December 13, 2004
INTELLIGENCE
A Hostile Land Foils the Quest for bin Laden
By JAMES RISEN and DAVID ROHDE
Hunting for Osama bin Laden, the C.I.A. established a series of small,
covert bases in the rugged mountain frontier of northwest Pakistan in
late 2003. Mr. bin Laden, the terrorist leader, was being sheltered
there by local tribesmen and foreign militants, the agency had
concluded, and controlled a group of handpicked operatives dedicated to
attacking the United States.
But since the bases opened, the C.I.A. officers stationed there have
been strictly supervised by Pakistani officials, who have limited their
ability to operate and have escorted them wherever they travel in the
Pakistani border region. As a result, it has been virtually impossible
for the Americans to gather intelligence effectively, say several
officials familiar with the operation who would only speak anonymously.
More than three years after the Sept. 11 attacks on the Pentagon and New
York transformed Osama bin Laden into the most wanted man in the world,
the search for him remains stalled, frustrated by the remote topography
of his likely Pakistani sanctuary, stymied by a Qaeda network that
remains well financed and disciplined, sidetracked by the distractions
of the Iraq war, and, perhaps most significantly, limited by deep
suspicion of the United States among Pakistanis.
Prodded by the United States, Pakistan began an offensive along its
northwest border this spring to flush out forces of Al Qaeda that had
escaped from Afghanistan and to help find Mr. bin Laden. But after
suffering heavy casualties and causing civilian deaths that stirred
opposition, the Pakistani Army declared victory two weeks ago and
announced that Mr. Bin Laden was not in Pakistan. Many American
intelligence officials are confident that he is, however - and that he
is as dangerous as ever.
The war in Afghanistan inflicted severe damage on Al Qaeda, forcing it
to adapt to survive, intelligence specialists agree. Today, they say it
functions largely as a loose network of local franchises linked by a
militant Islamist ideology. But Mr. bin Laden remains much more than
just an iconic figurehead of Islamic militancy, most American
intelligence officials now say. From a presumed hiding place on the
Pakistani side of the Afghan-Pakistan border, he controls an elite
terrorist cell devoted to attacking in the United States, the officials
say they suspect. They contend that he personally oversees the group of
Qaeda operatives, which he hopes to use for another "spectacular" event,
like the Sept. 11 hijacking plot.
American counterterrorism analysts say this special Qaeda unit is
probably dispersed, though they do not know where. This "external
planning group" can communicate with regional affiliates around the
world to work with them when needed, one senior intelligence official
said. "There is a strong desire by bin Laden to attack the continental
United States, and he wants to use the external planning node to do it,"
the official said.
But the United States has failed to penetrate the group and has no idea
when or where it will try to strike, the officials acknowledged.
Intelligence officials would not provide any details of how they reached
their conclusions about Mr. bin Laden's current role, which have not
previously been reported.
Protective Network
Many analysts are convinced that he is being protected by a
well-financed network of Pakistani tribesmen and foreign militants who
operate in the impoverished border region, and that they have helped him
communicate with major figures in his network. "Bin Laden is getting his
logistical support from the tribes," said one intelligence official. "He
still has operational communications with the outside."
The place suspected of being Mr. bin Laden's hide-out, in the shadow of
the Hindu Kush mountain range, is in one of the most isolated and
backward corners of the world. Pakistan's frontier is a barren terrain
of mountains and mud. The fiercely independent ethnic Pashtun who
inhabit the region are farmers and smugglers, most of them poor and
illiterate. Local mullahs preach a radical Islamic ideology that
portrays the United States as bent on enslaving Muslims and destroying
their culture.
Sympathetic to the Taliban, many of whom attended madrasas, or religious
schools, in the region, militant young tribesmen perceive American
soldiers as dangerous aggressors who have occupied Afghanistan and Iraq
and they view Mr. bin Laden as an avenging hero. Pakistan prohibits
Western reporters from entering the area without a military escort.
The seven semiautonomous tribal areas in the region have been a virtual
no man's land for American forces since the Sept. 11 attacks, making
them a natural haven for Qaeda figures who fled Afghanistan after the
battle of Tora Bora in 2001.
Pakistan does not permit American military and intelligence forces in
Afghanistan to cross the border to go after militants. This prohibition
on cross-border "hot pursuit" makes it relatively easy for Taliban and
Qaeda fighters to initiate attacks on American bases in Afghanistan, and
then quickly escape to the safety of Pakistan. American soldiers have
complained about being fired on from inside Pakistan by foreign
militants while Pakistani border guards sat and watched.
Has Hot Pursuit Cooled?
As a result of the restrictions, American military and intelligence
personnel in Afghanistan are no longer really hunting for Mr. bin Laden,
an intelligence official said. They are trying to provide stability for
Afghanistan's new government while battling a local Taliban insurgency
and a scattering of Qaeda fighters. On Saturday, the United States
military began an offensive in Afghanistan to pursue those militants.
While the United States conducts some air operations over Pakistan, they
are tightly controlled. Unmanned Predator drones are authorized to fly
over Pakistani airspace, but only with approval from the Pakistani
military chain of command, frequently leading to costly delays, C.I.A.
officials say.
Electronic surveillance of the border region by the National Security
Agency has proved frustrating as well, American intelligence officials
say. Mr. bin Laden is believed to avoid using any electronic devices
that could be monitored, and probably communicates only through trusted
couriers, American intelligence officials say. Without cellphone towers
along the frontier, satellite phones and push-to-talk radios are widely
used often by drug smugglers, making it difficult to zero in on Qaeda
operatives using the same kind of equipment.
Hoping to collect more intelligence, the C.I.A. opened secret bases with
small numbers of operatives in Pakistan in late 2003, but it has been
unable to use them for aggressive counterterrorism operations,
intelligence officials say. The operatives, many of whom are C.I.A.
paramilitary officers, depended on Pakistani Army commanders, whose
views on cooperation with the C.I.A. vary widely, American officials say.
"There are real limits on our movement" inside Pakistan, said one
American official, and it has deeply frustrated intelligence officers. A
C.I.A. spokesman declined to discuss any aspect of the clandestine bases.
Pakistani officials said that the Americans were instantly identifiable
and unlikely to succeed working alone. They say the Americans are
escorted to prevent them from being kidnapped or killed, or their
presence exposed, which would be damaging to the Pakistani government.
The decision to allow the bases is one of President Pervez Musharraf's
most significant steps to help the United States, intelligence officials
say. He is trying to balance his alliance with the United States with
his need to avoid setting off a broader insurgency in the border region,
where the central government is resented for its long neglect.
Government officials said that some militants from other parts of
Pakistan have gone to the tribal areas to join the fight.
Reluctant Allies
Though the Americans had pressed the Pakistanis to search for Qaeda
forces since late 2001, the military campaign was begun only after two
assassination attempts against General Musharraf in December 2003 were
traced back to the tribal areas. Before that, Pakistani officials had
stated that there were no foreign militants in the region.
The army eventually deployed 25,000 troops in South Waziristan, one of
the tribal areas, and found several terrorist training camps. In
October, Pakistani commanders said they had killed 246 militants and
captured 579. The raids and sweeps had a heavy cost. About 200 Pakistani
soldiers were killed, and tribal members said hundreds of civilians had
died.
On Sept. 9, for example, an air raid near the village of Dela in South
Waziristan killed as many as 80 civilians. Young men from the Mehsud
tribe, many of whose members died in the incident, began flocking to the
militants. "That was a turning point," said Rahimullan Yusufzai, a
Pakistani journalist. "Their friends, their relatives and people they
knew were killed."
No precise numbers exist, but Pakistani officials estimated that 500 to
1,000 of the tribesmen were fighting beside 150 to 300 foreign
militants, most of them Uzbeks. Pakistani analysts say the area's tribal
structure is fraying. Drawn by the wealth, sense of belonging and
promise of paradise that the militants offer, unemployed young tribesmen
are openly defying edicts from tribal leaders and taking up arms, Mr.
Yusufzai said. "These young men refuse to listen to their elders, to
their families," he added.
Local residents have said that they were caught between the army and the
militants. Nisar Wazir, 56, a teacher in Wana, a town in South
Waziristan, said in a telephone interview that the American and Pakistan
governments had neglected the tribal areas after supporting militants
there in the 1980's anti-Soviet jihad. Asked if Mr. bin Laden was hiding
in the tribal areas, Mr. Wazir responded angrily. "America brought Osama
bin Laden to this region," he said. "They know his whereabouts better
than me."
Despite the Pakistani government's efforts to win over residents by
building schools, wells and roads there, cooperating with Pakistani and
American investigators continues to be considered "napak kam," or dirty
work, among many tribesmen, Pakistani officials say.
Aside from tribal members, the militants may be getting help from some
officers in Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence, the country's
powerful intelligence agency. The agency was the hidden power behind the
Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan and was close to Al Qaeda.
Pakistani civilian security and police officials complained in the past
that intelligence agency personnel have sometimes interfered with their
efforts to arrest Qaeda members.
Pakistani officials warn that suspicion of the United States prevents a
significant American presence. Since the invasions of Afghanistan and
Iraq, many Pakistanis fear that the United States will bomb Iran to
prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, and that Pakistan will be next.
One Pakistani security official said opposition to American forces in
the country would be widespread. "The day the American troops cross into
Pakistan territory, that will be the day when the Pakistani government
will be hard put to stop the people who say, 'Why don't you reverse your
position on helping America?' " said the official, who spoke on
condition of anonymity. "They already say, 'You have done too much to
help America.' "
Some American intelligence officials say that the war in Iraq provided a
powerful new recruiting tool for Al Qaeda. The conflict has diverted
resources - C.I.A. paramilitary personnel and pilotless Predator
surveillance aircraft - from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2002, several
current and former intelligence and administration officials said. They
contend the war in Iraq weakened the focus of the United States, giving
Al Qaeda time to regroup. Pakistan has been a sanctuary for some Qaeda
figures since soon after the American-led invasion of Afghanistan. When
the Taliban government fell in the winter of 2001, some Qaeda leaders
went west to Iran, but a large group of Qaeda members, including many of
Mr. bin Laden's lieutenants, went south to Pakistan, intelligence
officials say.
By spring 2002, South Waziristan had become "the hub of Al Qaeda
operations in the whole world," one senior Pakistani official said.
Local religious leaders offered the militants houses, while poor
tribesmen collected handsome rents on their homes.
They soon established a highly effective security system. A network of
tribesmen augmented by radios and satellite phones acted as lookouts and
notified them whenever more than one vehicle left a new Pakistani army
base in Wana. "They could get warnings," said a senior Pakistani official.
The foreign militants are flush with cash, use a highly sophisticated
code when communicating, travel in small groups at night, are
disciplined and have access to laptop computers, Pakistani military
officials say. The network has even sent e-mail messages, letters and
DVD's to Pakistani soldiers fighting in the tribal areas urging them not
to kill their fellow Muslims on behalf of America, according to Western
diplomats.
A Pre-Election Warning
The C.I.A. has intermittently received information about Mr. bin Laden's
movements along the Pakistani frontier, but it has always come too late
to act against him, officials said. "There is no credible information
that he has ever left the border region" since Tora Bora, one American
analyst said.
Many American analysts have concluded that Ayman al-Zawahiri, the
Egyptian who is Mr. bin Laden's chief deputy, is also along Pakistan's
border - in the tribal lands or an adjacent region - but is no longer
with Mr. bin Laden. American officials contend that the two men
separated for security reasons, but remain in close communication. That
may explain why over the last year or more they have each issued audio
and videotapes broadcast over Arab television, but have not been seen or
heard together.
Days before the American presidential election this fall, Mr. bin Laden
released a videotape warning the United States to change course to
prevent future attacks. In contrast to his haggard appearance in his
videotaped message televised in September 2003, Mr. bin Laden appeared
vigorous. C.I.A. officials say they are not certain of the state of his
health, but have long been dismissive of reports that he suffered from
kidney disease or some other serious ailment.
Despite the shortcomings of the Pakistani border campaign, the Bush
administration contends that General Musharraf has taken great personal
and political risks to side with the United States against Al Qaeda, and
is unwilling to push him too hard or too publicly. Out of deference to
President Musharraf, the official United States position on Mr. bin
Laden's whereabouts is that he is on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, a
description that avoids pointing fingers at Islamabad.
American counterterrorism officials cite the vital role Pakistani
security services have played in catching Qaeda operatives, including
several important figures, in Pakistan cities. In urban areas, security
officials can argue that they are doing police work, and can arrest
Qaeda operatives one by one without much political unrest. "The key high
value targets that have been picked up in Pakistan have been picked up
in the cities," one American intelligence official said. "We haven't
gotten any out of the border." A benefit of the recent campaign is that
it has forced foreign Islamic fighters from lowlands of South Waziristan
into mountains and forests, other tribal areas or Pakistani cities,
American and Pakistani intelligence officials say. "It caused movement,
and hopefully that will expose them and we can target them," an American
said.
A 'Success' Meets Skepticism
At the end of November, the Pakistani government called the South
Waziristan operation a success, saying that Mr. bin Laden was not there.
Meeting with President Bush in Washington recently, General Musharraf
declared that Pakistani forces had "broken the back" of the Qaeda
network in his country and destroyed its training bases.
Many American intelligence officials have been skeptical of the effort,
though, noting that the Pakistanis often alerted tribal leaders to raids
beforehand and mostly only snared foot soldiers. To rout Al Qaeda and
find Mr. bin Laden is going to require a much more sustained campaign by
the United States and Pakistan, intelligence officials from those
countries say. The United States is spending $4.5 million to help build
roads, wells and schools in the tribal areas, an amount dwarfed by the
$18 billion the United States is spending on the reconstruction of Iraq.
Pakistani officials and others say economic development, locally elected
government and full integration of the tribal areas into Pakistan are
the only way to eradicate militancy from the isolated area.
"To really neutralize and eliminate them, it will have to be a lot more
effort," said Talat Masood, an Islamabad political analyst and former
general. "They are still a very potent force."
James Risen reported from Washington for this article, and David Rohde
from Peshawar, Pakistan. Mohammed Khan contributed reporting from Peshawar.
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