| Topic: |
Politics > Politics-USA |
| User: |
"nkdatta8839" |
| Date: |
02 Jun 2004 12:23:45 PM |
| Object: |
Pakistan Dictator's "Enlightened Moderation" |
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/ayaz.htm
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
28 May 2004 Friday 08 Rabi-us-Saani 1425
Moderation and modernism
By Ayaz Amir
...... [General Pervez Musharraf] called for rejecting extremism and
for making Pakistan a "tolerant, moderate and progressive nation."
Fine but who's given Pakistan its image problem as a jihad-friendly
nation? Who espoused jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir? The army in
command of politics or the people with zero input in decision-making?
All right, times have changed and the army, under the impact of the
attacks of September 11, has moved on, from jihad to a new state of
blessedness called "enlightened moderation".
But when you are responsible for a mess in the first place, isn't some
humility in order? Perhaps elsewhere but not in our climate. For the
way army commanders now go on, you would think they had never heard of
jihad.
Straighten this one out too. How on earth do you make any nation
"progressive" when the army barricades democratic space and insists on
running the show itself? Pakistan under Musharraf is no different from
Indonesia under Suharto. The army permeating every institution of
state, in the process destroying its own elan and crippling what it
touches.
The only difference and for which--let there be no cavil about
it--Musharraf is likely to be remembered is the scope allowed for
freedom of expression. For all its other shortcomings, Pakistan
remains a relatively open society, far better in this regard than most
other Muslim countries.
Lest memories be short, this is a radical advance over the Zia years
when no one could criticize the army directly, much less the ISI.
Which leads to a strange paradox. Even as the military spreads its
wings, it stands stripped of its holy cow status. The demystification
of the army was long overdue. But it has accelerated under Musharraf,
in part owing to the army's involvement in too many things.
Who knows this may be a good augury for the future. Change comes about
when the old order is discredited. Or when it outlives its utility.
Suhartoization is doing the military no good. The more it seeks
conspicuous privilege, the more it goes into real estate and housing
colonies, the worse becomes its image problem.
The discontent of the Ayub years was summed up by that evocative
phrase "22 families": the industrial mafia in whose hands, it was
said, national wealth was concentrated. Fairly or unfairly, what the
22 families stood for then, defence housing colonies stand for now.
......
...... For over 20 years the Pakistan army, especially the ISI, was
involved in various forms of jihadi activity: against the Soviets,
then in support of their favourites like Hekmatyar, then in support of
the Taliban.
At some point this activity also spilled over into Indian-occupied
Kashmir. With the ISI as its auxiliaries were various jihadi
organizations like the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba and, later, Jaish-i-Muhammad.
When this culture of jihad was in full bloom, it was considered the
greatest thing happening in Pakistan. Indeed, right until the eve of
September 11, General Musharraf subscribed as strongly to this
orthodoxy as any of his peers.
His change of heart and that of the army command only came about the
morning after when America piled on the pressure and it became clear
that there was no way of avoiding a reverse gear on Afghanistan. From
jihad Pakistan swung suddenly to "moderation", all in the twinkling of
an eye.
In the first flush of this conversion, Musharraf maintained that the
Kashmir policy would remain unchanged. Then as it became clear that
signing on for American duty was a package and involved not only
change in Afghanistan but also renunciation in Kashmir, the army
command started singing a different tune, now proclaiming a war on
religious extremism. .....
...... Gen Zia's military rule was the disequilibrium which produced
jihad. Jihad may have ended but the disequilibrium in the form of
another version of military rule remains, with the army still
operating on the principle that it knows best for Pakistan.
Moderation was something forced on Pakistan. What Pakistan must seek
for itself is 'modernism', a modern, forward-looking outlook on life
which, if the past is any guide, it won't achieve as long as the army
retains its stranglehold on politics and refuses to allow democracy to
take hold.
.
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| User: "nkdatta8839" |
|
| Title: Re: Pakistan Dictator's "Enlightened Moderation" |
21 Jun 2004 04:14:20 PM |
|
|
Military dictatorship is not a sign
of abundant enlightenment. And moderated
enlightenment cannot possibly lead to
enlightened moderation:
================================================================================
The Friday Times, Lahore, Pakistan
June 11-17, 2004
EDITORIAL
Fate of ‘enlightened moderation'
By Najam Sethi
...... In Saudi Arabia it was part of a Faustian bargain in which the
House of Saud exchanged control of religion, education and culture
with the Wahhabi establishment for state power and Saudi Arabia's
fabulous oil wealth.
In Pakistan, the military's Faustian bargain involved exchanging
control of religion, education and culture with the mullahs for their
support to the state's ‘regional' objectives as well as to the army's
requirement of blocking the development of a democratic, accountable
and representative political system in which civilian supremacy is the
norm rather than the exception.
What has General Musharraf done to reverse these trends in the cause
of ‘enlightened moderation'?
Little. General Musharraf has reined in the jihadis. But he has made
no move to disband them. General Musharraf has abandoned the Taliban
in Afghanistan. But he has not cracked down on them in Pakistan. More
significantly, General Musharraf is still putting his faith in a
rotten political alliance with the mullahs instead of the anti-mullah
mainstream parties and leaders who are natural political votaries of
‘enlightened moderation'.
General Pervez Musharraf's failure to practice the politics of
‘enlightened moderation' is based on his personal need to remain in
power at all costs and the military's insistence on ruling and running
Pakistan at all times. Both personal and institutional interests are
therefore in antagonistic contradiction with the requirements of
‘enlightened moderation'. Indeed, a necessary condition for
enlightened moderation in Pakistan is that the military should concede
political supremacy to the civilians and the author of enlightened
moderation, General Musharraf, should become the vehicle for
concluding such a national Compact.
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| User: "nkdatta8839" |
|
| Title: Re: Pakistan Dictator's "Enlightened Moderation" |
21 Jun 2004 04:16:02 PM |
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Military dictatorship is not a sign
of abundant enlightenment. And moderated
enlightenment cannot possibly lead to
enlightened moderation:
================================================================================http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_11-6-2004_pg3_1
The Daily Times, Lahore, Pakistan
Friday, June 11, 2004
EDITORIAL
The challenge is real; the danger clear and present
...... The irony should not be lost on anyone. The hotbed of Muslim
extremism was the Middle East, primarily Egypt and Algeria. Syria
tackled the problem of Muslim Brotherhood in February 1982 when Hafiz
Asad crushed the uprising in Hama and razed the city to the ground.
Egypt and Algeria too had to take stringent measures to put down the
Gama', Al-Jihad, the FIS and the GIA. But Pakistan did not have such
an ‘extremist' problem. For all its political uncertainties, it
allowed the religious parties to play a role. And despite their social
conservatism and retrogressive attitude towards women and minorities,
their cadres were not radicalised into terrorism. But all this began
to change after the Afghan war when we ‘handled' the jihad in
Afghanistan. Later, we meddled in Afghanistan and created an unholy
linkage between our Afghanistan and Kashmir policies.
For many years independent observers continued to point to the fallout
of these flawed policies. But the state had its own calculus to
determine costs and benefits. Laws were Islamised on the basis of a
literalist exegesis, syllabi were tempered with and distorted, the
official media were used to project a certain kind of worldview, the
‘independent' newspapers were either coerced or co-opted to do the
same...in short, an environment was created in which free thinking,
inquiry and rationalism was put to the sword. The point is that the
state not only supported certain groups to push its policies outside
but created an environment inside which could get willing recruits for
these groups to keep operating. .....
...... General Musharraf had an opportunity to get this country out of
the morass into which his predecessor General Zia-ul Haq had pushed
it. He could have used his unfettered power to that end. Instead, he
chose to pursue the unholy alliance with the religious elements and
jihadi-sectarian groups for purely opportunistic and personal reasons.
The sad part is that even after the bloodshed and after General
Musharraf himself has been attacked and faced the threat of
elimination, there does not appear to be any understanding among his
advisors of the contradictions built into the system he has put in
place. The biggest indication of internal threat to a country comes
when its army is attacked. We have seen that happen in South
Waziristan; we have now seen it happen in Karachi.
It is no coincidence that the two states that today face the gravest
danger from extremist terrorism are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Both
have been allies in the cloak-and-dagger stuff that started with the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The House of Saud thought it could
bribe its way out of its troubles; the Pakistan army always thought it
could not be threatened by its own creation. Both were clearly wrong.
Both, therefore, need to change their own orientation.
If General Musharraf wants things to improve, he will have to get out
of his one-step forward, two-steps backwards approach. For starters,
he will have to abandon his political alliance with the mullahs. Then
he will have to broaden his domestic political support base by
co-opting those political forces that can identify with his secular
agenda. .....
================================================================================
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/ayaz.htm
DAWN, Karachi, Pakistan
28 May 2004 Friday 08 Rabi-us-Saani 1425
Moderation and modernism
By Ayaz Amir
...... [General Pervez Musharraf] called for rejecting extremism and
for making Pakistan a "tolerant, moderate and progressive nation."
Fine but who's given Pakistan its image problem as a jihad-friendly
nation? Who espoused jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir? The army in
command of politics or the people with zero input in decision-making?
All right, times have changed and the army, under the impact of the
attacks of September 11, has moved on, from jihad to a new state of
blessedness called "enlightened moderation".
But when you are responsible for a mess in the first place, isn't some
humility in order? Perhaps elsewhere but not in our climate. For the
way army commanders now go on, you would think they had never heard of
jihad.
Straighten this one out too. How on earth do you make any nation
"progressive" when the army barricades democratic space and insists on
running the show itself? Pakistan under Musharraf is no different from
Indonesia under Suharto. The army permeating every institution of
state, in the process destroying its own elan and crippling what it
touches.
The only difference and for which--let there be no cavil about
it--Musharraf is likely to be remembered is the scope allowed for
freedom of expression. For all its other shortcomings, Pakistan
remains a relatively open society, far better in this regard than most
other Muslim countries.
Lest memories be short, this is a radical advance over the Zia years
when no one could criticize the army directly, much less the ISI.
Which leads to a strange paradox. Even as the military spreads its
wings, it stands stripped of its holy cow status. The demystification
of the army was long overdue. But it has accelerated under Musharraf,
in part owing to the army's involvement in too many things.
Who knows this may be a good augury for the future. Change comes about
when the old order is discredited. Or when it outlives its utility.
Suhartoization is doing the military no good. The more it seeks
conspicuous privilege, the more it goes into real estate and housing
colonies, the worse becomes its image problem.
The discontent of the Ayub years was summed up by that evocative
phrase "22 families": the industrial mafia in whose hands, it was
said, national wealth was concentrated. Fairly or unfairly, what the
22 families stood for then, defence housing colonies stand for now.
......
...... For over 20 years the Pakistan army, especially the ISI, was
involved in various forms of jihadi activity: against the Soviets,
then in support of their favourites like Hekmatyar, then in support of
the Taliban.
At some point this activity also spilled over into Indian-occupied
Kashmir. With the ISI as its auxiliaries were various jihadi
organizations like the Lashkar-i-Tayyaba and, later, Jaish-i-Muhammad.
When this culture of jihad was in full bloom, it was considered the
greatest thing happening in Pakistan. Indeed, right until the eve of
September 11, General Musharraf subscribed as strongly to this
orthodoxy as any of his peers.
His change of heart and that of the army command only came about the
morning after when America piled on the pressure and it became clear
that there was no way of avoiding a reverse gear on Afghanistan. From
jihad Pakistan swung suddenly to "moderation", all in the twinkling of
an eye.
In the first flush of this conversion, Musharraf maintained that the
Kashmir policy would remain unchanged. Then as it became clear that
signing on for American duty was a package and involved not only
change in Afghanistan but also renunciation in Kashmir, the army
command started singing a different tune, now proclaiming a war on
religious extremism. .....
...... Gen Zia's military rule was the disequilibrium which produced
jihad. Jihad may have ended but the disequilibrium in the form of
another version of military rule remains, with the army still
operating on the principle that it knows best for Pakistan.
Moderation was something forced on Pakistan. What Pakistan must seek
for itself is 'modernism', a modern, forward-looking outlook on life
which, if the past is any guide, it won't achieve as long as the army
retains its stranglehold on politics and refuses to allow democracy to
take hold.
.
|
|
|
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| User: "nkdatta8839" |
|
| Title: Re: Pakistan Dictator's "Enlightened Moderation" |
21 Jun 2004 04:15:12 PM |
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http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticle.asp?xfile=data/theworld/2004/June/theworld_June311.xml§ion=theworld&col=
The Khaleej Times, Dubai, UAE
16 June 2004
September 11 report says Pakistan helped Taleban support Al Qaeda
(AFP)
WASHINGTON - An official report into the September 11, 2001 attacks
said Wednesday that Pakistan helped the Taleban regime in Afghanistan
to give a haven to Al Qaeda in the face of international pressure.
The report from the official investigation into the attacks by Al
Qaeda on New York and Washington said that Pakistan broke with the
Taleban only after September 11, even though it knew the Afghan
militia was hiding Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden.
"The Taleban's ability to provide bin Laden a haven in the face of
international pressure and UN sanctions was significantly facilitated
by Pakistani support," the report said.
"Pakistan benefitted from the Taleban-Al Qaeda relationship, as bin
Laden's camps trained and equipped fighters for Pakistan's ongoing
struggle with India over Kashmir."
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| User: "nkdatta8839" |
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| Title: Re: Pakistan Dictator's "Enlightened Moderation" |
21 Jun 2004 04:12:50 PM |
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http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-alqaeda20jun20,1,440629.story?coll=la-home-headlines
LA Times
Suncay, June 20, 2004
2 Allies Aided Bin Laden, Say Panel Members
By Josh Meyer
WASHINGTON — Pakistan and Saudi Arabia helped set the stage for the
Sept. 11 attacks by cutting deals with the Taliban and Osama bin Laden
that allowed his Al Qaeda terrorist network to flourish, according to
several senior members of the Sept. 11 commission and U.S.
counter-terrorism officials.
...... For years, there have been unsubstantiated allegations that the
governments of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia intentionally ignored Bin
Laden's efforts in their countries or even cut deals with him, either
out of sympathy with his efforts or to protect themselves from attack.
That claim is made in a lawsuit by the families of Sept. 11 victims
against Saudi Arabia.
Both governments have strenuously denied this, and did so again
Saturday.
"President [Pervez] Musharraf has been taking serious steps against
extremism from the day he took power in October of 1999," including
trying to purge the government of Al Qaeda sympathizers, said Talat
Waseem, a spokeswoman for the Pakistani government.
A senior Saudi official acknowledged that Sept. 11 commission
investigators and members asked about such matters during two visits
to Saudi Arabia and in interviews with Prince Turki al Faisal, the
longtime intelligence minister who is now ambassador to Britain.
"This whole notion of us buying off Bin Laden is nonsense," said the
Saudi official, who declined to be identified. "It's nuts. Do you
trust a thug and a murderer like Bin Laden? You can't."
But commission investigators have come to believe that these
allegations are credible, based on their exhaustive review of all of
the classified intelligence data known to the U.S. government. The
commission's 80 staffers also conducted thousands of interviews in the
United States and abroad, and had access to the interrogations of Al
Qaeda's most senior operatives in U.S. custody, including accused
Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed.
"There's no question the Taliban was getting money from the Saudis …
and there's no question they got much more than that from the
Pakistani government," said former Sen. Bob Kerrey, one of the
congressionally appointed commission's 10 members. "Their motive is a
secondary issue for us."
Kerrey said the commission officials believed that the Saudi
government had a mutually beneficial relationship with the Taliban
that bought Riyadh safety from attack.
"Whether there was quid pro quo with the Saudis, we don't know. But
certainly the Pakistanis believed that there was. They benefited
enormously from their relationship with the Taliban and Al Qaeda."
Kerrey said the findings were based almost entirely on information
known to officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations, most
of it as early as 1997 — just months after Bin Laden moved his
operations from Sudan to Afghanistan. .....
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