<needham@syix.com> wrote in message
news:szpkf.26232$dO2.16083@newssvr29.news.prodigy.net...

Predictably watch and count how many of them will be offended when
confronted with the truth. For many of this particular respondent fringe,
they'll delete the information they cannot handle, including the link

before

attacking the messenger....

LN

The daily amount of death and destruction in Iraq dispells and debunks any
"facts" you can contrive about progress. Had you,

or Bush or Cheney ever
experienced warfare first hand, you would know how silly you are appearing
tying to carry this same burned out torch. I do however understand your
motive, because you simply can't admit bush made a huge mistake in the
invasion. But, there is no excuse to continue the slaughter because bush
cant admit the invasion was a huge mistake. You, like bush would rather
see
the killing continue and the blood flow untill eternity before you own
sinful pride is damaged by admiting how wrong and needless the bloodshed
is.
That is your curse. And, you can mark these words Clay, you will live to
regtret your unblinking support of thise slaughter of innocent people for
riches and power.

http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm932.cfm

Dispelling the Myths About Iraq
by James Phillips
WebMemo #932

December 2, 2005 | |



MYTH: The U.S. is making no progress in defeating the insurgency in
Iraq.


QUOTE: "I'm absolutely convinced that we're making no progress at

all,

and I've been complaining for two years that there's an overly

optimistic-an

illusionary process going on here." -Rep. John Murtha on "Meet the
Press,"
November 20, 2005



REALITY: The U.S.-led coalition and the Iraqi government have made
substantial progress in eliminating insurgent strongholds in Fallujah,
Mosul, Najaf, Samara, and Tal Afar, and in many smaller towns in the

western

Anbar province along the Syrian border. Most of Iraq is secure from major
guerrilla attacks, particularly the predominantly Shiite south and the
predominantly Kurdish north, which actively support the Iraqi government.
Most insurgent attacks are mounted in the heavily Sunni Arab central and
western portions of Iraq, although small numbers of insurgents continue
to
launch terrorist attacks, including suicide bombings at soft targets,
throughout the country. Outside of Iraq's Sunni heartland, which
benefited
the most from Saddam Hussein's Sunni-dominated regime, the insurgents
lack
popular support. Their terrorist strategy has failed to intimidate Iraqi
Shiites, Kurds, Turcomans, and Assyrians, who altogether comprise more

than

80 percent of Iraq's population.



The Iraqi army and police forces are growing larger,
better-trained,
and more effective. The Iraqi Army and security forces grew from just 1
operational battalion in July 2004 to more than 120 today. Over 200,000
trained and equipped Iraqis are now playing an increasingly active role
in
rooting out insurgents. While only one battalion is rated at the U.S.
Army
category "Level One," about 40 are at "Level Two." Level 2 battalions are
capable of fighting "with some support"-usually just logistics and
air/artillery support-from American forces. These units patrol their own
areas of operations, relieving U.S. troops to perform other duties. The
cities of Najaf and Mosul are now patrolled exclusively by Iraqi security
forces, as are large portions of Baghdad.



There are now six police academies in Iraq and one in Jordan

training

3,500 Iraqi police every ten weeks. Today the vast majority of Iraqi

police

and army recruits are trained by Iraqis, not Americans, the result of
systematic efforts to "train the trainers." Since the January 30th
elections, no Iraqi police stations have been abandoned under attack, as
once happened frequently, because police have fiercely resisted attacks

even

when outnumbered and outgunned, confident that help would come from 13
provincial SWAT teams and coalition forces.



Unlike during several military offensives in 2004, Iraqi security
forces now are strong enough to garrison and control cleared areas,
making
the Bush Administration's recent adoption of a "clear, hold, and build"
security strategy possible. Iraqi forces were able to take a leading role

in

the successful September 2005 offensive at Tal Afar, which involved 11

Iraqi

and 5 Coalition battalions.



The increasing effectiveness of the Iraqi security forces has

inspired

optimism among the Iraqi people. This is reflected in the growing number

of

intelligence tips from Iraqi civilians. In March 2005, Iraqi and
coalition
forces received 483 intelligence tips from Iraqi citizens. This figure

rose

to 3,300 in August, and to more than 4,700 in September. According to a
survey from early November, 71 percent of respondents believed that the
Iraqi security forces are winning the war against the insurgents, while

only

9 percent believed they are losing. The data was gathered from Iraqi

callers

who were passing intelligence tips to the Iraqi National Tips Line, which
was created to provide Iraqis with a safe and anonymous means of passing

on

information about insurgent activity to their own government.



MYTH: The U.S. is making little or no political progress in Iraq.


QUOTE: "It is surely a joke of history that even as the White House
sells this weekend's constitutional referendum as yet another 'victory'

for

democracy in Iraq, we still don't know the whole story of how our own
democracy was hijacked on the way to war." -Frank Rich, "It's
Bush-Cheney,
not Rove-Libby," New York Times, October 16, 2005



REALITY: Iraq has made remarkably rapid progress in establishing
the
foundations of a democratic political system after more than three
decades
of dictatorship. Pessimistic critics of U.S. policy have been repeatedly
wrong in predicting that Iraqis would not be ready for the June 2004
transfer of sovereignty, the January 2005 transitional government

elections,

the writing and approval of a constitution by October 2005, and the

December

15 elections that will create a government that will lead Iraq for the

next

four years.



The insurgents' inability to block the January elections, combined
with a simmering resentment of their indiscriminate violence, has led
many
Sunni Arabs to reconsider their boycott of the political process. Even
the
Association of Muslim Scholars, an anti-American group, has called for

Sunni

Arabs to join the Iraqi security services. The insurgents' political base

is

weakening as it becomes clear that they are opposed not just to the

American

presence, but also to the elected government.



Despite terrorist attacks and threats of intimidation, 8.5 million
Iraqis voted in the January elections; almost 10 million voted in the
October referendum on the new constitution; and turnout for the December

15

elections is expected to be even greater. Many Sunni Arabs realize that

they

erred in boycotting the January elections and are likely to vote in far
larger numbers on December 15. More than 300 parties and coalitions have
registered for the coming elections. Iraq's political process is messy
and
slow, like in other newly democratic political systems, but a new class
of
political leadership is emerging that, over time, can build a national
consensus and drain away support for the insurgency, which is dominated
by
Islamic radicals and diehard loyalists to Saddam's hated regime.



Ironically, while Americans appear to be growing more pessimistic
about Iraq's future, Iraqis are growing more optimistic. According to a

poll

conducted by Iraqis affiliated with Iraqi Universities, two-thirds of

Iraqis

believe they are better off now than under Saddam's dictatorship, and 82
percent are confident that they will be better off a year from now than

they

are today. An October survey conducted by the International Republican
Institute found that 47 percent of Iraqis believed that their country is
headed in the right direction, while 37 percent believed that it was
going
in the wrong direction. And 56 percent believed the situation would get
better in six months, while only 16 percent believed the situation would

get

worse.



MYTH: The Bush Administration exaggerated the threat of Iraqi

weapons

of mass destruction (WMD) to justify the war.


QUOTE: "In his march to war, President Bush exaggerated the threat

to

the American people." -Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA), quoted in U.S. Fed
News, November 10, 2005



REALITY: The Bush Administration acted on the basis of intelligence
conclusions that were widely shared by previous administrations and

foreign

governments. President Bush was not the first American president to
emphasize the long-term threat posed by Iraq. President Bill Clinton
justified Operation Desert Fox, a three-day U.S. air offensive against

Iraq,

by invoking the threat posed by Iraqi WMD on December 16, 1998:



Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the
price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we
will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at
his neighbors; he will make war on his own people. And mark my words he

will

develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use
them.



Clinton's National Security Council advisor Sandy Berger warned of
Saddam's threat in 1998, "He will use those weapons of mass destruction
again, as he has ten times since 1983." Former Vice PresidentAl Gore said

in

2002, "We know that [Saddam] has stored secret supplies of biological and
chemical weapons throughout his country." CIA Director George Tenet, a
holdover from the Clinton Administration, declared that the presence of
Iraqi WMD was a "slam dunk." (For more on the political campaign to paint
intelligence mistakes as conscious lies, see Norman Podhoretz's excellent
article, "Who Is Lying About Iraq?," in the December issue of
Commentary.)



The intelligence services of Britain, France, Russia, Germany, and
Israel, among many others, held the same opinion. French Foreign Minister
Dominique de Villepin explained his concerns to the UN Security Council
on
February 5, 2003: "Right now, our attention has to be focused as a

priority

on the biological and chemical domains. It is there that our presumptions
about Iraq are the most significant. Regarding the chemical domain, we

have

evidence of its capacity to produce VX and Yperite. In the biological
domain, the evidence suggests the possible possession of significant

stocks

of anthrax and botulism toxin, and possibly a production capability." The
German Ambassador to the United States, Wolfgang Ischinger, said on NBC's
"Today" of February 26, 2003, "I think all of our governments believe
that
Iraq has produced weapons of mass destruction and that we have to assume
that they still have-that they continue to have weapons of mass
destruction."



The Bush Administration may have been wrong about Iraqi WMD, but so
were many other governments, few of which have been accused of lying.
Moreover, three independent commissions have found that there is no

evidence

that the Bush Administration exaggerated the intelligence about Iraqi
WMD.



In July 2004, the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee issued a
report with the following conclusions:


Conclusion 83. The Committee did not find any evidence that
Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure

analysts

to change their judgments related to Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
capabilities. .

Conclusion 84. The Committee found no evidence that the Vice
President's visits to the Central Intelligence Agency were attempts to
pressure analysts, were perceived as intended to pressure analysts by

those

who participated in the briefings on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction
programs, or did pressure analysts to change their assessments.[1]



In March 2005, the bipartisan Robb-Silverman commission reached the
same conclusion:


The Commission found no evidence of political pressure to influence
the Intelligence Community's pre-war assessments of Iraq's weapons

programs.

As we discuss in detail in the body of our report, analysts universally
asserted that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or
alter any of their analytical judgments. We conclude that it was the

paucity

of intelligence and poor analytical tradecraft, rather than political
pressure, that produced the inaccurate pre-war intelligence

assessments.[2]

The July 2004 Butler Report, issued by a special panel set up by
the
British Parliament, found that the famous "16 words" in President Bush's
January 28, 2003, State of the Union address were based on fact, contrary

to

the claims of former ambassador Joseph Wilson, who has alleged that
Bush's
assertion was a lie. Bush said, "The British Government has learned that
Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from
Africa." The Butler report called Bush's 16 words "well founded." The

report

also made clear that some forged Italian documents, exposed as fakes
after
the President spoke, were not the basis for the British intelligence that

he

cited or the CIA's conclusion that Iraq was seeking to obtain uranium.



MYTH: The war in Iraq has set back the war on terrorism.



QUOTE: "It's the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong
time." -Senator John Kerry (D-MA), September 6, 2004



REALITY: Some critics contend that Iraq is a detour in the war on
terrorism and a distraction from the hunt for Osama bin Laden, but this
criticism is greatly overstated. The war in Iraq is a different type of
struggle than the war against Al Qaeda. It has required different kinds
of
resources. Strategically, the U.S. is certainly capable of engaging in
multiple operations on a global level.



True, some intelligence assets were diverted from the search for
bin
Laden to Iraq. But bin Laden had already gone underground, hunkering down

on

the Afghan-Pakistan border eighteen months before the Iraq war. And there

is

no evidence that bin Laden would have been caught had there been no war
in
Iraq.



One often overlooked benefit of the war is that Iraq is no longer a
state sponsor of terrorism. This is important because the United States
cannot win the war on terrorism unless it eliminates or at least greatly
reduces state support for terrorism. Al Qaeda, often held up as the

premier

example of "stateless terrorism," actually was helped tremendously by the
support of states. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the radical

Islamic

regime in Sudan provided crucial shelter that allowed Al Qaeda to develop
into the global threat that it is today.



Now Osama bin Laden has lost a potential ally, if not an actual

ally,

in Saddam's regime, which had a long and bloody history of supporting
terrorists and many reported contacts with Al Qaeda. Moreover, free
Iraqis
increasingly are joining the fight against terrorism. Osama bin Laden's
associates in Iraq clearly are worried about the expansion of the Iraqi
security forces. A 2004 message from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, later was
named
Al Qaeda's leader in Iraq, lamented Iraq's progress: "Our enemy is
growing
stronger day after day and its intelligence information increases. By
God,
this is suffocation."



The war to liberate Iraq, coming after the successful war to

liberate

Afghanistan from the Taliban, has disabused terrorists of the notion that
the United States is a paper tiger. This perception was created by

American

withdrawals, following terrorist attacks, from peacekeeping operations in
Lebanon and Somalia that did not involve vital American national

interests.

Another gain from the war is the effect that it has had on other

rogue

regimes. Libya was induced to disarm because of the Iraq war. In fact,
Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi told Italian Prime Minister Silvio

Berlusconi

that he moved forward after seeing what happened to Saddam's regime.
Iran,
also pushed by international pressure, decided to open its nuclear
program
to more inspections. Syria, caught red-handed in the assassination of
Lebanon's former Prime Minister, now is isolated and on the defensive.



While it is true that some Islamic extremists are going to Iraq to
join the fighting, many of them would have ventured elsewhere to
slaughter
civilians had the Iraq war never occurred. As well, the indiscriminate
murder of innocent Iraqis by Zarqawi's terrorists has undermined Al

Qaeda's

appeal throughout the Muslim world. Zarqawi's November 9, 2005, bombing
of
three hotels in Jordan outraged Jordanians and other Muslims, even those

who

previously had been sympathetic to Al Qaeda. While the war in Iraq has
helped Al Qaeda's recruitment efforts, on balance it has helped the war
on
terrorism by depriving Osama bin Laden and other terrorists from
receiving
any future support from Saddam's regime.



Now that Iraq has become, by Al Qaeda's own reckoning, a crucial

front

in the global war against terrorism, the United States and its allies

cannot

allow Zarqawi's thugs to establish a permanent base in Iraq. From there,

Al

Qaeda would be in a better position to penetrate the heart of the Arab
world, threaten moderate Arab regimes, and disrupt Persian Gulf oil

exports,

than it enjoyed under the protection of Afghanistan's Taliban regime from
1996 to 2001. Finally, any "exit strategy" from Iraq that is perceived by
Muslims to be a victory for Al Qaeda would boost the group's ability to
recruit new members far beyond the current rate.



MYTH: The war in Iraq is another Vietnam.



QUOTE: "Iraq is George Bush's Vietnam." -Senator Edward Kennedy
(D-MA), April 5, 2004



REALITY: Iraq is Iraq. Most Iraqis share American goals of building

a

pluralistic, democratic, and prosperous Iraq. Even many Sunni Arabs who
boycotted the January elections due to terrorist intimidation now are
participating in politics. The Iraqi insurgents do not have the military
strength, popular support, political unity, ideological cohesiveness,

strong

foreign allies, charismatic leadership, or alternative political program
that the Vietnamese communists possessed. The insurgents are divided by
ideology, religious affiliation, and factional rivalries into separate
groups, including remnants of Saddam's Baathist regime, Sunni Islamic
radicals, Shiite Islamic radicals, tribal forces, and foreign Islamic
radicals, such as Abu Musab Zarqawi's Al Qaeda faction.



Tensions appear to be growing between some of the insurgent
groups-particularly animosity towards Zarqawi's group, which has killed
hundreds of civilians in indiscriminate suicide bombings and provoked a
backlash that other groups fear will undermine the insurgency. While many
insurgent factions have been hurt by the improved flow of intelligence to
government forces since the January elections, Zarqawi's group has

suffered

disproportionately heavy losses. More than twenty of his lieutenants have
been captured or killed since the beginning of the year, and Zarqawi

himself

reportedly was almost captured twice. His predominantly non-Iraqi forces

are

so concerned about being betrayed by Iraqi informants that they
reportedly
confiscate cell phones in the areas that they control.



Unlike the insurgency in Vietnam, which had a relatively broad base

of

support, the Iraqi insurgents are actively supported by only a minority
of
the Sunni Arab population, which makes up 20 percent of the Iraqi

population

at most. The Iraqi insurgents cannot defeat the Iraqi people, but can
only
play a spoiler role.



Vietnam veterans who have served in Iraq see little comparison

between

the two wars. A USA Today reporter who interviewed many Vietnam War

veterans

now serving in Iraq wrote, "They see a clearer mission than in Vietnam, a
more supportive public back home and an Iraqi population that seems to be
growing friendlier toward Americans."[3]



MYTH: The U.S. has little allied support in the war in Iraq.


QUOTE: "With the exception of British troops in Basra, we are
essentially going it alone across the rest of Iraq." -Senator Frank
Lautenberg (D-NJ), quoted in U.S. Fed News, October 25, 2005



REALITY: Those who argue that the U.S. fights "alone" in Iraq
ignore
the contributions of the Iraqis themselves, who have committed 212,000
soldiers and police to fighting the insurgency and have suffered the

largest

number of casualties. In addition, the U.S. has the strong cooperation of
the 26 other nations that have deployed troops in Iraq. In addition to
155,000 Americans, there are 8,000 Britons, 3,200 South Koreans, 3,000
Italians, 1,400 Poles, 900 Ukrainians, 450 Australians, 400 Bulgarians,

and

smaller contingents from Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia,

Japan,

Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Norway,
Romania, and Slovakia.


MYTH: Iraqi women were better off under Saddam's regime than under

the

new constitution.


QUOTE: "It looks like today-and this could change-as of today, it
looks like women will be worse off in Iraq than they were when Saddam
Hussein was president of Iraq." -Howard Dean, CBS "Face The Nation,"

August

14, 2005



REALITY: Iraq's new constitution mandates that women hold

one-quarter

of the seats in Iraq's parliament and protects them against gender
discrimination, unlike Saddam's capricious legal system. Iraqi women now
enjoy more political power than they did under Saddam's dictatorship,

which

was run exclusively by men.



Saddam's 1980 invasion of Iraq and 1990 invasion of Kuwait resulted

in

the deaths of so many men that women were brought into Iraq's labor force

to

replace them. But this economic advancement came at a terrible price in
repression. Entire Iraqi families were jailed as collective punishment
for
alleged crimes against the state. Saddam's goons tortured, killed, and

raped

women to punish their husbands and male relatives for political

opposition.

Those who argue that Iraqi women were better off under Saddam ignore the
terrible crimes against women that were carried out by his regime.



MYTH: Iraq's economy is getting worse.


QUOTE: "Basic services such as electricity have never been worse
and
the economy of Arab Iraq is in ruins." -Andrew Gilligan, The Evening
Standard (London), February 14 2005



REALITY: Reconstruction and economic progress have come relatively
quickly, compared to the reconstruction efforts in postwar Germany and
Japan, and this is despite continued insurgent attacks on Iraq's
infrastructure and economic targets. Unemployment remains high, estimated

by

the government at 28 percent. But U.S. policy did not create that
unemployment.



Iraq's economy is beginning to thrive. Real GDP is expected to grow
3.7 percent in 2005 and 16 percent in 2006. Iraqi per-capita income has
doubled since 2003, according to the World Bank. Private investment,
bolstered with capital remitted from family members abroad, has fueled

rapid

growth in the private sector. More than 30,000 new businesses have
registered with the authorities since the war, and thousands of

unregistered

businesses are believed to have been established.



Iraq's infrastructure, neglected by Saddam's regime for many years

and

damaged in three wars triggered by Saddam, has been strained to its
capacity. But the situation is gradually improving. Since the end of
major
combat operations, over 2,000 megawatts of power have been added to the
Iraqi power grid, enough for 5.4 million homes. While some Baghdad

residents

had more electrical power under Saddam's regime-because it diverted power
from other parts of Iraq-many Iraqis now have much greater access to
electricity than before the war.