The Face of Iraqi Terrorism

Foreign fighters in Iraq care to guess from where?

Weekly Standard

3/4/05

Stephen Schwartz


FOR MONTHS, a behind-the-scenes, seldom-mentioned debate has raged in
the West, over the origins of the "foreign fighters" attacking the
U.S., coalition, and local anti-jihadist forces in Iraq. Some,
including Saudi dissidents like Ali al-Ahmed of the Saudi Institute
and myself, has suspected Iraq's dangerous southern neighbor, the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of being the main source.

Our evidence often seemed thin. We cited the repeated calls by
hundreds of Saudi clerics for volunteers to go north of the
unpatrolled border to kill themselves and others. We circulated
translations and photographs of Saudi "martyrs" whose biographies
appeared in the kingdom's print media and on websites.

But official opacity was maintained in the West. In mainstream media
and government statements, the jihadist killers were never

beyond noting that they were foreign.

Now we have real evidence, and the verdict still points south of the
Iraqi border.

The Global Research in International Affairs Center in Israel, a
highly reputable and reliable think-tank, has published a paper

"Arab volunteers killed in Iraq: an Analysis," available at
e-prism.org. Authored by Dr. Reuven Paz, the paper analyzes the
origins of 154 Arab jihadists killed in Iraq in the last six months,
whose names have been posted on Islamist websites.

The sample does not account for all jihadists in Iraq, but provides a
useful and eye-opening profile of them. Saudi Arabia accounted for 94
jihadists, or 61 percent of the sample, followed by Syria with 16 (10
percent), Iraq itself with only 13 (8 percent), and Kuwait with 11 (7
percent.) The rest included small numbers from Jordan, Lebanon,

Algeria, Morocco (of which one was a resident in Spain), Yemen,
Tunisia, the Palestinian territories (only 1), Dubai, and Sudan. The
Sudanese was living in Saudi Arabia before he went to die in Iraq.

The names of most of the dead appeared on the websites after the
battle of Falluja, and they were all supporters of Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi and al Qaeda.

Of the 94 Saudis, 61 originated in the region of Najd, known as the
heartland of the Wahhabis. The total of 154 included 33 suicide
terrorists, of whom 23 were Saudis (with 10 from Najd). Given that
Najdis make up 43.5 percent of Saudi suicide bombers in Iraq, and 65
percent of all Saudi jihadists on the list, Paz concludes that the
"Wahhabi doctrines of Najd--the heart of Wahhabism--remain highly
effective."

Paz emphasizes that "the support for violent Jihad in Iraq against

Americans was encouraged by the Saudi Islamic establishment." But he
also offers some interesting observations:

* "Jihadi volunteers constitute a significant portion of the Sunni
insurgents," suggesting that referring to the terrorists as if they
represented Sunnis in general, or were merely guerrillas opposed to a
foreign invader, is inaccurate.

* "Another element to note is the relatively small number of Iraqis
involved in the fighting on behalf of the Zarqawi group."

* "Particularly striking . . . is the absence of Egyptians among
foreign Arab volunteers [in] Iraq, even though Egypt is the largest
Arab country, with millions of sympathizers of Islamist groups." Paz
notes that Egyptians were previously prominent as fighters in
Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Chechnya. He ascribes the

of Egyptians to enlist in the Iraqi jihad to a combination of the
decline of Islamist influence in Egypt, effective Egyptian government
action against jihadism, and orders from the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt not to participate physically in the Iraqi jihad.

The predominance of Saudis in Iraqi terrorism also goes a long way
toward explaining the other fact that Western media and government
have been reluctant to admit: the role of Wahhabism as an inciter of
violence against Shias. Wahhabis hate Shias even more than Christians
and Jews, because, as Saudi schools (including those like the Islamic
Saudi Academy in the United States) teach, Christians and Jews have
their own religions that are openly opposed to Islam, but Shias want
to "change Islam," which the Wahhabis consider the personal property
of the Saudi rulers.

Few in the West seemed to notice earlier this
week when 2,000 people assembled in Hilla, near Baghdad, to protest a
car bombing that killed at least 125. The demonstrators chanted "No

terrorism! No to Baathism and Wahhabism!"

Paz concludes his study with words difficult to surpass for their
clarity and relevance: "The intensive involvement of Saudi volunteers
for Jihad in Iraq is . . . the result of the Saudi government's
doublespeak, whereby it is willing to fight terrorism, but only if
directly affected by it on its own soil. Saudi Arabia is either
deliberately ignoring, or incapable and too weak, to engage in open
and brave opposition to Jihadi terrorism outside of the Kingdom . . .

Their blind eyes in the face of the Saudi Islamic establishment's
support of the Jihad in Iraq may pose a greater threat in the future,
as the hundreds of volunteers return home."

Only one thing needs to be added: it's time to close Saudi Arabia's
northern border, silence the jihadist preachers, and cut off the
financing of international Wahhabism.

Stephen Schwartz is the author of The Two Faces of Islam.

--
"Surely an angel rides on the whirlwind, and directs this storm."

- President George W. Bush, 1st Inaugural, January 2001

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The Face of Iraqi Terrorism

Foreign fighters in Iraq care to guess from where?

Weekly Standard