Tuesday, December 23, 2003
'Bleeding Strategy' Comes Home
By Nicholas Berry


Back in the days of the "Evil Empire," the United States pursued what
was called the "bleeding strategy" toward the Soviet Union.

Reacting to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan
administration, like the Carter administration before it, decided to
bankrupt Moscow as the best way to win the Cold War.

The Soviet Union would be financially bled.

Economically isolating Cuba and Vietnam would force the Soviets to pump
considerable sums of money into these clients to prop up their regimes.
Supplying weapons to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan
would put heavy costs on the occupation.

And Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) would force the
Soviet Union to devote ever-increasing shares of its national wealth to
its military forces.

Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of its Communist
rulers, many American conservatives hailed the bleeding strategy as the
main reason for winning the Cold War.

Reagan won it. Although simple minded, this belief lingers among
Reagan's champions in America. The existence of the strategy is also
widely known abroad, especially among Russian officials and intellectuals.

Now, the shoe is on the other foot.

Conversations with Russian, EU and Chinese officials strongly suggest
that the bleeding strategy is now being used against Bush's America.

It is no secret that the leaders of these major players view Bush's
preemptive use of force, his pre-occupation on the war on terrorism and
on challenging axis-of-evil regimes, his disdain for the UN and
international law, and his highly threatening military buildup,
including the U.S. missile defense system, as contrary to their
interests. Presidents Vladimir Putin, Hu Jintao, Jacques Chirac, and
others favor multipolarity, not American unipolarity.

Finding it difficult to re-direct Bush to a wider, more internationalist
orientation, these leaders are taking advantage of what they see as an
opportunity to blunt and eventually change the direction of U.S. foreign
policy. They appear to have adopted three ways to do it.

First, Bush's narrow focus allows them to appease the United States by
joining the war on terrorism and to step back by tacitly approving the
Iraq war.

Bush then is free to pursue his narrow agenda. And that leaves the rest
of the world free to pursue their agendas without much U.S.
interference. Russia moves to reestablish its sphere of influence and
rejoin Europe. China advances its economy and regional influence in its
pursuit of great power status. The EU concentrates on expansion, unity
and even military cooperation.

Second, major powers in Europe and Asia see Bush's grand strategy as
weakening American power almost daily -- power that they see as
misguided and harmful. This weakening is good.

Noting that the United States employed a bleeding strategy to debilitate
and fracture the Soviet Union, major powers are now content to let the
United States bleed itself. Little help is given to the expensive
occupation of Iraq.

Objections to Bush's costly (and dubiously effective) missile defense
system are muted and it proceeds. China, EU countries, Russia and Japan
are lending money to the United States to the tune of $2 billion daily,
thus aiding and abetting huge budget deficits that will eventually
squeeze Washington's financial ability to maintain its imperium.
Interest payments overseas mount. The dollar weakens.

This bleeding makes the United States less able to engage in militarism
elsewhere, such as toward North Korea or Iran. It burdens the United
States, thereby lessening its international economic clout. It reduces
Bush's opportunities to interfere in their domestic affairs, whether on
human rights, elections or economic restructuring, thereby giving them
wide policy latitude.

Third, because Bush's strategy is unsustainable because of its enormous
costs, its failure to deal with a wide variety of important issues and
its dramatic denigration of diplomatic influence, major powers know that
Bush's grand unipolar design cannot last long.

Eventually, either Bush changes or he and his policies will be
repudiated at the polls. Bushism, like Bonapartism, is not forever. The
United States will eventually return to normal diplomacy, military
moderation, multilateral operations, and to support for international
law and organizations.

There is no need to advertise the bleeding. Bush is doing the bleeding
pretty well all by himself.


Nicholas Berry, director of ForeignPolicyForum.com, contributed this
comment to The Moscow Times.

http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2003/12/23/006-print.html

Tuesday, December 23, 2003
'Bleeding Strategy' Comes Home
By Nicholas Berry


Back in the days of the "Evil Empire," the United States pursued what
was called the "bleeding strategy" toward the Soviet Union.

Reacting to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan
administration, like the Carter administration before it, decided to
bankrupt Moscow as the best way to win the Cold War.

The Soviet Union would be financially bled.

Economically isolating Cuba and Vietnam would force the Soviets to pump
considerable sums of money into these clients to prop up their regimes.
Supplying weapons to the mujahedin fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan
would put heavy costs on the occupation.

And Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars) would force the
Soviet Union to devote ever-increasing shares of its national wealth to
its military forces.

Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the demise of its Communist
rulers, many American conservatives hailed the bleeding strategy as the
main reason for winning the Cold War.

Reagan won it. Although simple minded, this belief lingers among
Reagan's champions in America. The existence of the strategy is also
widely known abroad, especially among Russian officials and intellectuals.

Now, the shoe is on the other foot.

Conversations with Russian, EU and Chinese officials strongly suggest
that the bleeding strategy is now being used against Bush's America.

It is no secret that the leaders of these major players view Bush's
preemptive use of force, his pre-occupation on the war on terrorism and
on challenging axis-of-evil regimes, his disdain for the UN and
international law, and his highly threatening military buildup,
including the U.S. missile defense system, as contrary to their
interests. Presidents Vladimir Putin, Hu Jintao, Jacques Chirac, and
others favor multipolarity, not American unipolarity.

Finding it difficult to re-direct Bush to a wider, more internationalist
orientation, these leaders are taking advantage of what they see as an
opportunity to blunt and eventually change the direction of U.S. foreign
policy. They appear to have adopted three ways to do it.

First, Bush's narrow focus allows them to appease the United States by
joining the war on terrorism and to step back by tacitly approving the
Iraq war.

Bush then is free to pursue his narrow agenda. And that leaves the rest
of the world free to pursue their agendas without much U.S.
interference. Russia moves to reestablish its sphere of influence and
rejoin Europe. China advances its economy and regional influence in its
pursuit of great power status. The EU concentrates on expansion, unity
and even military cooperation.

Second, major powers in Europe and Asia see Bush's grand strategy as
weakening American power almost daily -- power that they see as
misguided and harmful. This weakening is good.

Noting that the United States employed a bleeding strategy to debilitate
and fracture the Soviet Union, major powers are now content to let the
United States bleed itself. Little help is given to the expensive
occupation of Iraq.

Objections to Bush's costly (and dubiously effective) missile defense
system are muted and it proceeds. China, EU countries, Russia and Japan
are lending money to the United States to the tune of $2 billion daily,
thus aiding and abetting huge budget deficits that will eventually
squeeze Washington's financial ability to maintain its imperium.
Interest payments overseas mount. The dollar weakens.

This bleeding makes the United States less able to engage in militarism
elsewhere, such as toward North Korea or Iran. It burdens the United
States, thereby lessening its international economic clout. It reduces
Bush's opportunities to interfere in their domestic affairs, whether on
human rights, elections or economic restructuring, thereby giving them
wide policy latitude.

Third, because Bush's strategy is unsustainable because of its enormous
costs, its failure to deal with a wide variety of important issues and
its dramatic denigration of diplomatic influence, major powers know that
Bush's grand unipolar design cannot last long.

Eventually, either Bush changes or he and his policies will be
repudiated at the polls. Bushism, like Bonapartism, is not forever. The
United States will eventually return to normal diplomacy, military
moderation, multilateral operations, and to support for international
law and organizations.

There is no need to advertise the bleeding. Bush is doing the bleeding
pretty well all by himself.


Nicholas Berry, director of ForeignPolicyForum.com, contributed this
comment to The Moscow Times.

http://www.moscowtimes.ru/stories/2003/12/23/006-print.html