| Topic: |
Science > Physics |
| User: |
"Mackie" |
| Date: |
27 Oct 2006 03:01:44 PM |
| Object: |
Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:nca4k2haki571bt6a97afh266hraulkpko@4ax.com...
The rubric that Popper believed applied to wholly or partly empirical
systems is that statements that are evaluable by that system cannot be
proven true but can be proven false, in principle.
That has always struck me as being perfectly valid and quite the
case--for empirical systems, which by their very nature must suffer
from that flaw, one which purely rational systems that require no
empirical input are immune. Kant however, has pointed out the faults
from which a purely rational system suffers (his "antinomies") when
reason gets out of its depth, in an attempt to puzzle out matters of
unknown or unknowable material fact, as e.g. in certain questions of
cosmological 'orogeny' as it were, and the like.
I tend to agree
that the conclusions of science are always provisional, but I think
this applies to proofs of both truth and falsity.
If perhaps you are thinking, as you say this, of such scientific
conclusions as E=MC^2 then who but an idiot or madman could disagree?
But, since we can't have our Popperian cake and eat it too, it would
appear that some elements of science are not, in themselves 'empirical'
as defined by the criterion of falsifiability but to the contrary are
the unfalsifiable product of an extra-scientific rigor of purely
rational analysis.
One might however object, to say that the empirical 'proof' of the bent
starlight during the historical eclipse was the test of falsifiability
for Einstein's theory of relativity. Is there any chance for all this
confusion to be resolved? Yes. Of course.
The eclipse did not prove E=MC^2 true, it only showed that there wasn't
a darned thing wrong with the equation in its expression of proving
itself true. Any equation at all, first and foremost, last and finally
says, "This is true." The equation is proof, the moment it's written,
as derived by all the pure mathematical reasoning that preceded it. The
only question upon looking at his equation came down to this: shall we
believe our eyes--or i.e., more to the point, our reasoning minds?
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
The theory of relativity was derived metaphysically, as it came forth
of sudden epiphanies while walking through a moving train, standing in
an elevator, of Einstein's philosophical discussions with his wife and
his friends, and came to be proved not in the lab, not experimentally,
not empirically but mathematically by process of Pure Reason, and only
later, for those who thought it needful, the already existent truth of
it was confirmed by the eclipse.
Like God and Psychoanalysis, E=MC^2, in and of itself, is
unfalsifiable.
The rubric I see applying to wholly axiomatic systems like math or
geometry is that true statements that are evaluable by that system can
be proven to be true or false, in principle. But I am not certain of
this because there are some conjectures that have been bouncing around
for a long time, and there is Godel's impact on certain axiomatic
systems.
I am getting out of my depth.
Aw shucks, Jim. Come on in, the water's fine!
-- Jim07D6
--
Mackie
http://www.mackiemesser.zoomshare.com/0.html
http://whosenose.blogspot.com
http://doo-dads.blogspot.com/
.
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| User: "Bill Hobba" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
27 Oct 2006 08:19:12 PM |
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"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
news:1161979304.908204.239030@b28g2000cwb.googlegroups.com...
"Jim07D6" <Jim07D6@nospam.net> wrote in message
news:nca4k2haki571bt6a97afh266hraulkpko@4ax.com...
The rubric that Popper believed applied to wholly or partly empirical
systems is that statements that are evaluable by that system cannot be
proven true but can be proven false, in principle.
That has always struck me as being perfectly valid and quite the
case--for empirical systems, which by their very nature must suffer
from that flaw, one which purely rational systems that require no
empirical input are immune. Kant however, has pointed out the faults
from which a purely rational system suffers (his "antinomies") when
reason gets out of its depth, in an attempt to puzzle out matters of
unknown or unknowable material fact, as e.g. in certain questions of
cosmological 'orogeny' as it were, and the like.
I tend to agree
that the conclusions of science are always provisional, but I think
this applies to proofs of both truth and falsity.
If perhaps you are thinking, as you say this, of such scientific
conclusions as E=MC^2 then who but an idiot or madman could disagree?
But, since we can't have our Popperian cake and eat it too, it would
appear that some elements of science are not, in themselves 'empirical'
as defined by the criterion of falsifiability but to the contrary are
the unfalsifiable product of an extra-scientific rigor of purely
rational analysis.
One might however object, to say that the empirical 'proof' of the bent
starlight during the historical eclipse was the test of falsifiability
for Einstein's theory of relativity. Is there any chance for all this
confusion to be resolved? Yes. Of course.
The eclipse did not prove E=MC^2 true,
It did not test that.
it only showed that there wasn't
a darned thing wrong with the equation in its expression of proving
itself true.
It provided evidence that space-time curvature is a good model of gravity.
Any equation at all, first and foremost, last and finally
says, "This is true." The equation is proof, the moment it's written,
as derived by all the pure mathematical reasoning that preceded it.
In physics equations are not derived by pure mathematical reasoning - many
physical assumptions also go into it - many of which have to do with
symmetry. This issue is examined carefully by Victor Stenger in a new book:
http://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/vstenger/nothing.html
The
only question upon looking at his equation came down to this: shall we
believe our eyes--or i.e., more to the point, our reasoning minds?
Scientifically the only criteria, the only gold coin, is correspondence with
experiment. However many other issues are also used eg SR is more elegant
than LET so is generally preferred even though they are experimentally
indistinguishable.
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
I don't think modern science provided any evidence for that at all. Indeed
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his ideas
on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the way of
progress.
The theory of relativity was derived metaphysically,
Wrong - it was derived from conclusions based on experiment eg the POR is a
generalization to all the laws of physics for a law long known to hold in
classical mechanics which had itsd origins in experiment eg Galileo's
experiments with inclined planes. The interplay of metaphysics and science
is quite subtle and is discussed here
http://hps.arts.unsw.edu.au/hps_content/online_resources/online_inhouse_res/schuster_SciRev_book/Schuster_a_contents.htm
Bottom line - science is an interplay between experiment and metaphysics -
relativity is no different.
as it came forth
of sudden epiphanies while walking through a moving train, standing in
an elevator, of Einstein's philosophical discussions with his wife and
his friends, and came to be proved not in the lab, not experimentally,
not empirically but mathematically by process of Pure Reason, and only
later, for those who thought it needful, the already existent truth of
it was confirmed by the eclipse.
I suspect your knowledge of the facts about the history of relativity need
updating - I suggest Pias - Subtle is the Lord.
Like God and Psychoanalysis, E=MC^2, in and of itself, is
unfalsifiable.
It most certainly is falsifiable.
Thanks
Bill
The rubric I see applying to wholly axiomatic systems like math or
geometry is that true statements that are evaluable by that system can
be proven to be true or false, in principle. But I am not certain of
this because there are some conjectures that have been bouncing around
for a long time, and there is Godel's impact on certain axiomatic
systems.
I am getting out of my depth.
Aw shucks, Jim. Come on in, the water's fine!
-- Jim07D6
--
Mackie
http://www.mackiemesser.zoomshare.com/0.html
http://whosenose.blogspot.com
http://doo-dads.blogspot.com/
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
27 Oct 2006 08:18:01 PM |
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Bill Hobba wrote:
"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
....
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
According to Popper, they aren't scientific. Since Kant didn't claim to
be a (natural) scientist, falsifiability isn't relevant to his thought.
I don't think modern science provided any evidence for that at all.
Evidence for what? the categorical imperatives?
? Indeed
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his ideas
on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the way of
progress.
What's "it"? geometry or Kant's view? If the latter, can you tell me more?
.
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| User: "Mackie" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 03:02:42 AM |
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"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:ddy0h.24333$7I1.7328@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
...
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
According to Popper, they aren't scientific. Since Kant didn't claim to
be a (natural) scientist, falsifiability isn't relevant to his thought.
Oh, for cripes sake. You're just whistling in the dark, there dearie.
How anything in what I've said could give rise to either of those two
contentions is a complete mystery (if not some broad farce of the
Commedia dell'arte) to me.
But, hey! Next time you need a strawman to absorb that surplus of
frustrated libido energies, just pull a handful of the necessary raw
material from your . . . transportation, girl. Otherwise, before
resorting to anything so un-flight-worthy, try taking a crack at the
original post. That might have saved you all this ornery bother of
running to the closet for your cape and black pointy hat, for once.
And in any case, she forgot to say, "Trick or Treat!"
--
Mackie
http://vignettes-mackie.blogspot.com/
"Do You Like Stinky Girls?"
http://doo-dads.blogspot.com/
Poetry?
http://whosenose.blogspot.com
Politics?
http://www.mackiemesser.zoomshare.com/0.html
Music?
http://jpdavid.blogspot.com/
A Punk Rock Nancy Drew?
"It's like butter." Linda Richman
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 06:37:21 AM |
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Mackie wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:ddy0h.24333$7I1.7328@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
...
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
According to Popper, they aren't scientific. Since Kant didn't claim to
be a (natural) scientist, falsifiability isn't relevant to his thought.
Oh, for cripes sake. You're just whistling in the dark, there dearie.
How anything in what I've said could give rise to either of those two
contentions is a complete mystery (if not some broad farce of the
Commedia dell'arte) to me.
It was probably your contention that "to Popper, they aren't 'proofs' at
all", implying that Popper's principle of falsifiability has any bearing
on Kant's aprioris.
[desperate handwaving snipped -- you're such an amateur, kiddo]
.
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| User: "Mackie" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 03:20:29 PM |
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"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:RhH0h.24414$7I1.3598@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
It was probably your contention that "to Popper, they aren't 'proofs' at
all", implying that Popper's principle of falsifiability has any bearing
on Kant's aprioris.
Oh! for goodness sake. How charmingly like something Marylin Monroe
would say.
[desperate handwaving snipped -- you're such an amateur, kiddo]
Yes indeed, but at which--being a randy old male chauvinist bore, or
just some nondescript postmodern, post-grad, post-hairspray sort of
unisex one? As to the latter, that you are a professional is always to
be envied, Ms. Cutie-Pie, Ph.D.
--
Mackie
http://vignettes-mackie.blogspot.com/
"Do You Like Stinky Girls?"
http://doo-dads.blogspot.com/
Poetry?
http://whosenose.blogspot.com
Politics?
http://www.mackiemesser.zoomshare.com/0.html
Music?
http://jpdavid.blogspot.com/
A Punk Rock Nancy Drew?
"It's like butter." Linda Richman
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 04:13:56 PM |
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Mackie wrote:
How charmingly like something Marylin Monroe
would say.
some post-hairspray sort of unisex one
confused again, are we.
.
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| User: "Bill Hobba" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
27 Oct 2006 10:09:19 PM |
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"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:ddy0h.24333$7I1.7328@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
...
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
According to Popper, they aren't scientific. Since Kant didn't claim to be
a (natural) scientist, falsifiability isn't relevant to his thought.
I don't think modern science provided any evidence for that at all.
Evidence for what? the categorical imperatives?
Evidence that modern science accepts a priori tenants. Modern physics in
some sense can be seen as progress towards accepting less and less on an a
priori and questioning as much as possible. About the only thing I can see
that is accepted a priori is the laws of logic.
? Indeed
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his
ideas on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the
way of progress.
What's "it"?
The belief that some things can be accepted a priori - and indeed it is
necessary to accept them a priori.
Geometry or Kant's view?
Kants belief that Euclidian geometry be accepted a priori intimidated
Gauss - who in mathematics is at least Kants equal in philosophy - stopped
Gauss publishing his ideas on non Euclidian geometry
http://johan-gauss.org/eucl.htm
'It is amazing that, despite his great reputation, Gauss was actually afraid
to make public his discoveries in non-Euclidean geometry. He wrote to F. W.
Bessel in 1829 that he feared "the howl from the Boeotians" if he were to
publish his revolutionary discoveries. He told H. C. Schumacher that he had
"a great antipathy against being drawn into any sort of polemic." The
"metaphysicians" referred to by Gauss in his letter to Taurinus were
followers of Immanuel Kant, the supreme European philosopher in the late
eighteenth century and much of the nineteenth century. Gauss' discovery of
non-Euclidean geometry refuted Kant's position that Euclidean space is
inherent in the structure of our mind. In his Critique of Pure Reason (1781)
Kant declared that "the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of
empirical origin, but is an inevitable necessity of thought."
If the latter, can you tell me more?
The link I gave above is a good start.
Thanks
Bill
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 06:46:06 AM |
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Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:ddy0h.24333$7I1.7328@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
...
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
According to Popper, they aren't scientific. Since Kant didn't claim to be
a (natural) scientist, falsifiability isn't relevant to his thought.
I don't think modern science provided any evidence for that at all.
Evidence for what? the categorical imperatives?
Evidence that modern science accepts a priori tenants.
Why, they don't take proper care of the appliances?
Seriously, I don't see the connection to Kant here, could you
elaborate? Certainly, scientists seem to be fond of the transcendental
subject, if unknowingly so.
Modern physics in
some sense can be seen as progress towards accepting less and less on an a
priori and questioning as much as possible. About the only thing I can see
that is accepted a priori is the laws of logic.
Again, could you tell me exactly which of Kant's aprioris is at stake here?
? Indeed
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his
ideas on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the
way of progress.
What's "it"?
The belief that some things can be accepted a priori - and indeed it is
necessary to accept them a priori.
Geometry or Kant's view?
Kants belief that Euclidian geometry be accepted a priori intimidated
Gauss - who in mathematics is at least Kants equal in philosophy - stopped
Gauss publishing his ideas on non Euclidian geometry
http://johan-gauss.org/eucl.htm
Ah -- I think it's long been opinio communis that Kant's treatment of
Eucl. geometry doesn't preclude non-Eucl. geometry but rather
anticipates it.
.
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| User: "Bill Hobba" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 10:04:25 PM |
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"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:2qH0h.24415$7I1.9589@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:ddy0h.24333$7I1.7328@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"Mackie" <mackiemesser@zoomshare.com> wrote in message
...
From this we may conclude, I think, that there are certain, in Kant's
terms, synthetic and analytical *a priori* proofs which are derived not
by observation, not by experiment, but purely by thought; proofs which
may not be claimed by science to be of empirical derivation--else
according to Popper, they are not 'proofs' at all.
According to Popper, they aren't scientific. Since Kant didn't claim to
be a (natural) scientist, falsifiability isn't relevant to his thought.
I don't think modern science provided any evidence for that at all.
Evidence for what? the categorical imperatives?
Evidence that modern science accepts a priori tenants.
Why, they don't take proper care of the appliances?
Seriously, I don't see the connection to Kant here, could you elaborate?
It seems pretty obvious to me. Kant believed Euclidian geometry was a prioi
true. We now know since other geometries exist that can be proven to be as
logically consistent as Euclidian geometry Kants purported view is false.
This has been discussed before on sci.physics.relativity - bottom line is
you can only believe Kants views hold water if you are a Kant scholar and
disagree with the (from my reading) generally held view that he believed
Euclidian geometry is true a priori. The contrarian view I have heard is it
referred to space - not Euclidian geometry in particular. I am no Kant
scholar so I will leave discussions to those that are. I simply accept the
view of the books I have read by the likes of Bertrand Russell (who was
knowledgeable about Kant and mathematics) that such is the case and Kant was
wrong.
Certainly, scientists seem to be fond of the transcendental subject, if
unknowingly so.
I disagree - philosophy only holds fascination for some scientists. I am no
scientist and it only holds a borderline fascination for me - I will only
enter into it when I see things I find interesting - such as the incorrect
claims about E=MC^2 I originally responded to.
Modern physics in some sense can be seen as progress towards accepting
less and less on an a priori and questioning as much as possible. About
the only thing I can see that is accepted a priori is the laws of logic.
Again, could you tell me exactly which of Kant's aprioris is at stake
here?
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that "the
concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but is an
inevitable necessity of thought." Now I have not studied that text and have
no real desire to. It is entirely possible the sources where I got the
information from have it wrong and you are perfectly entitled to correct me
if such is the case. But if true then Kant was wrong - Gauss right - simple
as that.
? Indeed
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his
ideas on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the
way of progress.
What's "it"?
The belief that some things can be accepted a priori - and indeed it is
necessary to accept them a priori.
Geometry or Kant's view?
Kants belief that Euclidian geometry be accepted a priori intimidated
Gauss - who in mathematics is at least Kants equal in philosophy -
stopped Gauss publishing his ideas on non Euclidian geometry
http://johan-gauss.org/eucl.htm
Ah -- I think it's long been opinio communis that Kant's treatment of
Eucl. geometry doesn't preclude non-Eucl. geometry but rather anticipates
it.
You may be right - however at least some Kant scholars don't agree with you.
And considering the number of places I got my info from I suspect my view is
in the majority.
Bill
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
28 Oct 2006 10:13:09 PM |
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Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:2qH0h.24415$7I1.9589@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
....
Seriously, I don't see the connection to Kant here, could you elaborate?
It seems pretty obvious to me. Kant believed Euclidian geometry was a prioi
true.
I'd say that Kant thought that Euclidian geometry was the result of our
mind's structure, and in that sense apriori.
We now know since other geometries exist that can be proven to be as
logically consistent as Euclidian geometry Kants purported view is false.
I still don't see how that follows, really, but I also know next to
nothing about non-E geometry.
This has been discussed before on sci.physics.relativity - bottom line is
you can only believe Kants views hold water if you are a Kant scholar and
disagree with the (from my reading) generally held view that he believed
Euclidian geometry is true a priori. The contrarian view I have heard is it
referred to space - not Euclidian geometry in particular. I am no Kant
scholar so I will leave discussions to those that are. I simply accept the
view of the books I have read by the likes of Bertrand Russell (who was
knowledgeable about Kant and mathematics) that such is the case and Kant was
wrong.
Well, as I mentioned, I think the prevailing current view amongst the
Kant connoisseurs is that Kant's musings on the apriority of Euclidian
geometry does not stand in the way of non-E geometry, but it appears as
if Gauss thought so.
There's a lovely German novel, unfortunately not translated yet, by
Kehlmann: _The Measuring-Out of the World/Die Vermessung der Welt_, on
Humboldt and Gauss, and two very different takes on/ways of deal with space.
Certainly, scientists seem to be fond of the transcendental subject, if
unknowingly so.
I disagree - philosophy only holds fascination for some scientists.
I wasn't suggesting that there's rampant interest there -- just that
many things Kantian are taken for granted, without being identified as
Kantian. I certainly agree that the worlds rarely touch these days.
Modern physics in some sense can be seen as progress towards accepting
less and less on an a priori and questioning as much as possible. About
the only thing I can see that is accepted a priori is the laws of logic.
Again, could you tell me exactly which of Kant's aprioris is at stake
here?
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that "the
concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but is an
inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
....
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his
ideas on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the
way of progress.
What's "it"?
The belief that some things can be accepted a priori - and indeed it is
necessary to accept them a priori.
Oh, okay ---- it seems to me that much of what Kant has to say on a
prioris isn't under the purview of science at all, most of which still
strikes me as solidly empirically-minded.
....
Ah -- I think it's long been opinio communis that Kant's treatment of
Eucl. geometry doesn't preclude non-Eucl. geometry but rather anticipates
it.
You may be right - however at least some Kant scholars don't agree with you.
Fair enough -- I don't think they'd be state-of-the-art on Kant, but I
can ask my Kant buff friends and find out. Not that it's a pressing issue.
.
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| User: "Bill Hobba" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
29 Oct 2006 01:40:27 AM |
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"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:2qH0h.24415$7I1.9589@newssvr27.news.prodigy.net...
...
Seriously, I don't see the connection to Kant here, could you elaborate?
It seems pretty obvious to me. Kant believed Euclidian geometry was a
prioi true.
I'd say that Kant thought that Euclidian geometry was the result of our
mind's structure, and in that sense apriori.
We now know since other geometries exist that can be proven to be as
logically consistent as Euclidian geometry Kants purported view is false.
I still don't see how that follows, really, but I also know next to
nothing about non-E geometry.
This has been discussed before on sci.physics.relativity - bottom line is
you can only believe Kants views hold water if you are a Kant scholar and
disagree with the (from my reading) generally held view that he believed
Euclidian geometry is true a priori. The contrarian view I have heard is
it referred to space - not Euclidian geometry in particular. I am no
Kant scholar so I will leave discussions to those that are. I simply
accept the view of the books I have read by the likes of Bertrand
Russell (who was knowledgeable about Kant and mathematics) that such is
the case and Kant was wrong.
Well, as I mentioned, I think the prevailing current view amongst the Kant
connoisseurs is that Kant's musings on the apriority of Euclidian geometry
does not stand in the way of non-E geometry, but it appears as if Gauss
thought so.
There's a lovely German novel, unfortunately not translated yet, by
Kehlmann: _The Measuring-Out of the World/Die Vermessung der Welt_, on
Humboldt and Gauss, and two very different takes on/ways of deal with
space.
Certainly, scientists seem to be fond of the transcendental subject, if
unknowingly so.
I disagree - philosophy only holds fascination for some scientists.
I wasn't suggesting that there's rampant interest there -- just that many
things Kantian are taken for granted, without being identified as Kantian.
I certainly agree that the worlds rarely touch these days.
Modern physics in some sense can be seen as progress towards accepting
less and less on an a priori and questioning as much as possible. About
the only thing I can see that is accepted a priori is the laws of logic.
Again, could you tell me exactly which of Kant's aprioris is at stake
here?
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as. I am
not a philosophy type so those of that persuasion may find holes in my
reasoning. But that is my view and from recollection it was the view of a
genuine philosophy type, a guy by the name of Bertrand Russell. But those
of a more scientific bent often disagree about philosophical stuff with
those that are more into philosophy. Wittgenstein and Turing debated each
other to a standstill about mathematics without reaching any firm conclusion
http://cs.nyu.edu/pipermail/fom/2000-January/003711.html
I side with Turing btw but Wittgenstein had a point.
Thanks
Bill
...
Gauss was initially intimidated by Kants view into not publishing his
ideas on non Euclidian geometry - it would seem it in fact gets in the
way of progress.
What's "it"?
The belief that some things can be accepted a priori - and indeed it is
necessary to accept them a priori.
Oh, okay ---- it seems to me that much of what Kant has to say on a
prioris isn't under the purview of science at all, most of which still
strikes me as solidly empirically-minded.
...
Ah -- I think it's long been opinio communis that Kant's treatment of
Eucl. geometry doesn't preclude non-Eucl. geometry but rather anticipates
it.
You may be right - however at least some Kant scholars don't agree with
you.
Fair enough -- I don't think they'd be state-of-the-art on Kant, but I can
ask my Kant buff friends and find out. Not that it's a pressing issue.
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
29 Oct 2006 09:54:05 AM |
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Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
....
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as.
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
.
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| User: "*Anarcissie*" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 08:38:05 AM |
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smw wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
...
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
It implies to me that no other geometries are thinkable by human
beings -- it is an inevitable necessity of thought, that is, you
must think it, primordially, let us say. Then if you try to think
something different it will at least be constantly in conflict with
the primordial thought and maybe will not be thinkable at all.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as.
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 09:53:00 AM |
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*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
...
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
It implies to me that no other geometries are thinkable by human
beings --
Nah. It implies that no other geometries are experienced in the way
Euclidian geometry is experienced.
it is an inevitable necessity of thought, that is, you
must think it, primordially, let us say.
Nah. For a good introduction to the First Critique, check out
plato.stanford.edu and do a Kant search.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as.
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
I assume you're referring to the categories, and, yes, they are a
apriori. But as I understand it, they are categories of understanding,
not of our experience of space/time.
.
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| User: "*Anarcissie*" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
02 Nov 2006 09:23:38 AM |
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smw wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
...
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
It implies to me that no other geometries are thinkable by human
beings --
Nah. It implies that no other geometries are experienced in the way
Euclidian geometry is experienced.
it is an inevitable necessity of thought, that is, you
must think it, primordially, let us say.
Nah. For a good introduction to the First Critique, check out
plato.stanford.edu and do a Kant search.
All right. Wikipedia says "the universality and necessity of
Euclidean geometry is taken for granted by Kant." Is that
false? It seems to me that if it is true, then it is Euclidian
geometry which is held to be known _a_priori_. And that
was the crux of the foregoing argument, because it turns
out that there are other geometries, but the repute of E.g.
to be _a_priori_ true supposedly impeded Gauss from
developing our knowledge of them, and this is at least
partly Kant's fault. (I doubted that any intuition of space
was _a_priori_ myself but that need not detain us here.)
I do not yet have a dog in this fight because when I read
CPR1, I took _space_ in a much more primitive sense,
the ability of the universe to manifest more than one thing
at one time. Such a space need not be Euclidian. I do
not know where the Euclidian part comes from. That is
the dog I wish to identify.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as.
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
I assume you're referring to the categories, and, yes, they are a
apriori. But as I understand it, they are categories of understanding,
not of our experience of space/time.
Logical consistency either is or isn't _a_priori_. Or both.
I have not yet discovered the relevant scripture.
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
02 Nov 2006 09:45:51 AM |
|
|
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
...
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
It implies to me that no other geometries are thinkable by human
beings --
Nah. It implies that no other geometries are experienced in the way
Euclidian geometry is experienced.
it is an inevitable necessity of thought, that is, you
must think it, primordially, let us say.
Nah. For a good introduction to the First Critique, check out
plato.stanford.edu and do a Kant search.
All right. Wikipedia says "the universality and necessity of
Euclidean geometry is taken for granted by Kant." Is that
false?
No, that's not false at all --- I was commenting on "you must think it,
primordially."
It seems to me that if it is true, then it is Euclidian
geometry which is held to be known _a_priori_.
Nothing is known a priori -- thinks are _knoweable_ a priori. The
position you're ascribing to Kant here reminds me of Plato's _Meno_, but
there's a raging debate on whether Socrates argues in good faith or
tongue-in-cheek.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as.
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
I assume you're referring to the categories, and, yes, they are a
apriori. But as I understand it, they are categories of understanding,
not of our experience of space/time.
Logical consistency either is or isn't _a_priori_. Or both.
The categories are apriori; they come in four groups of three (quantity,
quality, relation, modality), and they are part of the transcendental
logic. But if you reread what I said, you'll see that I was commenting
on the relationship between the structure of the mind and the experience
of space ---- you can have a perfectly logical system that still has no
bearing on that, or no bearing on anything whatsoever, for that matter,
since it could be entirely fictional. Clearer?
.
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| User: "*Anarcissie*" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
02 Nov 2006 11:25:22 AM |
|
|
smw wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
...
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
It implies to me that no other geometries are thinkable by human
beings --
Nah. It implies that no other geometries are experienced in the way
Euclidian geometry is experienced.
it is an inevitable necessity of thought, that is, you
must think it, primordially, let us say.
Nah. For a good introduction to the First Critique, check out
plato.stanford.edu and do a Kant search.
All right. Wikipedia says "the universality and necessity of
Euclidean geometry is taken for granted by Kant." Is that
false?
No, that's not false at all --- I was commenting on "you must think it,
primordially."
It seems to me that if it is true, then it is Euclidian
geometry which is held to be known _a_priori_.
Nothing is known a priori -- thinks are _knoweable_ a priori. The
position you're ascribing to Kant here reminds me of Plato's _Meno_, but
there's a raging debate on whether Socrates argues in good faith or
tongue-in-cheek.
This is near the beginning of CPR:
(http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-pure-reason.txt)
'Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our
representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be
possible? It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception,
no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception, and
yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must
be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of
objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For
geometrical principles are always apodeictic, that is, united with the
consciousness of their necessity, as: "Space has only three
dimensions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical
judgements, nor conclusions from them.'
It seems to me in this that Kant is saying we have _a_priori_
knowledge, i.e. an intuition, of space, which in turn has
certain definite attributes (for instance, those which make
geometry possible.) For instance, earlier I believe he says
space can be conceived of as infinitely extensible in any
direction, which is to me a definitely Euclidian idea.
I would think that if K. were speaking of the potentiality of
knowledge, he would use words like "faculty", "capacity",
and so forth, rather than "intuition", "conception", and
"representation", all of which suggest something
definitely manifested in someone's mind, not merely
potential.
Of course I am dealing with a translation here, which puts
me at a certain disadvantage.
If we want to determine whether Kant inhibited Gauss,
we first need to determine whether he said or did
something that might possibly have inhibited Gauss,
the smoking gun, so to speak.
.
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| User: "smw" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
02 Nov 2006 12:29:53 PM |
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*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
....
It seems to me that if it is true, then it is Euclidian
geometry which is held to be known _a_priori_.
Nothing is known a priori -- thinks are _knoweable_ a priori. The
position you're ascribing to Kant here reminds me of Plato's _Meno_, but
there's a raging debate on whether Socrates argues in good faith or
tongue-in-cheek.
This is near the beginning of CPR:
(http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-pure-reason.txt)
'Geometry is a science which determines the properties of space
synthetically, and yet a priori. What, then, must be our
representation of space, in order that such a cognition of it may be
possible? It must be originally intuition, for from a mere conception,
no propositions can be deduced which go out beyond the conception, and
yet this happens in geometry. (Introd. V.) But this intuition must
be found in the mind a priori, that is, before any perception of
objects, consequently must be pure, not empirical, intuition. For
geometrical principles are always apodeictic, that is, united with the
consciousness of their necessity, as: "Space has only three
dimensions." But propositions of this kind cannot be empirical
judgements, nor conclusions from them.'
It seems to me in this that Kant is saying we have _a_priori_
knowledge, i.e. an intuition, of space,
This is Kant saying that our intuitive representation of space is such
that it jives with Euclidian geometry.
which in turn has
certain definite attributes (for instance, those which make
geometry possible.) For instance, earlier I believe he says
space can be conceived of as infinitely extensible in any
direction, which is to me a definitely Euclidian idea.
I would think that if K. were speaking of the potentiality of
knowledge, he would use words like "faculty", "capacity",
and so forth, rather than "intuition", "conception", and
"representation", all of which suggest something
definitely manifested in someone's mind, not merely
potential.
Intuition is "Anschauung," and there are conditions of intuition which
aren't part of the things in themselves but the aspect the
transcendental subject brings to our representation (i.e. time/space).
I.e. humans intuit space in a way that is compatible with Euclidean
geometry (which wouldn't be called "Euclidean" if it were "primordially"
known. The fascinating aspect of traditional geometry is, to Kant, the
fact that it produces _synthetic_ knowledge a priori. Time and space are
empirically real but transcendentally ideal. So, again, yes, Euclidean
geometry conceives of space in the same way as our intuition does; that
doesn't mean that Euclidean geometry _itself_ is a priori knowledge.
When Kant says that those who conceive of space diffently must come into
conflict "with the principles of experience itself" (see LM's post). He
doesn't say that other conceptions of space aren't possible or must be
wrong, just that they don't congrue with our a priori intuition. This
seems right to me---our experience of space is such that we cannot
intuit it as ending, for instance. I liked Lew's formulation that
"Euclidean geometry does hold first place in our minds."
Of course I am dealing with a translation here, which puts
me at a certain disadvantage.
Not so much, really -- as long as the nomenclature as a whole is
translated consistently, translations of Kant are mostly ok (in contrast
to Hegel or Heidegger, for instance, who are untranslateable in
important respects).
If we want to determine whether Kant inhibited Gauss,
we first need to determine whether he said or did
something that might possibly have inhibited Gauss,
the smoking gun, so to speak.
Well, obviously, we can't determine whether Gauss was inhibted by what
Kant thought, at most that Gauss was inhibited by what he thought Kant
said. The excerpt from the letter someone posted here certainly suggests
as much.
I wonder whether anybody has linked this discussion to Kant's concept
of the sublime...
.
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| User: "Marko Amnell" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 08:58:56 AM |
|
|
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
Bill Hobba wrote:
"smw" <smwei@ameritech.net> wrote in message
news:9%U0h.4098$T_1.2385@newssvr14.news.prodigy.com...
...
His beleif espoused in his Critique of Pure Reason that declared that
"the concept of [Euclidean] space is by no means of empirical origin, but
is an inevitable necessity of thought."
Right -- but that doesn't imply that no other geometries are possible --
I've always taken that to be a comment on the way we/humans/the
transcendental subject structures its spatial experience.
It implies to me that no other geometries are thinkable by human
beings -- it is an inevitable necessity of thought, that is, you
must think it, primordially, let us say. Then if you try to think
something different it will at least be constantly in conflict with
the primordial thought and maybe will not be thinkable at all.
Hmmmm. My reasoning is this. If something is as logically as consistent as
something else (and it is well known in mathematics that you can prove non
Euclidian geometry is as logically consistent as non Euclidian geometry by
creating models of one from the other) then obviously it is just as much an
inevitable necessity of thought as the thing it logically as good as.
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
The things you missed in your hiatus from RAB...
.
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| User: "smw" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 09:59:53 AM |
|
|
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
....
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is just so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori or a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and the
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo Kant.
.
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| User: "Marko Amnell" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 12:46:55 PM |
|
|
smw wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
...
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is just so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori or a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and the
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo Kant.
Explain how you distinguish a valid argument from an
invalid argument if the correctness of the rules of logic
is not assumed.
.
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| User: "smw" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 12:58:54 PM |
|
|
Marko Amnell wrote:
smw wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
...
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is just so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori or a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and the
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo Kant.
Explain how you distinguish a valid argument from an
invalid argument if the correctness of the rules of logic
is not assumed.
After you explain how you know what the rules of logic are and whether
they are valid without asking questions about them.
.
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| User: "*Anarcissie*" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 01:08:35 PM |
|
|
Marko Amnell wrote:
smw wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
...
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is just so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori or a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and the
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo Kant.
Explain how you distinguish a valid argument from an
invalid argument if the correctness of the rules of logic
is not assumed.
One might ask the gods. One might proceed empirically.
However, if one rejects these strategies, one has probably
already made a decision in favor of logic.
I conclude that, unlike Aristotle (for instance) you think
that logic is external to philosophy; maybe it arrives on
our doorstep from the same Platonic realm as mathematics
is supposed to, a religious or quasi-religious position, I
would think, and thus we know it by a kind of direct,
unitary intuition, the way Kant thought we know about
space and time. This seems reasonable to me, but it
doesn't mean that other positions are necessarily wacky.
Or pomo, whatever that means.
.
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| User: "Marko Amnell" |
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| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
31 Oct 2006 01:30:40 PM |
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*Anarcissie* wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
smw wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
...
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is just so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori or a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and the
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo Kant.
Explain how you distinguish a valid argument from an
invalid argument if the correctness of the rules of logic
is not assumed.
One might ask the gods. One might proceed empirically.
However, if one rejects these strategies, one has probably
already made a decision in favor of logic.
I conclude that, unlike Aristotle (for instance) you think
that logic is external to philosophy; maybe it arrives on
our doorstep from the same Platonic realm as mathematics
is supposed to
Not at all. The validity of logic is something we must
assume to argue effectively at all. That assumption is a
starting point, a value judgement, it's an ethical choice.
Obviously it can't be proved to be valid, that would be
circular. So the validity of logic is a sort of life style
choice we make. Others don't make that choice. They
accept beliefs, say, because an authority figure tells
them to. Most people don't value logical thinking very
highly.
The idea that observation or sense perception is
the only valid source of knowledge is a similar
quasi-ethical choice. It cannot be proven to be correct.
Others assume that revelation from God is another
good, or perhaps even better, source of knowledge.
The holy books of the various world religions are such
revealed knowledge. It cannot be proven that they are
not a source of real knowledge.
So logic, metaphysics and epistemology ultimately
come down to ethics and values.
What precise rules of logic one should assume is,
of course, an interesting question. There are today
many alternative systems of formal logic, but I'm
not thinking of any of those. Nor do I think there is
any good way of choosing between those formal
systems. The injunction to avoid contradiction is
the main idea of logic. Even in mathematics one
doesn't use formal logic in proofs.
, a religious or quasi-religious position, I
would think, and thus we know it by a kind of direct,
unitary intuition, the way Kant thought we know about
space and time. This seems reasonable to me, but it
doesn't mean that other positions are necessarily wacky.
Or pomo, whatever that means.
.
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| User: "*Anarcissie*" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
02 Nov 2006 08:16:33 AM |
|
|
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
smw wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
...
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very little to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is just so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori or a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and the
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo Kant.
Explain how you distinguish a valid argument from an
invalid argument if the correctness of the rules of logic
is not assumed.
One might ask the gods. One might proceed empirically.
However, if one rejects these strategies, one has probably
already made a decision in favor of logic.
I conclude that, unlike Aristotle (for instance) you think
that logic is external to philosophy; maybe it arrives on
our doorstep from the same Platonic realm as mathematics
is supposed to
Not at all. The validity of logic is something we must
assume to argue effectively at all. That assumption is a
starting point, a value judgement, it's an ethical choice.
Obviously it can't be proved to be valid, that would be
circular. So the validity of logic is a sort of life style
choice we make. Others don't make that choice. They
accept beliefs, say, because an authority figure tells
them to. Most people don't value logical thinking very
highly.
The idea that observation or sense perception is
the only valid source of knowledge is a similar
quasi-ethical choice. It cannot be proven to be correct.
Others assume that revelation from God is another
good, or perhaps even better, source of knowledge.
The holy books of the various world religions are such
revealed knowledge. It cannot be proven that they are
not a source of real knowledge.
So logic, metaphysics and epistemology ultimately
come down to ethics and values.
What precise rules of logic one should assume is,
of course, an interesting question. There are today
many alternative systems of formal logic, but I'm
not thinking of any of those. Nor do I think there is
any good way of choosing between those formal
systems. The injunction to avoid contradiction is
the main idea of logic. Even in mathematics one
doesn't use formal logic in proofs.
I don't agree that it is impossible to argue without
accepting the validity of logic. But you may not
consider such arguments to be "philosophy". It is
a question of what you mean by the word -- one of
those linguistic questions, I suppose.
.
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| User: "Marko Amnell" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
03 Nov 2006 03:06:24 AM |
|
|
*Anarcissie* wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
smw wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
smw wrote:
...
I can't follow that argument. Logical consistence has very lit=
tle to do
with the apriori structure of the mind and its bearing on (how=
we)
experience space and/or time. But see Lew's post for excellent=
detail.
I thought logical consistency was part of the supposed
_a_priori_ structure of the mind.
The absurd notion that philosophy must question the rules
of logic is just one of smw's whacked out pomo convictions.
Ask Zeleny to dig up the quote from her in the Google archives.
That's a stunningly clueless comment even for "Wittgenstein is ju=
st so
overrated" Amnell. The question at stake here is whether logical =
claims
are analytical or synthetic, and if synthetic, whether a priori o=
r a
posteriori.
And of course philosophy must "question" the rules of logic and t=
he
nature of its claims. Questioning is its job. Oh that whacky pomo=
Kant.
Explain how you distinguish a valid argument from an
invalid argument if the correctness of the rules of logic
is not assumed.
One might ask the gods. One might proceed empirically.
However, if one rejects these strategies, one has probably
already made a decision in favor of logic.
I conclude that, unlike Aristotle (for instance) you think
that logic is external to philosophy; maybe it arrives on
our doorstep from the same Platonic realm as mathematics
is supposed to
Not at all. The validity of logic is something we must
assume to argue effectively at all. That assumption is a
starting point, a value judgement, it's an ethical choice.
Obviously it can't be proved to be valid, that would be
circular. So the validity of logic is a sort of life style
choice we make. Others don't make that choice. They
accept beliefs, say, because an authority figure tells
them to. Most people don't value logical thinking very
highly.
The idea that observation or sense perception is
the only valid source of knowledge is a similar
quasi-ethical choice. It cannot be proven to be correct.
Others assume that revelation from God is another
good, or perhaps even better, source of knowledge.
The holy books of the various world religions are such
revealed knowledge. It cannot be proven that they are
not a source of real knowledge.
So logic, metaphysics and epistemology ultimately
come down to ethics and values.
What precise rules of logic one should assume is,
of course, an interesting question. There are today
many alternative systems of formal logic, but I'm
not thinking of any of those. Nor do I think there is
any good way of choosing between those formal
systems. The injunction to avoid contradiction is
the main idea of logic. Even in mathematics one
doesn't use formal logic in proofs.
I don't agree that it is impossible to argue without
accepting the validity of logic. But you may not
consider such arguments to be "philosophy". It is
a question of what you mean by the word -- one of
those linguistic questions, I suppose.
I did say "argue effectively". Note the word
"effectively". But the whole question seems
like tedious nitpicking to me, a useless theoretical
argument about the meaning of a word.
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
Doch gr=FCn des Lebens goldner Baum.
.
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| User: "*Anarcissie*" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
03 Nov 2006 08:35:43 AM |
|
|
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
I don't agree that it is impossible to argue without
accepting the validity of logic. But you may not
consider such arguments to be "philosophy". It is
a question of what you mean by the word -- one of
those linguistic questions, I suppose.
I did say "argue effectively". Note the word
"effectively". But the whole question seems
like tedious nitpicking to me, a useless theoretical
argument about the meaning of a word.
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
Doch gr=FCn des Lebens goldner Baum.
But that, too is theory.
Logic, philosophy, mathematics and so forth seem like
tedious nit-picking to a lot of people. Their dismissal
of it all (as I think I mentioned before) is utterly
conclusive: either they don't pay any attention to it in the
first place, or they tell whoever is talking about it to
shut up. But you have already engaged in a good
deal of rhetoric about such things, so your turn
above is a bit odd. Either philosophy is worth
talking about, or it isn't -- or is that too logical?
.
|
|
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| User: "Marko Amnell" |
|
| Title: Re: Karl Popper & the Corny Conceits of Empiricism |
04 Nov 2006 03:26:14 AM |
|
|
*Anarcissie* wrote:
Marko Amnell wrote:
*Anarcissie* wrote:
I don't agree that it is impossible to argue without
accepting the validity of logic. But you may not
consider such arguments to be "philosophy". It is
a question of what you mean by the word -- one of
those linguistic questions, I suppose.
I did say "argue effectively". Note the word
"effectively". But the whole question seems
like tedious nitpicking to me, a useless theoretical
argument about the meaning of a word.
Grau, teurer Freund, ist alle Theorie
Doch gr=FCn des Lebens goldner Baum.
But that, too is theory.
Logic, philosophy, mathematics and so forth seem like
tedious nit-picking to a lot of people.
Don't stop there. One field of mathematics seems like
tedious nit-picking to another mathematician. Recall
e=2Eg. Paul Halmos's comments at the end of the preface
to his book NAIVE SET THEORY:
"This is not to say that the contents of this book are
unusually difficult or profound. What is true is that the
concepts are very general and very abstract, and that,
therefore, they may take some getting used to. It is
a mathematical truism, however, that the more generally
a theorem applies, the less deep it is. The student's
task in learning set theory is to steep himself in unfamiliar
but essentially shallow generalities till they become
so familiar that they can be used with almost no conscious
effort. In other words, general set theory is pretty trivial
stuff really, but, if you want to be a mathematician, you
need some, and here it is; read it, absord it, and forget it."
One might apply that wisdom -- "read it, absord it, and
forget it" to a book about basic empiricist epistemology.
But no one is free of metaphysics. One is always someone
else's metaphysician.
I used to study set theory.
Their dismissal
of it all (as I think I mentioned before) is utterly
conclusive: either they don't pay any attention to it in the
first place, or they tell whoever is talking about it to
shut up. But you have already engaged in a good
deal of rhetoric about such things, so your turn
above is a bit odd. Either philosophy is worth
talking about, or it isn't -- or is that too logical?
.
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