New look at Bush's `16 words'
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist | July 11, 2004

But if intelligence mistakes are inevitable, is it better to worry too
much about potential threats or to worry too little? Worrying too much
-- if that's what happened -- resulted in the toppling of one of the
planet's most murderous tyrants. Worrying too little resulted in 9/11.

Jeff Jacoby's e-mail address is jacoby@globe.com.

New look at Bush's `16 words'
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist | July 11, 2004

LAST YEAR at this time, the media were in full scandal mode over 16
words that President Bush had spoken nearly six months earlier.

The FT article has been covered to death.

For some reason your article doesn't discuss the clumsy forgeries, or
the evidence.

Who did the forgeries? The suggestion is now that at least some of them
were created by those involved in the scam to get the uranium, the
Iraqis.

Moreover, what would Saddam do with this ore?

He would need to enrich it. This would require something like the
centrifuges that Pakistan (and now North Korea) have been selling the
tech to all over the world.

A uranium bomb is significantly more
difficult for the world community to police and prevent from
proliferating.

New look at Bush's `16 words'
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist | July 11, 2004

LAST YEAR at this time, the media were in full scandal mode over 16
words that President Bush had spoken nearly six months earlier.

"The British government has learned," Bush had said in his State of
the Union address in January, "that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

A furor erupted over that statement when a CIA consultant and
ex-diplomat named Joseph Wilson, who had gone to Niger in 2002 to look
into the matter, publicly claimed that the charge wasn't true. The
White House agreed that the line shouldn't have been in Bush's speech,
but far from quelling the uproar, that admission only intensified it.

Within days, Howard Dean was making comparisons to Watergate, a group
of left-leaning former intelligence officers were calling for the
resignation of Vice President ***** Cheney (who had taken a close
interest in the uranium evidence), and the Bush-is-a-liar shrieking
reached fever pitch. The Democratic National Committee cut an ad
accusing Bush of deliberately lying to the American people. And the
press embarked on a classic feeding frenzy, turning loose a tidal wave
of coverage on what had been, by any sober estimate, only a very small
piece of the administration's case against Saddam.

Upshot: Bush's credibility took a blow, support for the war in Iraq
was undermined, and the idea that Saddam's regime had tried to acquire
refined uranium in Africa for use in nuclear weapons was dismissed as
false.

But what if it was true?

Late last month, the Financial Times reported that, according to
European intelligence agencies, Iraq was one of five countries
negotiating with smugglers in Niger for the illegal purchase of
uranium yellowcake. "These claims support the assertion made in the
British government dossier . . . that Iraq sought to buy uranium from
an African country," the Financial Times reported in a front-page
story on June 27. For some reason, though, the US media showed
virtually no interest in that revelation. (One exception: columnist
William Safire in The New York Times.)

A few days ago, the Financial Times was back with more news: An
independent British commission investigating the government's use of
intelligence during the runup to the war in Iraq, the paper reported
on Wednesday, "is expected to conclude that Britain's spies were
correct to say that Saddam Hussein's regime sought to buy uranium from
Niger."

But this, too, has been largely ignored by the American press.
Curious, no? Journalists couldn't get enough of this topic when the
story line was that Bush and the British had lied. Shouldn't they find
it just as riveting when facts point in the other direction?

Here's another fact, this one from a recent book by a one-time US
ambassador: In 1999, Saddam's information minister, Mohammed Saeed
al-Sahhaf approached an official of Niger to talk about expanding
trade, an approach the official interpreted as a possible attempt to
buy uranium. The author of the book? None other than Joseph Wilson --
the man who accused the Bush administration last year of making up an
Iraqi interest in uranium from Africa. Now, it seems, he comes close
to confirming that interest. Yet except for a single story in The
Washington Post, the media have had virtually nothing to say about
Wilson's new account. To be sure, none of this proves that Saddam's
agents sought uranium for use in nuclear weapons. What it proves is
that reasonable people had good reason to believe that that's what
Saddam's agents were doing. Just as reasonable people had good reason
to believe that Iraq was armed with biological or chemical weapons.
Remember: That was the deeply held consensus of the US intelligence
community. It was affirmed by Republicans and Democrats, by Americans
and Europeans, by the Bush administration and the Clinton
administration, and by a unanimous UN Security Council.

Only in the wake of Iraq's liberation has it become fashionable to
assert not just that there were no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,
but that only a liar would have said there were. And only now have the
media, in their eagerness to discredit Bush, been reluctant to cover
stories that prove otherwise.

Intelligence failures are not the same thing as lies. And intelligence
failures about Iraqi WMD did not begin with the Bush administration.
It is worth recalling that the CIA was way off the mark in its
estimates of Saddam's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
programs before the first Iraq war, too. It turned out then that
Saddam was a much more dangerous WMD menace than the experts had
realized. This time around, the experts may have overestimated the
threat.

But if intelligence mistakes are inevitable, is it better to worry too
much about potential threats or to worry too little? Worrying too much
-- if that's what happened -- resulted in the toppling of one of the
planet's most murderous tyrants. Worrying too little resulted in 9/11.

Jeff Jacoby's e-mail address is jacoby@globe.com.

----------------------------------------------------------------------
"Only one ambition is worthy of Islam, to save the world from the
curse of democracy: to teach men that they cannot rule themselves
on the basis of man-made laws. Mankind has strayed from the path of
God, we must return to that path or face certain annihilation."
-- Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Jubair

"Long term commitment in relationships is only necessary because it takes
so damn long to raise children. Marriage may well be some kind of trick
to keep the males around beyond sexual satiation." -- Captain Compassion

"Progress is the increasing control of the environment by life.
--Will Durant

Joseph R. Darancette
res0mp8t@NOSPAMverizon.net

New look at Bush's `16 words'
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist | July 11, 2004

LAST YEAR at this time, the media were in full scandal mode over 16
words that President Bush had spoken nearly six months earlier.

"The British government has learned," Bush had said in his State of
the Union address in January, "that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

A furor erupted over that statement when a CIA consultant and
ex-diplomat named Joseph Wilson, who had gone to Niger in 2002 to look
into the matter, publicly claimed that the charge wasn't true. The
White House agreed that the line shouldn't have been in Bush's speech,
but far from quelling the uproar, that admission only intensified it.

Within days, Howard Dean was making comparisons to Watergate, a group
of left-leaning former intelligence officers were calling for the
resignation of Vice President ***** Cheney (who had taken a close
interest in the uranium evidence), and the Bush-is-a-liar shrieking
reached fever pitch. The Democratic National Committee cut an ad
accusing Bush of deliberately lying to the American people. And the
press embarked on a classic feeding frenzy, turning loose a tidal wave
of coverage on what had been, by any sober estimate, only a very small
piece of the administration's case against Saddam.

Upshot: Bush's credibility took a blow, support for the war in Iraq
was undermined, and the idea that Saddam's regime had tried to acquire
refined uranium in Africa for use in nuclear weapons was dismissed as
false.

But what if it was true?

Late last month, the Financial Times reported that, according to
European intelligence agencies, Iraq was one of five countries
negotiating with smugglers in Niger for the illegal purchase of
uranium yellowcake. "These claims support the assertion made in the
British government dossier . . . that Iraq sought to buy uranium from
an African country," the Financial Times reported in a front-page
story on June 27. For some reason, though, the US media showed
virtually no interest in that revelation. (One exception: columnist
William Safire in The New York Times.)

A few days ago, the Financial Times was back with more news: An
independent British commission investigating the government's use of
intelligence during the runup to the war in Iraq, the paper reported
on Wednesday, "is expected to conclude that Britain's spies were
correct to say that Saddam Hussein's regime sought to buy uranium from
Niger."

But this, too, has been largely ignored by the American press.
Curious, no? Journalists couldn't get enough of this topic when the
story line was that Bush and the British had lied. Shouldn't they find
it just as riveting when facts point in the other direction?

Here's another fact, this one from a recent book by a one-time US
ambassador: In 1999, Saddam's information minister, Mohammed Saeed
al-Sahhaf approached an official of Niger to talk about expanding
trade, an approach the official interpreted as a possible attempt to
buy uranium. The author of the book? None other than Joseph Wilson --
the man who accused the Bush administration last year of making up an
Iraqi interest in uranium from Africa. Now, it seems, he comes close
to confirming that interest. Yet except for a single story in The
Washington Post, the media have had virtually nothing to say about
Wilson's new account. To be sure, none of this proves that Saddam's
agents sought uranium for use in nuclear weapons. What it proves is
that reasonable people had good reason to believe that that's what
Saddam's agents were doing. Just as reasonable people had good reason
to believe that Iraq was armed with biological or chemical weapons.
Remember: That was the deeply held consensus of the US intelligence
community. It was affirmed by Republicans and Democrats, by Americans
and Europeans, by the Bush administration and the Clinton
administration, and by a unanimous UN Security Council.

Only in the wake of Iraq's liberation has it become fashionable to
assert not just that there were no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,
but that only a liar would have said there were. And only now have the
media, in their eagerness to discredit Bush, been reluctant to cover
stories that prove otherwise.

Intelligence failures are not the same thing as lies. And intelligence
failures about Iraqi WMD did not begin with the Bush administration.

It is worth recalling that the CIA was way off the mark in its
estimates of Saddam's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
programs before the first Iraq war, too. It turned out then that
Saddam was a much more dangerous WMD menace than the experts had
realized. This time around, the experts may have overestimated the
threat.

But if intelligence mistakes are inevitable, is it better to worry too
much about potential threats or to worry too little? Worrying too much
-- if that's what happened -- resulted in the toppling of one of the
planet's most murderous tyrants. Worrying too little resulted in 9/11.

New look at Bush's `16 words'
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist | July 11, 2004

LAST YEAR at this time, the media were in full scandal mode over 16
words that President Bush had spoken nearly six months earlier.

New look at Bush's `16 words'
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist | July 11, 2004

LAST YEAR at this time, the media were in full scandal mode over 16
words that President Bush had spoken nearly six months earlier.

"The British government has learned," Bush had said in his State of
the Union address in January, "that Saddam Hussein recently sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

A furor erupted over that statement when a CIA consultant and
ex-diplomat named Joseph Wilson, who had gone to Niger in 2002 to look
into the matter, publicly claimed that the charge wasn't true. The
White House agreed that the line shouldn't have been in Bush's speech,
but far from quelling the uproar, that admission only intensified it.

Within days, Howard Dean was making comparisons to Watergate, a group
of left-leaning former intelligence officers were calling for the
resignation of Vice President ***** Cheney (who had taken a close
interest in the uranium evidence), and the Bush-is-a-liar shrieking
reached fever pitch. The Democratic National Committee cut an ad
accusing Bush of deliberately lying to the American people. And the
press embarked on a classic feeding frenzy, turning loose a tidal wave
of coverage on what had been, by any sober estimate, only a very small
piece of the administration's case against Saddam.

Upshot: Bush's credibility took a blow, support for the war in Iraq
was undermined, and the idea that Saddam's regime had tried to acquire
refined uranium in Africa for use in nuclear weapons was dismissed as
false.

But what if it was true?

Late last month, the Financial Times reported that, according to
European intelligence agencies, Iraq was one of five countries
negotiating with smugglers in Niger for the illegal purchase of
uranium yellowcake. "These claims support the assertion made in the
British government dossier . . . that Iraq sought to buy uranium from
an African country," the Financial Times reported in a front-page
story on June 27. For some reason, though, the US media showed
virtually no interest in that revelation. (One exception: columnist
William Safire in The New York Times.)

A few days ago, the Financial Times was back with more news: An
independent British commission investigating the government's use of
intelligence during the runup to the war in Iraq, the paper reported
on Wednesday, "is expected to conclude that Britain's spies were
correct to say that Saddam Hussein's regime sought to buy uranium from
Niger."

But this, too, has been largely ignored by the American press.
Curious, no? Journalists couldn't get enough of this topic when the
story line was that Bush and the British had lied. Shouldn't they find
it just as riveting when facts point in the other direction?

Here's another fact, this one from a recent book by a one-time US
ambassador: In 1999, Saddam's information minister, Mohammed Saeed
al-Sahhaf approached an official of Niger to talk about expanding
trade, an approach the official interpreted as a possible attempt to
buy uranium. The author of the book? None other than Joseph Wilson --
the man who accused the Bush administration last year of making up an
Iraqi interest in uranium from Africa. Now, it seems, he comes close
to confirming that interest. Yet except for a single story in The
Washington Post, the media have had virtually nothing to say about
Wilson's new account. To be sure, none of this proves that Saddam's
agents sought uranium for use in nuclear weapons. What it proves is
that reasonable people had good reason to believe that that's what
Saddam's agents were doing. Just as reasonable people had good reason
to believe that Iraq was armed with biological or chemical weapons.
Remember: That was the deeply held consensus of the US intelligence
community. It was affirmed by Republicans and Democrats, by Americans
and Europeans, by the Bush administration and the Clinton
administration, and by a unanimous UN Security Council.

Only in the wake of Iraq's liberation has it become fashionable to
assert not just that there were no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,
but that only a liar would have said there were. And only now have the
media, in their eagerness to discredit Bush, been reluctant to cover
stories that prove otherwise.

Intelligence failures are not the same thing as lies. And intelligence
failures about Iraqi WMD did not begin with the Bush administration.
It is worth recalling that the CIA was way off the mark in its
estimates of Saddam's chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons
programs before the first Iraq war, too. It turned out then that
Saddam was a much more dangerous WMD menace than the experts had
realized. This time around, the experts may have overestimated the
threat.

But if intelligence mistakes are inevitable, is it better to worry too
much about potential threats or to worry too little? Worrying too much
-- if that's what happened -- resulted in the toppling of one of the
planet's most murderous tyrants. Worrying too little resulted in 9/11.

Jeff Jacoby's e-mail address is jacoby@globe.com.


----------------------------------------------------------------------
"Only one ambition is worthy of Islam, to save the world from the
curse of democracy: to teach men that they cannot rule themselves
on the basis of man-made laws. Mankind has strayed from the path of
God, we must return to that path or face certain annihilation."
-- Sheikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim al-Jubair

"Long term commitment in relationships is only necessary because it takes
so damn long to raise children. Marriage may well be some kind of trick
to keep the males around beyond sexual satiation." -- Captain Compassion

"Progress is the increasing control of the environment by life.
--Will Durant

Joseph R. Darancette
res0mp8t@NOSPAMverizon.net