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Politics > Politics-USA |
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"PM" |
| Date: |
27 Sep 2005 08:41:57 PM |
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How 'weak' Allende was left out in the cold by the KGB |
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Books
September 19, 2005
Mitrokhin archive
How 'weak' Allende was left out in the cold by the
KGB
In the second exclusive extract from The Mitrokhin
Archive Volume II, the historian Christopher Andrew and KGB defector Vasili
Mitrokhin reveal how the Soviet Union influenced the rise and fall of the
first democratically elected Marxist leader
a.. Read the first extract of The Mitrokhin Archive
Volume II here
BY FAR the most important of the KGB's contacts in
South America was Salvador Allende Gossens (codenamed Leader by the KGB),
whose election as President of Chile in 1970 was hailed as "a revolutionary
blow to the imperialist system in Latin America".
Allende was the first Marxist anywhere in the world
to win power through the ballot box. He was unlike any stereotype of a
Marxist leader. During his visits to Havana in the 1960s, he had been
privately mocked by Castro's entourage for his aristocratic tastes: fine
wines, expensive objets d'art, well-cut suits and elegantly dressed women.
Allende was also a womaniser. Gabriel García Márquez described him as "a
gallant with a touch of the old school about him, perfumed notes and furtive
rendezvous".
Despite the private mockery which they aroused in
Allende's Communist allies, however, his bourgeois appearance and expensive
lifestyle were electoral assets, reassuring middle-class voters that their
lives would continue normally under an Allende presidency. As even his
opponents acknowledged, he had enormous personal charm.
Allende's election left President Nixon, according
to his National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, "beside himself" with
rage. Having berated the Democrats for more than a decade for allowing Cuba
to go Communist, Nixon now faced the prospect as a Republican president of
seeing Chile follow suit. There was, he angrily told Kissinger, "only a one
in ten chance" of preventing Allende's confirmation, but the attempt must be
made in order to "save Chile" from communism. The CIA drew up a two-track
plan. Track 1 was to find some method of persuading the Chilean Congress not
to vote Allende into office. Track 2 was to engineer a military coup. Both
failed. On October 24, Allende was formally elected President by vote of the
Chilean Congress.
Regular Soviet contact with Allende after his
election was maintained not by the Soviet Ambassador but by his KGB case
officer, Svyatoslav Kuznetsov, who was instructed by the centre to "exert a
favourable influence on Chilean government policy". According to Allende's
KGB file, he "was made to understand the necessity of reorganising Chile's
army and intelligence services, and of setting up a relationship between
Chile's and the USSR's intelligence services". Allende was said to react
positively.
CIA covert action against Allende continued during
his presidency. Nixon gave instructions to "make the [Chilean] economy
scream".
Kuznetsov arranged his regular meetings with Allende
through the President's personal secretary, Miria Contreras Bell, known as
La Payita and codenamed Marta by the KGB. La Payita was Allende's favourite
mistress during his presidency. Kuznetsov reported that Allende was spending
"a great deal of time" in her company. "His relationship with his wife has
more than once been harmed as a result." Despite Allende's affairs, however,
his wife, Hortensia, remained intensely loyal to him. Kuznetsov did his best
to cultivate her as well as her husband.
In October 1971, on instructions from the Politburo,
Allende was given $30,000 "in order to solidify the trusted relations" with
him. Allende also mentioned to Kuznetsov his desire to acquire "one or two
icons" for his private art collection. He was presented with two icons as a
gift.
On December 7, in a memorandum to the Politburo, the
KGB proposed giving Allende another $60,000 for what was termed "his work
with [ie, bribery of] political party leaders, military commanders and
parliamentarians". Allende was to be urged to strengthen his authority by
establishing "unofficial contact" with Chilean security chiefs and "using
the resources of friends [Communists]" in the Interior Ministry.
In June 1972, Kuznetsov's close relationship with
Allende was disturbed by the arrival in Santiago of a tough new Soviet
ambassador, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Basov, whose membership of the Central
Committee indicated both his high rank and the importance attached by Moscow
to relations with Allende's Chile. Unlike his predecessor, Basov was not
prepared to play second fiddle to a KGB officer. His relations with the
residency worsened, apparently soon after his arrival in Santiago, after the
discovery in the walls of both his office and apartment of American
listening devices with miniature transmitters which could be activated from
some distance away. Basov doubtless blamed the KGB for failing to protect
the security of the embassy. Basov initially insisted on accompanying
Kuznetsov to meetings with Allende, thus hampering the conduct of KGB
business which the resident was reluctant to discuss in the presence of the
ambassador.
Within a few months Basov was seeking to replace
Kuznetsov as the main Soviet contact with Allende. His aim was to reduce
most Soviet contact with Allende to "a single channel" controlled by
himself. But it is clear from KGB reports that without the ambassador's
knowledge, Kuznetsov succeeded in establishing a secret channel "for
handling the most confidential and delicate matters" directly with Allende.
In 1972 Moscow downgraded its assessment of the
prospects of the Allende regime. The "truckers' strike", allegedly backed by
CIA funding, virtually paralysed the economy for three weeks, providing
dramatic evidence of the weakness of the Popular Unity Government and the
power of its opponents. The mounting evidence of chronic economic
mismanagement made Moscow reluctant to provide large-scale support.
Anxious to do what it could to prevent the defeat of
the Allende regime, the KGB gave an exaggerated impression of its ability to
influence Chilean politics.
After Allende's Unidad Popular lost its majority in
Congress in March 1973, the KGB tried to explain to the Politburo why its
"confidential relations" with leading Chilean politicians across the
political spectrum had failed to produce the UP victory which it had led the
Politburo to expect three months earlier. Preferring as usual to concentrate
on its successes, it emphasised instead the President's willingness to
provide further assistance to its operations.
In the KGB's view, Allende's fundamental error was
his unwillingness to use force against his opponents. Without establishing
complete control over all the machinery of the State, his hold on power
could not be secure.
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