A Tool We Need to Stop the Next Airliner Plot
By Michael Chertoff
Tuesday, August 29, 2006; A15
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The 49 killed in Ky could have been prevented if they had put simple
traffic lights in on airport tarmac. It's an idea that's been around for
at least 10 years.
Why weren't we doing it? Because our leadership is focused only
overseas, and on terrorists.
Well, lots of other mundane things bring plans down, such as that old
chestnut, airport taxi accidents.
Also, why doesn't Chertoff allow NTSB to enforce it's safety findings?
For example, the mid-fuel tank explosion problem on 747's was never
fixed, using simple technology used on military aircraft for years.
Are we waiting for yet another 747 to go down, and kill another 300
souls? It seems so.
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Imagine that our troops in Afghanistan raided an al-Qaeda safe house and
captured a computer containing the cellphone numbers of operatives in
Europe. Wouldn't it be important to know whether one of those cellphone
numbers was used to book a transatlantic flight? Unfortunately, today
our ability to make that connection remains limited: Information that
terrorists readily share with travel agents cannot easily be shared
throughout the United States government. That needs to change.
Information sharing and intelligence gathering are some of our most
important tools in the global war on terrorism. British authorities, in
partnership with the United States and our allies, were able to disrupt
the recent terrorist plot against passenger aircraft precisely because
of timely, actionable intelligence, properly shared and acted upon
before the terrorists could carry out their plans.
But despite the strong links we've forged with our European partners to
protect our nations, we still remain handcuffed in our ability to use
all available resources to identify threats and stop terrorists.
To defeat terrorists, we must limit their movement between countries and
disable their worldwide networks by targeting our investigative
resources. One technique practiced by the Department of Homeland
Security and a number of foreign governments is the use of name-based
information, such as passenger manifests and crew lists, to screen
travelers coming to the United States before they get here. These
manifests allow us to identify known persons of interest on watch lists
and to act upon threats before they can reach our shores -- even, where
possible, before they depart on their trip. But how do we thwart a
terrorist who has not yet been identified?
One way is by using more of the detailed information collected by
airlines and travel agencies when an individual books a flight. These
passenger name records contain information, such as travel itineraries
and payment details, that can be analyzed in conjunction with current
intelligence to identify high-risk travelers before they board planes.
If we learned anything from Sept. 11, 2001, it is that we need to be
better at connecting the dots of terrorist-related information. After
Sept. 11, we used credit card and telephone records to identify those
linked with the hijackers. But wouldn't it be better to identify such
connections before a hijacker boards a plane?
By comparing passenger name record (PNR) data and intelligence gathered
on known terrorists -- such as cellphone numbers collected in
Afghanistan -- we can identify unknown threats for additional screening
and enhance our ability to assess risk. At the same time, that means we
will spend less time with inconvenient screening of low-risk travelers.
The U.S. government has collected PNR data on travelers aboard
international flights to the United States since the early 1990s. This
information is of such value that after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks,
Congress mandated its continued collection. But in the past few years
European privacy concerns have limited the ability of counterterrorism
officials to gain broad access to data of this sort.
For example, under an agreement with the European Union, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection receives this information regularly, but it cannot
routinely share it with investigators in another DHS component,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, or with the FBI -- never mind with
our allies in London. This information might yet identify associates of
those arrested in the plot in Britain, but the rules blind us in
routinely searching for that connection.
DHS has made a strong commitment to protect personal privacy while
screening international travelers. We do not profile based on race or
ethnicity, but we do assess potential threats through careful analysis
of individual behavior. The DHS chief privacy officer has closely
reviewed the PNR program to ensure that it meets standards of fair
information practices and U.S. law. This includes providing a process
through which travelers can seek redress if they feel their freedoms
have been violated.
Protecting personal privacy is a part of responding to the post-Sept. 11
world, but it should not reflexively block us from developing new
screening tools. Indeed, more data sharing leads to more precisely
targeted screening, which actually improves privacy by reducing
questioning and searches of innocent travelers.
All governments bear a responsibility to prevent terrorists from
boarding aircraft, and information sharing is a critical way we can work
together to limit terrorist mobility, screen for unknown threats and
investigate terrorist cells. Smart screening -- including careful and
responsive analysis of travel data -- will enhance security and privacy.
The writer is U.S. secretary of homeland security.
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