziges Rätsel" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 04:14:16 PM |
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Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy.
<snip>
In England science was formerly called "natural history".
.
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 04:18:58 PM |
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On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 17:14:16 -0400, Witziges Rätsel wrote:
Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy.
<snip>
In England science was formerly called "natural history".
Or "natural philosophy".
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
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| User: "Jim07D5" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 04:24:00 PM |
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mimus <tinmimus99@hotmail.com> said:
On Mon, 22 Aug 2005 17:14:16 -0400, Witziges Rätsel wrote:
Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy.
<snip>
In England science was formerly called "natural history".
Or "natural philosophy".
By the historians and philosophers, respectively, or
contrarespectively, depending on their opinion of science at the
moment. ;-)
--- Jim07D5
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| User: "BuddhaThu" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 02:55:25 PM |
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Dear Immortalist,
What you say is true. But one of the issues that come with this is if
all things now are scientific, where does it put philosophy?
To the metaphysicians, there are still many things that science cannot
answer and hence we still have a place in speculative philosophy.
In my view, there is nothing wrong with speculations when there is an
absence of explanation. Scientific creative endeavors begins with
speculations about "what if x."
The problem is that some do not understand that they are supposed to
only speculate and initiate beliefs as if these speculations are
actually true. This is what I notice in my brief but comprehensive
study of metaphysics. In this, it no longer is metaphysics. It is more
about Church Dogmatics.
According to Wittgenstein, philosophy's role is to be the handmaid to
science. Wilfred Sellars would interpret this as exploring and
self-reflecting on their concepts, words and grammar.
When practices become habitual, in fact so habitual, that practices
become automatic, ---science ceases to be because it loses
self-reflectivity on its issues.
There are still scientists in this world who push that numbers are
things, and that they can do certain things. Theories encompassing
numbers and abstractions cannot predict anything. They are still
descriptions of regularity.
They are co-opting an old magical world view that should have died out
during the Enlightenment, but is still here. Science whether they want
to believe it or not is still a part of cultural beliefs systems.
However, this does not mean that science loses its goal of
disinterested objectivism. But in order to let go of the culture that
should have been left behind, it must explore its concepts with the
philosophers.
Take for instance Newton's F=MA and Einstein's E=MC2, very few
sciences will see the contextual and cultural differences of how they
treated the equation. Most scientists who I have interviewed in my
correspondences cannot, (and do not) see the shift in grammar.
F=MA expresses an ***external relationship*** of combinations and
re-combinations. Mass which is a Newtonian concept will not change. The
change is external to the force acting on mass.
E=MC2 is a grammatical shift of meaning to be that E is self-identical
to the Mass travel twice the speed of light. This is no longer an
expression of combinations and recombinations. It is an expression of
pure identity.
Still, when I tell them this, they are surprised. They tell me they are
just doing the math, ***THEY DO NOT THINK ABOUT IT.****
And why should they?
Would it change much in their practice if they had???
Probably not, but it is nice of them to know, and I would like to think
it adds to their work.
This is what I do. I explore their logic and grammar. I find it very
interesting.
Newtonian physics esp. within the Three Laws presently is of great
grammatical interest to me, but because in the end, all three cannot
exist. But this is a complex matter of logic due to an
over-idealization in the way the three laws are expressed. But I cannot
get into it in detail. Perhaps, if someone were to post something on
it, I can go into it more.
Time is running out.
Freshman's are coming in. Those who know me on this NG know I like to
grammar critique the incoming freshmen before they get too educated. It
is an extraordinary plethora of specimen of common sense and ordinary
language usage. Sometimes, the language games might even yield what
Nelson Goodman would quip as "common nonsense", which is just as
equally interesting.
I will try to climb on about once a week and see what's up.
Oh, they're here! Oh there're here! What do I wear, what do I wear.
Got to check and test out my recording devices. I will see ya' all
later. BT :-)
Immortalist wrote:
Not too long ago, all scientific subjects were considered part of
philosophy. Philosophy concerning matter encompassed what we now think
of as physics and chemistry; philosophy concerning mind covered the
subject of psychology and adjacent areas. In short, philosophy was once
construed so broadly as to cover any field of theoretical inquiry. Any
subject matter for which some general explanatory theory might be
offered would have been a branch of philosophy. However, once a field
of study came to be dominated by some main theory and developed
standard methods of criticism and confirmation, then the field was cut
off from the mother country of philosophy and became independent.
For example, philosophers once advanced a variety of theories to
explain the nature of matter. One suggested that everything was made of
water; another, somewhat closer to current conceptions, proposed that
matter was composed of tiny, homogeneous, indivisible atoms. Once
certain theories of matter, as well as experimental methods for testing
such theories, became well established in the community of scholars,
the philosophy of matter became the sciences of physics and chemistry.
Another example of a philosophical problem that has been converted to a
scientific one is the problem of the nature of life. At one time, life
was conjectured to be an entity that enters the body at birth and
departs at death. Currently, the nature of life is explained in terms
of biochemistry.
Thus, it is a peculiarity of philosophy that, once argument and
disputation have brought us to some theory, accompanied by a
methodology, adequate to cope successfully with some issues in
philosophy, the theory and methodology become separated from philosophy
and are considered part of another discipline. Certain subjects are
currently in transition. One such example is the field of linguistics,
and, more particularly, the subject of semantics within that field.
Philosophers have articulated a variety of theories to explain how
words and other representations can have meaning, and what constitutes
the meaning of words and other representations. In semantics, there is
no sharp distinction between a philosopher and a linguist. In a field
in transition, whether an investigator is a philosopher or a scientist
characteristically becomes a moot question. In philosophy the
successful development of an area often leads to the independence and
autonomy of the developed part. For this reason, any specification of
philosophy in terms of subject matter is likely to be both
controversial today and out of date tomorrow.
Philosophical Problems and Arguments: An Introduction
by James W. Cornman, Keith Lehrer, George Sotiros Pappas
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0872201244/
.
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| User: "Joseki" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 05:01:42 PM |
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BuddhaThu said:
E=MC2 is a grammatical shift of meaning to be that E is self-identical
to the Mass travel twice the speed of light. This is no longer an
expression of combinations and recombinations. It is an expression of
pure identity.
That isn't even close. Back to remedial math and physics. Both F=MA
and E=mc^2 are equations. I see your point that Newtions force law is
more descriptive whereas Einstein's is describing a conversion. But
the speed of light SQUARED is not describing something traveling it is
simply a constant.
It is saying mass and energy are convertable. Mass cannot travel
faster than the speed of light (no I won't discuss tachyons right now).
Einstein showed and many, many physicists have subsequently verified
that it would take an infinite amount of energy to accelerate any mass
to the speed of light in a vacuum.
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| User: "Uncle Al" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
22 Aug 2005 04:23:39 PM |
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BuddhaThu wrote:
Dear Immortalist,
What you say is true. But one of the issues that come with this is if
all things now are scientific, where does it put philosophy?
[snip crap]
It puts philosophy in bed with Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, the
Great Pumpkin, the Keebler Elves, Tinkerbelle, the good Witch of the
North, Casper the Friendly Ghost, Superman, AstroBoy... "The Nine
Billion Names of God"... and all that textual crap Tommy Aquinas
generated - a combination Barbara Cartland and Louis L'Amour of ditzy
hateful Christianity. Even fetishistic homosexual pederasts of the
One True Church during Vatican II recoiled in horror at what Christ's
pet had locked them into.
If theology changed at Vatican II, then it never was nor is it
infallible. Without an infallible magisterium plus indispensable keys
to heaven, the entire human product of Catholic theology is corrupt
and worthless by its own rules of engagement. Pookie pookie.
Immanuel Kant was a real pissant
Who was very rarely stable.
Heidegger, Heidegger was a boozy beggar
Who could think you under the table.
David Hume could out-consume
Both Schopenhauer and Hegel.
And Wittgenstein was a beery swine
Who was just as schloshed as Schlegel.
There's nothing Nietzche couldn't teach ya
'Bout the raising of the wrist.
Socrates, himself, was permanently pissed.
John Stuart Mill, of his own free will,
On half a pint of shandy was particularly ill.
Plato, they say, could stick it away--
Half a crate of whisky every day.
Aristotle, Aristotle was a bugger for the bottle.
Hobbes was fond of his dram,
And René Descartes was a drunken fart.
"I drink, therefore I am."
Yes, Socrates, himself, is particularly missed,
A lovely little thinker,
But a bugger when he's pissed.
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf
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| User: "Brian Fletcher" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
23 Aug 2005 09:07:55 PM |
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"Uncle Al" <UncleAl0@hate.spam.net> wrote in message
news:430A425B.E89B4A42@hate.spam.net...
BuddhaThu wrote:
Dear Immortalist,
What you say is true. But one of the issues that come with this is if
all things now are scientific, where does it put philosophy?
[snip crap]
It puts philosophy in bed with Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, the
Great Pumpkin, the Keebler Elves, Tinkerbelle, the good Witch of the
North, Casper the Friendly Ghost, Superman, AstroBoy... "The Nine
Billion Names of God"... and all that textual crap Tommy Aquinas
generated - a combination Barbara Cartland and Louis L'Amour of ditzy
hateful Christianity. Even fetishistic homosexual pederasts of the
One True Church during Vatican II recoiled in horror at what Christ's
pet had locked them into.
If theology changed at Vatican II, then it never was nor is it
infallible. Without an infallible magisterium plus indispensable keys
to heaven, the entire human product of Catholic theology is corrupt
and worthless by its own rules of engagement. Pookie pookie.
Immanuel Kant was a real pissant
Who was very rarely stable.
Heidegger, Heidegger was a boozy beggar
Who could think you under the table.
David Hume could out-consume
Both Schopenhauer and Hegel.
And Wittgenstein was a beery swine
Who was just as schloshed as Schlegel.
There's nothing Nietzche couldn't teach ya
'Bout the raising of the wrist.
Socrates, himself, was permanently pissed.
John Stuart Mill, of his own free will,
On half a pint of shandy was particularly ill.
Plato, they say, could stick it away--
Half a crate of whisky every day.
Aristotle, Aristotle was a bugger for the bottle.
Hobbes was fond of his dram,
And René Descartes was a drunken fart.
"I drink, therefore I am."
Yes, Socrates, himself, is particularly missed,
A lovely little thinker,
But a bugger when he's pissed.
How much more would we love ourself, if we had come up with that?
An absolute classic!!!
Thanks for the reminder Uncle Al
Brian Of Life
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| User: "Robert Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
23 Aug 2005 11:52:16 AM |
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Uncle Al wrote:
[snip crap]
It puts philosophy in bed with Santa Claus, the Easter Bunny, the
Great Pumpkin, the Keebler Elves, Tinkerbelle, the good Witch of the
North, Casper the Friendly Ghost, Superman, AstroBoy... "The Nine
Billion Names of God"... and all that textual crap Tommy Aquinas
generated - a combination Barbara Cartland and Louis L'Amour of ditzy
hateful Christianity. Even fetishistic homosexual pederasts of the
One True Church during Vatican II recoiled in horror at what Christ's
pet had locked them into.
Not quite. Philosophy still has some uses in the area of epistemology,
the analysis of how we come to know things and how we validate our
knowledge. One could even classify the Goedel Incompleteness Theorems in
the realm of espistemlogy. The question is how aboslute or complete is
mathematics. The answers are no and not.
Metaphysics, on the other hand, was is and always will be ka ka. David
Hume, a philosopher (to whom we owe a great deal) put a stake through
the heart of metaphysics. Imanuel Kant try to pull it out, but he become
confused in the process.
And don't knock Wittgenstein. He invented truth tables (not Boole, not
Russel/Whitehead).
Bob Kolker
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| User: "mimus" |
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25 Aug 2005 11:22:12 AM |
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On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
And don't knock Wittgenstein. He invented truth tables (not Boole, not
Russel/Whitehead).
I'm impressed. One simple powerful analytical tool to his credit, then.
--
Io non giudico né giudicheròmai essere difetto
difendere alcuna opinione con le ragioni,
sanza volervi usare o l'autorità o la forza.
< Machiavelli
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| User: "Robert Kolker" |
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25 Aug 2005 11:59:50 AM |
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mimus wrote:
On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
And don't knock Wittgenstein. He invented truth tables (not Boole, not
Russel/Whitehead).
I'm impressed. One simple powerful analytical tool to his credit, then.
In 1911, L.W. designed and built a prototype for the first turbojet
aircraft engine. It did not go anywhere because the metallurgy was not
yet equal to the task.
He was a polymath and a practical doer, not just some academic phreak.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "mimus" |
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25 Aug 2005 02:27:27 PM |
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On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 12:59:50 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
mimus wrote:
On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
And don't knock Wittgenstein. He invented truth tables (not Boole, not
Russel/Whitehead).
I'm impressed. One simple powerful analytical tool to his credit, then.
In 1911, L.W. designed and built a prototype for the first turbojet
aircraft engine. It did not go anywhere because the metallurgy was not
yet equal to the task.
He was a polymath and a practical doer, not just some academic phreak.
Um. I consider the provision of simple powerful analytical tools to be an
important branch of practical doing. And a practical doer might perhaps've
done the metallurgy in the latter case, or died trying, like Edison
would've done if he hadn't finally run across tungsten (although we
should've gotten rid of them decades ago). And I get your point. But that
story reminds me of Babbage and his "engines."
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
23 Aug 2005 12:24:07 PM |
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On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
Imanuel Kant try to pull it out, but he become
confused in the process.
He in the intro to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ mourned over vast edifices
of arguments collapsing because they didn't take care of their foundations,
and then went right on in that same intro and assumed what he should've
proven from the start, the existence of _a priori_ knowledge-- he did give
some examples, but none of 'em hold up to a minute's analysis.
So I've always considered the _CoPR_ to be a rather complicated and
(Germanically) windy joke, like _Dianetics_.
--
Io non giudico né giudicheròmai essere difetto
difendere alcuna opinione con le ragioni,
sanza volervi usare o l'autorità o la forza.
< Machiavelli
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
24 Aug 2005 07:52:01 PM |
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"mimus" <tinmimus99@hotmail.com> skrev i melding
news:1m12oq2tk1m4l.aynozmr3usof.dlg@40tude.net...
On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
Imanuel Kant try to pull it out, but he become
confused in the process.
He in the intro to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ mourned over vast
edifices
of arguments collapsing because they didn't take care of their
foundations,
and then went right on in that same intro and assumed what he
should've
proven from the start, the existence of _a priori_ knowledge-- he did
give
some examples, but none of 'em hold up to a minute's analysis.
So I've always considered the _CoPR_ to be a rather complicated and
(Germanically) windy joke, like _Dianetics_.
That is probably not correct. Not even Germans tell that long jokes.
He did write under the threat of losing his licence to publish, which he
did lose for several years under one of the more pious Prussian kings.
Hence he took care to render not only unto Caesar, but unto God as well.
The quote you bring in a latter post should be read as one such defense
against ungodliness: by drawing up the borders of reason, he seeks to
set apart a separate region for religious stuff, i.e. the realm of
faith. If you had read it by a contgemporary politician, you would have
known instantly that this was spin.
Kant had no need to prove the existence of a priori knowledge, because a
priori knowledge is a fact and had been around and recognized as factual
since people began to think at all. What he did set out to prove, was
the existence of the truth conditions for a priori synthetical
propositions, which, by definition, cannot be taken from experience.
That our way of perceiving time and space are hardwired into our brain
(like e.g. Chomsky proposes for language, and from the same argument:
that the empirical input does not explain the existence of the
phenomenon) should perhaps not come as a shocking surprise to anyone,
although Nietzsche IMHO is correct in his lament that Kant's whole
theory amounts to saying: "We are capable of perceiving in time and
space because we have that capability", which one must admit, doesn't
really explain very much. Kant's KdRV isn't much more than a systematic
exposition of Leibniz's response to Hobbes empiricist dictum ("There is
nothing in the mind which has not first been in the senses ..."): "...
except the mind itself", which has always been the great empiricist
conundrum: Empiricism is worthless as an epistemology, since it on the
one hand denies causality, yet on the other hand requires causality for
its theory of mind to work (external events making impressions on the
mind, causing ideas, etc.). In that sense, I think you overestimate Hume
a little bit too much. A lot of people like that book burning quote, but
very few have had the patience to trace his reasoning. But then not
everybody likes to move in circles ...
T
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
24 Aug 2005 07:58:45 PM |
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On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 02:52:01 +0200, Tron wrote:
Kant had no need to prove the existence of a priori knowledge, because a
priori knowledge is a fact and had been around and recognized as factual
since people began to think at all.
Tell it to Locke. And Hume.
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 06:26:54 AM |
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Hi,
"mimus" <tinmimus99@hotmail.com> skrev i melding
news:sgjvog2rwhe8.j7vxnezfxrvj$.dlg@40tude.net...
On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 02:52:01 +0200, Tron wrote:
Kant had no need to prove the existence of a priori knowledge,
because a
priori knowledge is a fact and had been around and recognized as
factual
since people began to think at all.
Tell it to Locke. And Hume.
A bit late now, but neither of them had any problem with a priori
knowledge, only for them this was all analytical, like mathematics.
While talking is out, it is still not too late to read them, you know.
T
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| User: "Robert Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 06:38:37 AM |
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Tron wrote:
A bit late now, but neither of them had any problem with a priori
knowledge, only for them this was all analytical, like mathematics.
While talking is out, it is still not too late to read them, you know.
The problem is -synthetic a priori judgements-. There are no necessarily
true synthetic a priori judgements. That is a Kantian bojum with no
basis in reality. We conceive space and time because we -experience-
space and time. Not the other way around.
In order to refute Hume, Kant had to stand epistemology on its head.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Tron" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 08:45:57 AM |
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Hi,
"Robert Kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.com> skrev i melding
news:WfudnXT-YNIiMJDeRVn-3w@comcast.com...
Tron wrote:
A bit late now, but neither of them had any problem with a priori
knowledge, only for them this was all analytical, like mathematics.
While talking is out, it is still not too late to read them, you
know.
The problem is -synthetic a priori judgements-.
I know; Mimus didn't.
There are no necessarily
true synthetic a priori judgements. That is a Kantian bojum with no
basis in reality. We conceive space and time because we -experience-
space and time. Not the other way around.
While I envy you your seemingly direct access to reality - what a
marvellous opportunity for testing various philosophical hypotheses! - I
think I will suspend judgement on Kant vs. Kolker for a few more days.
In order to refute Hume, Kant had to stand epistemology on its head.
As if Hume spoke the last word on epistemology? His was an attempt, like
any other; and it consisted merely in taking empricism to its last
logical conclusion, which is scepticism. Apart from that, Hume is
riddled with inconsistencies and circularities, particularly regarding
causality and induction.
Empiricism isn't good enough to elevate to dogma, and doesn't get better
by it, either.
T
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 08:53:36 AM |
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On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 15:45:57 +0200, Tron wrote:
"Robert Kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.com> skrev i melding
news:WfudnXT-YNIiMJDeRVn-3w@comcast.com...
Tron wrote:
A bit late now, but neither of them had any problem with a priori
knowledge, only for them this was all analytical, like mathematics.
While talking is out, it is still not too late to read them, you
know.
The problem is -synthetic a priori judgements-.
I know; Mimus didn't.
Your statements are remarkable in the light of Locke's "tabula rasa" and
Hume's "causation is custom" . . . .
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 08:48:23 AM |
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On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 15:45:57 +0200, Tron wrote:
Hume spoke the last word on epistemology? His was an attempt, like
any other; and it consisted merely in taking empricism to its last
logical conclusion, which is scepticism.
I suspect you mean "Pyrrhonism" or maybe even "cynicism" here.
The journey from empiricism to skepticism being such a short one.
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
.
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 08:23:42 AM |
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On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 07:38:37 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
Tron wrote:
A bit late now, but neither of them had any problem with a priori
knowledge, only for them this was all analytical, like mathematics.
While talking is out, it is still not too late to read them, you know.
The problem is -synthetic a priori judgements-. There are no necessarily
true synthetic a priori judgements. That is a Kantian bojum with no
basis in reality. We conceive space and time because we -experience-
space and time. Not the other way around.
In order to refute Hume, Kant had to stand epistemology on its head.
Wot there's more than a whiff of that about Berkeley, too.
I did a post on that called "Berkeley's Dogs" once.
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
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| User: "Immortalist" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
24 Aug 2005 11:33:57 AM |
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mimus wrote:
On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
Imanuel Kant try to pull it out, but he become
confused in the process.
He in the intro to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ mourned over vast edific=
es
of arguments collapsing because they didn't take care of their foundation=
s,
and then went right on in that same intro and assumed what he should've
proven from the start, the existence of _a priori_ knowledge-- he did give
some examples, but none of 'em hold up to a minute's analysis.
So I've always considered the _CoPR_ to be a rather complicated and
(Germanically) windy joke, like _Dianetics_.
Are you saying that what is necessary is not necessary?
I like the romantic story version in much summary from, The Story of
Philosophy, by WILL DURANT
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0671739166/
CHAPTER 6 - IMMANUEL KANT & GERMAN IDEALISM
[A] - Roads to Kant
1=2E - From Voltaire to Kant
2=2E - From Locke to Kant
3=2E - From Rousseau to Kant
[B] - Kant Himself
[C] - The Critique of Pure Reason
What is meant by this title? Critique is not precisely a criticism, but
a critical analysis; Kant is not attacking "pure reason," except, at
the end, to show its limitations; rather he hopes to show its
possibility, and to exalt it above the impure knowledge which comes to
us through the distorting channels of sense. For "pure" reason is to
mean knowledge that does not come through our senses, but is
independent of all sense experience; knowledge belonging to us by the
inherent nature and structure of the mind.
At the very outset, then, Kant flings down a challenge to Locke and the
English school: knowledge is not all derived from the senses. Hume
thought he had shown that there is no soul, and no science; that our
minds are but our ideas in procession and association; and our
certainties but probabilities in perpetual danger of violation. These
false conclusions, says Kant, are the result of false premises: you
assume that all knowledge comes from "separate and distinct"
sensations; naturally these cannot give you necessity, or invariable
sequences of which you may be forever certain; and naturally you must
not expect to "see" your soul, even with the eyes of the internal
sense. Let us grant that absolute certainty of knowledge is impossible
if all knowledge comes from sensation, from an independent external
world which owes us no promise of regularity of behavior. But what if
we have knowledge that is independent of sense-experience, knowledge
whose truth is certain to us even before experience-a priori? Then
absolute truth, and absolute science, would become possible, would it
not? Is there such absolute knowledge? This is the problem of the first
Critique. "My question is, what we can hope to achieve with reason,
when all the material and assistance of experience are taken away." The
Critique becomes a detailed biology of thought, an examination of the
origin and evolution of concepts, an analysis of the inherited
structure of the mind. This, as Kant believes, is the entire problem of
metaphysics. "In this book I have chiefly aimed at completeness; and I
venture to maintain that there ought not to be one single metaphysical
problem that has not been solved here, or to the solution of which the
key at least has not here been supplied." Exegi monumentum aere
perennius! With such egotism nature spurs us on to creation.
The Critique comes to the point at once. "Experience is by no means the
only field to which our understanding can be confined. Experience tells
us what is, but not that it must be necessarily what it is and not
otherwise. It therefore never gives us any really general truths; and
our reason, which is particularly anxious for that class of knowledge,
if roused by it rather than satisfied. General truths, which at the
same time bear the character of an inward necessity, must be
independent of experience,-clear and certain in themselves." That is to
say, they must be true no matter what our later experience may be; true
even before experience; true a priori. "How far we can advance
independently of all experience, in a priori knowledge, is shown by the
brilliant example of mathematics." Mathematical knowledge is necessary
and certain; we cannot conceive of future experience violating it. We
may believe that the sun will "rise" in the west to-morrow, or that
some day, in some conceivable asbestos world, fire will not burn stick;
but we cannot for the life of us believe that two times two will ever
make anything else than four. Such truths are true before experience;
they do not depend on experience past, present, or to come. Therefore
they are absolute and necessary truths; it is inconceivable that they
should ever become untrue. But whence do we get this character of
absoluteness and necessity? Not from experience; for experience gives
us nothing but separate sensations and events, which may alter their
sequence in the future. These truths derive their necessary character
from the inherent structure of our minds, from the natural and
inevitable manner in which our minds must operate. For the mind of man
(and here at last is the great thesis of Kant) is not passive wax upon
which experience and sensation write their absolute and yet whimsical
will; nor is it a mere abstract name for the series or group of mental
states; it is an active organ which moulds and coordinates sensations
into ideas, an organ which transforms the chaotic multiplicity of
experience into the ordered unity of thought.*
*Radical empiricism" (James, Dewey, etc.) enters the controversy at
this point, and argues, against both Hume and Kant, that experience
gives u=BB relations and sequences as well as sensationi and events.
But how?
1. - Transcendental Esthetic
The effort to answer this question, to study tile inherent structure of
the mind, or the innate laws of thought, is what Kant calls
"transcendental philosophy," because it is a problem transcending
sense-experience. "I call knowledge transcendental which is occupied
not so much with objects, as with our a priori concepts of
objects."-with our modes of correlating our experience into knowledge.
There are two grades or stages in this process of working up the raw
material of sensation into the finished product of thought. The first
stage is the coordination of sensations by applying to them the forms
of perception-space and time; the second stage is the coordination of
the perceptions so developed, by applying to them the forms of
conception-the "categories" of thought. Kant, using the word esthetic
in its original and| etymological sense, as connoting sensation or
feeling, calls the study of the first of these stages "Transcendental
Esthetic"; and using the word logic as meaning the science of the forms
of thought, he calls the study of the second stage "Transcendental
Logic." These are terrible words, which will take meaning as the
argument proceeds; once over this hill, the road to Kant will be
comparatively clear.
Now just what is meant by sensations and perceptions?-and how does the
mind change the former into the latter? By itself a sensation is merely
the awareness of a stimulus; we have a taste on the tongue, an odor in
the nostrils, a sound in the ears, a temperature on the skin, a flash
of light on the retina, a pressure on the fingers: it is the raw crude
beginning of experience; it is what the infant has in the early days of
its groping mental life; it is not yet knowledge. But let these various
sensations group themselves about an object in space and time-say this
apple; let the odor in the nostrils, and the taste on the tongue, the
light on the retina, the shape-revealing pressure on the fingers and
the hand, unite and group themselves about this "thing": and there is
now an awareness not so much of a stimulus as of a specific object;
there is a perception. Sensation has passed into knowledge.
But again, was this passage, this grouping, automatic? Did the
sensations of themselves, spontaneously and naturally, fall into a
cluster and an order, and so become perception Yes, said Locke and
Hume; not at all, says Kant.
For these varied sensations come to us through varied channels of
sense, through a thousand "afferent nerves" that pass from skin and eye
and ear and tongue into the brain; what a medley of messengers they
must be as they crowd into the chambers of the mind, calling for
attention! No wonder Plato spoke of "the rabble of the senses." And
left to themselves, they remain rabble, a chaotic "manifold," pitifully
impotent, waiting to be ordered into meaning and purpose and power. As
readily might the messages brought to a general from a thousand sectors
of the battle-line weave themselves unaided into comprehension and
command. No; there is a law-giver for this mob, a directing and
coordinating power that does not merely receive, but takes these atoms
of sensation and moulds them into sense.
Observe, first, that not all of the messages are accepted. Myriad
forces play upon your body at this moment;; a storm of stimuli beats
down upon the nerve-endings which, amoebalike, you put forth to
experience the external world: but not all that call are chosen; only
those sensations are selected that can be moulded into perceptions
suited to your present purpose, or that bring those imperious messages
of danger which are always relevant. The clock is ticking, and you do
not hear it; but that same ticking, not louder than before, will be
heard at once if your purpose wills it so. The mother asleep at her
infant's cradle is deaf to the turmoil of life about her; but let the
little one move, and the mother gropes her way back to waking attention
like a diver rising hurriedly to the surface of the sea. Let the
purpose be addition, and the stimulus "two and three" brings the
response, "five"; let the purpose be multiplication, and the same
stimulus, the same auditory sensations, "two and three," bring the
response, "six." Association of sensations or ideas is not merely by
contiguity in space or time, nor by similarity, nor by recency,
frequency or intensity of experience; it is above all determined by the
purpose of the mind. Sensations and thoughts are servants, they await
our call, they do not come unless we need them. There is an agent of
selection and direction that uses them and is their master. In addition
to the sensations and the ideas there is the mind.
This agent of selection and coordination, Kant thinks, uses first of
all two simple methods for the classification of the material presented
to it: the sense of space, and the sense of time. As the general
arranges the messages brought him according to the place for which they
come, and the time at which they were written, and so finds an order
and a system for them all; so the mind allocates its sensations in
space and time, attributes them to this object here or that object
there, to this present time or to that past. Space and time are not
things perceived, but modes of perception, ways of putting sense into
sensation; space and time are organs of perception.
They are a priori, because all ordered experience involves and
presupposes them. Without them, sensations could never grow into
perceptions. They are a priori because it is inconceivable that we
should ever have any future experience that will not also involve them.
And because they are a priori, their laws, which are the laws of
mathematics, are a priori, absolute and necessary, world without end.
It is not merely probable, it is certain that we shall never find a
straight line that is not the shortest distance between two points.
Mathematics, at least, is saved from the dissolvent scepticism of David
Hume.
Can all the sciences be similarly saved? Yes, if their basic principle,
the law of causality-that a given cause must always be followed by a
given effect-can be shown, like space and time, to be so inherent in
all the processes of understanding that no future experience can be
conceived that would violate or escape it. Is causality, too, a priori,
an indispensable prerequisite and condition of all thought?
2. - Transcendental Analytic
So we pass from the wide field of sensation and perception to the dark
and narrow chamber of thought; from "transcendental esthetic" to
"transcendental logic." And first to the naming and analysis of those
elements in our thought which are not so much given to the mind by
perception as given to perception by the mind; those levers which raise
the "perceptual" knowledge of objects into the "conceptual" knowledge
of relationships, sequences, and laws; those tools of the mind which
refine experience into science. Just as perceptions arranged sensations
around objects in space and time, so conception arranges perceptions
(objects and events) about the ideas of cause, unity, reciprocal
relation, necessity, contingency, etc.; these and other "categories"
are the structure into which perceptions are received, and by which
they are classified and moulded into the ordered concepts of thought.
These are the very essence and character of the mind; mind is the
coordination of experience.
And here again observe the activity of this mind that was, to Locke and
Hume, mere "passive wax" under the blows of sense-experience. Consider
a system of thought like Aristotle's; is it conceivable that this
almost cosmic ordering of data should have come by the automatic,
anarchistic spontaneity of the data themselves? See this magnificent
card-catalogue in the library, intelligently ordered into sequence by
human purpose. Then picture all these card-cases thrown upon the floor,
all these cards scattered pell-mell into riotous disorder. Can you now
conceive these scattered cards pulling themselves up, Munchausen-like,
from their disarray, passing quietly into their alphabetical and
topical places in their proper boxes, and each box into its fit place
in the rack,-until all should be order and sense and purpose again?
What a miracle-story these sceptics have given us after all!
Sensation is unorganized stimulus, perception is organized sensation,
conception is organized perception, science is organized knowledge,
wisdom is organized life: each is a greater degree of order, and
sequence, and unity. Whence this order, this sequence, this unity? Not
from the things themselves; for they are known to us only by sensations
that come through a thousand channels at once in disorderly multitude;
it is our purpose that put order and sequence and unity upon this
importunate lawlessness; it is ourselves, our personalities, our minds,
that bring light upon these seas. Locke was wrong when he said, "There
is nothing in the intellect except what was first in the senses";
Leibnitz was right when he added,-"nothing, except the intellect
itself." "Perceptions without conceptions," says Kant, "are blind." If
perceptions wove themselves automatically into ordered thought, if mind
were not an active effort hammering out order from chaos, how could the
same experience leave one man mediocre, and in a more active and
tireless soul be raised to the light of wisdom and the beautiful logic
of truth?
The world, then, has order, not of itself, but because the thought that
knows the world is itself an ordering, the first stage in that
classification of experience which at last is science and philosophy.
The laws of thought are also the laws of things, for things are known
to us only through this thought that must obey these laws, since it and
they are one; in effect, as Hegel was to say, the laws of logic and the
laws of nature are one, and logic and metaphysics merge. The
generalized principles of science are necessary because they are
ultimately laws of thought that are involved and presupposed in every
experience, past, present, and to come. Science is absolute, and truth
is everlasting.
3. - Transcendental Dialectic
Nevertheless, this certainty, this absoluteness, of the highest
generalizations of logic and science, is, paradoxically, limited and
relative: limited strictly to the field of actual experience, and
relative strictly to our human mode of experience. For if our analysis
has been correct, the world as we know it is a construction, a finished
product, almost-one might say-a manufactured article, to which the mind
contributes as much by its moulding forms as the thing contributes by
its stimuli. (So we perceive the top of the table as round, whereas our
sensation is of an ellipse.) The object as it appears to us is a
phenomenon, an appearance, perhaps very different from the external
object before it came within the ken of our senses; what that original
object was we can never know; the "thing-in-itself" may be an object of
thought or inference (a "noumenon"), but it cannot be experienced,-for
in being experienced it would be changed by its passage through sense
and thought. "It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be
by themselves and apart from the re-ceptivity of our senses. We know
nothing but our manner of perceiving them; that manner being peculiar
to us, and not necessarily shared by every being, though, no doubt, by
every human being." [If Kant had not added the last clause, his
argument for the necessity of knowledge would have fallen.] The moon as
known to us is merely a bundle of sensations (as Hume saw), unified (as
Hume did not see) by our native mental structure through the
elaboration of sensations into perceptions, and of these into
conceptions or ideas; in result, the moon is for us merely our ideas.
[So John Stuart Mill, with all his English tendency to realism, was
driven at last to define matter as merely "a permanent possibility of
sensations."]
Not that Kant ever doubts the existence of "matter" and the external
world; but he adds that we know nothing certain about them except that
they exist. Our detailed knowledge is about their appearance, their
phenomena, about the sensations which we have of them. Idealism does
not mean, as the man in the street thinks, that nothing exists outside
the perceiving subject; but that a goodly part of every object is
created by the forms of perception and understanding: we know the
object as transformed into idea; what it is before being so transformed
we cannot know. Science, after all, is naive; it supposes that it is
dealing with things in themselves, in their full-blooded external and
uncorrupted reality; philosophy is a little more sophisticated, and
realizes that the whole material of science consists of sensations,
perceptions and conceptions, rather than of things. "Kant's greatest
merit," says Schopenhauer, "is the distinction of the phenomenon from
the thing-in-itself."
It follows that any attempt, by either science or religion, to say just
what the ultimate reality is, must fall back into mere hypothesis; "the
understanding can never go beyond the limits of sensibility." Such
transcendental science loses itself in "antinomies," and such
transcendental theology loses itself in "paralogisms." It is the cruel
function of "transcendental dialectic" to examine the validity of these
attempts of reason to escape from the enclosing circle of sensation and
appearance into the unknowable world of things "in themselves."
Antinomies are the insoluble dilemmas born of a science that tries to
overleap experience. So, for example, when knowledge attempts to decide
whether the world is finite or infinite in space, thought rebels
against either supposition: beyond any limit, we are driven to conceive
something further, endlessly; and yet infinity is itself inconceivable.
Again: did the world have a beginning in time? We cannot conceive
eternity; but then, too, we cannot conceive any point in the past
without feeling at once that before that, something was. Or has that
chain of causes which science studies, a beginning, a First Cause? Yes,
for an endless chain is inconceivable; no, for a first cause uncaused
is inconceivable as well. Is there any exit from these blind alleys of
thought? There is, says Kant, if we remember that space, time and cause
are modes of perception and Conception, which must enter into all our
experience, since they are the web and structure of experience; these
dilemmas arise from supposing that space, time and cause are external
things independent of perception. We shall never have any experience
which we shall not interpret in terms of space and time and cause; but
we shall never have any philosophy if we forget that these are not
things, but modes of interpretation and understanding.
So with the paralogisms of "rational" theology-which attempts to prove
by theoretical reason that the soul is an incorruptible substance, that
the will is free and above the law of cause and effect, and that there
exists a "necessary being," God, as the presupposition of all reality.
Transcendental dialectic must remind theology that substance and cause
and necessity are finite categories, modes of arrangement and
classification which the mind applies to sense-experience, and reliably
valid only for the phenomena that appear to such experience; we cannot
apply these conceptions to the noumenal (or merely inferred and
conjectural) world. Religion cannot be proved by theoretical reason.
-------------------------
So the first Critique ends. One could well imagine David Hume,
uncannier Scot than Kant himself, viewing the results with a sardonic
smile. Here was a tremendous book, eight hundred pages long; weighted
beyond bearing, almost, with ponderous terminology; proposing to solve
all the problems of metaphysics, and incidentally to save the
absoluteness of science and the essential truth of religion. What had
the book really done? It had destroyed the naive world of science, and
limited it, if not in degree, certainly in scope,-and to a world
confessedly of mere surface and appearance, beyond which it could issue
only in farcical "antinomies"; so science was "saved"! The most
eloquent and incisive portions of the book had argued that the objects
of faith-a free and immortal soul, a benevolent creator-could never be
proved by reason; so religion was "saved"! No wonder the priests of
Germany protested madly against this salvation, and revenged themselves
by calling their dogs Immanuel Kant.
And no wonder that Heine compared the little professor of Konigsberg
with the terrible Robespierre; the latter had merely killed a king, and
a few thousand Frenchmen-which a German might forgive; but Kant, said
Heine, had killed God, had undermined the most precious arguments of
theology. "What a sharp contrast between the outer life of this man,
and his destructive, world-convulsing thoughts! Had the citizens of
Konigsberg surmised the whole significance of those thoughts, they
would have felt a more profound awe in the presence of this man than in
that of an executioner, who merely slays human beings. But the good
people saw in him nothing but a professor of philosophy; and when at
the fixed hour he sauntered by, they nodded a friendly greeting, and
set their watches."
Was this caricature, or revelation?
[D] - The Critique of Practical Reason
[E] - On Religion and Reason
[F] - On Politics and Eternal Peace
[G] - Criticism and Estimate
[H] - A Note on Hegel
The Story of Philosophy
The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophers of the Western World
by WILL DURANT
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/0671739166/
--
Io non giudico n=E9 giudicher=F2mai essere difetto
difendere alcuna opinione con le ragioni,
sanza volervi usare o l'autorit=E0 o la forza.
=20
< Machiavelli
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
24 Aug 2005 12:02:03 PM |
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On 24 Aug 2005 09:33:57 -0700, Immortalist wrote:
mimus wrote:
On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
Imanuel Kant try to pull it out, but he become
confused in the process.
He in the intro to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ mourned over vast edifices
of arguments collapsing because they didn't take care of their foundations,
and then went right on in that same intro and assumed what he should've
proven from the start, the existence of _a priori_ knowledge-- he did give
some examples, but none of 'em hold up to a minute's analysis.
So I've always considered the _CoPR_ to be a rather complicated and
(Germanically) windy joke, like _Dianetics_.
Are you saying that what is necessary is not necessary?
Did you even read my post?
Furthermore, he specifically points out the audience for which he intended
the _Critique_ in the _Critique_ itself, where he sez something along the
line of (I don't have a copy-- I lost a very nice thirty- year- old library
in a housefire several years ago-- and couldn't Ixquick the quote that I--
barely-- have in mind) "It is my purpose to rescue the idea of God from the
free-thinkers"-- the quote's more complex than that, but the gist is there.
No wonder the thing became required study in the Kaiser's universities,
huh? along with Hegel, who proved that the Kaiserian State was the ultimate
expression of the wills of both God and History . . . <snort>.
--
In the previous number, the cattle rustlers (post-
Hegelian dogma) had trapped Professor Dewey in an
abandoned mine shaft (Jamesian pragmatism) and had
ignited the fuse leading to a keg of dynamite
(neo-Newtonian empiricism).
< S. J. Perelman
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| User: "WCB" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 01:44:47 AM |
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mimus wrote:
On 24 Aug 2005 09:33:57 -0700, Immortalist wrote:
mimus wrote:
On Tue, 23 Aug 2005 12:52:16 -0400, Robert Kolker wrote:
Imanuel Kant try to pull it out, but he become
confused in the process.
He in the intro to the _Critique of Pure Reason_ mourned over vast
edifices of arguments collapsing because they didn't take care of their
foundations, and then went right on in that same intro and assumed what
he should've proven from the start, the existence of _a priori_
knowledge-- he did give some examples, but none of 'em hold up to a
minute's analysis.
So I've always considered the _CoPR_ to be a rather complicated and
(Germanically) windy joke, like _Dianetics_.
Are you saying that what is necessary is not necessary?
Did you even read my post?
Furthermore, he specifically points out the audience for which he intended
the _Critique_ in the _Critique_ itself, where he sez something along the
line of (I don't have a copy-- I lost a very nice thirty- year- old
library in a housefire several years ago-- and couldn't Ixquick the quote
that I-- barely-- have in mind) "It is my purpose to rescue the idea of
God from the free-thinkers"-- the quote's more complex than that, but the
gist is there.
No wonder the thing became required study in the Kaiser's universities,
huh? along with Hegel, who proved that the Kaiserian State was the
ultimate expression of the wills of both God and History . . . <snort>.
The fun thing is, the Marxists adapted Hegel's claim for communism.
Hegelian pantheism had its "left wing" (Nature is God, later they added
history) and "right wing", God is the Universe. Both sides decided
their god and history were ultimate wills of the Universe.
Marxists were quite fond of Hegel's Dialectic, which Marx also liked.
--
Xenu is around and about,
mention Hubbard, Xenu pops out!
No way for the clams to stamp Xenu out,
Xenu is around and about!
Cheerful Charlie
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| User: "mimus" |
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| Title: Re: All science was once philosophy |
25 Aug 2005 04:00:24 AM |
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On Thu, 25 Aug 2005 01:44:47 -0500, WCB wrote:
Xenu is around and about,
mention Hubbard, Xenu pops out!
No way for the clams to stamp Xenu out,
Xenu is around and about!
Cheerful Charlie
Ah, ars still running strong, I hope? I burned out, after several
inadvertent and forcible absences and catchups, and also got frustrated at
just kind of following things along, once I'd got a good grip on
Scientology as the newest totalitarianism.
--
Io non giudico né giudicheròmai essere difetto
difendere alcuna opinione con le ragioni,
sanza volervi usare o l'autorità o la forza.
< Machiavelli
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