| Topic: |
Science > Physics |
| User: |
"Lester Zick" |
| Date: |
13 Sep 2005 10:52:37 AM |
| Object: |
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth
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In empiricism truth is ambiguous. Yet empirical science is faced with
a compelling need to say what is true. Empiricism cannot do this so
the empirical scientist has to assume truth because he cannot say what
truth actually is or what is actually true of what.
In mathematics truth only describes consistency with an axiomatic
assumptions. Beyond this foundation there is no guarantee of truth and
mathematicians are forced to justify the choice of axioms by assuming
their axioms are true.
Assumptions of truth are everywhere in mathematics and science. There
is lip service to the ideal of empiricism in contradiction alone, but
they are quickly forgotten and direct intuitive appeals to notions of
truth are substituted directly for a lack of empirical contradiction.
We can assume anything we want but we cannot assume the truth of
anything we want. Everyone knows this yet everyone just goes right
ahead and does it anyway. And everyone justifies this by induction of
lack of contradiction or by naively assuming that something has to be
assumed true in order to get on with the practical business at hand.
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
29 Sep 2005 12:24:42 PM |
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 11:24:52 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Transcendental and limit are reciprocally self consistent. Limits and
approximations to limits of transcendentals are not reciprocally self
consistent since one occurs on straight line segments and the other on
curves.
Transcendental numbers are simply no algebraic real numbers.
They may be. So what? Transcendentals are pointed out exactly on
curves not straight lines.
The concept
and its development is no way dependent on geometric constructs. Not at
all. There is nothing inherently geometric in the concept of a
non-algebraic real number.
I wouldn't know about that since terms like "algebraic" are simply
made up to patch over terminological holes in other definitions. You
can't point out transcendentals like pi on straight lines exactly so
you make up stories about geometry and arithmetic to cover it up.
And there is nothing inherently geometric in
the theory of real numbers. Geometric constructs are used as useful
heuristics and intuition pumps but they are not essential to the subject.
More stories. Blondes leading the blonde.
What this has to do with empiricism, I know not. In the real world there
are no numbers of any kind real or not. Numbers live as neurons
a-poppin' in our brains. They have no physical existence whatsoever.
In the real world, Bob, whatever you mean by that, there are no lines,
planes, or solids either. What this has to do with empiricism is that
what empiricism imagines is in the real world is nothing but a bunch
of educated guesses. Experimental religion. When you can explain how
angular momentum vectors morph into scalars in particle spin, get
back to me. At the moment all you're doing is grabbing at thin air.
You remind me of a child guessing at answers to questions. The child
can't understand how an adult knows the child is guessing any more
than you seem to understand how it's obvious you're just guessing and
assuming the truth of your guesses. Empiricism endorses guesses in
mathematics and physics as long as they can't be proven incorrect.
Science doesn't. In the case of mathematics you're just guessing with
problematic definitions and claims regarding where things do or don't
exist. Classic symptoms of empiricism and experimental religion.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
29 Sep 2005 05:03:46 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
They may be. So what? Transcendentals are pointed out exactly on
curves not straight lines.
Transecendental numbers (i.e. non alebraic reals) are defined
independently of any geometric construct. In fact the entire theory of
reals can be done without a smidgin of geomtry. Not even a dight.
I wouldn't know about that since terms like "algebraic" are simply
made up to patch over terminological holes in other definitions. You
can't point out transcendentals like pi on straight lines exactly so
you make up stories about geometry and arithmetic to cover it up.
A number is algebraic if it satisfies a polynomial equation in one
variable, the equation having rational co-efficients. You are an
ignorant stupid putz! No geometry whatsoever is required or involved in
this definition.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
30 Sep 2005 02:18:29 PM |
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 18:03:46 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
They may be. So what? Transcendentals are pointed out exactly on
curves not straight lines.
Transecendental numbers (i.e. non alebraic reals) are defined
independently of any geometric construct. In fact the entire theory of
reals can be done without a smidgin of geomtry. Not even a dight.
Modern math requires no geometry whatsoever. It just prefers mystic
assumptions of truth. Empricism in action.
I wouldn't know about that since terms like "algebraic" are simply
made up to patch over terminological holes in other definitions. You
can't point out transcendentals like pi on straight lines exactly so
you make up stories about geometry and arithmetic to cover it up.
A number is algebraic if it satisfies a polynomial equation in one
variable, the equation having rational co-efficients. You are an
ignorant stupid putz! No geometry whatsoever is required or involved in
this definition.
Nor is any scientific reduction to truth. As a matter of modern math
you prefer to guess. As a matter of science I prefer to know.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
30 Sep 2005 02:36:41 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Modern math requires no geometry whatsoever. It just prefers mystic
assumptions of truth. Empricism in action.
Nothing of the sort. Abstract mathematical theories have no empirical
content. They are formal systems.
Nor is any scientific reduction to truth. As a matter of modern math
you prefer to guess. As a matter of science I prefer to know.
An abstract mathematical theory is about proving theorems. Proofs are
checkable. There is no guesswork.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 09:24:33 AM |
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On Fri, 30 Sep 2005 15:36:41 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Modern math requires no geometry whatsoever. It just prefers mystic
assumptions of truth. Empricism in action.
Nothing of the sort. Abstract mathematical theories have no empirical
content. They are formal systems.
In the best tradition of empiricism I define empiricism ostensibly on
the assumption of truth. I don't know how you define empiricism but
I'm confident it isn't as parsimonious as my definition.
Modern math assumes the truth of its definitions and axioms without
proof. Ergo modern math is just the numerical branch of empiricism.
Nor is any scientific reduction to truth. As a matter of modern math
you prefer to guess. As a matter of science I prefer to know.
An abstract mathematical theory is about proving theorems. Proofs are
checkable. There is no guesswork.
Definitions and axioms in modern math are guesswork because they are
not reduced to truth.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 01:29:15 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Definitions and axioms in modern math are guesswork because they are
not reduced to truth.
Once more. Mathematics, as such, has no emprical content. So, truth in
the empirical sense (i.e. being a fact or asserting a fact) has no
application. The only truths in mathematics are tautologies, and
tautolgies tell us nothing about the world. Nada, bupkis, zilch.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 07:13:50 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 14:29:15 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Definitions and axioms in modern math are guesswork because they are
not reduced to truth.
Once more. Mathematics, as such, has no emprical content. So, truth in
the empirical sense (i.e. being a fact or asserting a fact) has no
application.
The only problem is that your reduction of truth to facts is nothing
but a meaningless terminological reduction. You could say empiricism
reduces to pink unicorns with the same significance.
The only truths in mathematics are tautologies, and
tautolgies tell us nothing about the world. Nada, bupkis, zilch.
Just as your lamentations over truth tell us nothing about empiricism.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 08:01:50 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
The only problem is that your reduction of truth to facts is nothing
but a meaningless terminological reduction. You could say empiricism
reduces to pink unicorns with the same significance.
Empirical means reducible to observable fact. Empirical means something
asserted about the world. Pink unicorns have no empirical status because
they do not exist.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
02 Oct 2005 03:41:39 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 21:01:50 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
The only problem is that your reduction of truth to facts is nothing
but a meaningless terminological reduction. You could say empiricism
reduces to pink unicorns with the same significance.
Empirical means reducible to observable fact. Empirical means something
asserted about the world. Pink unicorns have no empirical status because
they do not exist.
Oh ho. Sez you. Let me see if I can put this in perspective even for
dullards such as yourself. You claim two reductions for empiricism:
observable fact and/or assertions about the world. What is your
reduction for observation and/or assertion? Until you can produce a
reduction for observation and/or assertion we can't even begin to
guess what you think you're saying with fact and world. Guess again.
You think empiricism doesn't regress to pink unicorns? Prove it.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 01:34:32 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Definitions and axioms in modern math are guesswork because they are
not reduced to truth.
Once more. Definitons do not have truth values. They are pure
convention, specifying the use of words. Are the rules of chess true?
Are the rules of chess gueswork?
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 07:15:15 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 14:34:32 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Definitions and axioms in modern math are guesswork because they are
not reduced to truth.
Once more. Definitons do not have truth values. They are pure
convention, specifying the use of words. Are the rules of chess true?
Are the rules of chess gueswork?
No. Unlike empiricism and modern math, the rules of chess are
reductions to eternal truth.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 08:03:00 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
No. Unlike empiricism and modern math, the rules of chess are
reductions to eternal truth.
No. They are arbitrary conventions. They have no inherent logical
necessity and they have nothing essential to do with the world. They are
just made up.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 08:37:59 PM |
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In sci.math Robert J. Kolker <nowhere@nowhere.com> wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
No. Unlike empiricism and modern math, the rules of chess are
reductions to eternal truth.
No. They are arbitrary conventions. They have no inherent logical
necessity and they have nothing essential to do with the world. They are
just made up.
Bob Kolker
Wow, "the rules of chess are reductions to eternal truth".
Lester just keeps getting nuttier and nuttier. I wonder
if the rules of football are reductions to eternal truth
as well? Of course there are at least four different
sports called "football", so I imagine only one
of them can be the "eternally true" football.
Stephen
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 08:43:13 PM |
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wrote:
Wow, "the rules of chess are reductions to eternal truth".
Lester just keeps getting nuttier and nuttier.
Lester is very, very Zick.
Whenever you show what he says is nonsense he gets kind of desperate and
acts strangely.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
02 Oct 2005 03:41:41 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 21:43:13 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
stephen@nomail.com wrote:
Wow, "the rules of chess are reductions to eternal truth".
Lester just keeps getting nuttier and nuttier.
Lester is very, very Zick.
Whenever you show what he says is nonsense he gets kind of desperate and
acts strangely.
Well I'm sure you'll excuse me for missing your demonstration that
what I said is nonsense when all anyone saw was a contrary assertion.
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
02 Oct 2005 03:41:41 PM |
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On Sun, 2 Oct 2005 01:37:59 +0000 (UTC), in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
In sci.math Robert J. Kolker <nowhere@nowhere.com> wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
No. Unlike empiricism and modern math, the rules of chess are
reductions to eternal truth.
No. They are arbitrary conventions. They have no inherent logical
necessity and they have nothing essential to do with the world. They are
just made up.
Bob Kolker
Wow, "the rules of chess are reductions to eternal truth".
Lester just keeps getting nuttier and nuttier. I wonder
if the rules of football are reductions to eternal truth
as well? Of course there are at least four different
sports called "football", so I imagine only one
of them can be the "eternally true" football.
What is your reduction to prove that "the rules of chess are not
reductions to eternal truth", numbnuts?
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
02 Oct 2005 03:41:40 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 21:03:00 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
No. Unlike empiricism and modern math, the rules of chess are
reductions to eternal truth.
No. They are arbitrary conventions. They have no inherent logical
necessity and they have nothing essential to do with the world. They are
just made up.
According to you so is modern math.
~v~~
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| User: "HMS Beagle" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
29 Sep 2005 07:56:28 PM |
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 14:01:35 GMT,
(Lester Zick) wrote:
That's nice.
Now, are the defn of 'transcendental' and the idea of 'limit' from
calculus not reciprocally self-consistent?
Transcendental and limit are reciprocally self consistent. Limits and
approximations to limits of transcendentals are not reciprocally self
consistent since one occurs on straight line segments and the other on
curves.
The defn of the continuum in mathematics is like so.
Let r,s (- |R
If r < s then there exists a t (- |R, such that r < t < s
This defn is used as justification for the inference that the limit is
actually ON the real number line. Then one needs the defn of the
word "limit" itself. I suggest the epsilon-delta defn. It clearly
borrows from the continuum above.
If you don't like calculus, there is always nonstandard analysis.
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
29 Sep 2005 10:22:51 PM |
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HMS Beagle wrote:
If you don't like calculus, there is always nonstandard analysis.
That is even less geometrical that standard analysis.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
30 Sep 2005 02:29:15 PM |
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 23:22:51 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
HMS Beagle wrote:
If you don't like calculus, there is always nonstandard analysis.
That is even less geometrical that standard analysis.
And assumptions of truth even less so.
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
30 Sep 2005 02:28:35 PM |
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On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 20:56:28 -0400, HMS Beagle <bgates@microsoft.org>
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 14:01:35 GMT,
(Lester Zick) wrote:
That's nice.
Now, are the defn of 'transcendental' and the idea of 'limit' from
calculus not reciprocally self-consistent?
Transcendental and limit are reciprocally self consistent. Limits and
approximations to limits of transcendentals are not reciprocally self
consistent since one occurs on straight line segments and the other on
curves.
The defn of the continuum in mathematics is like so.
Let r,s (- |R
If r < s then there exists a t (- |R, such that r < t < s
Your type font is a little difficult to decipher.A translator perhaps?
This defn is used as justification for the inference that the limit is
actually ON the real number line.
In the interests of empiricism and experimental religion generally,
you'll need to point out a transcendental such as pi on any straight
real number line exactly, just for reference, you know. Otherwise
your claim bears as justification bears no probitive value at all. We
know pi is pointed out exactly on a circle arc by its diameter because
that's how it was originally defined. We can't tell where you find pi
exactly on any other kind of real number line.
Then one needs the defn of the
word "limit" itself. I suggest the epsilon-delta defn. It clearly
borrows from the continuum above.
If you don't like calculus, there is always nonstandard analysis.
I'm satisfied with reductions to truth. Empiricism is satisfied with
reductions to assumptions of truth.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
30 Sep 2005 03:09:48 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
In the interests of empiricism and experimental religion generally,
you'll need to point out a transcendental such as pi on any straight
real number line exactly, just for reference, you know. Otherwise
your claim bears as justification bears no probitive value at all. We
know pi is pointed out exactly on a circle arc by its diameter because
that's how it was originally defined. We can't tell where you find pi
exactly on any other kind of real number line.
There are several convergent Taylor series that can be used to get pi.
The series for arcsin x evaluated for x = 1 will give pi/2. So multiple
the series by 2 and use the sequence of finite sums and it will converge
to pi.
Since the arcsin can be defined in a purely analytic fashion one does
not need any geometric object to get pi to as many decimal places as one
likes.
I suppose one can imagining rolling out a circle whose radius is 1/2
(which gives the circumference = pi). But rolling circles is not a
mathematical operation. It is the idealization of a physical operation.
So one can not really "point pi" on the real number line in this obvious
fashion. If you want something you can calculate with you will have to
use some kind of series approximation to pi.
You can also use the series for the arctangent to get pi/4
this would be x -x^3/3 + x^5/5 - x^7/7 + ... evalueated at 1. and so
forth. Multiply an approximating finite portion and multiply by 4 and
you have an approximation to pi. The sequence of approximating partial
sums converges to pi. This is an -algorithm- and you get something you
can actually calculate with. As opposed to rolling circles.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 09:28:19 AM |
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On Fri, 30 Sep 2005 16:09:48 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
In the interests of empiricism and experimental religion generally,
you'll need to point out a transcendental such as pi on any straight
real number line exactly, just for reference, you know. Otherwise
your claim bears as justification bears no probitive value at all. We
know pi is pointed out exactly on a circle arc by its diameter because
that's how it was originally defined. We can't tell where you find pi
exactly on any other kind of real number line.
There are several convergent Taylor series that can be used to get pi.
Specifying arithmetic approximations for pi doesn't specify pi. You
claim modern math has no need for geometric concepts yet modern
mathematikers refer ad nauseum to real number "lines". Go figure.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 01:31:36 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Specifying arithmetic approximations for pi doesn't specify pi. You
claim modern math has no need for geometric concepts yet modern
mathematikers refer ad nauseum to real number "lines". Go figure.
Yes it does. Pi = (that is equals, which is having the same value as)
certain infinite series. In fact it is the only way to express pi. Pi
cannot be written out arithmetically in a complete fashion. It is a
transcendental number whose expansion in any base is infinite and
non-cyclic.
One can -define- pi geometrically, but that does not specify pi in an
arithmeitic sense. It does not give you a number you can use in a
calculation.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 07:11:19 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 14:31:36 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Specifying arithmetic approximations for pi doesn't specify pi. You
claim modern math has no need for geometric concepts yet modern
mathematikers refer ad nauseum to real number "lines". Go figure.
Yes it does. Pi = (that is equals, which is having the same value as)
certain infinite series. In fact it is the only way to express pi. Pi
cannot be written out arithmetically in a complete fashion. It is a
transcendental number whose expansion in any base is infinite and
non-cyclic.
One can -define- pi geometrically, but that does not specify pi in an
arithmeitic sense. It does not give you a number you can use in a
calculation.
No one claims it does specify pi in an arithmetic sense. Nothing
specifies pi in an arithmetic sense. That's why pi is transcendental.
Modern mathematikers use line terminology because it has no way to
specify transcendental concepts in arithmetic terms.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
01 Oct 2005 08:00:30 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
No one claims it does specify pi in an arithmetic sense. Nothing
specifies pi in an arithmetic sense. That's why pi is transcendental.
Modern mathematikers use line terminology because it has no way to
specify transcendental concepts in arithmetic terms.
Are you using the Zick definition of trancendental or the standard
mathematical definition of transcendental?
The square root of two which is an algebraic (non-transcendental)
irrational number has the same property. It has a an infinite non-cyclic
fractional expansion in -any- base. Being transcendental has nothting to
do with it.
Using infinite series one can get an approximation of pi as close as one
wishes. For all practical purposes an approximation good to ten decimal
places will be fine for just about any application.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
02 Oct 2005 03:41:42 PM |
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On Sat, 01 Oct 2005 21:00:30 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
No one claims it does specify pi in an arithmetic sense. Nothing
specifies pi in an arithmetic sense. That's why pi is transcendental.
Modern mathematikers use line terminology because it has no way to
specify transcendental concepts in arithmetic terms.
Are you using the Zick definition of trancendental or the standard
mathematical definition of transcendental?
I'm using the transcendental definition of transcendental.
The square root of two which is an algebraic (non-transcendental)
irrational number has the same property. It has a an infinite non-cyclic
fractional expansion in -any- base. Being transcendental has nothting to
do with it.
My, my, now the square root of two is transcendental?
Using infinite series one can get an approximation of pi as close as one
wishes.
Except for exactly.
For all practical purposes an approximation good to ten decimal
places will be fine for just about any application.
And you have the temertiy to wonder why I call modern math empirical.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
02 Oct 2005 08:35:12 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
My, my, now the square root of two is transcendental?
I just got saying that it is not. The square root of two satisfies the
polynomial equation x^2 - 2 = 0. The square root of two is algebraic
therfore not transcendental. However it is irrational.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
03 Oct 2005 12:10:22 AM |
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In sci.math Robert J. Kolker <nowhere@nowhere.com> wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
My, my, now the square root of two is transcendental?
I just got saying that it is not. The square root of two satisfies the
polynomial equation x^2 - 2 = 0. The square root of two is algebraic
therfore not transcendental. However it is irrational.
Bob Kolker
Once more Lester provides evidence of his inability to
read for comprehension. Why else would he respond to
The square root of two which is an algebraic (non-transcendental)
irrational number has the same property.
With
My, my, now the square root of two is transcendental?
????
Of course, maybe in Lester speak, 'non' means something
other than what the rest of the world thinks it means.
Stephen
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
03 Oct 2005 09:40:21 AM |
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On Mon, 3 Oct 2005 05:10:22 +0000 (UTC), in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
In sci.math Robert J. Kolker <nowhere@nowhere.com> wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
My, my, now the square root of two is transcendental?
I just got saying that it is not. The square root of two satisfies the
polynomial equation x^2 - 2 = 0. The square root of two is algebraic
therfore not transcendental. However it is irrational.
Bob Kolker
Once more Lester provides evidence of his inability to
read for comprehension. Why else would he respond to
The square root of two which is an algebraic (non-transcendental)
irrational number has the same property.
With
My, my, now the square root of two is transcendental?
????
Of course, maybe in Lester speak, 'non' means something
other than what the rest of the world thinks it means.
Why else indeed unless Lester is pointing out that metaBob with his
modern math gamecube speaks with forked tongue.
~v~~
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