Politics > Politics-USA > My Article on US Defence Equipment Sales to India, published in RealPolitik Magazine, October 2005 issue
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My Article on US Defence Equipment Sales to India, published in RealPolitik Magazine, October 2005 issue |
My Article on US Defence Equipment Sales to India, published in
RealPolitik Magazine, October 2005 issue
Copyright, Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, 2005
Reproduction and forwarding strictly prohibited under any circumstances
International publishing rights in all media with RealPolitik magazine
International copyrights in all media vest with Ravi Visvesvaraya
Prasad, 2005
Article on US Defence Equipment Sales to India
By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
1425 words
India's Defence Ministry stoutly resisted the hard sales pitch of Lt
Gen
Jeffrey B Kohler, Director of USA's Defense Security Cooperation
Agency,
for purchase of F-18 and F-16 aircraft, delivered during Kohler's
visit
to Delhi in the second week of September 2005. During his previous
visit, Kohler had offered to place their sales on a fast-track
government-to-government channel, rather than the usual - and slower
-
negotiations between the manufacturers (Lockheed Martin and Boeing) and
the Indian government.
Most Indian defence experts are of the view that the fourth generation
Boeing F-18 Hornets and Lockheed Martin F-16 Falcons are not as capable
as the Swedish SAAB JAS-39C Gripen, the Russian RSK MiG-29M/M2, and the
French Dassault Mirage 2000-5 Mk2, all of which are of generation 4.5.
India is also apprehensive about transfer of technologies, training of
personnel, supplies of spare parts, and logistical support from the US.
For India to exert its hegemony over South Asia and the Indian Ocean,
it
would require at least sixty squadrons of aircraft performing
multi-role
combat, deep penetration strike, air superiority, air defence,
tactical
combat, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare tasks.
However, India can afford only forty squadrons at present, which is the
current authorized strength of the Indian Air Force. But the IAF's
fleet
strength is currently down to about thirty-odd squadrons, due to its
MiG-21s and MiG-23s having reached the end of their useful lives. Types
66, 77 and 96 should have been phased out a decade ago.
Further, the IAF's current fleet suffers from qualitative imbalances.
Its Jaguars are specialized for deep penetration strikes and cannot
easily protect themselves from enemy fighter aircraft - they need to
be
escorted by MiG-29 fighters. And the MiG-29s are specialized for air
superiority and air defence roles, and are not geared for strike roles.
Moreover, the indigenously designed Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas, is
years behind schedule, mainly due to US sanctions for its GE 404
engines,
compounded by further delays on the part of Gas Turbine Research
Establishment in designing its indigenous engine, Kaveri. It was only
in
February 2005 that the IAF placed orders for the manufacture of twenty
Tejas LCAs, which would take at least five years to be delivered.
While the 140 Sukhoi Su-30MKIs to be built by Hindustan Aeronautics
Ltd.
over the next dozen years will partially fill the deficiencies in air
dominance and long-range strike requirements, the shortages in
multi-role
and combat-role requirements need to be filled urgently.
In 2002, the IAF had asked for 200 medium-range lightweight multi-role
/
tactical 'swing-role' fighters to be immediately inducted, in
order to
restore the power balance which prevailed in South Asia in the 1970s.
But the government cut the IAF's request down to 126, on financial
considerations, and sent Requests for Information (RFI) to four
manufacturers: Dassault of France for the Mirage 2000-5 Mk2; RSK MiG of
Russia for the MiG-29M/M2; SAAB of Sweden for the JAS-39C Gripen; and
Lockheed Martin of USA for the F-16 Fighting Falcon.
At this stage, the front-runners for the contract appear to be Mirage
and MiG. First, Dassault and MiG have historically been reliable
suppliers in terms of transfers of technology, licensed production in
India, personnel training, supplies of spare parts, and maintenance and
upgradation.
Second, IAF's pilots and technicians are already familiar with
earlier
aircraft from Dassault and MiG, and would need minimal retraining.
Third,
infrastructural and logistical support for maintenance and spares
would
also be much easier for these, as compared to the unfamiliar Gripen
and
F-16s and F-18s.
The JAS 39 Gripen, which can be used for interception, ground-attack,
and reconnaissance, was jointly developed by Saab Military Aircraft,
Ericsson Microwave Systems, Volvo Aero Corporation and Celsius
Aerotech,
with the specific intention of outdoing the F-16s and F-18s.
Currently,
the Gripens used by the Swedish Air Force are armed with AIM-120
AMRAAM,
AIM-9 Sidewinder, Saab Dynamics RBS 15 for ship targets, and the
Maverick ground attack missiles. The Czech government recently
cancelled
an order to purchase twenty-four
JAS-39 Gripens, and so these may be available relatively cheaply for
India.
The only advantage of the F-16 compared to Sukhoi Su-30MKI, MiG-29M/M2,
and Mirage 2000-5 Mk2 is its superior cockpit ergonomics and
comfortable
pilot seat. The F-16 provides its pilots a much better field of view
compared to these three. India should carefully evaluate the
performance
of the F-16s during the COPE exercises in November 2005 over
Kalaikunda
air-base in West Bengal.
The choice between Mirage and MiG would depend on the fundamental
decision of whether the IAF should go in for single-engined or
twin-engined
aircraft for the future. The Mirage has an airframe life of 7500 hours
versus 6000 hours for the MiG-29M/M2. The modular construction of the
Mirage's Snecma M53 engines make them much easier to maintain than
the
RD-33 engines of the MiGs. Further, the Mirage 2000-5 can carry 6,300
kg
of ordnance compared to 5,500 kg for the MiG-29M/M2.
However, the fuel consumption of the MiG-29 is much less than that of
the Mirage. Since the Indian Navy is also purchasing MiG-29Ks for
operation from the aircraft carrier "Admiral Gorshkov", purchasing
the
closely similar MiG-29M/M2 could potentially lower procurement,
infrastructural and logistical, and operations and maintenance costs
for
integrated services command.
Knowing it lagged behind Dassault and MiG, Lockheed Martin offered:
"If
India's requirements are beyond any existing fighters, we are
prepared
to make upgraded F-16s to India's specifications with complete
transfer
of technology. We are ready to develop a new Block 70 for the IAF."
Boeing then offered India its latest F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, which
have
not been sold to any other country, even to NATO allies.
A faction in the IAF is in favour of twin-engined aircraft, in view of
the large number of crashes due to bird hits, although the capital
costs
as well as operations and maintenance costs of twin-engined aircraft
are far higher. These officers feel that even generation 4.5 fighters,
such as the Mirage 2000H and the Gripen, would not be able to come up
to
the IAF's increasingly complex battle requirements in the future.
They
feel that the choice should be from twin-engined fifth generation
aircraft such as Dassault's Rafale, RSK MiG's MiG-29 and the
Eurofighter
Typhoon.
No airforce has much operational experience with Eurofighters or
Rafales,
since these have just begun to be manufactured. Greece recently
cancelled an order for sixty Eurofighters, and so these should be
available comparatively cheaply. But the MiG-29 has the advanced
Phazotron-NIIR's Kopyo radar.
While USA would probably not win the IAF contract, there is a
possibility of US aircraft manufacturers bagging orders from the Indian
Navy.
For the last four years, India has been negotiating the purchase of ten
Lockheed Martin P-3C Orion long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft
through USA's Foreign Military Sales programme. In February 2005,
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL) signed a Technical Assistance
Agreement
with Lockheed Martin.
During his September 2005 visit, Kohler offered to modernise eight old
P-3C
Orions and supply these to India. But the Pentagon is phasing out the
Orions in favour of the Boeing 737 P-8A multi-mission maritime
aircraft.
If USA is serious about a strategic partnership with India, then it
should offer the P-8A for local manufacture under license.
Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arun Prakash stated that while India was
examining Kohler's offer on the used Orions, it had also received an
offer from Russia for supply of long-range maritime reconnaissance
aircraft.
The Indian Navy is also considering Northrop Grumman's E-2C HawkEye
2000
airborne early-warning and battle-management / command-and-control
system for operation from the aircraft carrier "Vikramaditya (Admiral
Gorshkov)".
But integrating a US AEW&C aircraft with a Russian aircraft carrier
with
Indian procedures would be a formidable task. Moreover, experts on
information and electronic warfare have cautioned that the E-2C HawkEye
2000's software could very well contain Trojan Horses and backdoors
to
either feed sensitive information back to USA or to immobilize the
systems, if needed.
During his September 2005 visit, Kohler also pitched hard for selling
India the US Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-3 missile defence
system.
But Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee repeatedly emphasized that India
was keen on building its own missile defence system and had no plans at
all to acquire the Patriot. However, Mukherjee said that India would
welcome transfer of technologies from the US for developing its
indigenous missile defence system. Since 2003, India has repeatedly
turned down the Pentagon's offer to help it formulate a missile
defence
doctrine based on NATO concepts.
India will have to carefully consider the two factors of possible
future
sanctions, and system integration and interoperability when making
defence purchases from USA.
1425 words
For RealPolitik, Attn: Mr Shahid Faridi, Editor & Publisher
By Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
Published in October 2005 issue of RealPolitik magazine
Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad
19 Maitri Apts
A - 3, Paschim Vihar
New Delhi 110 063 India
rp@k.st
Tel: {91}(0) 98 117 56789, 92 121 13579, 987 12 45678
Copyright, Ravi Visvesvaraya Prasad, 2005
Reproduction and forwarding strictly prohibited under any circumstances
International publishing rights in all media with RealPolitik magazine
International copyrights in all media vest with Ravi Visvesvaraya
Prasad, 2005
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