It is as difficult for neurotypicals (i.e. "normal folks") to empathize
with autistics, as it is for autistics to empathize with neurotypicals.
How an autistic perceives reality is, in many respects, different from how
a neurotypical perceives reality. I have Aspeger syndrome, which is almost
identical to autism. I had a sudden onset reactive psychotic episode a few
years ago, and now I have psychotic symptoms with no underlying psychotic
disorder. My psychotic episode, in part, resulted from seventeen years of
Freudian psychotherapy. Prior my psychotic episode, I had no idea how
dangerous and futile it was to perform (Freudian) psychotherapy on an
autistic.

Psychotherapy attempts a transference of the patient's earliest emotional
affect-objects "at" the (Freudian) psychotherapist. (Almost) all other
types of psychiatric therapy avoids transferences, "at" the therapist, of
a patients affect-objects. Following the successful transference, a
countertransference of projection of the patient's affect objects is
attempted. A countertransference is the Freudian psychologist's
interpretation of the patient's transference, projected back at the
patient. This is an extremely involved process that is more of an art form
than a science. The projection of the interpretation can take the form of
subtle psychological manipulations on the part of the psychoanalyst. It
can also be involve an explanation of what has occurred, that is given to
the patient in terms he or she can understand. But an autistic's
affect-objects are in an autistic state, and if an autistic has a
transference, their psyche is "awoken" from its prenatal state, and a
psychotic episode ensues.

So now I am "stuck" between the autistic and neurotypical "worlds," and
have psychotic symptoms with no underlying psychotic disorder. I have been
modeling the ontology, with my autistic-before and psychotic
neurotypical-after "snapshots of reality" serving as independent,
perspectives of reality. Having two distinct perspectives of reality gave
me the ability to inferentially model a metaphysical reality (an ontology
is necessarily metaphysical). I understand that perceptions are antidotal
and highly suspect, so I did not permit my "snapshots of reality" to
influence the synthesis of the model. However, having perceived such
extreme perspectives of reality, I did not dismiss the final model on the
basis of its infinite, Platonic, extensibility. The metaphysics of reality
is Platonistic (it is Wheeler's pre-geometry), the model is synthetic, and
I am psychotic, so to say the least, it is going to be difficult to gain
academic concurrence that the model is valid.

This is abstract from the paper "A Platonic delusion: the identification
of psychosis and mysticism" by Daren Kemp:

"This paper discusses the frequently-made claim that psychosis and
mysticism are identifiable. Noting the failure of attempts by others to
define psychosis and mysticism, I present what I call the
symptomatological case for identifying them, hoping in this way to give an
idea of their essential features. More general observations about the
theoretical nature of the relationship between mental health and religion
are made which might indicate an identification of psychosis and
mysticism. It is then claimed that the idea of the identification often
derives, though at times unconsciously, from an outmoded Platonic model. A
short sketch of the intellectual history of the identification is
presented. Finally, a more plausible basis for comparing psychosis and
mysticism is offered, based on similar sociological origins or individual
psychodynamic factors, before concluding that a fundamental difference in
the conceptual status of psychosis as an illness and mysticism as a valued
state of consciousness a priori precludes their identification."

Empiricism is philosophic metaphysical doctrine, not scientific fact. The
pre-geometry is Platonism, and it is only inferable by examining
archetypes, self-similarities and recapitulations of an ontologically
normalizable reality, and it is not deductible by means of empirical
reductionism alone. Inference of the ontological pre-geometry is the only
means of discovering reality is metaphysical, but from this conceptual
model a mathematical model can be derived; hence empirical reduction and
logical deduction, alone, are insufficient for discovering the ontology.
The philosophy of science is so intent to "prove" empiricism by deriving a
mathematical model of reality (i.e., a TOE) from only empirical reduction,
that skepticism of the doctrines of the philosophy of science and
mathematics is presently unacceptable within academia. Science must
compromise in this case only, and meet metaphysics half-way. This
compromise is not only important for academia, but for civilization as
well.

In this modern day-and-age, inferences concerning reality that cannot by
empirically falsified, are assumed to be delusional. While I am not
claiming accounts given by psychiatric patients are accurate, rather the
accounts for many categories of delusions are a metaphysical
misperceptions of actual archetypes, synchronicities and teleological
entrainments. It is controlling of science to dismiss atypical perceptions
as meaningless, only on the basis of the lack of scientific accounts for
the modality of atypical perceptions. Many delusions (e.g., a Platonic
delusion) are diagnosed solely based upon their conflicting with the
philosophical doctrine held by psychiatrists, but psychiatry (mostly)
employs pre-Einsteinian physics as its empirical foundation. That is due
to relativistic and quantum mechanical models shed little additional light
upon phenomenology. The reason for this is, relativistic and quantum
mechanics requires phenomenological integration from a starting point of a
conceptual metaphysical model of the ontology.

The unconstrained feedback of philosophical doctrines between science and
the philosophy of science has created a religion, scientism, where many
scientists now lack skepticism of the direct implementation of doctrine(s)
as premise(s) of many scientific theories. Many scientists also believe in
scientific infallibility. Not only do I face the problem of convincing
very intelligent people that they are wrong on many important matters, and
the intellectual tools and methods they are employing are inadequate to
fully describe reality, I also must commit heresy against scientism, and
single handedly destroy an unorganized religion with many millions of
believers. Science has done nothing to investigate accounts for
theological and ontological claims of individuals that are labeled as
psychotic. With all of the abuse organized religions gets from science and
academia, in the present day, organized religions have been much more open
to scientific examination of religion, than science has been to organized
religions investigation of science.

Please ponder: "A Platonic delusion." The only reason that Daren Kemp
labeled Platonism a delusion is that it contradicts his religious belief
that reality is non-Platonic. Absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence! It is arrogant and ignorant for so many scientist to dismiss all
contradictory philosophical doctrines as being of no practical value or
meaning -- scientists should know better! If I were to conjecture why this
is, it is so a TOE could be discovered by science, and science (and
mathematics) alone would get the credit for discovering the nature of
reality. If you asked a theoretical physicist "could reality be Platonic?"
most would say it is highly unlikely, but remotely possible, and he or she
would be unable to fully consider all of the immense societal ramification
if someone discovered that reality is Platonic.

I have written a document called "A Model of Reality" and have given it to
some of the doctors that treat me. They looked at it, but their sanity
does not let them consider that a psychotic has discovered that "things
are not as they seem," even if it is the most likely way this discovery
would be made. If you would like to read it:
http://www.metaspec.org/onto/Doh.pdf
It is very superficial and psychosocial-centric. Words of wisdom
concerning what I should do next, would be appreciated.

Also, there are many ancillary issues I did not cover in Doh.pdf. Please
read:
http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html
for indirect support of some of the arguments in Doh.pdf. It is going to
be, at least, a couple of weeks before I have technically detailed model
of the ontology written. Eventually, I need help with disseminating the
model, and having it reviewed, but obviously first I need to convince
others of the viability of the model, so any feedback on how best to
present it, would also be appreciated.

Also, there are many ancillary issues I did not cover in Doh.pdf. Please
read:
http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html
for indirect support of some of the arguments in Doh.pdf. It is going to be,
at least, a couple of weeks before I have technically detailed model of the
ontology written. Eventually, I need help with disseminating the model, and
having it reviewed, but obviously first I need to convince others of the
viability of the model, so any feedback on how best to present it, would
also be appreciated.

It is as difficult for neurotypicals (i.e. "normal folks") to empathize with
autistics, as it is for autistics to empathize with neurotypicals. How an
autistic perceives reality is, in many respects, different from how a
neurotypical perceives reality. I have Aspeger syndrome, which is almost
identical to autism. I had a sudden onset reactive psychotic episode a few
years ago, and now I have psychotic symptoms with no underlying psychotic
disorder. My psychotic episode, in part, resulted from seventeen years of
Freudian psychotherapy. Prior my psychotic episode, I had no idea how
dangerous and futile it was to perform (Freudian) psychotherapy on an
autistic.

Psychotherapy attempts a transference of the patient's earliest emotional
affect-objects "at" the (Freudian) psychotherapist. (Almost) all other types
of psychiatric therapy avoids transferences, "at" the therapist, of a
patients affect-objects. Following the successful transference, a
countertransference of projection of the patient's affect objects is
attempted. A countertransference is the Freudian psychologist's
interpretation of the patient's transference, projected back at the patient.
This is an extremely involved process that is more of an art form than a
science. The projection of the interpretation can take the form of subtle
psychological manipulations on the part of the psychoanalyst. It can also be
involve an explanation of what has occurred, that is given to the patient in
terms he or she can understand. But an autistic's affect-objects are in an
autistic state, and if an autistic has a transference, their psyche is
"awoken" from its prenatal state, and a psychotic episode ensues.

So now I am "stuck" between the autistic and neurotypical "worlds," and have
psychotic symptoms with no underlying psychotic disorder. I have been
modeling the ontology, with my autistic-before and psychotic
neurotypical-after "snapshots of reality" serving as independent,
perspectives of reality. Having two distinct perspectives of reality gave me
the ability to inferentially model a metaphysical reality (an ontology is
necessarily metaphysical). I understand that perceptions are antidotal and
highly suspect, so I did not permit my "snapshots of reality" to influence
the synthesis of the model. However, having perceived such extreme
perspectives of reality, I did not dismiss the final model on the basis of
its infinite, Platonic, extensibility. The metaphysics of reality is
Platonistic (it is Wheeler's pre-geometry), the model is synthetic, and I am
psychotic, so to say the least, it is going to be difficult to gain academic
concurrence that the model is valid.

This is abstract from the paper "A Platonic delusion: the identification of
psychosis and mysticism" by Daren Kemp:

"This paper discusses the frequently-made claim that psychosis and mysticism
are identifiable. Noting the failure of attempts by others to define
psychosis and mysticism, I present what I call the symptomatological case
for identifying them, hoping in this way to give an idea of their essential
features. More general observations about the theoretical nature of the
relationship between mental health and religion are made which might
indicate an identification of psychosis and mysticism. It is then claimed
that the idea of the identification often derives, though at times
unconsciously, from an outmoded Platonic model. A short sketch of the
intellectual history of the identification is presented. Finally, a more
plausible basis for comparing psychosis and mysticism is offered, based on
similar sociological origins or individual psychodynamic factors, before
concluding that a fundamental difference in the conceptual status of
psychosis as an illness and mysticism as a valued state of consciousness a
priori precludes their identification."

Empiricism is philosophic metaphysical doctrine, not scientific fact. The
pre-geometry is Platonism, and it is only inferable by examining archetypes,
self-similarities and recapitulations of an ontologically normalizable
reality, and it is not deductible by means of empirical reductionism alone.
Inference of the ontological pre-geometry is the only means of discovering
reality is metaphysical, but from this conceptual model a mathematical model
can be derived; hence empirical reduction and logical deduction, alone, are
insufficient for discovering the ontology. The philosophy of science is so
intent to "prove" empiricism by deriving a mathematical model of reality
(i.e., a TOE) from only empirical reduction, that skepticism of the
doctrines of the philosophy of science and mathematics is presently
unacceptable within academia. Science must compromise in this case only, and
meet metaphysics half-way. This compromise is not only important for
academia, but for civilization as well.

In this modern day-and-age, inferences concerning reality that cannot by
empirically falsified, are assumed to be delusional. While I am not claiming
accounts given by psychiatric patients are accurate, rather the accounts for
many categories of delusions are a metaphysical misperceptions of actual
archetypes, synchronicities and teleological entrainments. It is controlling
of science to dismiss atypical perceptions as meaningless, only on the basis
of the lack of scientific accounts for the modality of atypical perceptions.
Many delusions (e.g., a Platonic delusion) are diagnosed solely based upon
their conflicting with the philosophical doctrine held by psychiatrists, but
psychiatry (mostly) employs pre-Einsteinian physics as its empirical
foundation. That is due to relativistic and quantum mechanical models shed
little additional light upon phenomenology. The reason for this is,
relativistic and quantum mechanics requires phenomenological integration
from a starting point of a conceptual metaphysical model of the ontology.

The unconstrained feedback of philosophical doctrines between science and
the philosophy of science has created a religion, scientism, where many
scientists now lack skepticism of the direct implementation of doctrine(s)
as premise(s) of many scientific theories. Many scientists also believe in
scientific infallibility. Not only do I face the problem of convincing very
intelligent people that they are wrong on many important matters, and the
intellectual tools and methods they are employing are inadequate to fully
describe reality, I also must commit heresy against scientism, and single
handedly destroy an unorganized religion with many millions of believers.
Science has done nothing to investigate accounts for theological and
ontological claims of individuals that are labeled as psychotic. With all of
the abuse organized religions gets from science and academia, in the present
day, organized religions have been much more open to scientific examination
of religion, than science has been to organized religions investigation of
science.

Please ponder: "A Platonic delusion." The only reason that Daren Kemp
labeled Platonism a delusion is that it contradicts his religious belief
that reality is non-Platonic. Absence of evidence is not evidence of
absence! It is arrogant and ignorant for so many scientist to dismiss all
contradictory philosophical doctrines as being of no practical value or
meaning -- scientists should know better! If I were to conjecture why this
is, it is so a TOE could be discovered by science, and science (and
mathematics) alone would get the credit for discovering the nature of
reality. If you asked a theoretical physicist "could reality be Platonic?"
most would say it is highly unlikely, but remotely possible, and he or she
would be unable to fully consider all of the immense societal ramification
if someone discovered that reality is Platonic.

I have written a document called "A Model of Reality" and have given it to
some of the doctors that treat me. They looked at it, but their sanity does
not let them consider that a psychotic has discovered that "things are not
as they seem," even if it is the most likely way this discovery would be
made. If you would like to read it:
http://www.metaspec.org/onto/Doh.pdf
It is very superficial and psychosocial-centric. Words of wisdom concerning
what I should do next, would be appreciated.

Also, there are many ancillary issues I did not cover in Doh.pdf. Please
read:
http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/transgress_v2/transgress_v2_singlefile.html
for indirect support of some of the arguments in Doh.pdf. It is going to be,
at least, a couple of weeks before I have technically detailed model of the
ontology written. Eventually, I need help with disseminating the model, and
having it reviewed, but obviously first I need to convince others of the
viability of the model, so any feedback on how best to present it, would
also be appreciated.

It is as difficult for neurotypicals (i.e. "normal folks") to empathize with
autistics, as it is for autistics to empathize with neurotypicals. How an
autistic perceives reality is, in many respects, different from how a
neurotypical perceives reality. I have Aspeger syndrome, which is almost
identical to autism.