A Veteran wrote:

Is the US About to Be Driven Out of Iraq?

A recent article by Asia Times reporter Pepe Escobar, one of the most
informed and astute observers of Iraq events, analyzes some potentially
momentous developments inside Iraq in the last few weeks, developments
that could actually result in making the American occupation militarily
and politically untenable.

Basically Escobar says recent meetings among and between Shia and Sunni
groups have initiated a set of alliances that could result in a united
resistance that will drastically reduce sectarian fighting (by
suppressing the Sunni terrorist and the Shia death squads) and move in
a coordinated way (using armed attacks and political maneuvering)
toward expelling the U.S..

Here are the key elements:

First, there is a new nationalist bloc forming from those who have
withdrawn from or always opposed the American backed government. It
includes leaders of the Sunni resistance (including the groups that are
supposed to have made an alliance with the US), Sunni parliamentary
leaders (including the vice president of Iraq), Muqtada al Sadr and his
Mahdi Army (the most powerful Shia faction which has always opposed the
U.S. presence) and the Fadhila (the most powerful Shia group in Basra,
which recently withdrew from the government). According to Escobar,
Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the most powerful Shia cleric, has
blessed the new group.

Second, the key goals in the newly developed pact are: united efforts to
expel the U.S. from Iraq, including dismantling the bases--with explicit
endorsement of armed resistance if the U.S. does not agree to leave; an
arms length relationship with Iran; no division of the country into
autonomous regions; and no tolerance of jihadist groups that attack
Iraqi civilians or death squads, or any armed forces attacking Iraqi
civilians.

Third, the various Sunni resistance groups are now negotiating alliances
among themselves (with a tentative agreement currently in place among
all but one of the most important groups). Included in this new unity
is a commitment to demobilize the jihadists who set car bombs in Shia
areas (forcefully if necessary) and direct all armed struggle toward
expelling the Americans, unless the U.S. agrees to leave.

Fourth, the SIIC, the strongest faction within the Maliki government
(though Maliki himself is from another group, the Da'wa), appears to be
responding to the pressure created by this new movement. Until now,
despite being elected on a platform calling for U.S. withdrawal, SIIC
had always said that U.S. troops were absolutely crucial to government
survival and had said nothing against the permanent U.S. bases. Then,
last week, the temporary leader of SIIC, Ammar al Hakim, called for U.S.
withdrawal and for dismantling the bases, a position that is so alarming
to the U.S. occupation that there has been a virtual news blackout about
this dramatic switch of position. Whether this is an actual change of
policy by the SIIC, or simply a rhetorical response to these latest
political developments, remains to be seen.

Finally, it appears that recent statements by U.S. occupation
authorities calling for "soft partition" of Iraq into three mostly
autonomous regions may be a response to this new unity between Shia and
Sunni. Realizing that the U.S. probably cannot sustain its presence if
this new alliance is consolidated and strengthened, they are looking
for a "divide and conquer" strategy that would allow the U.S. to
control the three regions separately.

Escobar's article pieces together a bunch of separate developments into
a coherent analysis, but it remains speculative. His analysis does,
however, make sense of a lot of otherwise confusing developments. We
need to see if the trends he identifies are consolidated, or if they
are reversed by the strong centripetal forces within Iraq. If the
trends do continue, this will mean more resistance to the U.S.
presence, particularly in the Shia areas of Baghdad and the Iraqi
south; and more focused attacks by Sunni insurgents on American forces
and bases in and around Baghdad. With the U.S. already military in a
weakened state, such an escalation could be overwhelming. It would mean
that another strategy would have to be developed, and perhaps this
might finally force the Bush Administration to consider withdrawal.

I think this is a very good framework to use in making sense of the news
in the next few weeks.

One can only hope. It's about time the Iraqis woke up and realized that
most of the sectarian violence was instigated by the US. It started with
the resistance attacking collaborators, who just happened to be mostly
Kurds and Shia, whom the US had put in charge. Of course, this was
interpreted by many Shia to be sectarian in nature.

As the insurgency picked up steam, in early 2005 we heard rumblings of
"the El Salvador option" coming from the US government. Miraculously, a
couple months later we started hearing of groups of young Sunni men
being found with bullets in the backs of their heads. We'll probably
never know for sure who bombed the Golden Dome the following year, but
we do know it was a very professional job, that no Iraqi benefited from
the crime, and that most of their leaders condemned the bombing.
http://www.rense.com/general69/whwow.htm

It fits the classic divide and rule strategy.