Appendix P
Miscellaneous Letters
Reader's Notes:
Registered U.S. Mail #R 756 488 761
Return Receipt Requested
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
zip code exempt (DMM 122.32)
December 29, 1993
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice
Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice
Hon. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice
Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice
Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice
Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice
Hon. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, Northeast
Washington, District of Columbia
Subject: NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST
Dear Honorable Justices:
Notice is hereby formally served upon you, both individually and
severally, that conclusive evidence now available to me proves that the
so-called 14th amendment to the Constitution for the United States of
America was never properly approved and adopted. I am under a legal and
moral obligation to intervene on behalf of the many millions of Americans
whose status has been unlawfully subsumed under federal jurisdiction,
because this was done without either their knowledge or their informed
consent.
As required by Title 28, United States Code, Section 453 (Oaths of
justices and judges), you have solemnly sworn (or affirmed) that you would
administer justice without respect to persons, and faithfully and
impartially discharge and perform all duties incumbent upon you as Justices
of the U. S. Supreme Court under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, so help you God (see revision at 104 Stat. 5124).
Please take formal notice that it is quite simply impossible for you,
or for any other public officials anywhere in America, to perform your
solemn duties under this oath (or affirmation), if the weight of material
evidence should prove that the exact provisions of that Constitution are
still in doubt. Your oath (or affirmation) is a binding contract which I
hereby seek to enforce, according to the dictates of my conscience, my
Creator, and the supreme Law of the Land, as lawfully amended.
Pursuant to the Guarantee Clause (4:4) and to the opinion of the
California Court of Appeal in Steiner v. Darby et al., 88 Cal.App.2d 481,
199 P.2d 429 (1948: the year of my birth as a Sovereign natural born Free
Citizen of one of the United States), it is not only my Right, but also my
Duty, to inform you that the weight of material and historical evidence
proves that the so-called 14th amendment is not now, nor has it ever been, a
lawful provision in the Constitution for the United States of America. This
proposed amendment failed to be ratified in accordance with the requirements
of Article 5 of the Constitution. At the very least, the evidence which I
now lay before you consists of the following public records and other
documents:
State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936, 941 (1975)
Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968)
28 Tulane Law Review 22
11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484
House Congressional Record, June 13, 1967, p. 15641 et seq.
Because the available evidence indicates to me that all Federal and
State judicial officers, without exception, have taken solemn oaths (or
affirmations) which disagree with the Constitution for the United States of
America as lawfully amended, I am now left entirely without any unbiased
judicial forum in which to seek review and declaratory relief in the matter
of the following federal questions:
(1) The constitutional qualifications for election to the offices of
President, Senator, and Representative retain the meaning they had when the
Constitution was first drafted (see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393-633
(1856)).
(2) There is still no constitutional authority for the status of a
"citizen of the United States", unlike the proper status of a "Citizen of
one of the States United" (see 1:2:2, 1:3:3, 2:1:5, and People v. De La
Guerra, 40 Cal. 311 (1870): the term "United States" here means "States
united"; see also Hooven & Allison v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945)).
(3) There is still no constitutional provision prohibiting anyone from
questioning the validity of the public debt, and freedom of speech is still
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
(4) All provisions in Federal law are necessarily null and void, to the
extent that they make reference, either implicitly or explicitly, to any
section(s) of the failed 14th amendment.
(5) All provisions in State constitutions and statutes are likewise null
and void, to the extent that they make reference to any section(s) of the
failed 14th amendment (e.g. see the attached letter to the California State
Lands Commission, to which all recipients fell silent).
DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST
Therefore, by virtue of the superior authority which is vested in me
by my Creator, as a direct consequence of my natural birth as a qualified
member of the Sovereign People, "by whom and for whom all government exists
and acts" (see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)), and on behalf
of each and every member of the Sovereignty known and lawfully identified as
"We, the People of the United States" of America (see Preamble), I hereby
demand and do hereby order you to Cease and Desist from any and all of the
following official acts on your part:
(1) any and all official oaths or affirmations which are predicated in any
way on the lawful ratification of the so-called 14th amendment;
(2) any and all judicial decisions or determinations which are predicated
in any way on the lawful ratification of the so-called 14th amendment,
including but not limited to:
(a) decisions or determinations which construe in any way the rights,
responsibilities, privileges, immunities, and liabilities of "citizens of
the United States" as that term is used in any and all Acts of Congress and
administrative rules and regulations promulgated by any employees of the
Executive Branch of the Federal government (e.g. 26 C.F.R. 1.1-1(c));
(b) decisions or determinations which attempt in any way to enforce the
administration of the individual income tax provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code upon the People of the 50 Union States, or upon their private
property (see Treasury Decision 2313 and Brushaber's pleadings);
(c) decisions or determinations which uphold in any way the validity of
the public debt of the Federal and State governments, acting in whatever
capacity and through whatever agency, lawfully delegated or not (see 1:6:2);
(d) decisions or determinations which recognize in any way the lawful
existence of a "State within a state", with particular reference to the
political body defined by the population of "citizens of the United States"
who may inhabit the 50 Union States at any given moment, however those terms
may be defined (see 4:3:1 and the case law interpreting the Buck Act, 4
U.S.C. 105-113).
Until such time as you demonstrate officially that each and every one
of you has executed a solemn oath which agrees with the Constitution for the
United States of America as lawfully amended, I will take the absence of
such an oath to mean that you are individually and severally biased in your
understanding of the Constitution and that you are, therefore, unqualified
to rule on these matters and hereby recused from doing so.
The burden of proof is now upon you to authenticate the Constitution
which you agree to uphold, now and at all times in the future, using
established principles of Law and the published rules of evidence.
I realize that this NOTICE AND DEMAND TO CEASE AND DESIST may
constitute an historically unprecedented act on my part, as an individual
California Citizen who enjoys neither elected nor appointed authority of any
kind at this moment in time. Nevertheless, this act is necessitated by the
fact that there is presently not one single judge, magistrate, or
commissioner anywhere in America whose oath of office is not colored by
faulty (non-existent) provisions in the federal Constitution which they are
sworn to uphold.
I realize also that this Notice and Demand must be general in nature
and in substance, because of the far-reaching consequences which issue from
the facts and Law which impugn federal "adoption" of the so-called 14th
amendment. It is not my purpose here to anticipate, nor to delineate, each
and every such consequence. Better minds than I should hesitate to assume
such a weighty task by themselves.
Therefore, for the time being, I will leave it to you, and to the
capable expertise on your respective staffs, to find and recommend the
course of action which will best execute this Demand with maximum justice,
liberty, and domestic tranquility. These are, after all, the stated goals
of our chosen form of government in the united States of America (see
Preamble).
Furthermore, I do explicitly reserve my unalienable Right to take
whatever steps I deem necessary and proper to correct, at any time, a
government which has now drifted so far off course, it hardly resembles the
constitutional Republic it was designed to be (see also Declaration of
Independence (1776)).
Thank you very much for your attention, and for your consideration.
Respectfully submitted,
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris
California Citizen, on behalf of the
People of the united States of America
All Rights Reserved AT LAW
NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO AGENTS.
NOTICE TO AGENTS IS NOTICE TO PRINCIPALS.
copies: Marin County Grand Jury, San Rafael
Bill Clinton, President
Pete Wilson, Governor of California
Barbara Boxer, U.S. Senator
Dianne Feinstein, U.S. Senator
Lynn Woolsey, U.S. Representative
Janet Reno, Attorney General
Drew S. Days, III, Solicitor General
William K. Suter, Supreme Court Clerk
Frank D. Wagner, Reporter of Decisions
Alfred Wong, Marshal
Shelley L. Dowling, Librarian
attachment: letter to California State Lands Commission
enclosures (under separate cover to Librarian supra):
The Federal Zone, hard-copy second edition
The Federal Zone, electronic fourth edition
Chapter 11, from upcoming fifth edition
California All-Purpose Acknowledgement
CALIFORNIA STATE/REPUBLIC )
)
COUNTY OF MARIN )
On this twenty-ninth (29th) day of December, 1993, Anno Domini, before
me personally appeared Paul Andrew Mitchell, personally known to me (or
proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the Person whose
name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that he
executed the same in His authorized capacity, and that by His signature on
this instrument the Person, or the entity upon behalf of which the Person
acted, executed the instrument. Purpose of Notary Public is for
identification only, and not for entrance into any foreign jurisdiction.
WITNESS my hand and official seal.
_____________________________________
Notary Public
C E R T I F I C A T E O F S E R V I C E B Y M A I L
It is hereby certified that service of this LETTER has been made on
interested parties by mailing one copy thereof, on this twenty-ninth (29th)
day of December, 1993, in a sealed envelope with postage prepaid, properly
addressed to them as follows:
Registered U.S. Mail #R 756 488 761
Return Receipt Requested of:
Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, Northeast
Washington, District of Columbia
Copies via first class U.S. mail to:
Hon. Harry A. Blackmun, Associate Justice
Hon. John Paul Stevens, Associate Justice
Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor, Associate Justice
Hon. Antonin Scalia, Associate Justice
Hon. Anthony M. Kennedy, Associate Justice
Hon. David H. Souter, Associate Justice
Hon. Clarence Thomas, Associate Justice
Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Associate Justice
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, Northeast
Washington, District of Columbia
Dated: December 29, 1993
__________________________________________________________________________
Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen/Principal, by Special Appearance, in Propria
Persona, proceeding Sui Juris, with Assistance, Special, "Without Prejudice"
to any of my unalienable Rights.
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
Postal Zone 94901/tdc
September 10, 1993
Ray Feyereisen
c/o general delivery
Houston, Texas state
Postal Zone 77253/tdc
Dear Ray:
I did some more research today, to explore some of the cases which
support the position that one can be a State Citizen without necessarily
being a citizen of the United States. You already knew about Crosse; here
are the relevant paragraphs:
Both before and after the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal
Constitution, it has not been necessary for a person to be a citizen of the
United States in order to be a citizen of his state. United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 549, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 73-74, 21 L.Ed. 394 (1873); and see Short v. State,
80 Md. 392, 401-402, 31 A. 322 (1895). See also Spear, State Citizenship,
16 Albany L.J. 24 (1877). ...
[B]ut we find nothing in Reum [City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 56
F. 576, 581 (8th Cir. 1893)] or any other case which requires that a citizen
of a state must also be a citizen of the United States, if no question of
federal rights or jurisdiction is involved. As the authorities referred to
in the first portion of this opinion evidence, the law is to the contrary.
[emphasis added]
Corpus Juris is another source of authorities which support this position:
So a person may be a citizen of a particular state and not a citizen
of the United States46 ....
[11 C.J., Sec. 3, p. 777]
Footnote 46 lists the following cases:
Harding v. Standard Oil Co., 182 Fed. 421
McDonel v. State, 90 Ind. 320
State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602
The reference librarian at the Marin County Law Library and I searched
in vain for McDonel v. State; they're going to put their special legal
beagle on that search. Here's what Harding said:
In the Constitution and laws of the United States the term ["citizenship"]
is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who
has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a state or of the United
States. Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 7 Sup. Ct. 656, 30 L.Ed. 766. A
person may be a citizen of a state but not of the United States; as, an
alien who has declared his intention to become a citizen, and who is by
local law entitled to vote in the state of his residence, and there exercise
all other local functions of local citizenship, such as holding office,
right to poor relief, etc., but who is not a citizen of the United States.
Taney, C.J., in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 405, 15 L.Ed. 691;
Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 74, 21 L.Ed. 394.
[Harding v. Standard Oil Co. et. al.]
[182 Fed. 421 (1910), emphasis added]
I really love the pertinent quote from State v. Fowler, which was decided by
the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1889:
A person who is a citizen of the United States is necessarily a
citizen of the particular state in which he resides. But a person may be a
citizen of a particular state and not a citizen of the United States. To
hold otherwise would be to deny to the state the highest exercise of its
sovereignty, -- the right to declare who are its citizens. The sovereignty
of the citizens of a republic has its highest assertion in representative
government, and is constituted in its political order in the representation
of persons, and not of classes or of interests.
[State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler]
[41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889)]
[emphasis added]
The Crosse court cites Short v. State, which came to essentially the same
conclusion in the following long passage:
And then, as to the objection that this local law is repugnant to that
clause in the fourteenth amendment of the federal constitution which
declares that "no state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," it is
sufficient to say that the interpretation of that clause by the supreme
court in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, is a complete answer to this
objection. There is a distinction, says Justice Miller, between citizenship
of the United States and citizenship of a state.
[Short v. State, 80 Md. 392, 401-402]
[31 A. 322 (1895)]
The Crosse court cites Short v. State, but I could find in the latter
decision no statements which took the exact position we are seeking;
nevertheless, it does cite the Slaughterhouse Cases and also Bradwell v.
State, 16 Wall. 130. In the Bradwell case, Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for
the court, says:
The protection designed by that clause, as has been repeatedly held, has no
application to a citizen of the state whose laws are complained of.
[emphasis added]
Also, I think I have already mentioned this book, but it's worth
mentioning again. See if you can get your hands on a copy of A Treatise on
Citizenship by Birth and by Naturalization, by Alexander Porter Morse,
Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1881. Buried near the end of this
voluminous treatise is a section entitled "State Citizenship -- Its
Existence". In addition to the big cases like Dred Scott, Slaughterhouse
and Cruikshank, he mentions the following in his footnotes:
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C.C. 371
Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591
Donovan v. Pitcher, 53 Ala. 411
Cully v. Baltimore, etc., R.R. Co., 1 Hughes 536
Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162
Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. Ct. App. 267
Reilly v. Lamar, 2 Cranch 344
He also writes, "That there is a state citizenship, see Registry Act of
California of 1865-1866, sect. 11." I pulled it; check it out.
So, you thought you were caught up with all your work, did you?
Carry on, and peace be with you.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
zip code exempt
July 29, 1993
Albert N. Baxter
c/o general delivery
Rancho Palos Verdes, California state
Postal Zone 90274/tdc
Dear Al:
I am in receipt of a copy of your letter from attorney William A.
Cohan, dated June 21, 1993. In this letter, Mr. Cohan wrote the following
to you:
The "non-resident alien" position has been repeatedly rejected by the
courts; your assertion of that position undermines your credibility.
In the margin, you wrote the following in long hand:
"Guess we made fools of ourselves. Al B"
Although I do not have the time to write as thorough a response as I
wish I could, I do have enough time to make a few careful remarks about
these statements. Please consider the electronic fourth edition of The
Federal Zone as a necessary supplement to the rest of this letter; it is
not yet available in hard copy.
First of all, I do not believe that your assertion of the "nonresident
alien" position undermines your credibility. It may undermine your
credibility in the eyes of Mr. Cohan, but it certainly does not undermine
your credibility in my eyes, nor in the eyes of those who have studied and
carefully documented the meaning of State Citizenship as that term was used
and intended to be understood by the framers of the U.S. Constitution. Even
IRS documents admit that you are an alien if you are not a citizen of the
United States. Simple logic is all that is necessary to explain away the
"alien" half of the problem, but there is much more proof, as you know.
I have recently made a crucial discovery in the writings of attorney
Roger Foster. Foster was a Yale lecturer and recognized expert in federal
jurisprudence at the time the so-called 16th Amendment was declared
"ratified". The second edition of his treatise on the federal income tax of
1913 states, in unequivocal language, that the tax was levied in Alaska, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Philippine Islands; the 48
States are not even mentioned (see Chapter 3 in The Federal Zone). In and
of itself, this documentary evidence is important proof of the territorial
extent of the 1913 federal income tax.
What is even more stunning is the comparable section from the first
edition of Foster's treatise. In this section, he rambles on about the lack
of court precedent authorizing Congress to tax bond interest that is payable
to nonresident aliens by domestic corporations. Because he makes repeated
use of the term "United States", a term which we now know to have multiple
different meanings in law, this section is almost always vague about the
exact territorial extent of the 1913 Act. There is, however, one place
where he tips his hand by utilizing the term "Union" in a territorial
sense. In other words, the first edition of Foster's treatise considers the
"Union of several States" to be the territorial reach of the 1913 Act, but
in the second edition this whole section is replaced with a much smaller
section which limits that reach to Alaska, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico and the Philippine Islands. Therefore, Foster has admitted, in
writing, that his first edition was in error about the territorial extent of
the 1913 federal income tax! Read it for yourself and see if you agree with
me.
It is not entirely correct to state that the "non-resident alien"
position has been repeatedly rejected by the courts. Such a statement
overlooks the obvious fact that the Brushaber decision is still standing
case law in America. As you must already know, this ruling was issued by
the United States Supreme Court. None of the cases cited in Mr. Conklin's
essay, "The Citizenship Argument Bites the Dust in the Courts", was decided
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Moreover, most of those lower court cases remain
unpublished, unlike the long list of Supreme Court decisions which have
carefully considered the meaning of Citizenship (e.g. Cruikshank, Dred
Scott, Slaughter-House Cases, to name a few of the key ones). Why?
Treasury Decision 2313 also remains as a standing decision of the U.S.
Treasury Department. There was only one Plaintiff in the Brushaber case;
that Plaintiff was Mr. Frank R. Brushaber who was "a citizen of the State of
New York and a resident of the Borough of Brooklyn, in the City of New
York", by his own admissions. To assert anything else about his status is
to assume facts that were not in evidence. If he had been a native of
France, according to federal government propaganda, then where was his green
card? The courts issued their decisions on the basis of facts that were in
evidence. Therefore, there was and still is no basis in fact, or in law,
for the Secretary of the Treasury in 1916 to extend the Brushaber decision
to those who were not parties to that action. It is conclusive, therefore,
that Frank R. Brushaber was the "nonresident alien" to which Treasury
Decision 2313 refers.
Quite apart from the technical issues involved in understanding and
explaining Treasury Decision 2313, I would like to dedicate the remainder of
my remarks here to a discussion of the importance of the U.S. Constitution.
If my research has established anything, it is that the U.S. Constitution
has explicitly recognized State Citizenship from the beginning, even if
there was no definition of State Citizenship as such in that document. If
the Constitution is perpetual, then so is the status of State Citizenship
which it recognizes (see Texas v. White), until and unless each and every
reference to State Citizens is lawfully amended so as to alter the original
meaning of those provisions. The intent of any law is the law, and this
principle applies as well to the Constitution itself (the supreme Law).
You will find explicit references to State Citizens throughout the U.S.
Constitution (see 1:2:2, 1:3:3, 2:1:5, 3:2:1, 4:2:1). In my opinion, three
of the most important references are found in the qualifications for
election to the offices of U.S. Senator, Representative, and President.
Since these provisions have never been amended, their meaning remains the
same as it was on the day the Constitution became the supreme Law in
America. Anyone who argues something different about the construction of
these provisions is woefully, and maybe even dangerously, ignorant of the
basic principles of constitutional law in our country (see Dred Scott v.
Sandford in particular, a decision which is "infamous" to me only because it
was such an authoritative and irrefutable mirror on the legal acceptability
of chattel slavery at that point in American history).
Prior to the 1866 Civil Rights Act, there was simply no such thing as
a "citizen of the United States" (see Ex parte Knowles, which is still
standing case law in the California Republic). If you can find the time to
wade into the huge body of case law which interpreted the so-called 14th
Amendment, you will find some jurists who credit that amendment with finally
settling the definition of "citizen of the United States" (see Field's
dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases for a good example of this position).
On the other hand, the pertinent U.S. Supreme Court decisions have never
ruled that a ratified 14th Amendment ever abolished the status of State
Citizenship; the amendment itself even stipulates that federal citizens are
also "citizens ... of the State wherein they reside", giving some jurists
reason to conclude that federal citizens were intended to be State Citizens
too, as long as they resided within one of the Union States.
To my knowledge, I am the first published author to call attention to
the lower-case "c" in this class of State citizens; the weight of
subsequent history has shown that they remain second-class citizens, even
when they "reside" within one of the Union States, because the Bill of
Rights has at best a limited application to them when they do. We must
credit The Informer for pointing out additional evidence in Section 2 of the
14th Amendment: "[W]hen the right to vote ... is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State ... and citizens of the United States ...." This
section is here referring to two different classes of people.
The Cruikshank case is perhaps the most lucid example of standing High
Court case law for ruling that "[W]e have in our political system a
government of the United States and a government of each of the several
States. Each of these governments is distinct from the others, and each has
citizens of its own ...." This means that, even if the so-called 14th
Amendment had been properly approved and adopted, the status of State
Citizen remains an integral part of the U.S. Constitution, so integral in
fact, that the highest elective offices in our land must be occupied by
People who enjoy and exhibit this status before occupying those offices.
Remember also that the Cruikshank case was decided after the alleged
ratification of the 14th Amendment and after the pivotal Slaughter-House
Cases. The failed ratification of this amendment lends even greater clarity
to logic of Cruikshank, namely, that federal citizens are aliens with
respect to the Union States, and State Citizens are likewise aliens with
respect to the District of Columbia.
The Constitution also plays a crucial role in determining whether or
not a proposed amendment is ever elevated to the status of a ratified
amendment. Hiding in the huge body of case law which has interpreted the
so-called 14th Amendment, there are two pivotal decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court which actually struck down the ratification of that amendment
(see State v. Phillips and Dyett v. Turner). The facts on which that Court
relied were assembled and published in the Congressional Record; courts
must take judicial notice of the Congressional Record. The U.S. Supreme
Court has never actually ruled on the ratification of the 14th Amendment and
has been prevented from doing so by treasonous behavior (see 28 Tulane Law
Review 22, and 11 South Carolina Law Quarterly 484).
Thus, the undeniable preponderance of historical evidence now proves
that the Utah Supreme Court was correct in striking down the 14th Amendment.
I invite you to review the shocking and sordid history of its "passage" by
studying carefully the details recited in the Dyett decision. The bottom
line is that the federal government has been exercising unlawful dominion
ever since the Civil War, and the failed ratification of the so-called 14th
Amendment is just one among several historical facts which constitute
conclusive evidence of this unlawful dominion. The so-called 16th Amendment
is another excellent example of this unlawful dominion.
By holding, as the Utah Supreme Court has done, that the 14th
Amendment was never properly approved and adopted, we are still entirely
justified in taking the U.S. Supreme Court's view in Cruikshank, namely,
that each governmental jurisdiction has citizens of its own. This view is
supported by the decision in Colgate v. Harvey, which ruled that the 14th
Amendment did not create a national citizenship (the italics implying that
the amendment was simply declaratory of existing federal law, which federal
law was the 1866 Civil Rights Act). Simply stated, California has its
Citizens; Oregon has its Citizens; Utah has its Citizens; ... and the
District of Columbia has its citizens (51 governmental jurisdictions in
all).
Notice that I have been careful to spell State Citizen with an
UPPER-CASE "C", and federal citizen with a lower-case "c". I do so
primarily because authentic copies of the U.S. Constitution do evidence this
convention; those authentic copies also maintain a similar distinction
between "Person" and "person". Prior to the 14th Amendment, "Person" was
consistently spelled with an UPPER-CASE "P" (see the qualifications for
Senator, Representative and President, where the term "No Person" is
repeated). Formal English also recognizes an important difference between
Proper Nouns and common nouns. Did you ever attend a baseball game that was
won by the chicago cubs (or the cHICAGO cUBS)?
Al, I invite you to take a closer look at the underlying rationale for
the "nonresident alien" position which I have endorsed and explained in my
book The Federal Zone, whether or not you choose to utilize it in any future
litigation. There is simply too much in the way of undeniable factual
evidence and relevant constitutional history for me to be dissuaded by this
or that unpublished decision by lower federal courts. I doubt very much
that Mr. Cohan would have us believe that federal and State courts are
always correct, and that their decisions are never overturned. I have read
some of these lower court decisions, and I find them to be riddled with
errors.
Specifically, any court in America which henceforth issues decisions
that are predicated upon the lawful ratification of the so-called 14th and
16th Amendments is plainly in error (see People v. Boxer). Any licensed
attorney in America who bases his advice to clients (or prospects) on such
rebuttable presumptions might justifiably be applauded for seeking the path
of least resistance, with the complete approval of his clients; but
attorneys and clients together should also seriously reconsider just how
dedicated they really are to upholding and defending the Constitution for
the United States of America, as compared to other priorities that can and
do take precedence under the pressures of day-to-day practice. I say this
only because the published evidence available to me shows that licensed
attorneys in America are expected to place the court first, public policy
second, and the client third in order of importance; the Constitution isn't
even mentioned!
It is high time that we return to basic issues of constitutional Law.
If we don't, then we shall surely lose the Constitution forever. It is
quite simply impossible for public officials anywhere in America to perform
their solemn duty to uphold and defend the U.S. Constitution, if the weight
of material evidence should prove that the exact provisions of that
Constitution are still in doubt. This was the major issue that was
addressed in the case of People v. Boxer; copies of the pleadings and
affidavits were shipped to Mr. Cohan several months ago, without any
response from him.
I don't mean to be rude or disrespectful to any licensed attorneys
when I suggest that they too should be obliged to take the same solemn oath,
if they have not already done so. The constitutional provisions which cite
State Citizens have never been in any serious doubt, even if our decision to
defend this status is fraught with much additional peril, above and beyond
the peril we might endure by resisting this or that tax assessment by the
collection agency of a foreign banking cartel. If the Constitution is
perpetual, then so is the Sovereign State Citizenship which that
Constitution has recognized from the beginning, with or without the
so-called 14th Amendment.
Let the judges in question come forward to explain why their recent
decisions were "unpublished". I am all ears.
The road less traveled may be the surest path to our destination, and
to our destiny as a free People.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
copies: William A. Cohan
John Voss, N.C.B.A.
Richard McDonald
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
zip code exempt
(DMM 122.32)
July 20, 1993
James R. Frey
Staff Counsel
State Lands Commission
c/o general delivery
Sacramento, California state
Dear Mr. Frey:
We do very much appreciate the consideration you showed in answering
our inquiry concerning California Government Code Sections 126 and 127.
We are happy to learn that the files in question are available for
public inspection and copying, by appointment. We understand that the index
is actually a file cabinet, with files on individual facilities.
As you may already know, many California State Citizens are actively
involved in private research and political action to help solve the
horrendous federal debt. Our research led us to Government Code Section
126, in particular, because it makes explicit reference to Section 4 of the
so-called 14th Amendment:
(c) The United States must in writing have requested the state to cede
concurrent criminal jurisdiction within such land and subject to each and
all of the conditions and reservations in this section and in Section 4 of
Article XIV of the Constitution prescribed.
[California Government Code, Sec. 126]
[emphasis added]
I use the language "so-called" because the evidence now available to
us proves that the 14th Amendment was never properly approved and adopted.
In the year 1968, the Utah Supreme Court detailed the shocking and sordid
history of the failed ratification in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d
266, 272. In the year 1975, the Utah Supreme Court again struck down the
ratification of the 14th Amendment with the following language:
I cannot believe that any court, in full possession of its faculties,
could honestly hold that the amendment was properly approved and adopted.
[State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d 936, 941]
To our knowledge, these two cases are still standing because the U.S.
Supreme Court has yet to rule specifically on the validity of the steps
taken to "ratify" the so-called 14th Amendment.
The House Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains
some of the essential documentation on which the Utah Supreme Court relied
to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never ratified into law (see
page 15641 et seq.). For example, it itemizes all States which voted
against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates when their
Legislatures did so.
Additional historical evidence can be found in the following law
review articles: 28 Tulane Law Review 22 and 11 South Carolina Law
Quarterly 484. Even though one of these articles was written by a man who
advocated racial discrimination, a policy with which I strongly disagree,
his facts are very consistent with the historical record as recited by these
other authorities.
Faced with this clear preponderance of historical evidence and
standing court authorities, we are not only justified in taking the position
that the 14th Amendment was never ratified, we are also justified in
challenging all State statutes which make reference to non-existent
provisions in the U.S. Constitution.
This train of evidence and logic leads us, then, to subsection (f) of
California Government Code Section 126:
(f) "Land held by the United States", as used in this section means: (1)
lands acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation, (2) lands owned by the
United States that are included in the military reservation by presidential
proclamation or act of Congress, (3) leaseholds acquired by the United
States over private lands or state-owned lands, and (4) any other lands
owned by the United States including, but not limited to, public domain
lands which are held for a public purpose.
[emphasis added]
We have taken specific note of subsection (f)(1), which omits any mention of
the "United States", whereas subsections (f)(2) thru (f)(4) do make explicit
mention of the "United States". Using the rule of statutory construction
known as inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (see Black's Law Dictionary,
Sixth Edition), we are entitled to infer that "United States" was omitted
from subsection (f)(1) because it was intended to be omitted.
Accordingly, Section 126(f) could be interpreted to mean that "Land
held by the United States" means any lands acquired in fee by purchase or
condemnation, whether or not said lands were acquired in fee by the federal
government. In other words, if private real estate in California were
acquired in a "fee simple" transaction, as recorded by the appropriate
County Recorder, does the "United States" thereby hold any legal interest in
such private land by virtue of California Government Code Section 126?
Now for the crux of the problem. We now know that the Federal Reserve
System is a private banking cartel (see Lewis v. United States, 680 F.2d
1239 (1982)). This cartel pays the federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing
a total of $230 to print 10,000 Federal Reserve Notes, regardless of
denomination, and thereby obtains from Congress a pledge of collateral equal
to the face value of those notes. Thus, if the Federal Reserve orders
10,000 notes in denominations of $100 each, it obtains from Congress a lien
on collateral equal to $1,000,000, for a total down payment of $230. That's
what I call leverage! What's the collateral?
Do the Federal Reserve banks thereby obtain any right, title or
interest in California lands "acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation"
pursuant to California Government Code Section 126?
Are these lands anywhere identified as collateral for the Treasury
bonds which the Federal Reserve purchased with money and credit which it
created out of thin air, via bookkeeping entries?
These are questions which should be important to all private Citizens
and to all government employees everywhere in America, because the Federal
Reserve has become one of the largest single "United States" creditors by
purchasing Treasury bonds without lawful consideration. Moreover, the
failed ratification of the so-called 14th Amendment frees all of us, private
Citizens and government employees alike, to question the validity of this
public debt, because Section 4 of that failed amendment reads:
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.
[emphasis added]
Quite obviously, if the so-called 14th Amendment was never properly
approved and adopted, then it follows that there is no Constitutional
prohibition which bars any of us from questioning the validity of the public
debt of the United States.
I will look forward to your timely and considerate response. Please
utilize the above mailing location exactly as shown in any and all future
correspondence. Believe it or not, we now have credible proof that the
unqualified use of zip codes and/or two-letter federal abbreviations (e.g.
"CA") also attaches California State Citizens to the spiralling federal
debt.
Mr. Frey, things are just not as they appear on the surface.
Thank you very much for your honesty and your consideration, at this
most difficult time in our brief history as a nation.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
copies: Charles Warren, Executive Officer
Leo T. McCarthy, Lieutenant Governor
Gray Davis, Controller
Thomas W. Hayes, Director of Finance
Pete Wilson, Governor
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
zip code exempt
(DMM 122.32)
July 5, 1993
Gregory Dahl
c/o general delivery
Eugene, Oregon state
Postal Zone 97401/tdc
Dear Greg:
Thanks very much for your letter dated 24 June 1993, and for
purchasing a copy of The Federal Zone. Because I shipped your book immediat
ely after opening your envelope at the post office, I hadn't allowed myself
time to read your letter before doing so. On the last page, your mentioned
enclosing $25 for the book, and $15 to show your support of my efforts and
your appreciation for my time. Thanks very much. I now take those amounts
to mean that you originally wanted the electronic edition of The Federal
Zone, which is enclosed with this letter. It was obviously my mistake.
With your immense computer knowledge, I would very much value your
suggestions for expediting the dissemination of this shareware.
On the subject of race, you may be surprised to hear that I agree
completely with your statement that my analysis of the 14th Amendment will
be construed as a contention that whites have different rights than others.
That is exactly the situation you will find throughout federal law; read
Title 42, Sections 1981 thru 1983, and there you will find that Congress
still maintains a clear legal distinction between whites and other races.
But then you went on to say that I will be called a racist. Well, I haven't
been called racist yet, not even by any of my black friends, but I guess
there is always a first time. Thus far, I haven't had any difficulty
explaining to people that federal law is maintaining racist distinctions,
and has done so ever since the infamous Dred Scott decision. My position is
quite simple: all races are eligible to be Sovereign State Citizens,
without exception.
Federal law would have us believe that blacks and other non-white
races are only eligible to be "citizens of the United States", but the
California Supreme Court ruled in 1855 that there is no such thing as a
"citizen of the United States", and this decision has never been overruled.
The federal government must rely, therefore, on the so-called 14th Amendment
to force this fiction on certain classes, e.g. those with Social Security
numbers. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has twice struck down this
amendment, and neither of these decisions has ever been overruled! Do you
see the pattern? I call it unlawful dominion.
I actually enjoy discussions which turn to the subject of racial
discrimination. It is a great opportunity to expose people to the "intent
of the post-Civil War reformers", as you call them. You have only to look
at Section 4 of the so-called 14th Amendment to appreciate what I mean:
"the validity of the public debt shall not be questioned." This is the real
intent of the 14th Amendment, to make it appear lawful for the federal
government to exercise dominion over all Americans and to relegate them to
second-class subject status (i.e. "subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States").
Once you are in this subject class, then the federal government can
compel your specific performance to discharge the interest on the massive
federal debt which has now accumulated. Of course, much of that debt was
created by the sale of Treasury bonds which were "purchased" by Federal
Reserve banks with money and credit which they created out of thin air. As
such, these bond contracts are unconscionable because they were not
purchased with real consideration. As I have written in the latest edition
of my book:
The vivid pattern that has now painfully emerged is that "citizens of
the United States", as defined in federal tax law, are the intended victims
of a new statutory slavery that was predicted by the infamous Hazard
Circular soon after the Civil War began. These statutory slaves are now
burdened with a bogus federal debt which is spiralling out of control. The
White House budget office recently invented a new kind of "generational
accounting" so as to project a tax load of seventy-one percent on future
generations of these "citizens of the United States". It is our duty to
ensure that this statutory slavery is soon gone with the wind, just like its
grisly and ill-fated predecessor.
Greg, this is a bank conspiracy we are dealing with here, and it is
clouded by waves and waves of smoke, mirrors, and dense propaganda. I don't
think the 71% projection is idle speculation. Many informed people
throughout the country realize now that it is only a matter of months before
the interest alone on the federal debt will exceed all federal income tax
receipts. I confirmed this in my first petition to Congress, dated December
of 1990. Now, the authors of Bankruptcy 1995 are saying the exact same
thing.
The basic issue with which most Americans are still not quite
prepared, intellectually, emotionally, or financially, is the specter of
default by the "United States". The media are certainly not courageous
enough to grapple with this issue head-on. If the banks obtained Treasury
bonds without consideration, then I say their bonds should be repudiated,
not the bonds which have been purchased ultimately with the labor of
Americans like you and me. This labor is something which has real value,
unlike bank credit which is created out of thin air. They used to use pen
and ink, then typewriters, now computers. The mechanism is the same; it's
called "bookkeeping". These same banks have become rich beyond imagination
by this swindle. I have not hesitated to say that it is the greatest fiscal
fraud that has ever been perpetrated upon any people at any time in the
history of the world, and nobody has yet disagreed with that statement!
After reading everything I could get my hands on, and doing a lot of
original research myself, I came to several important conclusions, one of
which is that the Constitution for the United States of America is, and
still should be, the supreme Law of the Land. This Constitution has
recognized a Sovereign class of Common-Law State Citizens from the
beginning. The case law also says that the Union created by this
Constitution is perpetual. That means the Citizenship which it recognizes
is also perpetual, and cannot be altered or destroyed by the Congress or any
of its agents. "Congress cannot by legislation alter the Constitution, from
which alone it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations
alone that power can be lawfully exercised." Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S.
189. This is the Law.
If I have done anything significant, I believe it was to prove that
the Internal Revenue Code was written deliberately to refer to Union State
Citizens as "nonresident aliens", among other reasons to give Americans a
reason to avoid such a label. After all, who wants to be known as an
"alien"? The government had to leave some tracks, and we picked up the
trail right out of the parking lot: the Brushaber decision, the first big
case to reach the Supreme Court after the so-called 16th Amendment was
declared ratified, and Treasury Decision 2313, in which the government
decided that Frank R. Brushaber was a "nonresident alien".
It is important to understand that Brushaber did not go into federal
district court claiming to be a "nonresident alien"; he went into federal
court claiming to be a citizen of the State of New York and a resident of
the Borough of Brooklyn, in the City of New York. It was the government
which applied this label to people who claimed the status of State Citizens.
In conjunction with the Brushaber decision, you should also study the
earlier Pollock decision, which struck down a federal income tax because it
was not apportioned. The apportionment restriction was operative because
the Plaintiff, Charles Pollock, was a Massachusetts State Citizen (not a
citizen of the United States). As a Union State Citizen, Pollock was immune
to federal direct taxation unless it was apportioned, and it was just not
apportioned, period. The Pollock Court also told Congress that if they
wanted to levy such a tax on people like Charles Pollock, they would have to
amend the Constitution to remove the apportionment restriction, and therein
is one of the essential historical roots of the so-called 16th Amendment.
I am very sorry to hear about your bicycle accident. I hope you have
recovered completely. I was also not aware that you now have children;
that changes everything, as far as political activism is concerned. I would
not have done many of the things I have done, like suing Barbara Boxer in
the California Supreme Court, if I had a wife and children of my own; the
risks are just too great.
Thanks again for writing such a thoughtful and detailed letter. I
feel privileged to be its recipient.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosure: The Federal Zone, fourth edition
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
zip code exempt
(DMM 122.32)
June 29, 1993
Dale Peters
c/o general delivery
San Jose, California state
Postal Zone 95157/tdc
Dear Dale:
Thanks very much for your detailed and enlightening letter, dated June
25, 1993. Before writing this letter to you, I have had several
conversations about your letter with Dr. John C. Alden, and we both feel
that your discussion of California Government Code Section 126 is extremely
important.
You began your discussion of Section 126 by recommending that I
incorporate in a future edition of The Federal Zone an expose of this
particular statute. Your recommendation suggests to me that you may not
have read all the way through Chapter 11, in which I discuss, in broad
strokes, sovereignty and the limits of exclusive federal jurisdiction.
Please understand that the book was written for all Americans, in the
federal zone and in the State Zone, and for this reason I deliberately
wanted to avoid getting too bogged down in the statutes of any particular
Union State. The fourth edition is now over 600 pages in length.
A major point of law, of course, is the status of the so-called 14th
Amendment. Again, in Chapter 11 of the fourth edition, I have made
reference to the two Utah Supreme Court cases which struck down the 14th
Amendment. If you haven't already reviewed these cases, I strongly
recommend that you do so, as soon as possible. The detailed historical
facts are covered quite well in the earlier of the two -- Dyett v. Turner.
I gave a lecture based in part on a recitation of this case, and John Alden
later said I had failed to notice that the audience was actually on the
edges of their seats; that's how powerfully the Utah Court recites the
relevant history. If you are going to enter this debate as an acknowledged
expert, then you must know this history in detail.
In light of State v. Phillips and Dyett v. Turner, I would not
hesitate to challenge the constitutionality of Section 126(c) of the
California Government Code, on obvious grounds that a State statute cannot
be valid if it makes reference to a non-existent provision in the U.S.
Constitution. Even the 1879 California Constitution, which has never been
approved by Congress as "republican" in form and the effective date of which
has actually been repealed, cites the U.S. Constitution as the supreme Law
of the Land.
I have been trying my best to broadcast the importance of Section 4 of
the so-called 14th Amendment, whenever and wherever possible. Even if it
had been properly ratified, there is a mountain of case law which has held
that a ratified 14th Amendment had no effect whatsoever on the status of
Common-Law State Citizens of the Union States. See, for example, the cases
cited in Appendix Y of The Federal Zone, fourth edition. By logical
extension of these holdings, I would argue that a ratified 14th Amendment,
in and of itself, had no effect whatsoever on the rights, titles and
interests of such Citizens.
The Federal government, however, does now take the position that the
14th Amendment had the effect of converting all Americans into federal
citizens who are, by definition, subject to the jurisdiction of the "United
States". It can be shown that this has been a fraudulent conversion.
Richard McDonald and his colleagues have recently gone so far as to file
cross-complaints against State Judges in L.A. County for violating the
Genocide Treaty because the judges in question have obviously discriminated
against State Citizens in criminal proceedings; this is a very interesting
development to monitor carefully.
Another factor to consider in your reasoning is the specific group of
people who are explicitly prevented from questioning the validity of the
public debt by virtue of Section 4 of the so-called 14th Amendment.
Treating the U.S. Constitution as a binding contract, it is not difficult to
prove that such a prohibition, even if part of a lawfully adopted amendment,
creates no restrictions on those who are not "subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States", in other words, not subject to the terms and conditions
of this binding constitutional contract. Employees of the State or federal
governments, and/or federal citizens who are, by definition, subject to the
jurisdiction of the "United States", are both subject to this provision.
Notice how the oath of office specifically binds Senators and
Representatives to uphold and defend this contract.
However, if my research proves anything, it proves that Sovereign
natural born free State Citizens are not subject to the jurisdiction of the
"United States", unless they render themselves subject by entering into a
valid voluntary contract with the "United States". For this reason alone,
they would not be subject in any way to Section 4 of the so-called 14th
Amendment, nor could the titles to their property be clouded lawfully by any
third-party debt or obligation to which they had not given their full
consent. The California Civil Code is very relevant here, because it
defines the criteria by which consent is neither real or free ("apparent
consent is neither real nor free when ....").
The "United States" is not authorized to obtain controlling interest
in Sovereign State Citizens, such that it can compel our specific
performance to any third-party debt or obligation, particularly if that debt
or obligation is unconscionable by reason of federal government bonds which
were purchased with Federal Reserve credit created out of thin air via
bookkeeping entries. Moreover, the 1849 California Constitution has
specific provisions prohibiting the paper of any bank to circulate as money
(see Article IV, Sections 34 and 35).
I would even go so far as to say that all bank mortgages are similarly
unconscionable if the banks in question obtained title conveyances in return
for credit similarly manufactured out of thin air. We are obviously dealing
here with a very big fraud. See my chapters entitled "Is It Voluntary?" and
"The Fundamental Law" for a general discussion of the Federal Reserve's role
in all of this. Howard Freeman's discussion of the privilege of limited
liability is very relevant here: the discharge of debts with FRN's is
treated by the Federal government as a privilege, the exercise of which to
convey real property actually clouds titles, precisely in the manner you
speculate.
Now, I want to discuss a point of statutory construction. Your thesis
is supported by one of two competing interpretations of subsection (f) of
Section 126. Note, in particular, where it states that:
"Land held by the United States", as used in this section means: (1)
lands acquired in fee by purchase or condemnation ....
When I first read this wording, I interpreted it to mean "lands
acquired by the United States in fee". This interpretation is supported by
the language of subsection (e), where it states:
Jurisdiction ceded pursuant to this section continues only so long as
the land continues to belong to the United States ....
[emphasis added]
Nevertheless, apply the rule of statutory construction known as inclusio
unius est exclusio alterius (i.e., the explicit mention of one thing is the
explicit exclusion of all other things not mentioned). In all other
enumerated sections of subsection (f), Government Code 126 refers to "lands
owned by the United States", "leaseholds acquired by the United States", and
"any other lands owned by the United States". Note that subsection (1) does
NOT say "lands acquired by the United States in fee"; it says "lands
acquired in fee", lending powerful support to your thesis.
If you acquire a copy of the videotape which was filmed of my
interview with Greg Meadows of the L.A. Lawman, you will note that I
specifically mention the use of federal land as collateral for the bogus
federal debt. I do not, as yet, have the statutory proof that Congress
actually pledged all this land as collateral, but John Nelson claims to have
done so. You should get copies of his work, if you can. Unfortunately, my
copies of his work are packed up in storage, or I would enclose a copy for
your review. I raise this point because it is imperative that we isolate
the exact mechanism whereby the Federal Reserve claims to have obtained
controlling interest in real property deeds acquired under "fee simple"
transactions, as opposed to allodial transactions. Without this evidence,
your ideas amount to nothing more than exciting, but unsubstantiated
speculation.
Notice also that Government Code 126 specifically refers to "cession
of concurrent criminal jurisdiction to United States on lands held by
general government." Are you implying that I should interpret this to mean
that a State Citizen's failure to pay his "fair share" of debt interest to
the Federal Reserve should be treated as a crime, particularly if his real
property was acquired in a "fee simple" transaction? The issue here is not
just semantic. Why does the heading of the statute refer to "concurrent
criminal jurisdiction"? In this vein, you should carefully review Internal
Revenue Code Section 7851(a)(6)(A), which gives force and effect to Subtitle
F of the IRC if and only if the Title is enacted into law. Subtitle F, as
you may already know, contains all the enforcement provisions of the IRC,
and it is crucial for you to understand that Title 26 has never been enacted
into positive law (see inside covers of any of the volumes of United States
Code titles 1 thru 50).
So, where is the crime, if federal income taxes are truly "voluntary"?
It has to be voluntary for State Citizens whose incomes derive from sources
outside the exclusive jurisdiction of the "United States", among many other
reasons because Congress simply lacks the authority to compel such Citizens
to discharge interest on the bogus federal debt. The 9th and 10th
Amendments are right on point here. The use of excise taxes, like taxing
the sale of gasoline, creates a voluntary choice for the buyer which in no
way compels the buyer to enter the transaction; he can always use his
bicycle or walk.
Thanks again for your terrific letter. Keep up the good work, and let
me know if you have any additional material on this statute. If you don't
already have a copy, try to get your hands on the study entitled
Jurisdiction over Federal Areas within the States; it contains over 700
case citations, all extremely relevant to the core issue here, namely, what
is meant by the exercise of "exclusive Legislation"? On this, I took
specific note of a decision under Government Code 126 which found that "as
to such federal territory Congress had combined powers of a general and a
state government." Inside the federal zone, Congress has combined powers of
a general and a state government; outside the federal zone and inside the
50 States, Congress only has the powers of a general government, and is
otherwise constrained by specific prohibitions found in the constitutional
contract to which ALL government employees are subject. Of course, the
pertinent restriction with which I am primarily concerned is the absence of
apportionment provisions anywhere in the Internal Revenue Code; as I have
documented in some detail in my book, their absence is proof to me that the
IRC's income tax provisions are confined to the federal zone, and to
citizens of that zone. Otherwise, there is a blatant violation of the U.S.
Constitution.
To date, nobody has been able to refute my thesis, except to catapult
garbage like rumors that Frank Brushaber was a fiduciary for others who were
the real stockholders (which rumor originated at the Free Enterprise
Society, to my great surprise). This latter rumor is easily disproven by
the very first sentence in the Brushaber decision! Another garbage rumor is
that there were other parties to the Brushaber decision (this again from the
Free Enterprise Society). As of the second and subsequent editions of The
Federal Zone, I have successfully dismissed the French immigrant propaganda.
In combination with Brushaber's original pleadings, which anyone can order
from the federal court in New York, Treasury Decision 2313 is explosive and
irrefutable in its implications. The next time you're in the law library,
pull the Pollock case too, and you will discover that he too was a State
Citizen (of Massachusetts) who was, by definition, protected from direct
taxation by the apportionment provisions in the U.S. Constitution. In light
of all the evidence which proves that the 16th Amendment was never lawfully
ratified, the importance of the Pollock case cannot be overstated.
As you must know all too well by now, the tax law in America is a
masterpiece of deception. In one sense, I really have to hand it to its
creators. Unfortunately for them, we have caught up with their fraud, and
now their every move is being watched intensely.
"We have in our political system a government of the United
States and a government of each of the several states. Each of these
governments is distinct from the others, and each has citizens of its own
....." You can't be faulted for relying upon decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court, and I say that on the authority of this very same Supreme Court!
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
zip code exempt
(DMM 122.32)
June 27, 1993
Stanley Waugh
Nevada Citizen
c/o general delivery
Reno, Nevada state
Postal Zone 89504/tdc
Dear Mr. Waugh:
Thank you for your thoughtful letter dated 21 June 1993. I am writing
primarily to respond to your statement:
"Based on this historical documentation, I wonder if you are not
making too much ado about citizen v.. Citizen and United States v.. united
States. Punctuation apparently is not crucial."
As you know, there are lots of historical documents which evidence the word
"citizen". You included copies of a North Dakota document, and the Treaty
of Peace between the United States and King George III. These are not the
documents which count, however.
The documents which count (in my opinion), and the documents with
which I am chiefly concerned, are the Constitution for the United States of
America (because it is the supreme Law of the Land), the Internal Revenue
Code (because it is the subject of my book), and the Code of Federal
Regulations for Title 26 (which are the promulgated rules for interpreting
the Internal Revenue Code).
Now, if you have studied statistics, what I am about to say will be
entirely familiar to you. If you have not studied statistics, continue
reading very carefully. If I flip a coin, what is the probability ("P") of
heads? You will answer "one in two", and that is the right answer. How do
we calculate the value of P in mathematical terms? It's very simple. P
equals one divided by the quantity two raised to the power of one, i.e.
1/(21). We raise two to the power of one because there are two outcomes to
a "trial" (a head or a tail), and we conduct only one trial, i.e. we flip
the coin only once. The probability P equals 0.50.
Now, continuing along with this approach, what is the probability of
getting heads twice in a row? You will answer "one in four", and that is
the right answer again. How do we calculate the value of P in mathematical
terms? P now equals one divided by the quantity two raised to the power of
two, i.e. 1/(22). We raise two to the power of two because there are two
outcomes to a "trial", and we conduct two trials, i.e. we flip the coin
twice. The probability P equals 0.250. Continuing along with this
sequence, you can compute for yourself that the probability of three heads
in a row is 0.125, and so on.
What does this have to do with "citizens" and "Citizens",
you ask? Plenty, and here's why. In formal English, a letter of the
alphabet is either upper-case or lower-case; there is no in-between. It's
kind of like "heads" and "tails"; the coin is not allowed to land on its
side. So, for every occurrence of this term in law, we will observe either
lower-case "c" or UPPER-CASE "C", and nothing in-between.
The rules of grammar and punctuation require that the first letter of
the first word in any sentence be UPPER-CASE, like the "T" in the word "The"
at the beginning of this sentence. You will also very often see UPPER-CASE
letters used in words that are found in titles and paragraph headings, for
example, the phrase "see Chapter 29: American Citizenship for more details"
might be found in some book or section of law. The UPPER-CASE "C" is used
because it is proper to do so in such situations.
Now, the crux of the matter is to observe whether lower-case or
UPPER-CASE is used when there is no other rule requiring UPPER-CASE. For
example, you might encounter the phrase: "If you are a citizen of the
United States ...." In this phrase, the term "citizen" is not the first
word of a sentence, nor is it part of a title or heading; therefore, it can
go either way. It can be either lower-case "citizen" or UPPER-CASE
"Citizen", just like the coin flip.
If you read through the Internal Revenue Code and observe all
occurrences of "citizen", I believe you will find that the only uses of
"Citizen" are found in the first word of sentences and in paragraph
headings. In all other instances, where it can go either way (without the
influence of some other grammar rule), you will find only "citizen" or
"citizens" and not "Citizen" or "Citizens".
Just how many instances of "Citizen" are there, where it can go either
way? I have observed none of the latter. I strongly encourage you to
conduct your own investigation of this count. How many instances of
"citizen" are there, where it can go either way? 100? 200? Even if there
were only 10, what is the probability P that every one of them would
randomly fall into lower-case? Using our formula from above, the value of P
is 1/(210), right? 2 to the power of 10 is 1,024, therefore P equals
1/1024, or roughly one in a thousand.
Now try to compute the value of P when there are 100 trials (coin
flips) which can go either way. You may need a computer to perform this
calculation, but you already know that the value of P in this instance is an
extremely small number. In other words, the probability that 100 random
occurrences of "citizen" will all evidence a lower-case "c" in the IRC and
the CFR is practically an impossibility.
There must be another explanation for this consistent pattern, other
than chance. I argue that the explanation is design: the evidence of
consistent lower-case "c" in "citizen of the United States" is conclusive
proof of a deliberate design and intent to maintain the same spelling
throughout the IRC and the CFR. Remember, we are not counting those
occurrences of "Citizen" in paragraph headings and in the first word of a
sentence, where grammar requires that UPPER-CASE "C" be utilized.
So much for the mathematical proof. I agree that it is
informative to compare other historical and legal documents, as you have
done. I have done such a comparison with the organic California
Constitution of 1849. There, you will find references to "citizen of the
United States". So, what gives? Is this a reference to a "federal citizen"
or is this a reference to a "State Citizen", or is this a reference to
neither? I have found the answer to this question in two authorities, Ex
parte Knowles and People v. De La Guerra (see enclosed). Both of these
cases, decided by the California Supreme Court, agreed that the term
referred to a Citizen of one of the Union States and that, strictly
speaking, there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United States", at
least not before the so-called 14th Amendment, and certainly not before the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.
I have concluded from this research that these courts did not observe
the UPPER/lower-case convention; they preferred instead to distinguish the
two classes of citizenship by using terminology such as "citizen of a State"
and "citizen of the United States", because the U.S. Constitution does make
a distinction between the government of the several "States", on the one
hand, and the government of the "United States", on the other hand. The
court records appear to indicate that judges were not always sensitive to
the ambiguity and multiple meanings that attach to the term "United States".
Of course, the Hooven case, and Black's Law Dictionary since Hooven,
constitute conclusive proof that the term "United States" is definitely
ambiguous and for this reason the term "united States" is a unique way to
identify the Union States.
Nevertheless, I contend that the Framers of the Constitution did
observe the UPPER/lower-case convention, and so did the authors of the IRC
and CFR. Specifically, in authenticated copies of the U.S. Constitution you
will find consistent references to "Citizen" and "Citizens", for example, in
the constitutional qualifications for President, Senator and Representative.
These provisions have never been lawfully amended and, for this reason
alone, the original meaning and intent of these provisions is decisive (see
"the proper construction and common understanding" in Ex parte Knowles, a
very crucial authority in this debate).
To add further fuel to the fire, I have located unofficial copies of
the U.S. Constitution which utilized lower-case "c" in the qualifications
for President, Senator and Representative. Moreover, similar results obtain
from the use of "Person" and "person"; prior to the so-called 14th
Amendment, the U.S. Constitution utilized "Person", as in "free Persons"
(see 1:2:3). Are you a "free Person", or are you a 14th Amendment "person"?
The voluminous research now assembled by Richard McDonald proves,
beyond any shadow of doubt, that there is an enormous difference between the
two statuses. Since the Slaughter House Cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently cited them as the seminal authority for the fact that there are
two classes of citizenship, which correspond to the two governmental
jurisdictions: federal and State. There are State Citizens and there are
federal citizens. I am strongly urging that we now observe this UPPER/lower
case convention, in order to be clear about which class we are referring to
in written English. In spoken English, we can be clear by maintaining the
distinction between "State Citizens" and "federal citizens", and by avoiding
any other substitutes or synonyms for these terms. Of course, there are
those people (some of whom are undercover agents) who prefer to confuse and
obfuscate this crucial distinction by using ambiguous, undefined language
and by attempting to argue that there has always been just one class of
citizenship in America. I think it is fair to say that this latter argument
is simply not supported by the relevant legal history.
I am tempted to digress into a response to your mention of the Free
Enterprise Society and Wayne Bentson. Let me just say that Wayne has had an
advance copy of The Federal Zone, fourth edition, for several weeks now, and
he has fallen silent. I prefer to let the enclosed materials speak for
themselves.
I hope this letter and its enclosures have addressed most, if not all,
of the concerns you expressed in your thoughtful letter.
Thanks for writing.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
P.S. How does Wayne Bentson explain T.D. 2313?
It's crucial, wouldn't you agree?
MEMO
TO: Trusted Colleagues
FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
DATE: November 4, 1992
SUBJECT: Trusts, Foreign and Domestic
I have recently taken a keen interest in practical applications of The
Federal Zone to trust creation and administration. In particular, I now
believe I have enough evidence to prove that the correct distinction between
foreign and domestic corporations is equally applicable to trusts. The
purpose of this memo is to share some of this evidence with you, in order to
challenge your thinking on this subject and possibly to open new
possibilities for trust creation and administration.
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, is a good place to begin. In
this dictionary, we find the following important definitions:
Foreign situs trust. A trust which owes its existence to foreign law.
It is treated for tax purposes as a non-resident alien individual.
[emphasis added]
Foreign trust. A trust created and administered under foreign law.
Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, defines "foreign state" very clearly,
as follows:
The several United States*** are considered "foreign" to each other
except as regards their relations as common members of the Union.
[emphasis added]
I have added three asterisks ("***") after "United States" in order to
emphasize that the "United States" in this context refers to the 50 States
of the Union.
Now examine the definition of "foreign estate or trust" in the
definitions section of the Internal Revenue Code, as follows:
Foreign Estate or Trust. -- The terms "foreign estate" and "foreign
trust" mean an estate or trust, as the case may be, the income of which,
from sources without the United States which is not effectively connected
with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, is not
includible in gross income under subtitle A.
[IRC 7701(a)(31)]
Do a bit of grammatical reconstruction, so as to eliminate the references to
"foreign estate", and you get the following:
The term "foreign trust" means a trust, the income of which is not
includible in gross income under subtitle A. The income of a foreign trust
is not includible in gross income when it derives from sources which are
without the "United States" and which are not effectively connected with the
conduct of a trade or business within the "United States".
Recall the definition of "foreign situs trust" from Black's supra.
Now compare the IRC definition of "foreign trust" with the IRC definition of
"gross income" for nonresident alien individuals. Notice the component
criteria of gross income for a nonresident alien individual, and their close
similarity to the same criteria for foreign trusts:
In the case of a nonresident alien individual, except where the
context clearly indicates otherwise, gross income includes only --
(1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States
and which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business within the United States, and
(2) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States.
[IRC 872(a), emphasis added]
It is crucial to remember that the term "United States", as used in these
sections of the IRC, means the federal zone, i.e., the territory over which
Congress has exclusive legislative authority. Income which is derived from
sources without the "United States" is not included in gross income for
nonresident aliens. Likewise, income which is effectively connected with
the conduct of a trade or business without the "United States" is not
included in gross income for nonresident aliens. Therefore, I have proven
that the following rule has identical application to nonresident aliens and
foreign trusts:
Income is excludible from the computation of "gross income" if it
derives from sources which are without the "United States" and which are not
effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the
"United States".
Now, let's dig a little deeper in order to determine if this finding
is supported by other sections of the IRC. Find the heading "foreign
trusts" in the Topical Index of the IRC as published by Commerce
Clearinghouse. There you will find references to "situs" at 402(c) and
404(a)(4). Read these sections carefully:
Taxability of Beneficiary of Certain Foreign Situs Trusts. -- For purposes
of subsections (a) and (b), a stock bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust
which would qualify for exemption from tax under section 501(a) except for
the fact that it is a trust created or organized outside the United States
shall be treated as if it were a trust exempt from tax under section 501(a).
[IRC 402(c), emphasis added]
Trusts Created or Organized Outside the United States. -- If a stock
bonus, pension, or profit-sharing trust would qualify for exemption under
section 501(a) except for the fact that it is a trust created or organized
outside the United States, contributions to such a trust by an employer
which is a resident, or corporation, or other entity of the United States,
shall be deductible under the preceding paragraphs.
[IRC 404(a)(4), emphasis added]
It is a well established principle of law that the 50 States are "foreign"
with respect to each other, just as the federal zone is "foreign" with
respect to each of them (In re Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894)). The
status of being foreign is the same as "belonging to" or being "attached to"
another state or another jurisdiction. The proper legal distinction between
the terms "foreign" and "domestic" is best seen in Black's definitions of
foreign and domestic corporations, as follows:
Foreign corporation. A corporation doing business in one state though
chartered or incorporated in another state is a foreign corporation as to
the first state, and, as such, is required to consent to certain conditions
and restrictions in order to do business in such first state.
Domestic corporation. When a corporation is organized and chartered
in a particular state, it is considered a domestic corporation of that
state.
[emphasis added]
In light of all the above, I now contend that untold numbers of trusts
have been created on the basis of a belief that they are domestic trusts
when, in fact, they are foreign trusts, as the terms "domestic" and
"foreign" are defined in the IRC and in the law dictionaries. The Internal
Revenue Code was written under authority granted to Congress for the
exercise of exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the federal zone.
Accordingly, the 50 States and their respective laws are actually foreign
with respect to the federal zone. The 10th Amendment makes it very clear
that powers not specifically delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited to the States by the Constitution, are reserved
to the States or to the people. A common-law trust situated in California
exercises rights which are reserved to the people, because California is a
common-law State and because the U.S. Constitution specifically reserves
such rights to the people.
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
Postal Zone 94901/tdc
February 15, 1993
Dagny Sharon
Attorney-at-Law
c/o general delivery
Tustin, California state
Postal Zone 92680/tdc
Dear Dagny:
I appreciated the opportunity to make your acquaintance at the
Libertarian Party Convention in Sunnyvale this past weekend. I also regret
that we didn't have a chance to spend more time together. Your videotape is
quite original and light-hearted; I hope it brings you much success.
Had we found a way to spend more time talking with each other, there
is one important matter which I would definitely have wanted you to consider
more carefully. During our conversation in the bar, while I was eating
lunch, you implied that one of your goals is to work towards a "democracy"
for America. Whether you intended it this way or not, such a goal directly
contradicts Article 4, Section 4 of the Constitution for the United States
of America, to wit:
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government ....
What exactly is a "Republican Form" of government? It is one in which
the powers of sovereignty are vested in the people and exercised by the
people. Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, makes this very clear:
Republican government. One in which the powers of sovereignty are
vested in the people and are exercised by the people, either directly, or
through representatives chosen by the people, to whom those powers are
specially delegated. In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 11 S.Ct. 573, 35 L.Ed.
219; Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 22 L.Ed. 627.
Both the California State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution state
that the latter shall be the supreme Law of the land. In the U.S.
Constitution, Article 6, Clause 2 states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
At the turn of the century, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a series of
controversial cases now known as The Insular Cases. These cases were
predicated, in part, on the principle that the Constitution for the United
States as such does not extend beyond the boundaries of the States which are
united by and under it. Accordingly, this principle set a crucial precedent
whereby Congress was free to establish a legislative democracy within the
federal zone, instead of a constitutional republic.
The federal zone is the area over which Congress exercises exclusive
legislative jurisdiction; it encompasses the District of Columbia and such
areas as Guam and the Virgin Islands. Even more important is the fact that
this exclusive legislative jurisdiction extends to all persons who are
subject to it, regardless of where they may reside. As such, the status of
"citizen of the United States" (also known as "U.S. citizen") causes one to
be subject to the letter of all municipal statutes, rules and regulations
which Congress enacts under this exclusive legislative authority. The
constitutional definition of this second class of citizens is alleged to be
the so-called 14th Amendment. However, two standing decisions of the Utah
Supreme Court have struck down the ratification of this amendment. Coupled
with all the evidence which that Court utilized to arrive at these
decisions, we have therein good cause to conclude that the so-called 14th
Amendment is null and void for fraud and duress. My book The Federal Zone
discusses the so-called 14th Amendment as follows:
Not only did this so-called "amendment" fail to specify which meaning
of the term "United States" was being used; like the 16th Amendment, it
also failed to be ratified, this time by 15 of the 37 States which existed
in 1868. The House Congressional Record for June 13, 1967, contains all the
documentation you need to prove that the so-called 14th Amendment was never
ratified into law (see page 15641 et seq.). For example, it itemizes all
States which voted against the proposed amendment, and the precise dates
when their Legislatures did so. "I cannot believe that any court, in full
possession of its faculties, could honestly hold that the amendment was
properly approved and adopted." State v. Phillips, 540 P.2d. 936, 941
(1975). The Utah Supreme Court has detailed the shocking and sordid history
of the 14th Amendment's "adoption" in the case of Dyett v. Turner, 439 P.2d
266, 272 (1968).
With this background knowledge firmly in hand, it is easy to explain
why the federal government would reiterate the theme of "democracy" and
"democratic institutions" over and over in its media propaganda. It is now
obvious that such programming has been entirely successful; witness the
large percentage of "Libertarians" who make repeated reference to their
political goal of "democracy" for America. Perhaps without knowing it, they
are participating in the slow but steady demise of the nation symbolized by
the Stars and Stripes, "the Republic for which it stands, one Nation, under
God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all." The Insular Cases made
it possible for America to become divisible into a constitutional republic
and a legislative democracy. It is the strategy of "divide and conquer",
being applied once again with much success, this time to our very own
homeland.
I hope I have given you a few things to think about.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures: People v. Boxer pleadings
"Citizen is a Term of Municipal Law"
copy: Jerry Collette
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
Postal Zone 94901/tdc
February 7, 1993
John Voss, Director
N.C.B.A.
c/o general delivery
Longmont, Colorado
Postal Zone 80502/tdc
Dear John:
Thanks so much for all the materials which you recently sent, with a
copy of your letter to Mitchell Beals. Time permitting, I do intend to do a
thorough analysis of the written opinions. I am very disappointed, but not
surprised, that the appellate decisions were "not for publication". I took
all the decisions to the law library yesterday, but simply ran out of time.
Enclosed are the preliminary results of that one afternoon at the library.
Nevertheless, a distinct pattern is emerging already.
Item #1: 28 U.S.C. 297. Assignment of judges to courts of the freely
associated compact states
This statute was part of the comprehensive "Judicial Improvements Act"
submitted to Congress by Peter F. Rodino, Jr., Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives. It went into law on November 19, 1988
(P.L. 100-702, copy attached). Notice that subsection (a) refers to "the
freely associated compact states" and to "the laws of the respective compact
state". In and of themselves, these references are significant because I
was unable to find any discussion of the legislative history for this
specific statute; the material cited in U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News
skipped any mention of it. The statute is also too recent for any case law
to have developed, and much too recent for the term "freely associated
compact states" to appear in Words and Phrases, C.J.S., or Am Jur, although
"compact" has several meanings in Black's Law Dictionary.
What makes this term even more significant is the reference to it that
is found in subsection (b), to wit:
The Congress consents the acceptance and retention by any judge so
authorized of reimbursement from the countries referred to in subsection (a)
.....
[emphasis added]
I am going on memory now, but I do seem to recall a key exception to the
definition of "state" once found in Title 28. The exception was to another
provision of Title 28 which utilized the term "State court". I think this
exception has since been removed by subsequent amendment, but the
pre-amendment version clearly implied that the meaning of "state" as found
in the standard definition was different from the meaning of "state" as
intended by the term "State court" (hence the need for the "exception"
clause). Therefore, the standard definition implied a federal state, not a
Union State.
In section 297 supra, we are faced with a choice between two
conflicting and mutually incompatible interpretations of the term "freely
associated compact states". If these states are Union States, then the
"compact" may well be the U.S. Constitution and Congress has admitted openly
that Union States are the "countries referred to in subsection (a)". If
these states are other nations in the family of nations (e.g. China, Japan),
then the "countries" referred to in subsection (a) are these other nations,
and I can only speculate about the "compact" to which Section 297 refers.
Could it be the U.N. charter? If not, what else could it be? some
international treaty? I wonder if there is a way to inquire of the House
Judiciary Committee without tipping our own hands and giving the Committee a
reason to obfuscate the real answer. Or, what about the Library of
Congress, or Congressional Research Service? I wouldn't put too much faith
into the CRS, in light of the hack job they continue to do on "Frequently
Asked Questions about Federal Income Taxes".
This little tidbit is highly significant when placed in the larger
context of all the research now assembled into the electronic version of The
Federal Zone, third edition (disk enclosed). In particular, my
interpretation of the distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" is amply
supported by the definitions in Black's Sixth Edition, and especially by the
Supreme Court decision to uphold the New York Court's decision of In re
Merriam's Estate, 36 NE 505 (1894). Black's definitions of foreign and
domestic corporations, in my opinion, leave little room for doubt about the
correct distinction here. Black's defines "foreign state" very clearly, as
follows:
The several United States*** are considered "foreign" to each other
except as regards their relations as common members of the Union. ... [O]ne
state of the Union is foreign to another.
[emphasis added]
Item #2: U.S. Code Service, Lawyers Edition, Interpretive Notes
In light of the pivotal importance of this distinction between
"foreign" and "domestic", it was revealing to discover the nearly total
absence of case law on this question in the U.S.C.S. Lawyers Edition (where
you would expect a plethora of citations). In the main body of U.S.C.S.
dealing with the IRC definitions in 7701, there is only one reference to
"foreign estate" (a revenue ruling) and there are only two references to
"domestic building and loan association" (a revenue ruling and a district
court ruling). What is even more revealing is the case of U.S. v. Bardina,
the one and only citation to the IRC definition of "United States", to wit:
Even though 26 USCS 7701(a)(9) defines "United States" as including
only United States and District of Columbia, Puerto Rico is considered as
being within United States for purposes of 6-year statute of limitations on
tax crimes; ....
[emphasis added]
Notice the blatant tautology (again). Notice also that this interpretation
flatly contradicts the actual IRC definition:
(9) United States. -- The term "United States" when used in a geographical
sense includes only the States and the District of Columbia.
[IRC 7701(a)(9), emphasis added]
The term "States" is very different from the term "United States". And, of
course, the corresponding definition of "State" makes absolutely no mention
of any Union States:
(10) State. -- The term "State" shall be construed to include the District
of Columbia, where such construction is necessary to carry out provisions of
this title.
[IRC 7701(a)(10)]
Moving on to the Cumulative Supplement for the U.S.C.S. Lawyers
Edition, we find a similar pattern. Here, we find one revenue ruling
concerning a "foreign estate", and four citations to "resident and
nonresident alien", two of which are "TC Memos", one of which is a "Private
Letter Ruling", and one of which is a "Revenue Ruling". These are not
exactly sterling authorities! One of these citations concerned a former
official of a foreign government that was overthrown while he was in the
"United States" under diplomatic passport. Another concerned a "US citizen
who obtained a US passport before moving to a foreign country". Another
concerned a spouse's election to be treated as a resident alien under IRC
7701(b). The last citation is worth investigating:
Status of trust as foreign trust turns upon whether trust is
comparable to nonresident alien individual; trust established and
administered under laws of foreign country whose trustee is a foreign entity
and whose corpus is located in a foreign country is nonforeign trust even
though trust is grantor trust and its income is taxable to grantor who is
United States citizen. Rev Rul 87-61, 1987-2 CB 219.
[emphasis added]
It would be revealing to examine the details about the trust in
question, i.e., what was the "foreign country" under the laws of which the
trust was established and administered. If it was a Union State, we have a
bingo. Who or what was the "foreign entity" trustee? Where exactly was the
"corpus" located? Notice the term "nonforeign"; I presume this means
"domestic", based on the IRC definition of "foreign" at 7701(a)(5) (i.e.,
not domestic). Finally, notice that there is a "grantor" who is a "United
States citizen"; this status appears to be the only mention of any nexus
with the federal zone (if any).
Item #3: United States Code Annotated (U.S.C.A.)
Again, an identical pattern is found in the annotated version of the
United States Codes. Here, we do find an interesting exception to the
general rule for the federal zone, i.e., a Guam corporation is "foreign" for
federal income tax purposes:
Guam is not a "territory" within meaning of this section defining
domestic corporation as one created or organized in United States or under
laws of United States or of any state or territory, and Guam is considered a
possession so that its corporations are foreign for federal income tax
purposes. Sayre & Co. v. Riddell, C.A. Guam, 1968, 395 F.2d 407.
Notice how carefully they skirt the general issue of exclusive
legislative jurisdiction by ruling that Guam is a "possession", and
"possessions" were not mentioned in the IRC's definition of "domestic" at
that time ("or Territory" was deleted in 1977). In other words, in 1968 the
definition of "domestic" mentioned "United States", and "any State or
Territory". Since Guam was found to be a "possession" and not the "United
States", not a "State" and not a "Territory", it was not domestic and
therefore foreign. This is a fascinating little intricacy in this semantic
jungle.
The only other citation of any interest is the 1944 case which
interpreted the meaning of "includes". I consider this decision to be
erroneous, for reasons which I explain in detail in Chapter 12 of The
Federal Zone, third edition. Specifically, in formal English, a noun is
either a person, a place, or a thing. The IRC specifically defines a trust
to be a "person" as opposed to a "place" or a "thing" (see IRC 7701(a)(1)).
The clarification of "includes" at IRC 7701(c) specifically states that this
term shall not be deemed to exclude other things otherwise within the
meaning of term defined; notice that "persons" and "places" are
conspicuously absent from this clarification of "includes". Therefore, a
"trust" cannot be a thing otherwise within the definition of "transferee"
because a trust is a person, by definition, and a "transferee" is not a
person because it is not mentioned in the IRC definition of "person". I
know this may sound strained, but the IRC definition of "person" clearly
embraces only an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association,
company or corporation; moreover, there is ample evidence that the IRC does
obey strictly the rules of formal English grammar.
That's it! Now, don't you get the feeling, as I do, that they are
trying their best to avoid these crucial distinctions between "foreign" and
"domestic"? In light of the clarity which is found in Black's definitions
of foreign and domestic corporations, I would be hard pressed to demonstrate
a clear and consistent pattern among these sparse authorities, many of which
are not even courts. John, I am forced to conclude that some (if not all)
of these cases were contrived, and that a thorough set of consistent Court
authorities is very conspicuous for its absence.
Item #4: McKinley v. United States of America, S.D. Ohio, 1992
Time permitting, I will try my best to analyze the unpublished cases
which you generously provided to me. For now, I will take a brief look at
McKinley because it will be published, and because there is so little in
this decision which is relevant to The Federal Zone, i.e.:
The Court takes judicial notice that while Ohio is a
sovereign state, it is nevertheless part of the United States and Ohio
residents are also residents of the United States and are subject to
taxation. The Court finds the plaintiffs to be residents of the United
States and not non-resident aliens.
[emphasis added]
I guess this Court failed to read Hooven or the corresponding
definitions of "United States" in Black's. More importantly, this decision
flatly contradicts the definition of "United States" at IRC 7701(a)(9).
Sure, Ohio is part of the "United States" if "United States" means the
several States of the Union. However, the IRC says that "United States"
(when used in a geographical sense) includes only the District of Columbia
and the States, and "State" shall be construed to include the District of
Columbia (and nothing else)! Since singular and plural are interchangeable
(per Title 1), since "include" is not found in the clarification of
"includes" and "including" at 7701(c), and since 7701(c) mentions only
"things" and not "persons" or "places", we are entirely justified in arguing
that the term "United States" at 7701(a)(9) omits any mention of the Union
States because they were intended to be omitted. The rules of statutory
construction support this inference, as do the changes to 7701(a)(9) & (10)
that resulted from the Alaska and Hawaii Omnibus Acts: Alaska and Hawaii
were removed from the IRC definition of "State" when they joined the Union
(of freely associated compact states). So, as pro bono judge of the
Sovereign Electrical Circuit of Justice, I hereby reverse the holding in
McKinley v. United States of America and remand with instructions to take
explicit judicial notice of the legislative history of IRC 7701(a)(9), in
addition to the well established rules of statutory construction (see
Sutherland, for example).
Item #5: Notes on Decisions re: 1:6:2 and Null and Void Lloyd
These cases are either favorable or neutral. Lloyd, you are a sitting
duck. Notice also the careful IRC distinction between "Secretary of the
Treasury" and "Secretary" at 7701(a)(11). At first glance, this is bad news
for our 7401 challenge, but closer examination reveals the following:
(A) In General. -- The term "or his delegate" --
(i) when used with reference to the Secretary of the Treasury, means any
officer, employee, or agency of the Treasury Department duly authorized by
the Secretary of the Treasury directly, or indirectly by one or more
redelegations of authority, to perform the function mentioned or described
in the context;
Even though IRC 7401 utilizes the term "Secretary", which means the
Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate, the term "or his delegate" means
an officer, employee or agency duly authorized by the Secretary of the
Treasury either directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of
authority. In other words, Lloyd Bentsen must be in the loop, either
directly, or indirectly by one or more redelegations of authority. So, it
looks as if Null and Void Lloyd remains in a heap'a trouble; his colorable
acts will spread through the Treasury Department like a computer virus,
infecting everything they touch. We should get an expert on delegation of
authority to see what, if any, redelegations originated from Nicholas Brady
and whether they remain valid and in force after Bentsen's reign began.
Enough for now. I know you have nothing else to do but read these
technicalities. The devil is always in the details.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures
copy: Mitchell Beals
(great first name)
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
Postal Zone 94901/tdc
February 8, 1993
John Voss, Director
N.C.B.A.
c/o general delivery
Longmont, Colorado
Postal Zone 80502/tdc
Dear John:
In my letter to you of February 7, my memory failed me when I referred
to Title 28; the correct reference was Title 8 (I got one number right). I
tracked it down today for you, because I am convinced that one of the
"unpublished" cases which you recently sent to me is completely wrong for
ruling that Union States are not "foreign countries" for purposes of the
IRC. Enclosed is stunning proof of my position from American Jurisprudence.
I picked up the trail in Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, where
it defines "sovereign state" as follows:
In the United States, each state constitutes a discrete and
independent sovereignty, and consequently the laws of one state do not
operate of their own force in any other state. 16 AmJur J2d, "Conflict of
Laws", Section 4.
[Ballentine's Law Dictionary, Third Edition]
I had to go hunting for the corresponding section in Am Jur, because
the reference to Section 4 is a typographical error. I found what I was
looking for at Section 2 instead. The key is to understand that the IRC is
a "municipal law" as far as income taxation is concerned (see Conclusions in
The Federal Zone):
"... [T]he several states ... are otherwise, at least so far as
private international law is concerned, in the same relation as foreign
countries13. The great majority of questions of private international law
are therefore subject to the same rules when they arise between two states
of the Union as when they arise between two foreign countries, and in the
ensuing pages the words "state," "nation," and "country" are used
synonymously and interchangeably, there being no intention to distinguish
between the several states of the Union and foreign countries by the use of
varying terminology.
[16 Am Jur 2d, "Conflict of Laws", Section 2]
Notice, in particular, the comment in footnote 11:
In the sense of public international law, the several states of the Union
are neither foreign to the United States nor are they foreign to each other,
but such is not the case in the field of private international law.
Robinson v. Norato, 71 RI 256, 43 A2d 467, 162 ALR 362.
Not to be outdone, Black's Sixth Edition chimed in with the following
similar message:
The term "foreign state," as used in a statement of the rule that the
laws of foreign nations should be proved in a certain manner, should be
construed to mean all nations and states other than that in which the action
is brought; and hence one state of the Union is foreign to another, in the
sense of that rule.
[Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition]
Further stunning proof of The Federal Zone thesis is found in the
Immigration and Nationality Act (see attached), where Congress slipped by
including a key exception in its statutory definition of "State" at 8 USC
1101(a)(36). Prior to an amendment in 1987, this definition included the
language "(except as used in section 310(a) of title III [8 USCS Section
1421(a)])". At that time, Section 1421(a) of Title 8 referred to courts "in
any State" and "all courts of record in any State". I failed to pull the
current text of 1421(a), but the current 1101(a)(36) removed the exception
clause! I would bet that 1421(a) now has a special definition for the term
"State", because 1421(a) must be talking about courts of the Union States.
For corroboration, I have enclosed a page from the California State
Constitution (1879), wherein California Superior Courts are given clear
original jurisdiction to naturalize and "to issue papers therefor".
Sincerely yours,
/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell, Founder
Account for Better Citizenship
enclosures: photocopies of evidence
c/o general delivery
San Rafael
California state
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