Major arms soar to twice pre-9/11 cost
Systems to have little direct role in terror fight
By Bryan Bender, Globe Staff | August 19, 2006
WASHINGTON -- The estimated costs for the development of major weapons
systems for the US military have doubled since September 11, 2001, with
a trillion-dollar price tag for new planes, ships, and missiles that
would have little direct role in the fight against insurgents in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
The soaring cost estimates -- disclosed in a report for the
Republican-led Senate Budget Committee -- have led to concerns that
supporters of multibillion-dollar weapons programs in Congress, the
Pentagon , and the defense industry are using the conflicts and the war
on terrorism to fulfill a wish-list of defense expenditures, whether
they are needed or not for the war on terrorism.
The report, based on Defense Department data, concluded that the best
way to keep defense spending in check in the coming years lies in
``controlling the cost of weaponry," especially those programs that the
Pentagon might not necessarily need.
The projections of what it will cost to acquire ``major weapons
programs" currently in production or on the drawing board soared from
$790 billion in September 2001 to $1.61 trillion in June 2006, according
to the congressional analysis of Pentagon data.
Costs for some of the most expensive new weapon systems -- such as
satellite-linked combat vehicles for ground troops; a next-generation
fighter plane ; and a cutting-edge, stealth-technology destroyer for the
Navy -- are predicted to cost even more by the time they are delivered,
because many of them are still in their early phases. In a quarterly
report to Congress on weapons costs earlier this month, the Pentagon
reported that of the $1.61 trillion it thinks it will need for
big-ticket weapons, it has spent more than half so far -- about $909
billion.
But the huge increase in weapons costs is already placing enormous
strain on the federal budget, according to government budget
specialists, who predict major increases in defense spending for years
to come so that the Pentagon can afford all the weapons it has on the
books. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office, for example,
estimates that between 2012 and 2024 the Pentagon budget will have to
grow between 18 percent and 34 percent over what was appropriated this year.
Overall, annual defense spending has increased by about 11 percent per
year since 2001, to about $400 billion this year, not including hundreds
of billions of dollars that Congress has set aside to pay for military
operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Military operations and maintenance
costs, as well as salaries and health benefits for people in uniform,
have all gone up by about 40 percent.
But the price tag for major weapons has garnered new attention from
watchdog groups and government auditors, who contend that many of the
arms already on the drawing board don't have much to do with ongoing
combat or the war on terrorism.
In fact, most of the weapon systems being designed, tested , or built
had been in the Pentagon's pipeline long before the Sept. 11 attacks.
Despite the steep price jump, there has been a relatively modest
increase in the number of new weapons projects over the past five years,
according to Pentagon figures.
Still, ``only a portion of these increased costs are a result of the war
on terror," said Winslow Wheeler , a former congressional budget
specialist now at the nonprofit Center for Defense Information in
Washington and the author of `` The Wastrels of Defense ."
The weapons projects designated as ``major acquisition programs" require
at least $365 million in research funding and $2.1 billion is
acquisition costs. They include new armored vehicles; two new fighter
jets; an advanced Navy destroyer; a package of land, air , and
space-based missile defense systems; and sophisticated electronic and
intelligence systems such as a new satellite communications network.
Defense specialists attribute the spiral ing costs to a variety of
factors. Some projects have increased in scope, while other weapons
systems have taken longer to acquire, adding to the cost. Other projects
turned out to be far more expensive than project managers and
contractors predicted.
For example, the Future Combat System, a high-tech fleet of armored
combat vehicles being developed by the Army , was forecast to cost $92
billion when its development began in 2003, according to the GOP
committee's report. As of December 2005, however, the price tag had
skyrocketed to $165 billion, about an 80 percent increase in just two years.
The Government Accountability Office, the government's nonpartisan audit
bureau, warned of ``the risks of conducting business as usual," and
concluded in a report in November that the major weapons programs are at
``high risk" for fraud, waste, abuse , and mismanagement.
The Department of Defense ``has experienced cost overruns, missed
deadlines, performance shortfalls, and persistent management problems,"
the report said. ``In light of the serious budget pressures facing the
nation, such problems are especially troubling."
The GOP committee report was blunt about the impact of rising weapons
costs on the federal budget, and expressed little confidence that
Congress has the political will to reign in spending on weapons that are
not critical to the war effort. Noting that ``every project has local
employment implications," the report said ``weapon system politics" will
make it extremely difficult to make cuts.
``Controlling the long-term costs of the Pentagon's arsenal are very
nearly as complex as restraining the cost of government entitlements
like Social Security and Medicare," the analysis said.
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