| Topic: |
Science > Physics |
| User: |
"Lester Zick" |
| Date: |
26 Dec 2004 06:59:34 PM |
| Object: |
Epistemology 101 |
Epistemology 101
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(Positivism)
Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
one must judge value.
Of course all sciences judge truth in terms of self contradiction, the
falsification of empirical observation through empirical observation.
However with no ability to judge truth in absolute terms, there is no
model of reality in general with which to judge empirical observations
in general without reference to other empirical observations.
This is a very tedious and cumbersome process which yields no further
indication of cause one way or the other and forces us to invalidate
empirical observations without gaining further insight as to what may
be true. In other words, it shows what is false but not what is true
of one thing in relation to others. For further insight we are forced
to rely on educated guesses rather than causation or instrumentality.
The curious thing about this is that empirical observations are
neither true nor false in themselves; they are only true or false in
relation to other things. Any empirical observation can only be taken
as true in the absence of self contradiction through other empirical
observations and we cannot otherwise know that they are false.
However we cannot know the reverse: that any empirical observation is
false without evidence of self contradiction. Consequently empirical
observers are in the enviable position of not having to prove what
they say is true or even necessarily understand what it is that they
are saying in order to assert that it is not false. Whereas naysayers
are in the rather awkward position of having to know what empiricists
are talking about is not true and why.
Strangely enough in positivism it turns out that the burden of proof
is on the negativist not the positivist.
(Positivist Forensic Techniques)
This means that we are faced with a negativism in science where
empiricsts do not have to prove truth but naysayers have to prove
falsity. Consider a certain forensic technique. Empiricist A asserts
observation B as not false because there is no mechanical standard of
reality in general against which to judge the truth of B. Naysayer X
wishes to argue against B but is forced to demand from A the meaning
of B. And if A recognizes what he is up against, he merely replies B
is whatever he says it is as long as B is not self contradictory. And
even if in conflict with other empirical observations, A can change B.
Naysayer X is thus stymied unless he in turn appeals to philosophy
rather than science to decide the issue. He must counter B with some
ad hoc rationale designed to exclude certain interpretations of B.
Consider the problem of mentation or the mind and mental effects
posited as causes for sentient behavior. I opine that mentation is a
cause of human behavior. And the typical materialist is immediately
driven to demand what I mean by mentation or the mind and mental
effects. Of course, I cleverly evade being pinned down so as to avoid
the numerous traps laid for the unwary by materialists on this
particular subject and simply decline to answer, recognizing that it
is the naysayer's responsibility for knowing what he is denying and
not mine for knowing what I am asserting simply because I have no way
to know what I am asserting in the absence of any universal frame of
reference for reality in mechanical terms.
In order to deny mentation, materialists have to construct a whole
series of philosophical rationales with which preclude mentation on
more or less plausible terms so they can claim contradiction of any
mentalist interpretation of behavior even in speculative terms.
Does this seem unfair? Yes I would certainly agree that it is. However
this is the way science has to be conducted in positivism with the
doctrinal absence of any definitive view of reality. Physics suffers
from this peculiar miasma almost completely and mathematics to the
extent it has no mechanical ontology to support its axioms.
The reason is that there are two kinds of processes involved: emprical
and logical. Empirical observations just represent positive judgments.
Logical inference on the other hand represent negations of positive
judgments compounded in various ways.
In effect empirical observation is the out-there and logical inference
the in-here. This is true regardless of where empirical observation
actually occurs. We could have empirical observation within the brain,
but we cannot have logical inference outside the brain or comparable
organ. The reason is that to the extent negation occurs, it is defined
and circumscribed by the mechanics of negation and to the extent
negation is not what is out-there, it must be in-here.
------------------
Let's examine certain consequences of this view of epistemology.
Without any overall view of reality that allows us to judge empirical
observation directly in positive terms, absent self contradiction, we
are forced to rely on an assumption of not false which means naysayers
are forced to provide evidence of contradiction and to provide
evidence of meaning in terms of what contradicts what.
This kind of epistemology is called positivism. Positivism knows it
cannot judge empirical observations in terms of absolute truth; so, it
relies on educated guesses and the absence of self contradiction as a
substitute for truth. And naysayers are required to produce either
absolute truth or evidence of meaning and self contradiction.
So far we are on good positivistic grounds. However, now a curious
problems emerges. How are we to judge the significance of empirical
truth? In the absence of self contradiction we are just forced to rely
on some judgment of value instead of truth. Empiricist B maintains
that such and such is true of behavior but actually bases the merit of
his claims on some form of pragmatic utility or what works instead. He
has to because as positivists everywhere understand he can't prove his
speculative observations are actually true.
Regards - Lester
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| User: "Franz Heymann" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 04:22:26 AM |
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"Lester Zick" <lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net> wrote in message
news:41d004d4.21585466@netnews.att.net...
Epistemology 101
----------
(Positivism)
Anything ending in "-ism" is crap.
[ssip]
Franz
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
26 Dec 2004 09:20:06 PM |
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(Lester Zick) writes:
Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
one must judge value.
I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.
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| User: "Franz Heymann" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 04:22:25 AM |
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"Neil W Rickert" <rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> wrote in message
news:cqnv16$dt0$2@usenet.cso.niu.edu...
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations
except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on
the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge
truth
one must judge value.
I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.
Thank God for small mercies.
Franz
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| User: "Albert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 10:25:35 AM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
one must judge value.
I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
what you wrote in that post.
Your disagreement is noted.
I won't quote it all.
If you don't intend to refute what you disagree with and are
content to express disagreement only, then that is probably wise.
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 10:04:46 AM |
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On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 03:20:06 +0000 (UTC), Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
lesterDELzick@worldnet.att.net (Lester Zick) writes:
Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
one must judge value.
I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.
Without partonizing your disagreement, Neil, which you haven't made
specific, what I meant is not that judgments do fall back on utility,
but that they should fall back on utility. I don't mind speculation.
But I consider truth a considerably preferable standard for science.
Regards - Lester
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 10:44:22 AM |
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(Lester Zick) writes:
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
(Lester Zick) writes:
Without any way to decide the truth of empirical observations except
the absence of self contradiction, one is forced to fall back on the
idea of utility as the basis of epistemology.If one cannot judge truth
one must judge value.
I agree that it falls back on utility. But I disagree with most of
what you wrote in that post. I won't quote it all.
Without partonizing your disagreement, Neil, which you haven't made
specific, what I meant is not that judgments do fall back on utility,
but that they should fall back on utility. I don't mind speculation.
But I consider truth a considerably preferable standard for science.
But what is the basis for "truth"?
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| User: "Albert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 12:03:22 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
<snip>
But what is the basis for "truth"?
I don't understand this question. What could possibly be a
'basis' for truth? A higher truth? A truism? The context was
Science.
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 01:44:16 PM |
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Albert <albertwagner@cox.net> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
<snip>
But what is the basis for "truth"?
I don't understand this question.
You have stated the problem quite succinctly. I look forward to
your solution.
What could possibly be a
'basis' for truth? A higher truth? A truism? The context was
Science.
Some philosophers seem to write as if truth is determined by the god
of their atheism, and piped directly into the immaterial substance
of their non-existent spiritual soul.
The theologians at least have somewhere to point when asked for a
basis for truth. But where does the secular philosopher point?
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| User: "robert j. kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 03:30:01 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
The theologians at least have somewhere to point when asked for a
basis for truth. But where does the secular philosopher point?
Truth is an attribute of propositions. The proposition p is true if and
only if state of the world asserted by p is in fact the state of the
world. This is the Plain Old Correspondence Theory of Truth and it goes
all the way back to Aristotle.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 03:39:00 PM |
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"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The theologians at least have somewhere to point when asked for a
basis for truth. But where does the secular philosopher point?
Truth is an attribute of propositions. The proposition p is true if and
only if state of the world asserted by p is in fact the state of the
world. This is the Plain Old Correspondence Theory of Truth and it goes
all the way back to Aristotle.
And that is the same old evasion of the issue that goes back to even
earlier.
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| User: "David Longley" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 05:06:26 PM |
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In article <cqpvdk$7ba$1@usenet.cso.niu.edu>, Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> writes
"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.com> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The theologians at least have somewhere to point when asked for a
basis for truth. But where does the secular philosopher point?
Truth is an attribute of propositions. The proposition p is true if and
only if state of the world asserted by p is in fact the state of the
world. This is the Plain Old Correspondence Theory of Truth and it goes
all the way back to Aristotle.
And that is the same old evasion of the issue that goes back to even
earlier.
The "evasion" here may just be yours (would you know otherwise?) Through
"ignoring", or neglecting how science actually works (i.e. through not
having practised such behaviour other than as a folk psychologist) you
wouldn't understand the nature of the pursuit of truth, and what is
abandons (the intensional) in the process. This is the "disappearance
theory" of truth which I referred you to nearly a decade ago, and which
you clearly didn't grasp when you read "From Stimulus To Science".
That's understandable, as you're not a scientist.
It's basically as simple as that.
--
David Longley
http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm
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| User: "Uthur" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 03:35:30 PM |
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"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.com> wrote in message news:O8%zd.814767$8_6.282307@attbi_s04...
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The theologians at least have somewhere to point when asked for a
basis for truth. But where does the secular philosopher point?
Truth is an attribute of propositions. The proposition p is true if and only if state of the world asserted by p is in fact the
state of the world. This is the Plain Old Correspondence Theory of Truth and it goes all the way back to Aristotle.
Bob Kolker
But how do you decide if the state of the world asserted by p is in fact the
state of the world. And when you have decided that, how do you decide if
*that* is true. And so on...
Didn't Lewis Carroll disappear up that alley once?
Uthur
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| User: "robert j. kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 03:41:57 PM |
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Uthur wrote:
But how do you decide if the state of the world asserted by p is in fact the
state of the world. And when you have decided that, how do you decide if
*that* is true. And so on...
You look and see. For example: The propostion "There is a five dollar
bill in my wallet". I look in my wallet and sure enough, there is a five
dollar bill. The proposition is true. What's in yer wallet?
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 04:10:44 PM |
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On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 21:30:01 GMT, "robert j. kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.com> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The theologians at least have somewhere to point when asked for a
basis for truth. But where does the secular philosopher point?
Truth is an attribute of propositions. The proposition p is true if and
only if state of the world asserted by p is in fact the state of the
world. This is the Plain Old Correspondence Theory of Truth and it goes
all the way back to Aristotle.
Problem is, you've got different middle terms: p and the state of the
world, whatever that means. In a subordinate reply you indicate that
the state of the world is contained in your wallet. So, you've added
another undefined term. Plus seeing, etc. So, you've just regressed
the explanation of truth to further undefined terms. Kinda reminds me
of the "we don't need no stinkin truth" rationale for physics.
Regards - Lester
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| User: "robert j. kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 07:43:21 PM |
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Lester Zick wrote:
Problem is, you've got different middle terms: p and the state of the
world, whatever that means. In a subordinate reply you indicate that
the state of the world is contained in your wallet.
I said no such thing. I said I had five dollars in my wallet, which is
in fact the case so the statement is true. If I had said, I have a
thousand dollars in my wallet, that statement would be false (I don't
have that much money on me). What's in yer wallet?
Aristotle and Tarski use the same definition of truth. A statment is
true if and only if it asserts a fact.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 08:17:03 PM |
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"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.net> writes:
Aristotle and Tarski use the same definition of truth. A statment is
true if and only if it asserts a fact.
Perhaps Aristotle gave that definition. I don't know about Tarski.
If you take that as the basis for truth, then please provide the
basis for factuality.
As far as I know, Tarski defined the conditions for truth in a formal
language, assuming that there is already a concept of truth available
in natural language.
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| User: "David Longley" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 05:18:41 PM |
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In article <cqqfmv$dg6$1@usenet.cso.niu.edu>, Neil W Rickert
<rickert+nn@cs.niu.edu> writes
"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.net> writes:
Aristotle and Tarski use the same definition of truth. A statment is
true if and only if it asserts a fact.
Perhaps Aristotle gave that definition. I don't know about Tarski.
If you take that as the basis for truth, then please provide the
basis for factuality.
As far as I know, Tarski defined the conditions for truth in a formal
language, assuming that there is already a concept of truth available
in natural language.
Tarksi made it clear that truth could not be reliably established in
natural language. But truth is not pursued using natural language, it's
pursued using artificial languages, i.e. the empirical languages of
science. These are, as has been said, and demonstrated here (some would
say ad nauseam, whilst still not learning from it), ....extensional.
Arguing about this in natural language (which is largely intensional) is
therefore completely futile. You should therefore stop, and learn how to
do some science instead. But you won't..... See below.
--
David Longley
http://www.longley.demon.co.uk/Frag.htm
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| User: "Albert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 07:28:38 PM |
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David Longley wrote:
<snip>
Tarksi made it clear that truth could not be reliably established in
natural language. But truth is not pursued using natural language, it's
pursued using artificial languages, i.e. the empirical languages of
science. These are, as has been said, and demonstrated here (some would
say ad nauseam, whilst still not learning from it), ....extensional.
Arguing about this in natural language (which is largely intensional) is
therefore completely futile. You should therefore stop, and learn how to
do some science instead. But you won't..... See below.
There are truths that your logic cannot handle, Horatio. Read
some poetry before your brain becomes completely ossified.
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
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| User: "robert j. kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 10:35:06 PM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
Perhaps Aristotle gave that definition. I don't know about Tarski.
If you take that as the basis for truth, then please provide the
basis for factuality.
As far as I know, Tarski defined the conditions for truth in a formal
language, assuming that there is already a concept of truth available
in natural language.
http://www.anoca.org/true/truths/truth.html
The semantic theory of truth has as its generalcase for a given language:
'P' is true if and only if P
where 'P' is a reference to the sentence (the sentence's name), and P is
just the sentence itself. The semantic theory can beapplied to languages
with a denumerable number of sentences. In a naturallanguage such as
English this process consists simply of quoting the sentence, so:
'Snow is white' is true iff snow is white
This definition of truth has also been called the disquotation, since
the term on the right is simply the term on theleft, without the quotes.
Its inventor, philosopher-logician Alfred Tarski , thought of it as
aspecies of correspondence theory, in which the term on the right is
assumed to correspond to the facts. On this account, to saythat 'P is
true' is to do no more than to assert P. In this regard, it can also be
considered a form of the deflationary theory of truth .
For more details and reference to Taski's book -Logic, Semantics,
Metamathematics-.
Or Google <Tarsk, Wahrheitsbegriff>
The long and skinny is this: Truth/Falsity is up in our head. In Out
There, things are or they are not.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 11:01:41 PM |
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"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.net> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The semantic theory of truth has as its generalcase for a given language:
'P' is true if and only if P
That's empty. It says nothing. It is merely an internal consistency
theory for certain types of expression.
Its inventor, philosopher-logician Alfred Tarski , thought of it as
And therefore Tarski was an idiot, for proposing such a vacuous theory.
But wait. Tarski did no such thing.
Tarski was dealing with a theory of truth for *formal* languages.
And the part stated is only a portion of his theory. It is the
consistency requirement, so that where P is expressible in both the
formal language and natural language (or a meta language), then it
would have the same truth conditions in both.
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| User: "Jeff Rubard" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 10:29:56 AM |
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Neil W Rickert wrote:
"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.net> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The semantic theory of truth has as its generalcase for a given
language:
'P' is true if and only if P
That's empty. It says nothing. It is merely an internal consistency
theory for certain types of expression.
What is being stated are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the predicate "is true". It just so happens that in most cases the most
interesting case of the equivalence (Convention T) is that a sentence
is true if and only if it is true (metalinguistic concerns enter in
that one side of the definition consists of a structural-descriptive
name for the sentence).
Its inventor, philosopher-logician Alfred Tarski , thought of it as
And therefore Tarski was an idiot, for proposing such a vacuous
theory.
But wait. Tarski did no such thing.
Tarski was dealing with a theory of truth for *formal* languages.
And the part stated is only a portion of his theory. It is the
consistency requirement, so that where P is expressible in both the
formal language and natural language (or a meta language), then it
would have the same truth conditions in both.
The semantic definition of truth can be used as a theory of truth for
natural languages (see Donald Davidson's much-attended-to work), and in
both cases the truth-conditions for the object language are given *in*
the metalanguage (if truth-conditions need to be given for the
metalanguage, you set up a meta-metalanguage, etc.) But it is still
explicitly a correspondence theory (and if you think it's so vacuous,
you're welcome to attend to the difficulties inherent in word-world
relations).
--
Jeff Rubard
http://opensentence.tripod.com/
Essays on theory, politics, and culture
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| User: "Neil W Rickert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 03:12:57 PM |
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"Jeff Rubard" <jeffrubard@online.ie> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.net> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The semantic theory of truth has as its generalcase for a given
language:
'P' is true if and only if P
That's empty. It says nothing. It is merely an internal consistency
theory for certain types of expression.
What is being stated are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the predicate "is true".
Bunk.
What is being stated is circular, and thus vacuous.
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 01:06:21 PM |
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On 28 Dec 2004 08:29:56 -0800, "Jeff Rubard" <jeffrubard@online.ie> in
comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
"robert j. kolker" <nowhere@nowhere.net> writes:
Neil W Rickert wrote:
The semantic theory of truth has as its generalcase for a given
language:
'P' is true if and only if P
That's empty. It says nothing. It is merely an internal consistency
theory for certain types of expression.
What is being stated are the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the predicate "is true". It just so happens that in most cases the most
interesting case of the equivalence (Convention T) is that a sentence
is true if and only if it is true (metalinguistic concerns enter in
that one side of the definition consists of a structural-descriptive
name for the sentence).
". . . is that a sentence is true if and only if it is true . . ."
The ratio of the meaning of this particular statement to the sequence
of words is undoubtedly 3.14159 . . .
Its inventor, philosopher-logician Alfred Tarski , thought of it as
And therefore Tarski was an idiot, for proposing such a vacuous
theory.
But wait. Tarski did no such thing.
Tarski was dealing with a theory of truth for *formal* languages.
And the part stated is only a portion of his theory. It is the
consistency requirement, so that where P is expressible in both the
formal language and natural language (or a meta language), then it
would have the same truth conditions in both.
The semantic definition of truth can be used as a theory of truth for
natural languages (see Donald Davidson's much-attended-to work), and in
both cases the truth-conditions for the object language are given *in*
the metalanguage (if truth-conditions need to be given for the
metalanguage, you set up a meta-metalanguage, etc.) But it is still
explicitly a correspondence theory (and if you think it's so vacuous,
you're welcome to attend to the difficulties inherent in word-world
relations).
--
Jeff Rubard
http://opensentence.tripod.com/
Essays on theory, politics, and culture
Regards - Lester
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 09:18:12 AM |
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On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 20:43:21 -0500, "robert j. kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Problem is, you've got different middle terms: p and the state of the
world, whatever that means. In a subordinate reply you indicate that
the state of the world is contained in your wallet.
I said no such thing. I said I had five dollars in my wallet, which is
in fact the case so the statement is true. If I had said, I have a
thousand dollars in my wallet, that statement would be false (I don't
have that much money on me). What's in yer wallet?
Aristotle and Tarski use the same definition of truth. A statment is
true if and only if it asserts a fact.
A nice little circular distinction without a difference since facts
are what we mean by truth. How clever. I think I'll add that little
tidbit to my wallet, which seems rather bereft of facts as the moment.
The problem for epistemology is not whether something is a fact but
how we know it is a fact. You claim to know facts by checking your
wallet. Personally I prefer a little non self contradictory logic.
Regards - Lester
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| User: "Albert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 09:02:04 PM |
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robert j. kolker wrote:
Lester Zick wrote:
Problem is, you've got different middle terms: p and the state of the
world, whatever that means. In a subordinate reply you indicate that
the state of the world is contained in your wallet.
I said no such thing. I said I had five dollars in my wallet, which is
in fact the case so the statement is true. If I had said, I have a
thousand dollars in my wallet, that statement would be false (I don't
have that much money on me). What's in yer wallet?
Aristotle and Tarski use the same definition of truth. A statment is
true if and only if it asserts a fact.
Ah, but there's the rub, isn't it? A statement is true if and
only if it asserts a fact. A fact is a statement about reality
that is true. Circles within circles, onward and upward.
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
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| User: "robert j. kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
27 Dec 2004 10:09:47 PM |
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Albert wrote:
Ah, but there's the rub, isn't it? A statement is true if and only if
it asserts a fact. A fact is a statement about reality that is true.
Circles within circles, onward and upward.
The fact is what is. It is a statement that is either true or false.
True/False are predicates that apply to statements.
Facts are. The predicate true does not apply to a fact (i.e. something
that actually is).
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 09:30:25 AM |
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On Mon, 27 Dec 2004 23:09:47 -0500, "robert j. kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Albert wrote:
Ah, but there's the rub, isn't it? A statement is true if and only if
it asserts a fact. A fact is a statement about reality that is true.
Circles within circles, onward and upward.
The fact is what is. It is a statement that is either true or false.
True/False are predicates that apply to statements.
Facts are. The predicate true does not apply to a fact (i.e. something
that actually is).
Why not? What is a fact? Is p a fact? If p can be false, you provide
no way to discern whether p is a fact. And in point of fact you have
only terminologically regressed the problem of truth to one of fact.
If p can be true, it can be false. If p can be a fact, it can also not
be a fact. You have only regressed truth terminologically and not
logically.
Regards - Lester
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| User: "Albert" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 09:17:58 AM |
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robert j. kolker wrote:
Albert wrote:
Ah, but there's the rub, isn't it? A statement is true if and only if
it asserts a fact. A fact is a statement about reality that is true.
Circles within circles, onward and upward.
The fact is what is. It is a statement that is either true or false.
True/False are predicates that apply to statements.
Facts are. The predicate true does not apply to a fact (i.e. something
that actually is).
You should read your posts before sending. Your second sentence
above contradicts your first sentence above: You cannot
simultaneously assert that a fact is a statement that is either
true or false and, at the same time, assert that the predicate
true does not apply to a fact.
And through half a dozen posts you steadfastly ignore the fact
that 'what is' is not always known or even knowable. The five
dollar bill in your wallet is not subject to Schroedinger's Cat.
--
"Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the
range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally
impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it."
-- George Orwell as Syme in "1984"
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| User: "robert j. kolker" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 09:10:01 AM |
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Albert wrote:
You should read your posts before sending. Your second sentence above
contradicts your first sentence above: You cannot simultaneously assert
that a fact is a statement that is either true or false and, at the same
time, assert that the predicate true does not apply to a fact.
Learn to read. A fact is what is, it is not a -statement- about what is.
Bob Kolker
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| User: "Lester Zick" |
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| Title: Re: Epistemology 101 |
28 Dec 2004 01:09:38 PM |
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On Tue, 28 Dec 2004 10:10:01 -0500, "robert j. kolker"
<nowhere@nowhere.net> in comp.ai.philosophy wrote:
Albert wrote:
You should read your posts before sending. Your second sentence above
contradicts your first sentence above: You cannot simultaneously assert
that a fact is a statement that is either true or false and, at the same
time, assert that the predicate true does not apply to a fact.
Learn to read. A fact is what is, it is not a -statement- about what is.
And who arbitrates these facts to decide what is and is not a fact?
And how is that arbitration done? The only thing you've suggested so
far is the Mark 1 eyeball in conjunction with your wallet. Learn to
read before you try to write.
Regards - Lester
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