washingtonpost.com
Rethinking Iraq's Election
By Samir S.M. Sumaidaie
Tuesday, December 28, 2004; Page A19
The interim Iraqi government faces a stark choice: whether to go ahead
with the planned elections on Jan. 30 or postpone them. It has so far
stood firm on its decision to stick to the schedule. The argument for
doing so is compelling. Legally, the interim government is bound by the
stipulations of the Transitional Administrative Law, which determined
that elections be held before the end of January 2005, and by Security
Council Resolution 1546, which confirmed the timetable and gave the
commitment an international dimension.
Morally, delaying elections would be seen by insurgents as a victory,
encouraging them to redouble their efforts to derail the political
process. Moreover, a large segment of Iraq's people is eagerly awaiting
elections and will feel cheated of their legitimate right if they are
postponed. Nor would postponing the elections by a few months
necessarily bring about any significant improvement in security
conditions. In fact, it would probably create a disgruntled population
of restive parties in southern Iraq, in addition to the violent and
emboldened insurgents of the northwest.
But to hold elections under current circumstances, when a sizable part
of the country is not secure, just for the sake of voting, would produce
a disproportionate and nonrepresentative national assembly. Far from
stabilizing the country, this could be a recipe for a greater rebellion.
If the national assembly then proceeded to write the permanent
constitution, a significant number of Iraqis would feel marginalized and
shortchanged. Their nonparticipation would be due not to any lack of
desire to vote but rather to the lack of security.
So far this issue has been presented through public debates in Iraq and
in the United States in binary terms: We either postpone the elections
or keep to the timetable. Yet there is a third way forward -- namely, to
go ahead with the elections but set criteria for their inclusiveness
that would have to be met before the newly elected national assembly
would be allowed to produce a permanent constitution. A criterion that
could be agreed to by the major political players in the country might
be set out in terms of differences in turnout. For example, if the
turnout in two or three provinces was less than half that of the rest of
the country, the assembly might not be considered sufficiently balanced
to commit the country to a permanent constitution.
Of course, this idea may be implemented in more than one way. One
possible mechanism could be to leave a number of seats vacant for the
underrepresented provinces. Details could be worked out, and it is not
beyond the ingenuity of Iraqi political leaders to devise a mechanism
that is both workable and fair. Such a solution would have the merit of
satisfying all those who want elections as soon as possible, thus
denying terrorists a victory while producing a legitimate elected
government that could focus on stabilizing the country. When that was
achieved, another round of elections could be held to produce a more
representative national assembly that could command the confidence of
the whole country for writing a permanent constitution.
What is the downside? One obvious disadvantage is the delay in writing
the permanent constitution. This, in my view, is a price worth paying
for more stability. Another is the potential of giving the insurgents a
victory by delaying the constitution indefinitely. But such an idea
presumes that an elected government, acting with the help of the
international community, would fail to make meaningful progress on the
security front. That is by no means certain. In fact, an elected
government would have a much better chance of stabilizing Iraq than the
current interim government.
It might be argued that the Transitional Administrative Law already has
a built-in safety valve in the shape of the stipulated referendum that
specifies that if three of Iraq's provinces reject the draft permanent
constitution, it would have to be redrafted. That is not the same,
because without sufficient assurances made clear in advance, the road to
the referendum could be very bumpy indeed. We need to put out a powerful
message of inclusiveness, partnership and even mutual esteem, and to put
it out now.
At this juncture we need understanding no less than force, and wisdom no
less than clear goals. If a consensus can be reached, Iraq can approach
the international community and ask for a Security Council resolution
endorsing its decision to postpone the writing of its permanent
constitution. Even if that proves to be difficult or time-consuming, it
could be argued that a consensus within Iraq (e.g., a unanimous or near
unanimous resolution by the interim national assembly backed by the
interim government and some key political parties) is sufficient to
adapt the political process to current realities.
One other thing could also be very helpful: a delay in the election date
of just two or three weeks, primarily to give time for realistic
arrangements for out-of-country voting and to better secure and prepare
for the elections inside Iraq. Only one week has been set aside for
voter registration of Iraqis in 14 countries. Considering that all
eligible voters have to register in person, this is hardly enough time.
And it assumes that by that time, all these countries would have agreed
to allow elections to be conducted in their territories. At this point
only one of these countries has signed up.
The electoral process is subject to an impractically tight schedule.
While we must demonstrate commitment to the overall political process
and its timelines, we must not be enslaved by it.
The writer is Iraq's ambassador to the United Nations.
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