| Topic: |
Science > Physics |
| User: |
"Lester Zick" |
| Date: |
13 Sep 2005 10:52:37 AM |
| Object: |
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth
-------------
In empiricism truth is ambiguous. Yet empirical science is faced with
a compelling need to say what is true. Empiricism cannot do this so
the empirical scientist has to assume truth because he cannot say what
truth actually is or what is actually true of what.
In mathematics truth only describes consistency with an axiomatic
assumptions. Beyond this foundation there is no guarantee of truth and
mathematicians are forced to justify the choice of axioms by assuming
their axioms are true.
Assumptions of truth are everywhere in mathematics and science. There
is lip service to the ideal of empiricism in contradiction alone, but
they are quickly forgotten and direct intuitive appeals to notions of
truth are substituted directly for a lack of empirical contradiction.
We can assume anything we want but we cannot assume the truth of
anything we want. Everyone knows this yet everyone just goes right
ahead and does it anyway. And everyone justifies this by induction of
lack of contradiction or by naively assuming that something has to be
assumed true in order to get on with the practical business at hand.
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 09:59:04 AM |
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Intellectual Fossils
~v~~
It seems paleontologists have been researching the wrong piles when so
many intellectual fossils lie ready to hand. The most recent of these
to go extinct is homo e. which used to stand for homo erectus but now
stands for homo empiricus, a lineal descendent of homo habilis, who is
directly responsible for the extraordinarily slow educated guessing
which has allowed me to spew my apriorist nonsense on the internet.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 12:01:47 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Intellectual Fossils
~v~~
It seems paleontologists have been researching the wrong piles when so
many intellectual fossils lie ready to hand. The most recent of these
to go extinct is homo e. which used to stand for homo erectus but now
stands for homo empiricus, a lineal descendent of homo habilis, who is
directly responsible for the extraordinarily slow educated guessing
which has allowed me to spew my apriorist nonsense on the internet.
As opposed to the nearly zero progress produced by the a priorists. The
best of the a priorists, Descartes, could not come up with a decent
dynamics of moving massive bodies.
Plato produce -The Republic- and -The Timeaus-. But he produced no
machines. And so it was. The a priorists have produced little of any use
to anyone.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 02:12:10 PM |
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On Wed, 14 Sep 2005 13:01:47 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Intellectual Fossils
~v~~
It seems paleontologists have been researching the wrong piles when so
many intellectual fossils lie ready to hand. The most recent of these
to go extinct is homo e. which used to stand for homo erectus but now
stands for homo empiricus, a lineal descendent of homo habilis, who is
directly responsible for the extraordinarily slow educated guessing
which has allowed me to spew my apriorist nonsense on the internet.
As opposed to the nearly zero progress produced by the a priorists. The
best of the a priorists, Descartes, could not come up with a decent
dynamics of moving massive bodies.
Well Descartes may have been a lame excuse for apriority but at least
he came up with cartesian geometric concepts.
Plato produce -The Republic- and -The Timeaus-. But he produced no
machines. And so it was. The a priorists have produced little of any use
to anyone.
Ah, well, spoken like a true fossil.
~v~~
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| User: "Jure" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 12:06:54 PM |
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"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:4325bd1f.44603199@netnews.att.net...
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth
-------------
In empiricism truth is ambiguous. Yet empirical science is faced with
a compelling need to say what is true. Empiricism cannot do this so
the empirical scientist has to assume truth because he cannot say what
truth actually is or what is actually true of what.
In mathematics truth only describes consistency with an axiomatic
assumptions. Beyond this foundation there is no guarantee of truth and
mathematicians are forced to justify the choice of axioms by assuming
their axioms are true.
Assumptions of truth are everywhere in mathematics and science. There
is lip service to the ideal of empiricism in contradiction alone, but
they are quickly forgotten and direct intuitive appeals to notions of
truth are substituted directly for a lack of empirical contradiction.
We can assume anything we want but we cannot assume the truth of
anything we want. Everyone knows this yet everyone just goes right
ahead and does it anyway. And everyone justifies this by induction of
lack of contradiction or by naively assuming that something has to be
assumed true in order to get on with the practical business at hand.
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
So, you discovered that truth comes from observing and thinking and it is
not given by God or some other supreme creatures. Or to use another words:
God still didn't reply to my mail and told me is everything I know true or
not. Well, even God thinks that pornography is more interesting than
discussing the truth and Aristotle logic (this may be related with the fact
that many people say "Oh, God, this ***** is so beautiful" in certain
circumstances).
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 02:28:59 PM |
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On Tue, 13 Sep 2005 19:06:54 +0200, "Jure"
<kupus2_at_hi_tocka_htnet_tocka_hr@blablabla.hr> in comp.ai.philosophy
wrote:
"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:4325bd1f.44603199@netnews.att.net...
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth
-------------
In empiricism truth is ambiguous. Yet empirical science is faced with
a compelling need to say what is true. Empiricism cannot do this so
the empirical scientist has to assume truth because he cannot say what
truth actually is or what is actually true of what.
In mathematics truth only describes consistency with an axiomatic
assumptions. Beyond this foundation there is no guarantee of truth and
mathematicians are forced to justify the choice of axioms by assuming
their axioms are true.
Assumptions of truth are everywhere in mathematics and science. There
is lip service to the ideal of empiricism in contradiction alone, but
they are quickly forgotten and direct intuitive appeals to notions of
truth are substituted directly for a lack of empirical contradiction.
We can assume anything we want but we cannot assume the truth of
anything we want. Everyone knows this yet everyone just goes right
ahead and does it anyway. And everyone justifies this by induction of
lack of contradiction or by naively assuming that something has to be
assumed true in order to get on with the practical business at hand.
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
So, you discovered that truth comes from observing and thinking and it is
not given by God or some other supreme creatures. Or to use another words:
God still didn't reply to my mail and told me is everything I know true or
not.
Well you see you just put your ***** on the crux of the problem. God
told you everything you know is true or not. The difficulty is truth
cannot be told without "not". So as long as God has to deal not only
with what is true but also what is not true, he too has to deal with
"not" in various combinations. Which may irritate true believers but
there it is.
~v~~
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 01:35:00 AM |
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But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
Ultimately, truth must come from a self-referential definition of truth
itself. Otherwise, if one asks if a statement is true, as you pointed
out, there will always be another interpretation. Therefore, a
statement can only be true if it is about truth itself. After all, the
statement such as this must be able to operate on itself.
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 08:59:25 AM |
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wrote:
Ultimately, truth must come from a self-referential definition of truth
itself. Otherwise, if one asks if a statement is true, as you pointed
out, there will always be another interpretation. Therefore, a
statement can only be true if it is about truth itself. After all, the
statement such as this must be able to operate on itself.
If the statement is a simple statement asserting a state of the world,
then the statement is true, if the world is in the state asserted by the
statement. How does one determine world states? One looks.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 09:37:52 AM |
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On Wed, 14 Sep 2005 09:59:25 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
jhn_hbr@yahoo.com wrote:
Ultimately, truth must come from a self-referential definition of truth
itself. Otherwise, if one asks if a statement is true, as you pointed
out, there will always be another interpretation. Therefore, a
statement can only be true if it is about truth itself. After all, the
statement such as this must be able to operate on itself.
If the statement is a simple statement asserting a state of the world,
then the statement is true, if the world is in the state asserted by the
statement. How does one determine world states? One looks.
So that would make you, what, a world statesman? I count at least
eight undefined terms in your simple statement; so, presumably your
statement cannot be true. And that makes you a pretty poor excuse for
a statesman and a pretty typical excuse for an empiricist.
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 09:34:07 AM |
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On 13 Sep 2005 23:35:00 -0700, in comp.ai.philosophy
wrote:
But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
Ultimately, truth must come from a self-referential definition of truth
itself.
Well perhaps more accurately a self reverential definition of truth
because ideas of truth advanced by empiricism lack any basis in fact.
Otherwise, if one asks if a statement is true, as you pointed
out, there will always be another interpretation.
What I pointed out was that empiricism works this way because it has
no factual standard of truth apart from mere assumptive definition.
Therefore, a
statement can only be true if it is about truth itself. After all, the
statement such as this must be able to operate on itself.
Only provided you are able to show how and why it operates on itself.
Just claiming some definition of truth does operate on itself doesn't
show anything. You actually have to show recursive operation by
reduction to a single function.
~v~~
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| User: "Uncle Al" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 11:02:59 AM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth
-------------
In empiricism truth is ambiguous.
[snip]
Zick, you are a voluable idiot. Science works to spec every time.
Name another human endeadvor for which that is true.
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 02:15:18 PM |
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On Tue, 13 Sep 2005 09:02:59 -0700, Uncle Al <UncleAl0@hate.spam.net>
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth
-------------
In empiricism truth is ambiguous.
[snip]
Zick, you are a voluable idiot. Science works to spec every time.
Name another human endeadvor for which that is true.
Apparently your replies to my threads would fall into that category,
Uncle Ox. Empiricism works to spec every time. Unfortunately it can't
tell quite which specs it works to. I'm sure you think you can tell
which specs it works to but then you can't even tell true from false.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 02:40:45 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Apparently your replies to my threads would fall into that category,
Uncle Ox. Empiricism works to spec every time. Unfortunately it can't
tell quite which specs it works to. I'm sure you think you can tell
which specs it works to but then you can't even tell true from false.
It works to the sort of specs that leads to computers which when
networked allow you to spew your a priorist nonsense world wide.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 07:10:43 PM |
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On Tue, 13 Sep 2005 15:40:45 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Apparently your replies to my threads would fall into that category,
Uncle Ox. Empiricism works to spec every time. Unfortunately it can't
tell quite which specs it works to. I'm sure you think you can tell
which specs it works to but then you can't even tell true from false.
It works to the sort of specs that leads to computers which when
networked allow you to spew your a priorist nonsense world wide.
And what makes you think my a priorist nonsense wouldn't have led to
exactly the same ends somewhat faster than the four or five hundred
years it took your empiricist nonsense?
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 09:43:37 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
And what makes you think my a priorist nonsense wouldn't have led to
exactly the same ends somewhat faster than the four or five hundred
years it took your empiricist nonsense?
THe only a priori principle we know is necessarily true is the principle
of non-contradiction which tells us nothing specific about the world.
Since you raised the question, the burden is on you to show that
anything a posteriori theories can produce can be produced better and
faster with a priori theories. In particular show how ti derive quantum
electrodynamics a priori and the quantum theory of the solid state a
priori so we can develop transistors purely from a priori principles
without making a single measurement.
When you have done this (in complete detail with no hand waving) let us
know. The victory will be yours.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 09:25:54 AM |
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On Tue, 13 Sep 2005 22:43:37 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
And what makes you think my a priorist nonsense wouldn't have led to
exactly the same ends somewhat faster than the four or five hundred
years it took your empiricist nonsense?
THe only a priori principle we know is necessarily true is the principle
of non-contradiction which tells us nothing specific about the world.
So now you're an expert on a priorist nonsense too? How do you know
what is necessarily true of a priorist nonsense?
Since you raised the question, the burden is on you to show that
anything a posteriori theories can produce can be produced better and
faster with a priori theories. In particular show how ti derive quantum
electrodynamics a priori and the quantum theory of the solid state a
priori so we can develop transistors purely from a priori principles
without making a single measurement.
Well measurements certainly derive from a priorist nonsense like
geometry. Without geometry you wouldn't have any way to measure
your empricist nonsense.
When you have done this (in complete detail with no hand waving) let us
know. The victory will be yours.
Good, Bob, then the victory's mine.
~v~~
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| User: "Robert J. Kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 09:39:55 AM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Good, Bob, then the victory's mine.
You are a legend in your own mind.
No it isn't. Derive the fine structure constant, Planck's constant, the
gravitational constant a priori with no recourse to observation or
measurement. Do it now and show all the work.
For once, show the stuff you merely assert. Show proof. Stop dancing around.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
14 Sep 2005 02:06:22 PM |
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On Wed, 14 Sep 2005 10:39:55 -0400, "Robert J. Kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Good, Bob, then the victory's mine.
You are a legend in your own mind.
I suspect I'm a legend in yours too.
No it isn't. Derive the fine structure constant, Planck's constant, the
gravitational constant a priori with no recourse to observation or
measurement. Do it now and show all the work.
The derivation of Planck's constant from particle spin characteristics
was already shown. No measurement involved.
For once, show the stuff you merely assert. Show proof. Stop dancing around.
Why. You've already admitted that showing you proof has no bearing on
what you believe and I believe you. But before you demand proof you
need to establish which criteria would convince you. No point to work
on unconvincing criteria.
~v~~
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 12:11:41 PM |
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Science works to spec every time.
**********
Cybernetic emergent phenomena do not "work to spec every time" for they
are indeterminate.
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| User: "Uncle Al" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
13 Sep 2005 01:47:01 PM |
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wrote:
Science works to spec every time.
**********
Cybernetic emergent phenomena do not "work to spec every time" for they
are indeterminate.
Engineering is not science. Include quote attributions, turkey.
--
Uncle Al
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/
(Toxic URL! Unsafe for children and most mammals)
http://www.mazepath.com/uncleal/qz.pdf
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| User: "Hlafordlaes" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
20 Sep 2005 11:17:38 AM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
The question seems to be if definitions have any reliable relation to
"reality," or are merely constructs. This would bring us to the old
solopsist arguments. My short answers: (1) I know I am not just
imagining things, or I would by preference imagine them differently
(success at dating comes to mind) (2) Sense-data are not the data
themselves, but my survival does seem to rely on there being a fairly
close match.
If one does accept the notion of there being some sort of external
reality to which sense-data do map, then definitions attempt to
describe qualities and relations. As the senses and instrumentation
employed are limited, it is certain there is more data than the
definitions can describe. But it would seem that the definitions do
improve; after all, though engineering is not science, things built do
seem to work, and improve as the quality of the definitions progresses.
Any definitions are of course only related to this spacetime, and if
there is a multiverse, then we may never derive physical first
principles, but I wonder if that is not a frustration about some
"ultimate" truth for physics and not really an argument against the
validity of all emprirical approximations.
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| User: "feedbackdroids" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
20 Sep 2005 12:27:59 PM |
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Hlafordlaes wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
The question seems to be if definitions have any reliable relation to
"reality," or are merely constructs. This would bring us to the old
solopsist arguments. My short answers: (1) I know I am not just
imagining things, or I would by preference imagine them differently
(success at dating comes to mind) (2) Sense-data are not the data
themselves, but my survival does seem to rely on there being a fairly
close match.
Exactly. All of these endless philosophical recursions are, whether
people realize it or not, based upon old religious ideas that some
large magical hand picked us up and plunked us down into a world to
which our brains had no connection. Is all illusion filtered by our
senses, and/or can we ever know the truth about external reality?
That's fine for endless top-down word-games. OTOH, our sensory systems
evolved in a bottom-up manner, so as to give the rest of our brains
"close-enough" and "accurate-enough" information so as to allow our
bodies to survive in a hostile world. If this information weren't
close-enough and accurate-enough to do the job, THEN natural selection
would have seen to it that we wouldn't be here now to obsess about it.
Wordgames are played by people living in soft easy environments, not by
people trying to survive in Darfur and other parts of Afica, and being
eaten by tigers in parts of southeast asia, on and on.
If one does accept the notion of there being some sort of external
reality to which sense-data do map, then definitions attempt to
describe qualities and relations. As the senses and instrumentation
employed are limited, it is certain there is more data than the
definitions can describe. But it would seem that the definitions do
improve; after all, though engineering is not science, things built do
seem to work, and improve as the quality of the definitions progresses.
Witness the keyboard you're typing on.
Any definitions are of course only related to this spacetime, and if
there is a multiverse, then we may never derive physical first
principles, but I wonder if that is not a frustration about some
"ultimate" truth for physics and not really an argument against the
validity of all emprirical approximations.
As indicated above, the vast majority of these arguments keep recursing
on ideas formulated BEFORE the theory of evolution and before all
modern science in general. We're never gonna have the ultimate or
absolute truth about physics or anything else. What we do have is a
close-enough truth for the world we live. Saying that empirical science
is just a philosophy, as people have been doing here every day, is just
another game to avoid understanding what was written above regards
bottom-up evolution and natural selection. In his latest book on Godel,
Palle Yourgrau quotes Wittgenstein talking about how students of
philosophy are loathe to "... shake off [their] dream [that philosophy
is a "superscience"], and return to the sober dreariness of everyday
life ...". Get over it. Life is tough, and then you die - at least in
many parts of the real world.
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
20 Sep 2005 03:11:22 PM |
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On 20 Sep 2005 10:27:59 -0700, "feedbackdroids"
<feedbackdroids@yahoo.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Hlafordlaes wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
The question seems to be if definitions have any reliable relation to
"reality," or are merely constructs. This would bring us to the old
solopsist arguments. My short answers: (1) I know I am not just
imagining things, or I would by preference imagine them differently
(success at dating comes to mind) (2) Sense-data are not the data
themselves, but my survival does seem to rely on there being a fairly
close match.
Exactly. All of these endless philosophical recursions are, whether
people realize it or not, based upon old religious ideas that some
large magical hand picked us up and plunked us down into a world to
which our brains had no connection. Is all illusion filtered by our
senses, and/or can we ever know the truth about external reality?
I don't doubt endless philosophical recursions are related to old
religious ideas of truth. It doesn't really matter whether we're just
a mote in the eye of god or not. Most empiricists are empiricists out
of frustration. That's understandable. What is not understandable is
the alternative assumption of truth for empirical observations. That's
an empirical homunculus used to ground empirical observations without
evidence of truth or falsity one way or the other.
That's fine for endless top-down word-games. OTOH, our sensory systems
evolved in a bottom-up manner, so as to give the rest of our brains
"close-enough" and "accurate-enough" information so as to allow our
bodies to survive in a hostile world. If this information weren't
close-enough and accurate-enough to do the job, THEN natural selection
would have seen to it that we wouldn't be here now to obsess about it.
Wordgames are played by people living in soft easy environments, not by
people trying to survive in Darfur and other parts of Afica, and being
eaten by tigers in parts of southeast asia, on and on.
Sure. If we didn't have the luxury of considering such issues we'd
just have to do the best we could and labor in the dark as mankind has
on the subject throughout its evolution. Somehow I doubt this is an
effective indictment of the search for truth. It would be more of an
indictment to abandon the search for truth. The fact you see nothing
but futility in the search for truth only indicates you're in circular
regression.
If one does accept the notion of there being some sort of external
reality to which sense-data do map, then definitions attempt to
describe qualities and relations. As the senses and instrumentation
employed are limited, it is certain there is more data than the
definitions can describe. But it would seem that the definitions do
improve; after all, though engineering is not science, things built do
seem to work, and improve as the quality of the definitions progresses.
Witness the keyboard you're typing on.
This just regresses the idea of truth to perceptual evidence without
justification. The senses can be and are wrong and frequently so. They
just happen to be more often right than conventional alternatives.
Any definitions are of course only related to this spacetime, and if
there is a multiverse, then we may never derive physical first
principles, but I wonder if that is not a frustration about some
"ultimate" truth for physics and not really an argument against the
validity of all emprirical approximations.
As indicated above, the vast majority of these arguments keep recursing
on ideas formulated BEFORE the theory of evolution and before all
modern science in general. We're never gonna have the ultimate or
absolute truth about physics or anything else.
Do we just accept your word for this or the word of every empiricist
who has ever lived? Or are we allowed to get on with the definition of
truth in tautological terms which defy empirical comprehension?
What we do have is a
close-enough truth for the world we live. Saying that empirical science
is just a philosophy, as people have been doing here every day, is just
another game to avoid understanding what was written above regards
bottom-up evolution and natural selection. In his latest book on Godel,
Palle Yourgrau quotes Wittgenstein talking about how students of
philosophy are loathe to "... shake off [their] dream [that philosophy
is a "superscience"], and return to the sober dreariness of everyday
life ...". Get over it. Life is tough, and then you die - at least in
many parts of the real world.
Last time I checked you die in every part of the world. The only
choice you have is whether to die with assumptions of truth for your
beliefs or live with alternatives. So far no one has been able to die
with knowledge of truth. Evolution has nothing to do with it. All that
proves is that we are one of many potential implementations of
intelligence and not that we actually know what we're talking about.
You seem satisfied to guess at what you're talking about. I prefer to
know.
~v~~
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| User: "feedbackdroids" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
20 Sep 2005 10:23:02 PM |
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What we do have is a
close-enough truth for the world we live. Saying that empirical science
is just a philosophy, as people have been doing here every day, is just
another game to avoid understanding what was written above regards
bottom-up evolution and natural selection. In his latest book on Godel,
Palle Yourgrau quotes Wittgenstein talking about how students of
philosophy are loathe to "... shake off [their] dream [that philosophy
is a "superscience"], and return to the sober dreariness of everyday
life ...". Get over it. Life is tough, and then you die - at least in
many parts of the real world.
Last time I checked you die in every part of the world. The only
choice you have is whether to die with assumptions of truth for your
beliefs or live with alternatives. So far no one has been able to die
with knowledge of truth. Evolution has nothing to do with it. All that
proves is that we are one of many potential implementations of
intelligence and not that we actually know what we're talking about.
You seem satisfied to guess at what you're talking about. I prefer to
know.
More cycles. Somehow, I suspect that NONE of the people who have ever
lived [see below] "preferring to know" have died satisifed, but they
surely had lots of fun in their lives playing these endlessly recursive
games. As long as we hold that we can never know, then we fulfill our
own prophesies. Wittgenstein was right [as above]. As mentioned several
times, I can only hold to such ideas, as contained in these endless
recursions, if I believe in the magical hand, which takes us back to
theology, not science. Oh well. Moving on ...
5000YA, in one of the first stories ever written down in print [ie
Mesopotamian/Sumerian cunieform], lord Gilgamesh quested for the
meaning of life and the secret of eternal youth. He actually had it in
his grasp, the secret given to him by Utnapishtim who was the only man
ever to be granted eternal life by the gods, but then as Gilgamesh
rested, a snake came up through the depths of the waters and carried it
away. [natural selection is a ***** that way]. I suspect Gilgamesh,
Abraham, Plato, Kant, and most students of philosophy today have all
been in the same metaphorical boat.
If you've never read Gilgamesh, I highly recommend the edition by John
Gardner and John Maier, 1985. You also get to learn a little on how to
transliterate cu-ni-e-form too. In any case, it does help to put our
entire western tradition into perspective. As one raised catholic, I
found it to be one of the most illuminating books I've ever read ....
"The one who saw the abyss I will make the land know;
of him who knew all, let me tell the story,
.... in the same way ...
as the lord of wisdom, he who knew everything, Gilgamesh,
who saw things secret, opened the place hidden,
and carried back the word of time before the Flood-"
...........
"Opener of the mountain passes,
digger of wells on the hills' side,
he crossed the ocean, the wide sea, to where Shamash rises,
scouted the world regions: the one who seeks life,
forcing his way to Utnapishtim the remote one,
the man who restored life where the FLood had destroyed it,
.... peopling the earth."
...........
"From the day of his birth, Gilgamesh was called by name."
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
21 Sep 2005 10:19:59 AM |
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On 20 Sep 2005 20:23:02 -0700, "feedbackdroids"
<feedbackdroids@yahoo.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
What we do have is a
close-enough truth for the world we live. Saying that empirical science
is just a philosophy, as people have been doing here every day, is just
another game to avoid understanding what was written above regards
bottom-up evolution and natural selection. In his latest book on Godel,
Palle Yourgrau quotes Wittgenstein talking about how students of
philosophy are loathe to "... shake off [their] dream [that philosophy
is a "superscience"], and return to the sober dreariness of everyday
life ...". Get over it. Life is tough, and then you die - at least in
many parts of the real world.
Last time I checked you die in every part of the world. The only
choice you have is whether to die with assumptions of truth for your
beliefs or live with alternatives. So far no one has been able to die
with knowledge of truth. Evolution has nothing to do with it. All that
proves is that we are one of many potential implementations of
intelligence and not that we actually know what we're talking about.
You seem satisfied to guess at what you're talking about. I prefer to
know.
More cycles. Somehow, I suspect that NONE of the people who have ever
lived [see below] "preferring to know" have died satisifed, but they
surely had lots of fun in their lives playing these endlessly recursive
games.
The only endless recusion possible is on closed curves. No one to date
has died satisfied but many have preferred not to play games on closed
curves.
As long as we hold that we can never know, then we fulfill our
own prophesies. Wittgenstein was right [as above]. As mentioned several
times, I can only hold to such ideas, as contained in these endless
recursions, if I believe in the magical hand, which takes us back to
theology, not science. Oh well. Moving on ...
Empiricism is as good an experimental religion as any and better than
most.
[. . .] (delete fables)
~v~~
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
20 Sep 2005 03:11:23 PM |
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On 20 Sep 2005 09:17:38 -0700, "Hlafordlaes" <hlafordlaes@gmail.com>
in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
In empiricism and mathematics truth is regressed to definitions.
Empiricists and mathematicians cannot say what truth is but can with
certainty say what definitions are. And this forms their standard of
truth. But the interesting thing here is that definitions themselves
cannot be proven true because they are true by definition and they
have to be true because they are definitions. And if anyone questions
consistency of definitions it's irrelevant because they still remain
definitions and definitions are all anyone can assume is true.
~v~~
The question seems to be if definitions have any reliable relation to
"reality," or are merely constructs. This would bring us to the old
solopsist arguments. My short answers: (1) I know I am not just
imagining things, or I would by preference imagine them differently
(success at dating comes to mind)
Actually this seems to be about the best rationalization of solipsism
I seen from anyone but myself. Is it original with you? (My own
happens to be that everything we know, think, and perceive actually
does occur in the brain/mind complex but that what we can know of
such things depends on their logical relations to one another.)
(2) Sense-data are not the data
themselves, but my survival does seem to rely on there being a fairly
close match.
Well your position seems to be that you're tired of all the
rationalization and need to get on with life so we'll do the best we
can without knowing for sure. And I don't disagree. However I see
nothing in this position which means we can't get to the heart of the
problem. Empiricists solve problems piecemeal mainly because they
don't see the problem as a whole. Some are content with this approach
whereas many suspect they really don't know what's going on and their
reactionary approachs to such issues are indicative of this.
If one does accept the notion of there being some sort of external
reality to which sense-data do map, then definitions attempt to
describe qualities and relations. As the senses and instrumentation
employed are limited, it is certain there is more data than the
definitions can describe. But it would seem that the definitions do
improve; after all, though engineering is not science, things built do
seem to work, and improve as the quality of the definitions progresses.
Here I don't quite understand why you seem satisfied with perceptual
regressions. I grant they're more consistently right than conventional
alternatives but they aren't even close to being always right.
Any definitions are of course only related to this spacetime, and if
there is a multiverse, then we may never derive physical first
principles, but I wonder if that is not a frustration about some
"ultimate" truth for physics and not really an argument against the
validity of all emprirical approximations.
What's curious in all this is that the most hardened empiricst doesn't
even cringe at the grossest flights of fancy in spacetime, infinitudes
and multiverses. Where are all your perceptual regressions now? First
you say we have to rely on the senses and then you warp off into never
never land at the drop of a hat.Fact is you don't know what's true and
what's not nor do you understand why.
~v~~
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| User: "platopes" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
24 Sep 2005 10:51:05 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Actually this seems to be about the best rationalization of solipsism
I seen from anyone but myself. Is it original with you? (My own
happens to be that everything we know, think, and perceive actually
does occur in the brain/mind complex but that what we can know of
such things depends on their logical relations to one another.)
Where does the brain/mind complex "occur"?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/
"...there is little philosophical consensus about the basis for the
distinction between logical and nonlogical expressions."
Having been recently fired from the Towelry, (which is perhaps a good
thing, though the beatings weren't completely unbearable), I had a bit
of time to fix the above dilemma...
No existence without change; dimension is change.
Change precludes "nothingness"; "nothingness" cannot change.
Change is Two Things - Now & Future; they are mutually definitive,
but not "opposite". They are One Thing.
One Thing is fundamental and homogeneous - change is continuous.
Now exists as certainty in Future, (particle).
Future exists as probability in Now, (wave).
Probability and certainty exist in the physical manifestation of
existence, (just like the EM field), in response to which the human
brain evolved; life forms evolve toward better exploitation of
pre-existing physical environments. But I'm not going to type
"thought-field".
An object may be thought of as a process - the process of thought
should be viewed as an object.
"Thought is the unifying force" should be taken literally. We do not
experience the full spectrum of Thought, just as we do not see the full
spectrum of light.
The Towelry just called. They want me back and I am *pretty healed
up*. So who needs you, Zick.
p
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
25 Sep 2005 07:37:45 PM |
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On 24 Sep 2005 20:51:05 -0700, "platopes" <platopes@yahoo.com> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Actually this seems to be about the best rationalization of solipsism
I seen from anyone but myself. Is it original with you? (My own
happens to be that everything we know, think, and perceive actually
does occur in the brain/mind complex but that what we can know of
such things depends on their logical relations to one another.)
Where does the brain/mind complex "occur"?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/
"...there is little philosophical consensus about the basis for the
distinction between logical and nonlogical expressions."
Having been recently fired from the Towelry, (which is perhaps a good
thing, though the beatings weren't completely unbearable), I had a bit
of time to fix the above dilemma...
No existence without change; dimension is change.
Change precludes "nothingness"; "nothingness" cannot change.
Change is Two Things - Now & Future; they are mutually definitive,
but not "opposite". They are One Thing.
One Thing is fundamental and homogeneous - change is continuous.
Now exists as certainty in Future, (particle).
Future exists as probability in Now, (wave).
Probability and certainty exist in the physical manifestation of
existence, (just like the EM field), in response to which the human
brain evolved; life forms evolve toward better exploitation of
pre-existing physical environments. But I'm not going to type
"thought-field".
An object may be thought of as a process - the process of thought
should be viewed as an object.
"Thought is the unifying force" should be taken literally. We do not
experience the full spectrum of Thought, just as we do not see the full
spectrum of light.
The Towelry just called. They want me back and I am *pretty healed
up*. So who needs you, Zick.
Not sure what the problem here is but my remark was intended as a
compliment not a put down. However take it any way you like.
~v~~
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| User: "platopes" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
25 Sep 2005 09:47:21 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
On 24 Sep 2005 20:51:05 -0700, "platopes" <platopes@yahoo.com> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Actually this seems to be about the best rationalization of solipsism
I seen from anyone but myself. Is it original with you? (My own
happens to be that everything we know, think, and perceive actually
does occur in the brain/mind complex but that what we can know of
such things depends on their logical relations to one another.)
Where does the brain/mind complex "occur"?
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-constants/
"...there is little philosophical consensus about the basis for the
distinction between logical and nonlogical expressions."
Having been recently fired from the Towelry, (which is perhaps a good
thing, though the beatings weren't completely unbearable), I had a bit
of time to fix the above dilemma...
No existence without change; dimension is change.
Change precludes "nothingness"; "nothingness" cannot change.
Change is Two Things - Now & Future; they are mutually definitive,
but not "opposite". They are One Thing.
One Thing is fundamental and homogeneous - change is continuous.
Now exists as certainty in Future, (particle).
Future exists as probability in Now, (wave).
Probability and certainty exist in the physical manifestation of
existence, (just like the EM field), in response to which the human
brain evolved; life forms evolve toward better exploitation of
pre-existing physical environments. But I'm not going to type
"thought-field".
An object may be thought of as a process - the process of thought
should be viewed as an object.
"Thought is the unifying force" should be taken literally. We do not
experience the full spectrum of Thought, just as we do not see the full
spectrum of light.
The Towelry just called. They want me back and I am *pretty healed
up*. So who needs you, Zick.
Not sure what the problem here is but my remark was intended as a
compliment not a put down. However take it any way you like.
~v~~
First problem: you think I'm "Hlafordlaes".
Second problem: Where does the brain/mind complex "occur"? In the
context of your statements above, of course.
The rest was just some stuff I've been kicking around.
p
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| User: "" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
25 Sep 2005 09:52:10 PM |
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Where does the brain/mind complex "occur"?
***********************
Within the skull?????????????????????????
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| User: "platopes" |
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| Title: Re: Empiricism and the Assumption of Truth |
25 Sep 2005 10:19:04 PM |
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wrote:
platopes wrote:
Where does the brain/mind complex "occur"?
***********************
Within the skull?????????????????????????
***********************
"CONTEXT FOR DONNY"
A Disturbing New Play
by Lester Zick
"Actually this seems to be about the best rationalization of
solipsism
I seen from anyone but myself. Is it original with you? (My own
happens to be that everything we know, think, and perceive actually
does occur in the brain/mind complex but that what we can know of
such things depends on their logical relations to one another.)"
***********************
So Don, your skull, as I perceive it, does only "occur" in my
brain/mind complex. You have no external existence, and that's fine
with me, but where does my brain/mind complex "occur"?
It's all out there. Empiricism is a polite and humble way of asking,
"and so how does this thing behave?" Historically it represents a
hard-won victory against heinous religious mind control. Of course, the
battle continues...
p
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