Reversing Policy, U.S. "Froze" Iran Talks in March
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33303
Analysis by Gareth Porter*
WASHINGTON, May 19 (IPS) - In yet another apparent
episode of the inability of the White House to steer
a consistent diplomatic course in the Middle East,
a new report says that the George W. Bush
administration ordered U.S. Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad in March to postpone indefinitely the
talks with Iran on Iraq for which Khalilzad had
previously gotten White House approval.
The reversal of the earlier authorisation for talks
with Iran has resulted in a widening chasm between
the United States and the other major powers on how
to reach a diplomatic solution with Iran on the
nuclear issue.
Washington Post columnist David Ignatius reported
on Friday that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
"froze" the talks on Iraq that the United States and
Iran had agreed to in mid-March, telling Khalilzad
"it wasn't the right time to meet".
Previously it had been reported that the talks had
been postponed only until the formation of a new
government in Baghdad. Rice told reporters on the
plane to Berlin Mar. 29-30 that the talks would take
place "sooner or later", suggesting that Khalilzad
was "very busy right now in Iraq". The new report by
Ignatius indicates, however, that it was a high-level
political decision in Washington not to proceed with
the talks at all.
Ignatius also revealed that Khalilzad had held
"several secret meetings with an Iranian
representative around the turn of the year". Such
meetings were presumably to try to convince Tehran
to agree to higher-level talks on Iraq.
Although he cites no source for these revelations,
Ignatius has broken news in the past based on
exclusive access to Khalilzad himself. Khalilzad has
also used the press in the past to try to overcome
resistance to his own policy initiatives from
high-ranking officials in Washington.
The Post columnist attributes the March decision to
scuttle the talks with Iran to Rice's desire for
close coordination of Iran strategy with the three
European countries -- Britain, France and
Germany -- which had been conducting direct
negotiations with Iran. But the decision had much
less to do with multilateral diplomacy on Iran than
with the determination of Vice Pres. ***** Cheney and
Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld to avoid
anything that legitimised the Islamic Republic of
Iran.
That determination apparently overrode the
preference of both Khalilzad and Rice. Rice's
initial comment, just before leaving for Sydney,
Australia on Mar. 16, was that talks with Iran on
Iraq "could be useful".
By the time she had arrived in Sydney, however,
White House National Security Adviser Stephen J.
Hadley and an unnamed "senior U.S. official" had
denigrated the idea of such talks. Rice had
apparently been informed that such talks were
unacceptable to powerful figures in the
administration. "We will see when and if those
talks [with Iran] take place," she said in Sydney.
The bilateral U.S.-Iranian talks on Iraq were
certainly not cut off to coordinate multilateral
diplomacy on the Iranian nuclear issue more closely.
All those involved in the negotiations except the
United States had agreed by March that Washington
needed to have direct negotiations with Tehran to
achieve a settlement of the conflict over Iran's
nuclear programme.
On Mar. 8, after a meeting of the Governing Board of
the International Atomic Energy Agency, Director
General Mohammed ElBaradei told the press,
"Throughout the spectrum, everybody underscored the
need to look for a comprehensive political settlement
that takes account of all underlying issues." And he
added, "I believe that once we start to discuss
security issues, my personal view is that the U.S.
should be engaged into [sic] a dialogue."
The Europeans -- particularly France and
Germany -- have long been dismayed at Washington's
refusal to enter into diplomatic dialogue with Iran
on the nuclear issue. They viewed the expected talks
with Iran about stabilising Iraq as an opportunity
open up a channel for U.S.-Iran negotiations on
nuclear issues.
The most aggressive of the European three in
pressing this point has been Germany, whose
Chancellor Angela Merkel the Bush administration
had expected to follow Washington's lead on Iran.
Instead, the Merkel government has now become the
most aggressive of the European three in telling
the United States that it must agree to direct U.S.
participation in negotiations with Iran.
During a visit to Washington Apr. 3-4, German foreign
minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier told reporters he
had advised Rice and Hadley that the talks he
understood were to occur between the United States
and Iran should not be limited to Iraq but should
include the nuclear issue as well, according a report
by AFP and the German television network Deutsche
Welle.
Steinmeier also said that British foreign minister
Jack Straw joined him in supporting direct
U.S.-Iranian negotiations. Straw, who had infuriated
hardliners in the United States by referring to an
attack on Iran as "inconceivable" and unjustified,
was replaced by Prime Minister Tony Blair as foreign
minister early this month.
In an interview with International Herald Tribune
reporter Judy Dempsey in late April, German defence
minister Franz Josef Jung struck the same theme.
"This is our request to Washington: that it begins
direct talks and from there reach results," Jung
said.. When Merkel arrived in Washington for a
meeting with Bush on May 3, the White House expected
her to raise the issue directly with Bush. A senior
U.S. official told the Financial Times that Bush
would reaffirm U.S. opposition to direct negotiations
with Iran should she do so, according to a May 3
story.
France has taken the same view of the problem since
at least last Jul. 5, when French foreign minister
Philippe Douste-Blazy, standing next to Condoleezza
Rice, pledged that the European three would discuss
with Iranians "the security of their country".
Then he added, "And for this, we shall need the
United States -- and we shall talk with them before
proposing the package -- making the proposal." But
Rice did not comment on his bid for an active U.S.
role in negotiating with Tehran, and no European
proposal involving security was forthcoming.
The administration's refusal to meet with Iran is
now at the heart of the protracted discussions
between the United States and the five other powers
on a common position on Iran. The European three,
China and Russia have all been insisting since a
meeting in New York May 8 that the United States
sign on to a package of incentives to Iran that
includes not only nuclear technology but security
guarantees for Iran, as reported by Philip Sherwill
of the London Telegraph May 9.
The U.S. stance, with its implicit rejection of
substantive compromise with Iran and its readiness
to use force on the issue, is also the main reason
why Russia, China and Germany have made it clear
they are opposed any U.N. resolution that would
levy sanctions against Iran.
Some in the administration may be open to an
eventual shift of policy. Newsweek reported May 15
that Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns had
"indicated to colleagues that he is mainly waiting
for the right moment, when America's leverage and
its chances of success are maximised."
But Bush appears to be listening not to the
diplomats but to the same figures who vetoed the
direct talks with Iran in March and have been
irrevocably opposed for more than four years to any
dealings with Tehran.
*Gareth Porter is an historian and national security
policy analyst. His latest book, "Perils of
Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War
in Vietnam", was published in June 2005. (END/2006)
Gareth Porter also contributes to antiwar.com
http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33303
--
The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
John J. Mearsheimer
University of Chicago - Department of Political Science
Stephen M. Walt
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government
http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011
( has polemical response from Alan Dershowitz at site )
Edited non-PDF version :
http://www.lrb.co.uk./v28/n06/mear01_.html
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