Bush's Impending Watergate
By Harvey Wasserman
originally published on May 23, 1991
George Bush should be impeached. Whether he will be impeached depends
on the intestinal fortitude of Congress. But the evidence is clearly
sufficient to begin proceedings.
The grounds for impeachment rest in the now-familiar circumstances
around the 1980 Iranian hostage crisis. The story has circulated since
the mid 1980s, but in recent weeks has gained startling new
confirmation.
The circumstances are worth repeating: On November 4, 1979, radical
Iranian students seized some 55 American citizens and began a crisis
that lasted until the moment Ronald Reagan was inaugurated as
president 444 days later.
Future historians may well blame President Jimmy Carter for the
inception of the crisis. He ignored warnings that it could happen and
stumbled badly once it began. Some may also wonder if he exploited the
situation to deflect a challenge to his renomination from Sen. Edward
Kennedy.
But by October of 1980, one thing was clear: If the hostages were
released prior to the election, Carter would be re-elected. If not,
Ronald Reagan would win. All major polls -- including one by the
primary Republican pollster, Richard Wirthlin -- showed a 10 percent
swing on just that issue.
In early October, word spread through the world media that Carter had
negotiated a deal for the hostages' release. It was widely believed
that he had agreed to unfreeze some $4 billion in assets claimed by
the deposed Shah, and to supply spare parts to the American-made arms
inherited by the Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary regime. The
hostages were due home by mid-October, in ample time to assure
Carter's re-election.
Then, mysteriously, the deal was off. The hostages weren't coming home
after all. What happened?
The Iranians were known to detest Jimmy Carter. Despite his advocacy
of human rights, Carter had befriended the brutal, repressive Shah.
Conceivably, the Muslim fundamentalists tantalized Carter with the
hostages' possible release and then, just for the hell of it, left him
hanging.
There were other theories. Columnist George Will suggested that Iran
responded to Reagan because he had threatened to use nuclear weapons
if the hostages weren't released, something the pacifistic Carter
would not have done.
But two years later, Barbara Honegger, a member of the Reagan campaign
team, angrily left the White House staff, leveling charges of sexual
discrimination. She then asserted that during the 1980 campaign a
special "October Surprise" Committee had operated with a mandate that
appeared focused on sabotaging Carter's arrangements and guaranteeing
that the hostages remain in Teheran until after the 1980 election.
Honegger claimed no direct proof, but she recalled being told that the
hostages would not be coming home because October Surprise Committee
member Richard Allen (later chief of Reagan's National Security
Council) had "cut a deal" to keep them in Teheran. Future CIA director
William Casey may have masterminded the sabotage, Honegger said.
Honegger was dismissed by Reagan-Bush staffers as a "low-level
munchkin." But her allegations were given powerful confirmation in
1985 by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, president of Iran at the time of the
crisis. According to Bani-Sadr, George Bush, then candidate for vice
president, may personally have flown to Paris on a crucial weekend to
convince the son of the Ayatollah "that the hostages should not be
released during the Carter administration." Instead, Bani-Sadr said,
"they should be released when Reagan became president. So, in return,
Reagan would give them arms."
Indeed, Iran was desperately needed weapons to carry on its holy war
with Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Hostilities had begun in September, and
they were short on guns and cash. There was little doubt they would
trade whatever "assets" they had for the arms they needed -- including
the American hostages.
The story became common knowledge among top Middle Eastern operatives,
including Bassam Abu Sharif, number two man in the Palestine
Liberation Organization (assassinated during the recent Gulf War) and
Mansour Rafizadeh, a former CIA operative and head of the Shah's
dreaded SAVAK secret police.
"The deal was made to release the hostages exactly the moment Ronald
Reagan was president," Rafizadeh told the Other America's Radio
Network. "It was promised for the arms," said Rafizadeh. "The moment
Ronald Reagan was president, they signaled the plane [with the
hostages aboard], they took off. After, the shipment of the arms
started from Tel Aviv."
Despite repeated denials from the Reagan-Bush team, the story gained
some media prominence during the 1988 election, including a story in
the Advocate, a major feature co-authored by activist Abbie Hoffman
(now dead by an alleged suicide) in Playboy, and an op-ed in the
now-defunct Los Angeles Herald-Examiner.
Just prior to the election, a self-proclaimed former CIA operative
named Richard Brenneke claimed to have personally flown Bush to Paris
to negotiate the deal. Producers from CBS' 60 Minutes were preparing a
feature on Brenneke, who was in jail in Colorado, when questions about
his credibility were raised and the feature was canceled. The Miami
Herald, Los Angeles Times, Boston Globe and other major publications
carried stories concluding there was insufficient evidence to confirm
or deny the deal occurred.
Recently, Brenneke was cleared of perjury charges stemming from his
claimed connection to the Paris trip. And the assertions have
resurfaced with new power. Former Carter security adviser Gary Sick,
after a two-year investigation, has released a book arguing the
likelihood that an "arms for no hostages" deal was, in fact, made.
Bani-Sadr has issued a new book asserting the same thing. Bill Moyers'
Frontline devoted an entire program to it. Bush's denials -- issued
just before his recent heart problems -- that he ever flew to Paris
during the 1980s campaign made front-page news across the nation.
But does the story really turn on that? White House spokesperson
Marlin Fitzwater says all of Bush's time can be accounted for. Bush
has vehemently denied ever going to Paris during the 1980 campaign.
Yet the official log of Bush's whereabouts on the crucial weekend --
when he is alleged to have made the deal -- has a hole big enough for
him to have flown to Paris, negotiated the deal and then flown back.
The idea that the vice presidential candidate would have flown abroad
to negotiate a deal that amounts to treason might seem absurd. Bush,
after all, was formerly head of the Central Intelligence Agency, and a
master of plausible deniability. It was clearly out of character to
expose himself in such a direct manner to what could ultimately be a
scandal of truly epic proportions.
On the other hand, the Iranians could well have demanded Bush's
personal presence. It was well-known that the Ayatollah's cabal put
little faith in the American electoral system. Like many Iranians,
they believed that the true power in U.S. politics rested not with
elected officials, but with the secret police, i.e. the CIA. As the
CIA's former head, they believed Bush to be the true power in the
Reagan-Bush campaign, and may well have demanded his personal approval
for any trade of their hostage "assets."
Even so, the question of Bush going to Paris may be a red herring. The
circumstances pointing to the likelihood of a deal being made are
overwhelming. That Carter had all but secured their release is
well-known. That there was a Reagan-Bush October Surprise Committee
run by Allen and Casey is undeniable, as is the fact that the hostages
were released precisely at the moment that Ronald Reagan was sworn in
as President. It is also well-known that large quantities of
American-sponsored arms began flowing through Israel in March 1981.
As for the question of Iranian motive, although Khomeini profoundly
hated Jimmy Carter, he had no reason to like Reagan more, and would
hardly have bothered to spite one representative of the "Great Satan"
over another. In Iran's jihad with Saddam Hussein, however, the
hostages were an asset to be traded, a bargaining chip to go to the
highest bidder. Carter was deeply disinclined to send Iran large
quantities of arms; once in office, Reagan did just that.
Thus, the evidence suggesting that George Bush actually flew to Paris
to negotiate the deal is ultimately irrelevant. As the number two man
on the ticket and the former head of the CIA, no such deal would have
been cut without Bush's approval, whether he flew to Paris or not.
And that means high treason and public crimes of the highest order.
The ideal that the nominees of a major party could have knowingly
prolonged the agony of American citizens in exchange for weapons is
about as low as one could imagine any politician sinking.
In fact, the sabotage may even have preceded the October negotiations.
Earlier in 1980, Carter set out to free the hostages with "Operation
Eagle Claw," built around a surprise helicopter landing and secret
assault on the building where they were held in Teheran.
The mission proved disastrous. At least two American helicopters
crashed into each other in the desert long before they made it
anywhere near Teheran. Eight Marines were killed. Carter looked
ineffectual and frustration with the hostage crisis escalated.
Unfortunately, the operatives in charge of Desert Claw may not have
been loyal to Carter -- or to the U.S. Carter held deeply alienated a
broad range of CIA operatives by trying to clean up the Agency when he
first came to power. Admiral Stansfield Turner, the tough but honest
Navy man Carter put in charge at the CIA fired some 600 "spooks" soon
after taking command. Many were deeply loyal to former Director George
Bush and to the "Old Boy" network that serves as the Agency's true
infrastructure.
That loyalty may have carried over to sabotage of Operation Eagle
Claw. For the man who served as chief mission planner was none other
than Richard Secord, who later surfaced as a major kingpin in the
shady arms dealings between the Reagan White House and the contras of
Nicaragua. A top staffer at a key base in Eagle Claw's catastrophic
helicopter support operation was none other than the legendary Colonel
Oliver North. Working closely with him as a logistical planner was
Albert Hakkim, who later sat by Secord's side at the Congressional
Iran-contra hearings and wept of his love for Oliver North.
As historian Donald Fried has put it "Precisely the people in the
intelligence community commissioned to develop some kind of rescue for
the hostages were those elements of covert action close to William
Casey and hostile to Carter."
Casey, of course, later became Reagan's CIA chief. But higher up in
the chain at the time of the failed rescue mission was Donald Gregg, a
member of Carter's National Security Council who later surfaced as s
high-level Bush operative. Gregg's close personal ties to Bush became
a serious issue in light of his extensive dealings with key contra
figures tied both to the Iran-contra scandal and illegal drug
shipments coming from Central America. Gregg is now Bush's ambassador
to South Korea.
In a recent interview Carter specifically implied that Gregg might
have betrayed key security items to Bush during the 1980 campaign.
Students of the affair, including author Gary Sick, also wonder if
Gregg might have fed the Reagan-Bush team key items in the dealings
between Carter and the Iranians.
At this point with Bush's popularity so high on the heels of a
much-desired military victory millions of Americans would not want to
believe such a story could be true. The U.S. triumph over Saddam
Hussein clearly filled a psychological void plaguing Americans since
Vietnam. It allowed for a military triumph where the most recent
memory had been of defeat. And it gave Americans the opportunity to do
penance for the mistreatment of Vietnam veterans by showering those
who fought the brief Gulf War with a heroes' welcome outstripping
anything since World War II and way out of proportion for the size and
duration of the Iraqi massacre.
Nonetheless, there is nothing in the character of the Reagan-Bush
regimes that indicates a moral incapability of cutting such a deal.
More than 200 members of the administration were indicted during their
eight-year tenure, including Attorney General Edwin Meese and close
Reagan counselors Michael Deaver and Lyn Nofziger. By all accounts,
the Reagan-Bush administration were the most corrupt since the short
term of Ulysses S. Grant.
The idea that Ronald Reagan and George Bush could have conspired to
prolong the torment of U.S. hostages dwarfs the miasma that was
Watergate on both a moral and political scale. Ultimately its impact
will depend on the willingness of Congress to investigate the facts
and act on what it finds. It is time for Congress to once again assume
its role in the balance of powers. Impeachment means bringing to
trial. The evidence is clearly sufficient to begin the process.
http://old.valleyadvocate.com/25th/archives/bushs_watergate.html
"If I can not dance, I want no part in your revolution." Emma Goldman
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