The Definition of Points



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Topic: Science > Physics
User: "Lester Zick"
Date: 13 Mar 2007 12:52:40 PM
Object: The Definition of Points
The Definition of Points
~v~~
In the swansong of modern math lines are composed of points. But then
we must ask how points are defined? However I seem to recollect
intersections of lines determine points. But if so then we are left to
consider the rather peculiar proposition that lines are composed of
the intersection of lines. Now I don't claim the foregoing definitions
are circular. Only that the ratio of definitional logic to conclusions
is a transcendental somewhere in the neighborhood of 3.14159 . . .
~v~~
.

User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 20 Mar 2007 01:17:36 PM
On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD


The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.

I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.
However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.
~v~~
.
User: "Bob Kolker"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 20 Mar 2007 01:26:59 PM
Lester Zick wrote:


I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other

Blue as in sad? Blue as in color? Blue as in puritanical?
Bob Kolker
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 20 Mar 2007 06:59:56 PM
On Tue, 20 Mar 2007 14:26:59 -0400, Bob Kolker <nowhere@nowhere.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:


I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other


Blue as in sad? Blue as in color? Blue as in puritanical?

"Blue" as in color. The others are metaphorical. However they're all
predicates of one sort or another. They just have different usages and
standards of truth.
~v~~
.


User: "Tony Orlow"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 21 Mar 2007 12:06:40 AM
Lester Zick wrote:

On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD

The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.


I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.

No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong. "Blue" is
a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.
One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)

However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.

But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
value, there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
that I just used the word?
If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?
The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
contradiction in that....


~v~~

:D
01oo
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 21 Mar 2007 02:09:55 PM
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:06:40 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD

The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.


I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.


No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong.

No need for any regret, Tony. I certainly don't mind being called on
errors or even called on non errors when there's something you think
is wrong. But we shall just have to see what we shall see here, Tony.

"Blue" is
a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.

So "blue" is not a predicate, Tony, as in "it is blue"? And this
predicate cannot be true or false?

One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)

Tony, I think you're confusing the supposed truth or falsity of a
single predicate with the supposed truth or falsity of an abstract
proposition. For that matter we can always make a proposition
out of a single predicate by saying "it is blue (or whatever)".

However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.


But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
value,

I'm not sure what the significance of "truth value" is, Tony. I deal
with truth and finite tautological regressions to self contradictory
alternatives as the basis for truth and not merely the assignment and
evaluation of truth values whatever that may mean.

there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
that I just used the word?

If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?

Well all predicates and predicate combinations are what they are,
Tony. And they can range from true to false to self contradictory. I
don't see the problem with that whether we're considering things
literally or even metaphorically for that matter. It's all one system
of predicates and predicate combinations which are either true or
false in combinations. Some predicate combinations appear silly
because we already understand the combinations are false and self
contradictory. But that isn't to say the predicates themselves cannot
be true or false alone or in other combinations in given instances.

The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
contradiction in that....

Nor do I. Nor do I see any problem in evaluating the truth or falsity
of "it is blue". No special mystery there that I can see.
~v~~
.
User: "Tony Orlow"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 21 Mar 2007 10:21:25 PM
Lester Zick wrote:

On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:06:40 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD

The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.

I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.

No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong.


No need for any regret, Tony. I certainly don't mind being called on
errors or even called on non errors when there's something you think
is wrong. But we shall just have to see what we shall see here, Tony.

Very good. :)

"Blue" is
a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.


So "blue" is not a predicate, Tony, as in "it is blue"? And this
predicate cannot be true or false?

Right. It(blue) and blue(it) have truth values between 0 and 1
inclusive, but "blue" has no more truth value than "it". Truth is a
matter of how much one idea applies to another, or perhaps something
less vague than that.

One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)


Tony, I think you're confusing the supposed truth or falsity of a
single predicate with the supposed truth or falsity of an abstract
proposition. For that matter we can always make a proposition
out of a single predicate by saying "it is blue (or whatever)".

Without defining "it", there is no measure of the truth value of the
statement, "it is blue". Likewise, if I say, "the moon is thus", one
cannot ascertain the truth value of that statement without knowing which
"thus" the moon is asserted to satisfy.

However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.

But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
value,


I'm not sure what the significance of "truth value" is, Tony. I deal
with truth and finite tautological regressions to self contradictory
alternatives as the basis for truth and not merely the assignment and
evaluation of truth values whatever that may mean.

Truth assumes values between 0, commonly known as "false", and 1, or
"true". In Boolean logic there are only these two values, but statistics
allows for the full spectrum. So, a statement has a truth value, which
can perhaps be evaluated, and which will always fall within these
bounds, quantitatively.

there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
that I just used the word?

If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?


Well all predicates and predicate combinations are what they are,
Tony.

They are expressions of logical implication.
And they can range from true to false to self contradictory.
Self-contradictory = automatically false.
I

don't see the problem with that whether we're considering things
literally or even metaphorically for that matter. It's all one system
of predicates and predicate combinations which are either true or
false in combinations. Some predicate combinations appear silly
because we already understand the combinations are false and self
contradictory. But that isn't to say the predicates themselves cannot
be true or false alone or in other combinations in given instances.

I think you need to distinguish between predicates and attributes and
objects. Predicates are assignments of attributes to objects, and only
predicates have truth values, true, fals, or somewhere in between.


The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
contradiction in that....


Nor do I. Nor do I see any problem in evaluating the truth or falsity
of "it is blue". No special mystery there that I can see.

~v~~

Only, just, what is it?
:)
01oo
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 22 Mar 2007 12:07:17 PM
On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 22:21:25 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:06:40 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD

The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.

I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.

No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong.


No need for any regret, Tony. I certainly don't mind being called on
errors or even called on non errors when there's something you think
is wrong. But we shall just have to see what we shall see here, Tony.


Very good. :)

"Blue" is
a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.


So "blue" is not a predicate, Tony, as in "it is blue"? And this
predicate cannot be true or false?


Right. It(blue) and blue(it) have truth values between 0 and 1
inclusive, but "blue" has no more truth value than "it".

But "it" can be true of things other than "blue" whereas "blue" cannot
be true of things other than "it" whatever the "it" is taken to mean.

Truth is a
matter of how much one idea applies to another, or perhaps something
less vague than that.

I still don't understand how you arrive at "truth values" Tony. As far
as I can tell they're just assigned arbitrarily or by assumption of
truth. They're meaningless in this sense. They're nothing more than a
mechanization of truisms defined by Aristotle's syllogistic inference
like "if A then B then C" etc. They don't tell us anything about
what's actually true or why. Finite tautological reduction to self
contradictory alternatives on the other hand tells us what's actually
true and necessarily and universally true of everything.

One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)


Tony, I think you're confusing the supposed truth or falsity of a
single predicate with the supposed truth or falsity of an abstract
proposition. For that matter we can always make a proposition
out of a single predicate by saying "it is blue (or whatever)".


Without defining "it", there is no measure of the truth value of the
statement, "it is blue".

Well "it" is a universal subject, Tony. It has no definition of its
own apart from that. "It" can and does stand for any subject.
And any predicate can be true or not of "it". "It" just gives us a
universal subjective reference point for predicates just as "not"
gives a universal predicate reference point for all predicates.

Likewise, if I say, "the moon is thus", one
cannot ascertain the truth value of that statement without knowing which
"thus" the moon is asserted to satisfy.

Of course not. One can never ascertain actual "truth values" for
anything as far as I can tell. They just represent an arithmetic
mechanization of syllogistic inference. In other words "truth values"
just mechanize arithmetically something that wasn't true to begin
with.
When you begin to talk about problematic intermediate "truth values"
the picture becomes even clearer. Syllogistic inference offers no way
to determine actual truth. All it produces are truisms not truth. Thus
the truth of given predicates or predicate combination is problematic
and we are left with no recourse but to express truth mathematically
in terms of some kind of degree of confidence akin to a probability.
The whole situation would be a joke if it weren't so pathetic.

However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.

But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
value,


I'm not sure what the significance of "truth value" is, Tony. I deal
with truth and finite tautological regressions to self contradictory
alternatives as the basis for truth and not merely the assignment and
evaluation of truth values whatever that may mean.


Truth assumes values between 0, commonly known as "false", and 1, or
"true". In Boolean logic there are only these two values, but statistics
allows for the full spectrum. So, a statement has a truth value, which
can perhaps be evaluated, and which will always fall within these
bounds, quantitatively.

Except you can't actually assign a "truth value" to any predicate as
far as I can tell except by a naive assumption of truth to begin with.

there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
that I just used the word?

If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?


Well all predicates and predicate combinations are what they are,
Tony.


They are expressions of logical implication.

And they can range from true to false to self contradictory.

Which may or may not be true but you can't assign any "truth value" to
any predicate as far as I can see except by naive assumption of truth.

Self-contradictory = automatically false.

I

don't see the problem with that whether we're considering things
literally or even metaphorically for that matter. It's all one system
of predicates and predicate combinations which are either true or
false in combinations. Some predicate combinations appear silly
because we already understand the combinations are false and self
contradictory. But that isn't to say the predicates themselves cannot
be true or false alone or in other combinations in given instances.


I think you need to distinguish between predicates and attributes and
objects. Predicates are assignments of attributes to objects, and only
predicates have truth values, true, fals, or somewhere in between.

If you could demonstrate the difference between "attributes" and
"predicates" perhaps I would. Both "attributes" and "predicates" are
"predicated" of something or "it" through "predication".

The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
contradiction in that....


Nor do I. Nor do I see any problem in evaluating the truth or falsity
of "it is blue". No special mystery there that I can see.

~v~~


Only, just, what is it?

What is what? I can't see much that it matters exactly what "blue" may
be if it is true or false. The only thing that matters is whether it's
true or not and whether it's true combined with other predicates.
In the same regard what is "sky"? Who cares what "sky" is? The only
thing that matters in this particular context is whether a combination
of true "blue" and true "sky" remains true. That's how combinations of
predicates acquire meaning and definition. Definitions and meanings of
words are not just abbreviations as David Marcus would have us
believe. They are true or not considered in isolation or combination
with other words.
~v~~
.
User: "Tony Orlow"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 22 Mar 2007 05:11:43 PM
Lester Zick wrote:

On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 22:21:25 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:06:40 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD

The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.

I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.

No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong.

No need for any regret, Tony. I certainly don't mind being called on
errors or even called on non errors when there's something you think
is wrong. But we shall just have to see what we shall see here, Tony.

Very good. :)

"Blue" is
a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.

So "blue" is not a predicate, Tony, as in "it is blue"? And this
predicate cannot be true or false?

Right. It(blue) and blue(it) have truth values between 0 and 1
inclusive, but "blue" has no more truth value than "it".


But "it" can be true of things other than "blue" whereas "blue" cannot
be true of things other than "it" whatever the "it" is taken to mean.

So this(blue) precludes that(blue)??? More than one thing can be blue,
and any given thing can have more than one attribute. fluid(sky),
blue(sky), fluid(liquid) and blue(liquid) can all be true.

Truth is a
matter of how much one idea applies to another, or perhaps something
less vague than that.


I still don't understand how you arrive at "truth values" Tony. As far
as I can tell they're just assigned arbitrarily or by assumption of
truth. They're meaningless in this sense. They're nothing more than a
mechanization of truisms defined by Aristotle's syllogistic inference
like "if A then B then C" etc. They don't tell us anything about
what's actually true or why. Finite tautological reduction to self
contradictory alternatives on the other hand tells us what's actually
true and necessarily and universally true of everything.

An algebraic expression does not give a quantitative result without
quantitative parameters, and a logical expression does not give a truth
value without logical parameters. Truth value calculations can be
expressed as algebraic calculations, as well as using truth tables.
After all, not every statement is 100% true or false.

One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)

Tony, I think you're confusing the supposed truth or falsity of a
single predicate with the supposed truth or falsity of an abstract
proposition. For that matter we can always make a proposition
out of a single predicate by saying "it is blue (or whatever)".

Without defining "it", there is no measure of the truth value of the
statement, "it is blue".


Well "it" is a universal subject, Tony. It has no definition of its
own apart from that. "It" can and does stand for any subject.
And any predicate can be true or not of "it". "It" just gives us a
universal subjective reference point for predicates just as "not"
gives a universal predicate reference point for all predicates.

So, "it" is "x", a variable parameter. Fill in that blank, and then you
can evaluate the expression.

Likewise, if I say, "the moon is thus", one
cannot ascertain the truth value of that statement without knowing which
"thus" the moon is asserted to satisfy.


Of course not. One can never ascertain actual "truth values" for
anything as far as I can tell. They just represent an arithmetic
mechanization of syllogistic inference. In other words "truth values"
just mechanize arithmetically something that wasn't true to begin
with.

They simply express a certainty of truth, from 0 to 1.


When you begin to talk about problematic intermediate "truth values"
the picture becomes even clearer. Syllogistic inference offers no way
to determine actual truth. All it produces are truisms not truth. Thus
the truth of given predicates or predicate combination is problematic
and we are left with no recourse but to express truth mathematically
in terms of some kind of degree of confidence akin to a probability.

I won't object to that.


The whole situation would be a joke if it weren't so pathetic.

All humor is based on pain and foolishness. It's all pathetic. So, laugh
a little. :)

However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.

But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
value,

I'm not sure what the significance of "truth value" is, Tony. I deal
with truth and finite tautological regressions to self contradictory
alternatives as the basis for truth and not merely the assignment and
evaluation of truth values whatever that may mean.

Truth assumes values between 0, commonly known as "false", and 1, or
"true". In Boolean logic there are only these two values, but statistics
allows for the full spectrum. So, a statement has a truth value, which
can perhaps be evaluated, and which will always fall within these
bounds, quantitatively.


Except you can't actually assign a "truth value" to any predicate as
far as I can tell except by a naive assumption of truth to begin with.

Right. ASSUMING predicates a and b are true and false, respectively, a
AND b is false, a OR b is true. The value of the expression depends on
the values of the variables. Presumably, in real world situations, we
can at least give a guesstimate of the certainty for any assertion
involved in the logical statement, and therefore calculate at least a
rough estimate of the certainty of the entire expression. That's science
for you. ;)

there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
that I just used the word?

If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?

Well all predicates and predicate combinations are what they are,
Tony.

They are expressions of logical implication.

And they can range from true to false to self contradictory.


Which may or may not be true but you can't assign any "truth value" to
any predicate as far as I can see except by naive assumption of truth.

You can only assume truth, or calculate from other assumed truths. Some
things are rather certain, but could still be wrong. The sun might not
"rise" tomorrow, but I'll bet you it will. Assuming it does, chances
are, it will become warmer during the first half of the day.

Self-contradictory = automatically false.

I

don't see the problem with that whether we're considering things
literally or even metaphorically for that matter. It's all one system
of predicates and predicate combinations which are either true or
false in combinations. Some predicate combinations appear silly
because we already understand the combinations are false and self
contradictory. But that isn't to say the predicates themselves cannot
be true or false alone or in other combinations in given instances.

I think you need to distinguish between predicates and attributes and
objects. Predicates are assignments of attributes to objects, and only
predicates have truth values, true, fals, or somewhere in between.


If you could demonstrate the difference between "attributes" and
"predicates" perhaps I would. Both "attributes" and "predicates" are
"predicated" of something or "it" through "predication".

Grammar lesson 101:
Let's say the most basic elements of any expression are objects, that
is, nouns. If we are speaking, we are speaking about something.
Otherwise we should shut up.
We can describe objects, which means we assign attributes to them, that
is, adjectives describe nouns. When we assign attributes to nouns, or
nouns to sets described by those attributes, we use an assumed predicate
relation, either "describes" or "is a member of this class". The
predicate is the verb of the statement. Real world predicates include
actions and events, but unless you have rules pertaining to specific
actions or events, those predicates do not come into play in the
evaluation of a logical statement.
In a predicate, the core is some verb, like "is". If there is no "is" or
"does" or "has", then there is no predicate. A full statement also must
have a noun, a subject, or it's not talking about anything. A statement
does not require an attribute, such as "blue", but the most interesting,
of course, do. Of course there are those like, "0 exists", which have
their utility.
So, there are objects, predicates involving an attribute or event, and
statements that combine the two.:)

The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
contradiction in that....

Nor do I. Nor do I see any problem in evaluating the truth or falsity
of "it is blue". No special mystery there that I can see.

~v~~

Only, just, what is it?


What is what? I can't see much that it matters exactly what "blue" may
be if it is true or false. The only thing that matters is whether it's
true or not and whether it's true combined with other predicates.

"true blue" is just a patriotic phrase.


In the same regard what is "sky"? Who cares what "sky" is? The only
thing that matters in this particular context is whether a combination
of true "blue" and true "sky" remains true. That's how combinations of
predicates acquire meaning and definition. Definitions and meanings of
words are not just abbreviations as David Marcus would have us
believe. They are true or not considered in isolation or combination
with other words.

~v~~

Right. A full statement requires a subject and a predicate. "is blue" is
just the predicate, and therefore is not a statement, and has no truth
value in isolation.
01oo
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 22 Mar 2007 08:31:01 PM
On Thu, 22 Mar 2007 17:11:43 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 22:21:25 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Wed, 21 Mar 2007 00:06:40 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

Lester Zick wrote:

On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 18:04:27 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

No one says a set of points IS in fact the constitution of physical
object.
Whether it is rightly the constitution of a mentally formed object
(such as a geometric object), that seems to be an issue of arbitration
and convention, not of truth. Is the concept of "blue" a correct one?

PD

The truth of the "convention" of considering higher geometric objects to
be "sets" of points is ascertained by the conclusions one can draw from
that consideration, which are rather limited.

"blue" is not a statement with a truth value of any sort, without a
context or parameter. blue(sky) may or may not be true.

I disagree here, Tony. "Blue" is a predicate and like any other
predicate or predicate combination it is either true or not true.

No, Lester. I hate to put it this way, but here, you're wrong.

No need for any regret, Tony. I certainly don't mind being called on
errors or even called on non errors when there's something you think
is wrong. But we shall just have to see what we shall see here, Tony.

Very good. :)

"Blue" is
a descriptor for an object, a physical object as perceived by a human,
if "blue" is taken to mean the color. It's an attribute that some
humanly visible object may or may not have. The "truth" of "blue"
depends entirely on what it is attributed to. Blue(moon) is rarely true.
Blue(sky) is often true in Arizona, and not so often around here.

So "blue" is not a predicate, Tony, as in "it is blue"? And this
predicate cannot be true or false?

Right. It(blue) and blue(it) have truth values between 0 and 1
inclusive, but "blue" has no more truth value than "it".


But "it" can be true of things other than "blue" whereas "blue" cannot
be true of things other than "it" whatever the "it" is taken to mean.


So this(blue) precludes that(blue)??? More than one thing can be blue,
and any given thing can have more than one attribute. fluid(sky),
blue(sky), fluid(liquid) and blue(liquid) can all be true.

"Blue" can be true of lots of things without meaning it's not true of
"it" where "it" indicates different things.

Truth is a
matter of how much one idea applies to another, or perhaps something
less vague than that.


I still don't understand how you arrive at "truth values" Tony. As far
as I can tell they're just assigned arbitrarily or by assumption of
truth. They're meaningless in this sense. They're nothing more than a
mechanization of truisms defined by Aristotle's syllogistic inference
like "if A then B then C" etc. They don't tell us anything about
what's actually true or why. Finite tautological reduction to self
contradictory alternatives on the other hand tells us what's actually
true and necessarily and universally true of everything.


An algebraic expression does not give a quantitative result without
quantitative parameters, and a logical expression does not give a truth
value without logical parameters. Truth value calculations can be
expressed as algebraic calculations, as well as using truth tables.
After all, not every statement is 100% true or false.

"Truth values" and "truth" are different things. You can algebraically
calculate all kinds of things whether true or not. Those calculations
don't tell us whether the things they concern are true or not.

One can assign an attribute to an object as a function, like I just did.
One can also use a function to include an object in a set which is
described by an attribute, like sky(blue) or moon(blue) - "this object
is a member of that set". The object alone also doesn't constitute an
entire statement. "Sky" and "moon" do not have truth values. Blue(sky)
might be true less than 50% of the time, and blue(moon) less than 1%,
but "blue" and "sky" and "moon" are never true or false, because that
sentence no verb. There is no "is" there, eh, what? :)

Tony, I think you're confusing the supposed truth or falsity of a
single predicate with the supposed truth or falsity of an abstract
proposition. For that matter we can always make a proposition
out of a single predicate by saying "it is blue (or whatever)".

Without defining "it", there is no measure of the truth value of the
statement, "it is blue".


Well "it" is a universal subject, Tony. It has no definition of its
own apart from that. "It" can and does stand for any subject.
And any predicate can be true or not of "it". "It" just gives us a
universal subjective reference point for predicates just as "not"
gives a universal predicate reference point for all predicates.


So, "it" is "x", a variable parameter. Fill in that blank, and then you
can evaluate the expression.

Naturally. You just have to decide whether it's true or not. "Truth
values" don't help you.

Likewise, if I say, "the moon is thus", one
cannot ascertain the truth value of that statement without knowing which
"thus" the moon is asserted to satisfy.


Of course not. One can never ascertain actual "truth values" for
anything as far as I can tell. They just represent an arithmetic
mechanization of syllogistic inference. In other words "truth values"
just mechanize arithmetically something that wasn't true to begin
with.


They simply express a certainty of truth, from 0 to 1.

Then how do you assign "truth" to "truth values"? The assignment of
"truth values" is purely an assumption as far as I can tell.

When you begin to talk about problematic intermediate "truth values"
the picture becomes even clearer. Syllogistic inference offers no way
to determine actual truth. All it produces are truisms not truth. Thus
the truth of given predicates or predicate combination is problematic
and we are left with no recourse but to express truth mathematically
in terms of some kind of degree of confidence akin to a probability.


I won't object to that.

Except when it comes to "truth values" and the algebraic manipulation
of them you're just guessing.

The whole situation would be a joke if it weren't so pathetic.


All humor is based on pain and foolishness. It's all pathetic. So, laugh
a little. :)

I laugh a lot. Mainly at the assholes who think their terminological
regressions are a substitute for tautological regressions and truth.

However the difference is that a single predicate such as "blue"
cannot be abstractly analyzed for truth in the context of other
predicates. For example we could not analyze "illogical" abstractly in
the context of "sky" unless we had both predicates together as in
"illogical sky". But that doesn't mean single isolated predicates are
not either true or false.

But, it does. In order for there to be a statement with a logical truth
value,

I'm not sure what the significance of "truth value" is, Tony. I deal
with truth and finite tautological regressions to self contradictory
alternatives as the basis for truth and not merely the assignment and
evaluation of truth values whatever that may mean.

Truth assumes values between 0, commonly known as "false", and 1, or
"true". In Boolean logic there are only these two values, but statistics
allows for the full spectrum. So, a statement has a truth value, which
can perhaps be evaluated, and which will always fall within these
bounds, quantitatively.


Except you can't actually assign a "truth value" to any predicate as
far as I can tell except by a naive assumption of truth to begin with.


Right. ASSUMING predicates a and b are true and false, respectively, a
AND b is false, a OR b is true. The value of the expression depends on
the values of the variables. Presumably, in real world situations, we
can at least give a guesstimate of the certainty for any assertion
involved in the logical statement, and therefore calculate at least a
rough estimate of the certainty of the entire expression. That's science
for you. ;)

No actually it's empiricism for you. Empirics don't have any way to
know what's demonstrably true or false. They just guess. And their
guesses are no better and no worse than anyone elses guesses since
they're just guesses to begin and end with.

there must be buried within it a logical implication, "this
implies that". The only implication for "blue" alone is that such a
thing as "blue" exists. Does "florange" exist, by virtue of the fact
that I just used the word?

If "blue" and "fast" are predicates, is "blue fast" a predicate? Does
that sound wrong? How about "chicken porch"? Is that true or false?

Well all predicates and predicate combinations are what they are,
Tony.

They are expressions of logical implication.

And they can range from true to false to self contradictory.


Which may or may not be true but you can't assign any "truth value" to
any predicate as far as I can see except by naive assumption of truth.


You can only assume truth, or calculate from other assumed truths. Some
things are rather certain, but could still be wrong. The sun might not
"rise" tomorrow, but I'll bet you it will. Assuming it does, chances
are, it will become warmer during the first half of the day.

A lot of things are problematic. But if all you can do is assume truth
then you should become a gambler instead of a mathematician. Math
deals with truth and not problematic guesstimated "truth values".

Self-contradictory = automatically false.

I

don't see the problem with that whether we're considering things
literally or even metaphorically for that matter. It's all one system
of predicates and predicate combinations which are either true or
false in combinations. Some predicate combinations appear silly
because we already understand the combinations are false and self
contradictory. But that isn't to say the predicates themselves cannot
be true or false alone or in other combinations in given instances.

I think you need to distinguish between predicates and attributes and
objects. Predicates are assignments of attributes to objects, and only
predicates have truth values, true, fals, or somewhere in between.


If you could demonstrate the difference between "attributes" and
"predicates" perhaps I would. Both "attributes" and "predicates" are
"predicated" of something or "it" through "predication".


Grammar lesson 101:

Let's say the most basic elements of any expression are objects, that
is, nouns. If we are speaking, we are speaking about something.
Otherwise we should shut up.

You can talk about whatever you want, Tony. Doesn't make what you say
true or false including what you say here.

We can describe objects, which means we assign attributes to them, that
is, adjectives describe nouns. When we assign attributes to nouns, or
nouns to sets described by those attributes, we use an assumed predicate
relation, either "describes" or "is a member of this class". The
predicate is the verb of the statement. Real world predicates include
actions and events, but unless you have rules pertaining to specific
actions or events, those predicates do not come into play in the
evaluation of a logical statement.

In a predicate, the core is some verb, like "is". If there is no "is" or
"does" or "has", then there is no predicate. A full statement also must
have a noun, a subject, or it's not talking about anything. A statement
does not require an attribute, such as "blue", but the most interesting,
of course, do. Of course there are those like, "0 exists", which have
their utility.

So, there are objects, predicates involving an attribute or event, and
statements that combine the two.:)

Whatever, Tony. I have yet to see you demonstrate the truth of what
you say or opine.

The fast chicken on the blue porch, don't you agree? I see no
contradiction in that....

Nor do I. Nor do I see any problem in evaluating the truth or falsity
of "it is blue". No special mystery there that I can see.

~v~~

Only, just, what is it?


What is what? I can't see much that it matters exactly what "blue" may
be if it is true or false. The only thing that matters is whether it's
true or not and whether it's true combined with other predicates.


"true blue" is just a patriotic phrase.

Hardly. You're writing too fast and thinking too little.

In the same regard what is "sky"? Who cares what "sky" is? The only
thing that matters in this particular context is whether a combination
of true "blue" and true "sky" remains true. That's how combinations of
predicates acquire meaning and definition. Definitions and meanings of
words are not just abbreviations as David Marcus would have us
believe. They are true or not considered in isolation or combination
with other words.

~v~~


Right. A full statement requires a subject and a predicate. "is blue" is
just the predicate, and therefore is not a statement, and has no truth
value in isolation.

Nothing has any demonstrable "truth value" in isolation or anywhere
else. However "blue" can be true both in isolation and in combination.
Except self contradiction I'd like to see you demonstrate something
that has an unambiguous "truth value" Tony that isn't just a naive
assumption and isn't just naively paired with "Well if so and so has
thus and such truth value then this and that has this and that truth
value". Not happening.
~v~~
.







User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 19 Mar 2007 01:26:39 PM
On Mon, 19 Mar 2007 10:48:56 -0500, Tony Orlow <tony@lightlink.com>
wrote:

PD wrote:

On Mar 18, 6:08 pm, Lester Zick <dontbot...@nowhere.net> wrote:

On 18 Mar 2007 10:36:04 -0700, "PD" <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote:

All of a sudden you want to talk about original posts? I mean like the
original post where in response to your specific questions I spell out
the combined vector analysis pertinent to Michelson-Morley and you
just ignore it but subsequently pretend there is no combined vector
analysis relevant to Michelson-Morley?

Actually, no, I didn't ignore it. Others could see my posts, but you
(and to all evidence) you alone said you could not. Then you claimed
that I was "channeling" through someone else, who plainly could see my
posts and was responding to them. You, of course, assumed that the
problem was not yours, and that whatever was happening was by my
choice or design.

Well if not by design a rather peculiar lacuna in any event since you
subsequently asked me to repeat my analysis of Michelson-Morley.


No, I asked you to do what you *claim* to do about your analysis of M-
M.
What you did in your "analysis" of M-M was propose (guess) a
polarization dependency of the speed of light, which you supposed
accounted for the null result.
But what you *claim* to do to establish truth of a proposal is to
catalog all alternatives and to demonstrate that they are false. This
you simply have not done in any explicit manner. If you have all those
in your notes somewhere in your bottom drawer, do please draw them out
and explicate them.


Of course, PD, you know it's impossible to enumerate all possible
alternative explanations for a phenomenon, and that's why science works
the way it does. It seems to me Lester wants to find a formula for
truth, rather than a process to detect falsehoods. I don't see his
vision in that respect, but I do agree with his disagreement regarding
sets of points as full descriptions of geometric and physical objects,
as far as he understands it himself. Right, Lester?

Tony, you know this is an interesting point in the context of physics
and empirical experimentation. First let me say that my demonstration
of truth in universal terms is rather limited at this point to the one
proposition ~v~~ and certain mathematical implications. So I don't
claim to be able to demonstrate the application of that principle or
law of contradiction as I call it, to the analysis of experimentation,
apart from certain quantum particle spin characterisitics, in general
physical terms. At least not just yet.
Having said which however just allow me to add that the particular
experiment under consideration here, Michelson-Morley, and its
resolution in terms of Einstein's geometric and Lorentz's material
contraction hypotheses are so simple that an exhaustive mechanical
analysis in fact becomes possible.
The usual difficulty with abstract analysis of physical experiments is
that there are so many hypothetically conceivable factors relevant to
any analysis that actually analyzing such experiments is impossible.
(The problem is exactly the same as I pointed out in the tautological
analysis of alternatives to any specific circumstance, that "not A" is
a complex combination of predicates and predicate combinations.)
However in the context of Michelson-Morley there are only a couple
predicates and predicate combinations involved such that we can in
fact approach experimental analysis in exhaustive terms. There are the
null results of the experiment, Maxwell's calculation of constant c
through space independent of the experimental platform, and the
analysis of the anisotropic velocity of light relative to experimental
platforms, the Fitzgerald-Lorentz transforms which here I call FLT.
So all we really have to look at are tautological alternatives to the
various predicates and predicate combinations. Beyond this we also
have to examine Einstein's geometric and Lorentz's material
contraction hypotheses in exhaustive terms to determine whether or not
they can in fact explain the null results of Michelson-Morley and if
not exactly where the explanation has to lie.
Now this may not be a simple thing to do but it is possible because in
this particular instance we only have to deal with a mere handful of
experimental considerations and not the welter of conceivable factors
ordinary experiments would be subject to. Thus here together with
particle spin characteristics we find possibly the one and only sui
generis physical experiment subject to exhaustive physical analysis.

Curiously I've never had the specific kind of problem you presented in
this regard and I think you're being just a little too clever by half.

Or the original post wherein I
point out that points making up lines and the interesection of lines
defining point is circular logic? Do tell which original posts exactly
did you have in mind?

Yes, I believe I answered that post as well. In fact, mine was the
first response. Your memory is apparently dismal.

I seem to recollect some kind of remarks but nothing I considered
substantive. There's a huge difference between posting a reply and
addressing the subject itself in terms responsive to those employed.

However I have a further notion. I'd assumed when you said you were
bored that I'd seen the last of you. If you wish to offer constructive
criticism by all means do so. Just please get to the point. Brevity is
the soul of wit and at this juncture you're neither.


Brief enough for you?

PD



My two cents worth,

No problem. All contributions gratefully accepted.
~v~~
.

User: "VK"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 15 Mar 2007 12:03:19 PM
On Mar 14, 11:02 pm, "PD" <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote:

I believe Lester is asking whether a line is a composite object or an
atomic primitive.

That is one of things and the most easy one. I believe I already gave
the answer but not sure that he will ever accept it: it is whatever
one wants it to be today thus whatever higher level constructs is one
planning to study. Sometimes for instance it is more benefitial to go
in definitions from surface rather than from point. The line then is
an intersection of two surfaces and the point is an intersection of
two lines. For the final touch it is left to define the surface as a
set of points and we are back to the round of circular definitions :-)
- but - in either case we don't care as we are getting the starting
point we need to move on.
And - hidden for an appropriate moment - he also has an implicit join
of numbers and geometry, so number points and number lines are being
kept close to Euclidic points and lines for the next shot :-)
And what he really wants I guess as a provable definition of a basic
abstraction. So he doesn't want a statement like "Got does exist" but
he wants a statement like "It is rainy today outside" so Lester could
just run outside to say is it true or not and provide his wet/dry
umbrella as an ultimate proof.
So overall it is a rather demanding gentleman :-)
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 15 Mar 2007 06:26:03 PM
On 15 Mar 2007 10:03:19 -0700, "VK" <schools_ring@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Mar 14, 11:02 pm, "PD" <TheDraperFam...@gmail.com> wrote:

I believe Lester is asking whether a line is a composite object or an
atomic primitive.


That is one of things and the most easy one. I believe I already gave
the answer but not sure that he will ever accept it

Oh I accept it all right. I just don't understand it. I always find it
easier to accept things I don't understand. That's what philosophy and
religion are for. Science is a little harder. It really helps to know
whether and why things are true. Philosophy and religion just don't
have much to say on the subject of truth. Their claims are many; their
true demonstrations and explanations scarcer than hens' teeth.

: it is whatever
one wants it to be today thus whatever higher level constructs is one
planning to study. Sometimes for instance it is more benefitial to go
in definitions from surface rather than from point. The line then is
an intersection of two surfaces and the point is an intersection of
two lines. For the final touch it is left to define the surface as a
set of points and we are back to the round of circular definitions :-)
- but - in either case we don't care as we are getting the starting
point we need to move on.

And - hidden for an appropriate moment - he also has an implicit join
of numbers and geometry, so number points and number lines are being
kept close to Euclidic points and lines for the next shot :-)

And what he really wants I guess as a provable definition of a basic
abstraction. So he doesn't want a statement like "Got does exist" but
he wants a statement like "It is rainy today outside" so Lester could
just run outside to say is it true or not and provide his wet/dry
umbrella as an ultimate proof.

So overall it is a rather demanding gentleman :-)

I do the best I can.
~v~~
.
User: "VK"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 17 Mar 2007 01:29:29 PM
On Mar 16, 2:26 am, Lester Zick <dontbot...@nowhere.net> wrote:

I believe Lester is asking whether a line is a composite object or an
atomic primitive.


That is one of things and the most easy one. I believe I already gave
the answer but not sure that he will ever accept it


Oh I accept it all right. I just don't understand it.

So you don't understand that a abstraction - having no exact
equivalence in the perceived world - may be defined in different
ways?
Let me ask a question then if you don't mind. Given a few definition
of the abstraction in question:
1) a point is what doesn't have sides
2) a point is n intersection of two lines
3) a point is to ti en einai of infinity
....
n) a point is a reversed infinity
where between 3 and n feel free to place whatever is missing in any
amount.
So given this set of definitions: would you agree that only one
definition is possibly true among all given ones? Would you agree that
for any abstraction among all possible definitions there is one and
only one which is correct? So the task is not to define an abstraction
in a custom and possibly erroneous way - but the task it to find that
pre-existing true definition among all possible ones?
Three questions in total but really only one as promised, just making
myself as clear as possible. It is also not a rhetoric question with a
"proper" answer implied, I'm really asking you: yes or no?
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 18 Mar 2007 12:33:17 PM
On 17 Mar 2007 11:29:29 -0700, "VK" <schools_ring@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Mar 16, 2:26 am, Lester Zick <dontbot...@nowhere.net> wrote:

I believe Lester is asking whether a line is a composite object or an
atomic primitive.


That is one of things and the most easy one. I believe I already gave
the answer but not sure that he will ever accept it


Oh I accept it all right. I just don't understand it.


So you don't understand that a abstraction - having no exact
equivalence in the perceived world - may be defined in different
ways?

Oh I don't actually disagree; I just can't tell exactly what all these
qualifications amount to and mean. You've got "abstraction" and
"perception" and "equivalence" and all sorts of terms mixed up in here
that make me suspect none of us including you knows exactly what
you're talking about in mechanically exhaustive terms.

Let me ask a question then if you don't mind. Given a few definition
of the abstraction in question:

1) a point is what doesn't have sides
2) a point is n intersection of two lines
3) a point is to ti en einai of infinity
...
n) a point is a reversed infinity

where between 3 and n feel free to place whatever is missing in any
amount.

So given this set of definitions: would you agree that only one
definition is possibly true among all given ones? Would you agree that
for any abstraction among all possible definitions there is one and
only one which is correct? So the task is not to define an abstraction
in a custom and possibly erroneous way - but the task it to find that
pre-existing true definition among all possible ones?

Well maybe that would be true if your initial predicates had any
specific and exhaustive value. But lots of things may be true of
points without being essential to their definition. I don't understand
what "ti en einai of infinity" is supposed to mean nor a "reversed
infinity".

Three questions in total but really only one as promised, just making
myself as clear as possible. It is also not a rhetoric question with a
"proper" answer implied, I'm really asking you: yes or no?

The primary task in scientific definition is an exhaustive reduction
of terms. Your observations read more like philosophy than science. So
I can't really answer your questions one way or the other.
~v~~
.
User: "VK"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 18 Mar 2007 01:12:39 PM
On Mar 18, 8:33 pm, Lester Zick <dontbot...@nowhere.net> wrote:

Oh I don't actually disagree; I just can't tell exactly what all these
qualifications amount to and mean. You've got "abstraction" and
"perception" and "equivalence" and all sorts of terms mixed up in here
that make me suspect none of us including you knows exactly what
you're talking about in mechanically exhaustive terms.

If anyone of rivals (mathematics, philosophy, religion) would knew one
day "in mechanically exhaustive terms" what is a "thing without sides"
or say what is "infinity" - wow, the rest would come begging to clean
their shoos :-)
<snip>

Well maybe that would be true if your initial predicates had any
specific and exhaustive value. But lots of things may be true of
points without being essential to their definition. I don't understand
what "ti en einai of infinity" is supposed to mean nor a "reversed
infinity".

That was not a question which one of definition is correct, neither
"in mechanically exhaustive terms" nor even by some intuitive feeling;
well probably neither one. I was asking: do you believe that there is
one and only one correct definition of the point (a point on a line)
implied by the very nature of this entity?
The fact that maybe no one can bring it in some mechanically
exhaustive terms right in this second does not change anything in the
question. After all there is a number of unresolved problems not
because they don't have any solution but simply because they are not
solved yet due to different obstacles.
But as long as we arrived to such entities as "point", "line",
"infinite set", "natural number", "real number", "irrational number"
etc. - as long that: do you believe that each of them there is one and
only one proper mechanically exhaustive definition to find - coming
from the very nature of these entities? So once found we may expect
them universally correct, so even for some civilization from another
star they will be necessary either the same or wrong (so the said
civilization did not find the proper definition yet)?
.
User: "Lester Zick"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 18 Mar 2007 05:50:06 PM
On 18 Mar 2007 11:12:39 -0700, "VK" <schools_ring@yahoo.com> wrote:

On Mar 18, 8:33 pm, Lester Zick <dontbot...@nowhere.net> wrote:

Oh I don't actually disagree; I just can't tell exactly what all these
qualifications amount to and mean. You've got "abstraction" and
"perception" and "equivalence" and all sorts of terms mixed up in here
that make me suspect none of us including you knows exactly what
you're talking about in mechanically exhaustive terms.


If anyone of rivals (mathematics, philosophy, religion) would knew one
day "in mechanically exhaustive terms" what is a "thing without sides"
or say what is "infinity" - wow, the rest would come begging to clean
their shoos :-)

Personally I don't agree. I see the issue of points with or without
sides as almost frivolous as I've never known anyone who thought
points had sides.

<snip>

Well maybe that would be true if your initial predicates had any
specific and exhaustive value. But lots of things may be true of
points without being essential to their definition. I don't understand
what "ti en einai of infinity" is supposed to mean nor a "reversed
infinity".


That was not a question which one of definition is correct, neither
"in mechanically exhaustive terms" nor even by some intuitive feeling;
well probably neither one. I was asking: do you believe that there is
one and only one correct definition of the point (a point on a line)
implied by the very nature of this entity?

I think probably so. However my interest as I pointed out early on was
more directed at whether lines are made up of points or not if points
are in fact defined by the intersection of lines.

The fact that maybe no one can bring it in some mechanically
exhaustive terms right in this second does not change anything in the
question.

No of course not. However the issue I'm really interested in doesn't
require a mechanically exhaustive or any other kind of definition for
points apart from what is mentioned directly above.

After all there is a number of unresolved problems not
because they don't have any solution but simply because they are not
solved yet due to different obstacles.
But as long as we arrived to such entities as "point", "line",
"infinite set", "natural number", "real number", "irrational number"
etc. - as long that: do you believe that each of them there is one and
only one proper mechanically exhaustive definition to find - coming
from the very nature of these entities?

Once again probably so. I just haven't spent a lot of time on those
issues as yet - if I ever do.

So once found we may expect
them universally correct, so even for some civilization from another
star they will be necessary either the same or wrong (so the said
civilization did not find the proper definition yet)?

Sure. The truth of what I'm after is universal in scope and not just a
particular or local truth in the sense it is demonstrably so.
~v~~
.
User: "Tony Orlow"

Title: Re: The Definition of Points 19 Mar 2007 10:42:43 AM