ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
[prepared by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References
3
Background
6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation
and Detention Operations In Iraq
(MG Miller's Assessment).
.
........... 8
IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment..
8
Report on Detention and Corrections In Iraq
(MG Ryder's Report).................................... 9
IO Comments on MG Ryder's Report
...
12
Preliminary Investigative Actions
.. 12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One (Detainee Abuse).
15
Findings
. 15
Recommendations
20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability)
.. 22
Findings
. 22
Recommendations.
31
Part Three (Command Climate, Etc
).
34
Findings
36
Recommendations
44
Other Findings/Observations
49
Conclusion
50
Annexes
51
References
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12
August 1949Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August 1949
3. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12
August 1949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1967
5. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status of Refugees, 1951
6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War Victims, 12 August 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 12 August 1949DOD Directive 5100.69, "DOD Program for
Prisoners of War and other Detainees," 27 December 1972DOD Directive
5100.77 "DOD Law of War Program," 10 July 1979STANAG No. 2044,
Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition 5), 28 June
1994STANAG No. 2033, Interrogation of Prisoners of War (PW) (Edition
6), 6 December 1994AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, 1 October 1997AR
190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996
14. AR 190-14, Carrying of Firearms and Use of Force for Law
Enforcement and Security Duties, 12 March 1993
15. AR 195-5, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives,
12 February 1998
17. AR 190-12, Military Police Working Dogs, 30 September 1993
18. AR 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program, 30 September 1993
19. AR 380-67, Personnel Security Program, 9 September 1988
20. AR 380-5, Department of the Army Information Security, 31
September 2000
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Army Uniforms and Insignia, 5
September 2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of
Officers, 11 May 1988
24. AR 27-10, Military Justice, 6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted Personnel, 1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobilization, 6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Evaluation Reports, 1 April 1998
30. AR 175-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999
FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment/Resettlement Operations, 1
August 2001FM 3-19.1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001FM
3-19.4, Military Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 March 2002 FM 3-05.30,
Psychological Operations, 19 June 2000FM 33-1-1, Psychological
Operations Techniques and Procedures, 5 May 1994FM 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogation, 28 September 1992FM 19-15, Civil Disturbances, 25
November 198538. FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organizations and Functions, 23 May 1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Security, 8 January 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Battalion (IR)
43. ARTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Guard Company
44. ARTEP 19-647-30 MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Escort Guard Company
45. STP 19-95B1-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS 95B, Military Police, Skill
Level 1, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95C14-SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS
95C Internment/Resettlement Specialist, Skill Levels 1/2/3/4, 26 March
1999
47. STP 19-95C1-SM MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Level 1,
Soldier's Manual, 30 September 2003
48. STP 19-95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levels
2/3/4, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide, 30 September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention
Operations in Iraq, (MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander JTF-GTMO,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba), 9 September 2003
50. Assessment of Detention and Corrections Operations in Iraq, (MG
Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003
51. CJTF-7 FRAGO #1108, Subject: includes- para 3.C.8 & 3.C.8.A.1,
Assignment of 205 MI BDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central
Confinement Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003
52. CJTF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligence and Evidence-Led
Detention Operations Relating to Detainees, 24 August 2003
53. 800th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject: Rules of Engagement, 26 December
2003
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance
Policy, 12 October 2003
55. CG CJTF-7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting Operations,
13 December 2003
56. Uniform Code of Military Justice and Manual for Courts Martial,
2002 Edition
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE800th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 19 January 2004, Lieutenant General (LTG) Ricardo S.
Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) requested
that the Commander, US Central Command, appoint an Investigating
Officer (IO) in the grade of Major General (MG) or above to
investigate the conduct of operations within the 800th Military Police
(MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of detention and
internment operations by the Brigade from 1 November 2003 to present.
LTG Sanchez cited recent reports of detainee abuse, escapes from
confinement facilities, and accountability lapses, which indicated
systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a lack of clear
standards, proficiency, and leadership. LTG Sanchez requested a
comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make findings and
recommendations concerning the fitness and performance of the 800th MP
Brigade. (ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 January 2003, the Chief of Staff of US Central Command
(CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whitcomb, on behalf of the CENTCOM Commander,
directed that the Commander, Coalition Forces Land Component Command
(CFLCC), LTG David D. McKiernan, conduct an investigation into the
800th MP Brigade's detention and internment operations from 1 November
2003 to present. CENTCOM directed that the investigation should
inquire into all facts and circumstances surrounding recent reports of
suspected detainee abuse in Iraq. It also directed that the
investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses
as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more comprehensive and
all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the 800th
MP Brigade. (ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January 2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG Antonio
M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, CFLCC, to conduct this
investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an informal
investigation under AR 15-6 into the 800th MP Brigade's detention and
internment operations. Specifically, MG Taguba was tasked to:
a. (U) Inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding recent
allegations of detainee abuse, specifically allegations of
maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement
Facility (BCCF));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as
reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events
at the Abu Ghraib Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command
policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP
Brigade, as appropriate;
d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the
investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action, as
appropriate. (ANNEX 4)
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the 800th MP Brigade
followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army
Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC) into specific allegations of
detainee abuse committed by members of the 372nd MP Company, 320th MP
Battalion in Iraq. These units are part of the 800th MP Brigade. The
Brigade is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON to CJTF-7, but OPCON to CFLCC
at the time this investigation was initiated. In addition, CJTF-7 had
several reports of detainee escapes from US/Coalition Confinement
Facilities in Iraq over the past several months. These include Camp
Bucca, Camp Ashraf, Abu Ghraib, and the High Value Detainee (HVD)
Complex/Camp Cropper. The 800th MP Brigade operated these facilities.
In addition, four Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had been
formally charged under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
with detainee abuse in May 2003 at the Theater Internment Facility
(TIF) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXES 5-18, 34 and 35)
5. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual
appointment by the CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter experts
from the CFLCC Provost Marshal (PM) and the CFLCC Staff Judge Advocate
(SJA). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be
my Deputy for this investigation. I also contacted the Provost Marshal
General of the Army, MG Donald J. Ryder, to enlist the support of MP
subject matter experts in the areas of detention and internment
operations. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Investigating Team also reviewed the Assessment of DoD
Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq
conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force
Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO). From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller
led a team of personnel experienced in strategic interrogation to HQ,
CJTF-7 and the Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi
Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable
intelligence. MG Miller's team focused on three areas: intelligence
integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations;
and detention operations. MG Miller's team used JTF-GTMO procedures
and interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiry with an in-depth
analysis of the Report on Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated 5
November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team of military police,
legal, medical, and automation experts. The CJTF-7 Commander, LTG
Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts to
assess, and make specific recommendations concerning detention and
corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG Ryder
personally led this assessment/assistance team in Iraq. (ANNEX 19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION
OPERATIONS IN IRAQ (MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT)
1. (S/NF) The principal focus of MG Miller's team was on the strategic
interrogation of detainees/internees in Iraq. Among its conclusions in
its Executive Summary were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and
procedures in place to affect a unified strategy to detain,
interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq.
The Executive Summary also stated that detention operations must act
as an enabler for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) With respect to interrogation, MG Miller's Team recommended
that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force subordinate to
the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) Commander that "sets
the conditions for the successful interrogation and exploitation of
internees/detainees." Regarding Detention Operations, MG Miller's team
stated that the function of Detention Operations is to provide a safe,
secure, and humane environment that supports the expeditious
collection of intelligence. However, it also stated "it is essential
that the guard force be actively engaged in setting the conditions for
successful exploitation of the internees." (ANNEX 20)
3. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint Strategic
Interrogation Operations (within CJTF-7) are hampered by lack of
active control of the internees within the detention environment. The
Miller Team also stated that establishment of the Theater Joint
Interrogation and Detention Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will
consolidate both detention and strategic interrogation operations and
result in synergy between MP and MI resources and an integrated,
synchronized, and focused strategic interrogation effort. (ANNEX 20)
4. (S/NF) MG Miller's team also observed that the application of
emerging strategic interrogation strategies and techniques contain new
approaches and operational art. The Miller Team also concluded that a
legal review and recommendations on internee interrogation operations
by a dedicated Command Judge Advocate is required to maximize
interrogation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)
IO COMMENTS ON MG MILLER'S ASSESSMENT
1. (S/NF) MG Miller's team recognized that they were using JTF-GTMO
operational procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines for
its observations and recommendations. There is a strong argument that
the intelligence value of detainees held at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is
different than that of the detainees/internees held at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there are a
large number of Iraqi criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These are
not believed to be international terrorists or members of Al Qaida,
Anser Al Islam, Taliban, and other international terrorist
organizations. (ANNEX 20)
2. (S/NF) The recommendations of MG Miller's team that the "guard
force" be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful
exploitation of the internees would appear to be in conflict with the
recommendations of MG Ryder's Team and AR 190-8 that military police
"do not participate in military intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF template whereby
military police actively set the favorable conditions for subsequent
interviews runs counter to the smooth operation of a detention
facility. (ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS
IN IRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a comprehensive
review of the entire detainee and corrections system in Iraq and
provided recommendations addressing each of the following areas as
requested by the Commander CJTF-7:
a. (U) Detainee and corrections system management
b. (U) Detainee management, including detainee movement, segregation,
and accountability
c. (U) Means of command and control of the detention and corrections
system
d. (U) Integration of military detention and corrections with the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for
transition to an Iraqi-run corrections system
e. (U) Detainee medical care and health management
f. (U) Detention facilities that meet required health, hygiene, and
sanitation standards
g. (U) Court integration and docket management for criminal detainees
h. (U) Detainee legal processing
i. (U) Detainee databases and records, including integration with law
enforcement and court databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations of MG Ryder's team are
beyond the scope of this investigation. However, several important
findings are clearly relevant to this inquiry and are summarized below
(emphasis is added in certain areas):
A. (U) Detainee Management (including movement, segregation, and
accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide variance in standards and approaches at the
various detention facilities. Several Division/Brigade collection
points and US monitored Iraqi prisons had flawed or insufficiently
detailed use of force and other standing operating procedures or
policies (e.g. weapons in the facility, improper restraint techniques,
detainee management, etc.) Though, there were no military police units
purposely applying inappropriate confinement practices. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, Iraqi
criminals (generally Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detained with security
internees (generally Iraqi-on-Coalition offenses) and EPWs in the same
facilities, though segregated in different cells/compounds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The management of multiple disparate groups of detained people
in a single location by members of the same unit invites confusion
about handling, processing, and treatment, and typically facilitates
the transfer of information between different categories of detainees.
(ANNEX 19)
4. (U) The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive
Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections specific training during
their mobilization period. Corrections training is only on the METL of
two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one currently
serving in Afghanistan, and elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan,
Kuwait. MP units supporting JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in
detention facility operations, to include two days of unarmed
self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced
cell moves, and correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and Corrections
System
1. (U) The 800th MP Brigade was originally task organized with eight
MP(I/R) Battalions consisting of both MP Guard and Combat Support
companies. Due to force rotation plans, the 800th redeployed two
Battalion HHCs in December 2003, the 115th MP Battalion and the 324th
MP Battalion. In December 2003, the 400th MP Battalion was relieved of
its mission and redeployed in January 2004. The 724thMP Battalion
redeployed on 11 February 2004 and the remainder is scheduled to
redeploy in March and April 2004. They are the 310th MP Battalion,
320th MP Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. The
units that remain are generally understrength, as Reserve Component
units do not have an individual personnel replacement system to
mitigate medical losses or the departure of individual Soldiers that
have reached 24 months of Federal active duty in a five-year period.
(ANNEX 19)
2. (U) The 800thMP Brigade (I/R) is currently a CFLCC asset, TACON to
CJTF-7 to conduct Internment/Resettlement (I/R) operations in Iraq.
All detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps Ganci,
Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value Detention
(HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its
task organizational structure, training, and equipment resources from
a unit designed to conduct standard EPW operations in the COMMZ
(Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a
compliant, self-disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or
high-risk security internees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) EPWs and Civilian Internees should receive the full protections
of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is
due to specifically articulated military necessity (e.g., no
visitation to preclude the direction of insurgency operations).
(ANNEXES 19 and 24)
5. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees, and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Military Police Internment
and Resettlement Operations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence
Interrogations, require military police to provide an area for
intelligence collection efforts within EPW facilities. Military
Police, though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a
facility, do not participate in Military Intelligence supervised
interrogation sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of
Operation Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby military police
actively set favorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such
actions generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention
facility, attempting to maintain its population in a compliant and
docile state. The 800th MP Brigade has not been directed to change its
facility procedures to set the conditions for MI interrogations, nor
participate in those interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Report also made the following, inter alia, near-term
and mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of
detainees:
a. (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD
Policy. The process of screening security internees should include
intelligence findings, interrogation results, and current threat
assessment.
b. (U) Determine the scope of intelligence collection that will occur
at Camp Vigilant. Refurbish the Northeast Compound to separate the
screening operation from the Iraqi run Baghdad Central Correctional
Facility. Establish procedures that define the role of military police
Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the actions of the
guards from those of the military intelligence personnel.
c. (U) Consolidate all Security Internee Operations, except the MEK
security mission, under a single Military Police Brigade Headquarters
for OIF 2.
d. (U) Insist that all units identified to rotate into the Iraqi
Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and confinement
operations in support of OIF 2 be organic to CJTF-7. (ANNEX 19)
IO COMMENTS REGARDING MG RYDER'S REPORT
1. (U) The objective of MG Ryder's Team was to observe detention and
prison operations, identify potential systemic and human rights
issues, and provide near-term, mid-term, and long-term recommendations
to improve CJTF-7 operations and transition of the Iraqi prison system
from US military control/oversight to the Coalition Provisional
Authority and eventually to the Iraqi Government. The Findings and
Recommendations of MG Ryder's Team are thorough and precise and should
be implemented immediately. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that surfaced
during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very same issues that are
the subject of this investigation. In fact, many of the abuses
suffered by detainees occurred during, or near to, the time of that
assessment. As will be pointed out in detail in subsequent portions of
this report, I disagree with the conclusion of MG Ryder's Team in one
critical aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800th MP Brigade
had not been asked to change its facility procedures to set the
conditions for MI interviews. While clearly the 800th MP Brigade and
its commanders were not tasked to set conditions for detainees for
subsequent MI interrogations, it is obvious from a review of
comprehensive CID interviews of suspects and witnesses that this was
done at lower levels. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) I concur fully with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding the effect
of AR 190-8. Military Police, though adept at passive collection of
intelligence within a facility, should not participate in Military
Intelligence supervised interrogation sessions. Moreover, Military
Police should not be involved with setting "favorable conditions" for
subsequent interviews. These actions, as will be outlined in this
investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth operation of a
detention facility. (ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIVE ACTIONS
1. (U) Following our review of MG Ryder's Report and MG Miller's
Report, my investigation team immediately began an in-depth review of
all available documents regarding the 800th MP Brigade. We reviewed in
detail the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged detainee
abuses at detention facilities in Iraq, particularly the Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty witness
statements from military police and military intelligence personnel,
potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed numerous photos and
videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel,
which are now in the custody and control of the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command and the CJTF-7 prosecution team. The photos and
videos are not contained in this investigation. We obtained copies of
the 800th MP Brigade roster, rating chain, and assorted internal
investigations and disciplinary actions involving that command for the
past several months. (All ANNEXES Reviewed by Investigation Team)
2. (U) In addition to military police and legal officers from the
CFLCC PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two
individuals who are experts in military police detention practices and
training. These were LTC Timothy Weathersbee, Commander, 705th MP
Battalion, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, and
SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Military
Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the
services of Col (Dr) Henry Nelson, a trained US Air Force psychiatrist
assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4)
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports, the team
reviewed numerous reference materials including the 12 October 2003
CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6
Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November 2003,
the 205thMI Brigade's Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE),
facility staff logs/journals and numerous records of AR 15-6
investigations and Serious Incident Reports (SIRs) on detainee
escapes/shootings and disciplinary matters from the 800th MP Brigade.
(ANNEXES 5-20, 37, 93, and 94)
4. (U) On 2 February 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day
inspection of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value Detainee
(HVD) Complex in order to become familiar with those facilities. We
also met with COL Jerry Mocello, Commander, 3rd MP Criminal
Investigation Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock, Commander, 16th MP
Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89th MP Brigade, and COL Ed
Sannwaldt, CJTF-7 Provost Marshal. On 7 February 2004, the team
visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to familiarize itself with
the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7 February
2004, at Camp Doha, Kuwait, we conducted extensive training sessions
on approved detention practices. We continued our preparation by
reviewing the ongoing CID investigation and were briefed by the
Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We refreshed ourselves on
the applicable reference materials within each team member's area of
expertise, and practiced investigative techniques. I met with the team
on numerous occasions to finalize appropriate witness lists, review
existing witness statements, arrange logistics, and collect potential
evidence. We also coordinated with CJTF-7 to arrange witness
attendance, force protection measures, and general logistics for the
team's move to Baghdad on 8 February 2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1
February 2004 between III Corps and V Corps, and the upcoming
demobilization of the 800th MP Brigade Command, I directed that
several critical witnesses who were preparing to leave the theater
remain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until they could be interviewed (ANNEX
29). My team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and conducted a
series of interviews with a variety of witnesses (ANNEX 30). We
returned to Camp Doha, Kuwait on 13 February 2004. On 14 and 15
February we interviewed a number of witnesses from the 800th MP
Brigade. On 17 February we returned to Camp Bucca, Iraq to complete
interviews of witnesses at that location. From 18 February thru 28
February we collected documents, compiled references, did follow-up
interviews, and completed a detailed analysis of the volumes of
materials accumulated throughout our investigation. On 29 February we
finalized our executive summary and out-briefing slides. On 9 March we
submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and recommendations
to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Mark Johnson, for a legal sufficiency
review. The out-brief to the appointing authority, LTG McKiernan, took
place on 3 March 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and 45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse,
specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison
(Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).
1. (U) The US Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID), led by COL
Jerry Mocello, and a team of highly trained professional agents have
done a superb job of investigating several complex and extremely
disturbing incidents of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Prison. They
conducted over 50 interviews of witnesses, potential criminal
suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photos and
videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Military Police
personnel on numerous occasions from October to December 2003. Several
potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions regarding
their personal involvement and the involvement of fellow Soldiers in
this abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights under
Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5th
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 25)
2. (U) In addition to a comprehensive and exhaustive review of all of
these statements and documentary evidence, we also interviewed
numerous officers, NCOs, and junior enlisted Soldiers in the 800th MP
Brigade, as well as members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade
working at the prison. We did not believe it was necessary to
re-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided
comprehensive statements to CID, and I have adopted those statements
for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXES 26, 34, 35, and
45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF) provides
security of both criminal and security detainees at the Baghdad
Central Correctional Facility, facilitates the conducting of
interrogations for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the
prison, and enhances the force protection/quality of life of Soldiers
assigned in order to ensure the success of ongoing operations to
secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commander, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, was
designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
effective 19 November 2003. That the 205th MI Brigade conducts
operational and strategic interrogations for CJTF-7. That from 19
November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TOA) on 6 February 2004,
COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commander of the 205th MI Brigade and the
Commander of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Military Police Battalion of the 800th MP
Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp
Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF). That from February
2003 to until he was suspended from his duties on 17 January 2004, LTC
Jerry Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320th MP
Battalion. That from December 2002 until he was suspended from his
duties, on 17 January 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the Company
Commander of the 372ndMP Company, which was in charge of guarding
detainees at FOB Abu Ghraib. I further find that both the 320th MP
Battalion and the 372ndMP Company were located within the confines of
FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEXES 32 and 45)
4. (U) That from July of 2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Karpinski
was the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)
5. (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib
Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant,
and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This
systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrated
by several members of the military police guard force (372nd Military
Police Company, 320thMilitary Police Battalion, 800th MP Brigade), in
Tier (section) 1-A of the Abu Ghraib Prison (BCCF). The allegations of
abuse were substantiated by detailed witness statements (ANNEX 26) and
the discovery of extremely graphic photographic evidence. Due to the
extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and videos, the
ongoing CID investigation, and the potential for the criminal
prosecution of several suspects, the photographic evidence is not
included in the body of my investigation. The pictures and videos are
available from the Criminal Investigative Command and the CTJF-7
prosecution team. In addition to the aforementioned crimes, there were
also abuses committed by members of the 325th MI Battalion, 205th MI
Brigade, and Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC).
Specifically, on 24 November 2003, SPC Luciana Spencer, 205th MI
Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip and returned
to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)
6. (S) I find that the intentional abuse of detainees by military
police personnel included the following acts:
a. (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their
naked feet;
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees;
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit
positions for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them
naked for several days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear;
f. (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while
being photographed and videotaped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on
them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on
his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to
simulate electric torture;
i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged
to have forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then
photographing him naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck and
having a female Soldier pose for a picture;
k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
l. (S) Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and
frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely
injuring a detainee;
m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions
provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by
detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have
carefully considered the pre-existing statements of the following
witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company Suspect
c. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company - Suspect
d. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Translator, Titan Corp., Assigned to the
205th MI Brigade- Suspect
(Names deleted)
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the following
acts of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on
the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence provided by
other witnesses (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on
detainees;
b. (U) Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;
e. (U) Threatening male detainees with rape;
f. (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of a
detainee who was injured after being slammed against the wall in his
cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom
stick.
h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighten and intimidate
detainees with threats of attack, and in one instance actually biting
a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the statements provided by the
following detainees, which under the circumstances I find credible
based on the clarity of their statements and supporting evidence
provided by other witnesses:
a. (U) Amjed Isail Waleed, Detainee # 151365
b. (U) Hiadar Saber Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee # 13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-Zayiadi, Detainee # 19446
d. (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hilas, Detainee # 151108
e. (U) Mohanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jassim Mustafa, Detainee # 150542
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, # 150422
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Youss, Detainee # 150425
i. (U) Asad Hamza Hanfosh, Detainee # 152529
j. (U) Nori Samir Gunbar Al-Yasseri, Detainee # 7787
k. (U) Thaar Salman Dawod, Detainee # 150427
l. (U) Ameen Sa'eed Al-Sheikh, Detainee # 151362
m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee # 18470 (ANNEX 26)
10. (U) I find that contrary to the provision of AR 190-8, and the
findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Military Intelligence (MI)
interrogators and Other US Government Agency's (OGA) interrogators
actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions
for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contrary to the findings of
MG Ryder's Report, I find that personnel assigned to the 372ndMP
Company, 800th MP Brigade were directed to change facility procedures
to "set the conditions" for MI interrogations. I find no direct
evidence that MP personnel actually participated in those MI
interrogations. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I
find was inflicted on detainees and by the following witness
statements. (ANNEXES 25 and 26):
a. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her sworn
statement regarding the incident where a detainee was placed on a box
with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis, "that her job was
to keep detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to CPL
Grainer. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Grainer and
Frederick's job to do things for MI and OGA to get these people to
talk."
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his sworn
statement as follows: "I witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section,
wing 1A being made to do various things that I would question morally.
In Wing 1A we were told that they had different rules and different
SOP for treatment. I never saw a set of rules or SOP for that section
just word of mouth. The Soldier in charge of 1A was Corporal Granier.
He stated that the Agents and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things,
but nothing was ever in writing he would complain (sic)." When asked
why the rules in 1A/1B were different than the rest of the wings, SGT
Davis stated: "The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B
are Military Intelligence (MI) holds." When asked why he did not
inform his chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: "
Because I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinary
or outside the guidelines, someone would have said something. Also the
wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel approved of the
abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had heard MI insinuate to the
guards to abuse the inmates. When asked what MI said he stated:
"Loosen this guy up for us." Make sure he has abad night." "Make sure
he gets the treatment." He claimed these comments were made to CPL
Granier and SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT Davis stated that (sic): "the
MI staffs to my understanding have been giving Granier compliments on
the way he has been handling the MI holds. Example being statements
like, "Good job, they're breaking down real fast. They answer every
question. They're giving out good information, Finally, and Keep up
the good work . Stuff like that."
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd MP Company, was asked if he were
present when any detainees were abused. He stated: "I saw them nude,
but MI would tell us to take away their mattresses, sheets, and
clothes." He could not recall who in MI had instructed him to do this,
but commented that, "if they wanted me to do that they needed to give
me paperwork." He was later informed that "we could not do anything to
embarrass the prisoners."
d. (U) Mr. Adel L. Nakhla, a US civilian contract translator was
questioned about several detainees accused of rape. He observed (sic):
"They (detainees) were all naked, a bunch of people from MI, the MP
were there that night and the inmates were ordered by SGT Granier and
SGT Frederick ordered the guys while questioning them to admit what
they did. They made them do strange exercises by sliding on their
stomach, jump up and down, throw water on them and made them some wet,
called them all kinds of names such as "gays" do they like to make
love to guys, then they handcuffed their hands together and their legs
with shackles and started to stack them on top of each other by
insuring that the bottom guys penis will touch the guy on tops butt."
e. (U) SPC Neil A Wallin, 109th Area Support Medical Battalion, a
medic testified that: "Cell 1A was used to house high priority
detainees and cell 1B was used to house the high risk or trouble
making detainees. During my tour at the prison I observed that when
the male detainees were first brought to the facility, some of them
were made to wear female underwear, which I think was to somehow break
them down."
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation
Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had
received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find
that very little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel
on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40.
Moreover, I find that few, if any, copies of the Geneva Conventions
were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24,
33, and multiple witness statements)
13.(U) Another obvious example of the Brigade Leadership not
communicating with its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency
concerns the incident of detainee abuse that occurred at Camp Bucca,
Iraq, on May 12, 2003. Soldiers from the 223rd MP Company reported to
the 800th MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four Military Police
Soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had abused a number of detainees
during inprocessing at Camp Bucca. An extensive CID investigation
determined that four soldiers from the 320th MP Battalion had kicked
and beaten these detainees following a transport mission from Talil
Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal charges under the UCMJ were preferred against these
Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gentry. He
recommended a general court martial for the four accused, which BG
Karpinski supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind 800th MP Soldiers
of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions regarding detainee
treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was not
repeated. Nor is there any evidence that LTC(P) Phillabaum, the
commander of the Soldiers involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident,
took any initiative to ensure his Soldiers were properly trained
regarding detainee treatment. (ANNEXES 35 and 62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated
multi-discipline Mobile Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject
matter experts in internment/resettlement operations, international
and operational law, information technology, facility management,
interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab
cultural awareness, and medical practices as it pertains to I/R
activities. This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive
training in all aspects of detainee and confinement operations.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel
involved in any aspect of detainee operations or interrogation
operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided
with training by an international/operational law attorney on the
specific provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and
Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be responsible for overall
detainee operations throughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I also
recommend that the Provost Marshal General of the Army assign a
minimum of two (2) subject matter experts, one officer and one NCO, to
assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee operations.
4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility
commanders ensure that appropriate copies of the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and notice of
protections be made available in both English and the detainees'
language and be prominently displayed in all detention facilities.
Detainees with questions regarding their treatment should be given the
full opportunity to read the Convention.
5. (U) That each detention facility commander and interrogation
facility commander publish a complete and comprehensive set of
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) regarding treatment of detainees,
and that all personnel be required to read the SOPs and sign a
document indicating that they have read and understand the SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordance with the recommendations of MG Ryder's
Assessment Report, and my findings and recommendations in this
investigation, all units in the Iraq Theater of Operations conducting
internment/confinement/detainment operations in support of Operation
Iraqi Freedom be OPCON for all purposes, to include action under the
UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTF as the staff proponent for detainee
operations in the Iraq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller,
C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to
determine the extent of culpability of Military Intelligence
personnel, assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of
detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations
is assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized
training and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist
and advise on matters of detainee operations.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The Investigation inquire into detainee escapes and accountability
lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning
these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. The 800th MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide Internment
and Resettlement (I/R) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and 95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex during the time
period covered in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at the
Camp Bucca Detention Facility until TOA on 26 February 2004. (ANNEXES
41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility
until TOA on 4 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)
5. (U) The 530th MP Battalion, 800th MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility
until TOA on 15 March 2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)
6. (U) Detainee operations include accountability, care, and well
being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees,
and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prisoners. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task IAW
FM 3-19.40. (ANNEX 22)
8. (U) There is a general lack of knowledge, implementation, and
emphasis of basic legal, regulatory, doctrinal, and command
requirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units.
(Multiple witness statements in ANNEXES 45-91).
9. (U) The handling of detainees and criminal prisoners after
in-processing was inconsistent from detention facility to detention
facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and even
shift to shift throughout the 800th MP Brigade AOR. (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a
"Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Training Outline" for
transferring and releasing detainees, which appears to have been
followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgoing detainees are being documented in the
National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated
Toolset System (BATS) as required by regulation at all detention
facilities. However, it is underutilized and often does not give a
"real time" accurate picture of the detainee population due to
untimely updating. (ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees at
the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a
self-created "change sheet" to document the transfer of a detainee
from one location to another. For proper accountability, it is
imperative that these change sheets be processed and the detainee
manifest be updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Ghraib, this
process would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time
resulted in inaccurate detainee Internment Serial Number (ISN) counts,
gross differences in the detainee manifest and the actual occupants of
an individual compound, and significant confusion of the MP Soldiers.
The 320th MP Battalion S-1, CPT Theresa Delbalso, and the S-3, MAJ
David DiNenna, explained that this breakdown was due to the lack of
manpower to process change sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXES 39 and
98)
13. (U) The 320th Battalion TACSOP requires detainee accountability at
least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of their
operational journals revealed that these accounts were often not done
or not documented by the unit. Additionally, there is no indication
that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in the accounting
process triggered any immediate corrective action by the Battalion
TOC. (ANNEX 44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standardization in the way the 320th MP
Battalion conducted physical counts of their detainees. Each compound
within a given encampment did their headcounts differently. Some
compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10, some had them sit in
rows, and some moved all the detainees to one end of the compound and
counted them as they passed to the other end of the compound. (ANNEX
98)
15. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100% ISN band
checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did this check only 2 times
per week. Due to the lack of real-time updates to the system, these
checks were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800th MP Brigade and subordinate units adopted
non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups," and "call-ups,"
which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the
soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98)
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th
Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant
comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit.
There was no indication that the journals were ever reviewed by anyone
in their chain of command. (Annex 37)
18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fully developed and standing
TACSOPs were widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained
on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most procedures
were shelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the subordinate units and
guards mount sites. (Annexes 44, 67, 71, and 85)
19. (U) Accountability and facility operations SOPs lacked
specificity, implementation measures, and a system of checks and
balances to ensure compliance. (AnnexES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to
develop the accountability practices throughout the 800th MP Brigade's
subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee care
appears to have been made up as the operations developed with reliance
on, and guidance from, junior members of the unit who had civilian
corrections experience. (Annex 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and untrained to conduct I/R
operations prior to deployment, at the mobilization site, upon arrival
in theater, and throughout their mission. (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
22. (U) The documentation provided to this investigation identified 27
escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout
the 800th MP Brigade's AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed
analysis of the substandard accountability process maintained by the
800th MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more
unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off" as
administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. 1LT Lewis Raeder,
Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least two
additional escapes (one from a work detail and one from a window) from
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) that were not documented. LTC Dennis McGlone,
Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed the escape of one detainee at
the High Value Detainee Facility who went to the latrine and then
outran the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis Karpinski, Commander,
800th MP Brigade, stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her
holding facilities, which does not match the number derived from the
investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10, 45, 55, and 71)
23. (U) The Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities are
significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard
force is undermanned and under resourced. This imbalance has
contributed to the poor living conditions, escapes, and accountability
lapses at the various facilities. The overcrowding of the facilities
also limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the
detainee population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the
facility. (ANNEXES 6, 22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who should
not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the overcrowding
and unrest in the detention facilities. There are currently three
separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide internment operations.
First, the apprehending unit can release a detainee if there is a
determination that their continued detention is not warranted.
Secondly, a criminal detainee can be released after it has been
determined that the detainee has no intelligence value, and that their
release would not be detrimental to society. BG Karpinski had
signature authority to release detainees in this second category.
Lastly, detainees accused of committing "Crimes Against the
Coalition," who are held throughout the separate facilities in the
CJTF-7 AOR, can be released upon a determination that they are of no
intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to
Coalition Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is
a screening by the local US Forces Magistrate Cell and a review by a
Detainee Release Board consisting of BG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren,
SJA, CJTF-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the
"Detainee Release Authority" for detainees being held for committing
crimes against the coalition. According to BG Karpinski, this category
of detainee makes up more than 60% of the total detainee population,
and is the fastest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to BG
Karpinski, routinely denied the board's recommendations to release
detainees in this category who were no longer deemed a threat and
clearly met the requirements for release. According to BG Karpinski,
the extremely slow and ineffective release process has significantly
contributed to the overcrowding of the facilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45,
and 46)
25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being conducted
after an escape or other serious incident. No lessons learned seem to
have been disseminated to subordinate units to enable corrective
action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team requested copies of
AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple Witness Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations from
various 15-6 Investigations concerning escapes and accountability
lapses) were rubber stamped as approved and ordered implemented by BG
Karpinski. There is no evidence that the majority of her orders
directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted
upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify
the corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and
recommendations contained within their own investigations been
analyzed and actually implemented by BG Karpinski, many of the
subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse may have
been prevented. (ANNEXES 5-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghraib and the detention
facility at Camp Bucca is inadequate and needs to be improved to
illuminate dark areas that have routinely become avenues of escape.
(ANNEX 6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geneva
Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees
at any of the detention facilities in the 800th MP Brigade's AOR, even
after several investigations had annotated the lack of this critical
requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Ghraib BCCF) demonstrate questionable
work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous contingent
within the Hard-Site. These guards have furnished the Iraqi criminal
inmates with contraband, weapons, and information. Additionally, they
have facilitated the escape of at least one detainee. (ANNEX 8 and
26-SPC Polak's Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (Titan Corporation,
CACI, etc
), third country nationals, and local contractors do not
appear to be properly supervised within the detention facility at Abu
Ghraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered about with too
much unsupervised free access in the detainee area. Having civilians
in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area
causes confusion and may have contributed to the difficulties in the
accountability process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX 51, Multiple
Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation
Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
contended that the Detainee Rules of Engagement (DROE) and the general
principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at every guard mount
and shift change on Abu Ghraib. However, none of our witnesses, nor
our personal observations, support his contention. I find that SGM
Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45, 80, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI Soldiers at
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee
operations; however, they have been unable to produce any verifying
documentation, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content
of this training. (Annexes 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training
Records)
33. (S/NF) The various detention facilities operated by the 800th MP
Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other
Government Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing their
identities, or even the reason for their detention. The Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib called these
detainees "ghost detainees." On at least one occasion, the 320th MP
Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainees" (6-8) for
OGAs that they moved around within the facility to hide them from a
visiting International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) survey team.
This maneuver was deceptive, contrary to Army Doctrine, and in
violation of international law. (Annex 53)
34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been
documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although there is
no data from other missions of similar size and duration to compare
the number of escapes with, the most significant factors derived from
these reports are twofold. First, investigations and SIRs lacked
critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident. Second,
each investigation seems to have pointed to the same types of
deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the
problems and to implement the recommendations as was ordered by BG
Karpinski, nor was there any command emphasis to ensure these
deficiencies were corrected:
a. (U) 4 June 03- This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Investigation
covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and shootings of detainees
at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion). However, no investigation or
additional information was provided as requested by this investigation
team. (ANNEX 7)
b. (U) 9 June 03- Riot and shootings of five detainees at Camp
Cropper. (115th MP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted after
a detainee was subdued by MPs of the 115th MP Battalion after striking
a guard in compound B of Camp Cropper. A 15-6 investigation by 1LT
Magowan (115th MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that a detainee
had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took
off his DCU top and flexed his muscles to the detainees, which further
escalated the riot. The MPs were overwhelmed and the guards fired
lethal rounds to protect the life of the compound MPs, whereby 5
detainees were wounded. Contributing factors were poor communications,
no clear chain of command, facility-obstructed views of posted guards,
the QRF did not have non-lethal equipment, and the SOP was inadequate
and outdated. (ANNEX 5)
c. (U) 12 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and
shooting of detainee # 7166, and attempted escape of an unidentified
detainee from Camp Cropper Holding Area (115th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly made their escape in the nighttime hours prior to
0300. A 15-6 investigation by CPT Wendlandt (115th MP Battalion, S-2)
concluded that the detainees allegedly escaped by crawling under the
wire at a location with inadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped
prior to escape. An MP of the 115th MP Battalion search team
recaptured detainee # 8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by
a Soldier during the recapture process. Contributing factors were
overcrowding, poor lighting, and the nature of the hardened criminal
detainees at that location. It is of particular note that the command
was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the upcoming escape
attempt and started doing amplified announcements in Arabic stating
the camp rules. The investigation pointed out that rules and
guidelines were not posted in the camps in the detainees' native
languages. (ANNEX 6)
d. (U) 13 June 03- Escape and recapture of detainee # 8968 and the
shooting of eight detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) (320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly attempted to escape at about 1400 hours
from the Camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). A 15-6
investigation by CPT Wyks (400th MP Battalion, S-1) concluded that the
detainee allegedly escaped by sliding under the wire while the tower
guard was turned in the other direction. This detainee was
subsequently apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600 the same day, 30-40
detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP guards with rocks. One
guard was injured and the tower guards fired lethal rounds at the
rioters injuring 7 and killing 1 detainee. (ANNEX 7)
e. (U) 05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 and # 10739 from Abu
Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at
0345 from the Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by
SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S-3 RTO). The SIR indicated that 2
criminal prisoners escaped through their cell window in tier 3A of the
Hard-Site. No information on findings, contributing factors, or
corrective action has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX
11)
f. (U) 07 November 03- Escape of detainee # 14239 from Abu Ghraib
(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped at 1330 from
Compound 2 of the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was
initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC). The SIR
indicated that a detainee escaped from the North end of the compound
and was discovered missing during distribution of the noon meal, but
there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on
findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided
to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)
g. (U) 08 November 03- Escape of detainees # 115089, # 151623, #
151624, # 116734, # 116735, and # 116738 from Abu Ghraib (320th MP
Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped at 2022 from Compound
8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by MAJ
DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S-3). The SIR indicated that 5-6
prisoners escaped from the North end of the compound, but there is no
method of escape listed in the SIR. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 13)
h. (U) 24 November 03- Riot and shooting of 12 detainees # 150216,
#150894, #153096, 153165, #153169, #116361, #153399, #20257, #150348,
#152616, #116146, and #152156 at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion).
Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the
compounds at the Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting
deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers.
A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy
Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their
living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal
force was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed
"Golden Spike," the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly
force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack of comprehensive
training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount
conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix
of less than lethal rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs
being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understood,
overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication
between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)
i. (U) 24 November 03- Shooting of detainee at Abu Ghraib(320th MP
Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his cell and around
1830 an extraction team shot him with less than lethal and lethal
rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation
by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that
one of the detainees in tier 1A of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol
and a couple of knives from an Iraqi Guard working in the encampment.
Immediately upon receipt of this information, an ad-hoc extraction
team consisting of MP and MI personnel conducted what they called a
routine cell search, which resulted in the shooting of an MP and the
detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate
SOPs, the Detention ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to
the numerous levels of authorization needed for use of lethal force,
poorly trained MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, and ambiguous
relationship between the MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)
j. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci
encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in
the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to
break up the fight, which was successful. No information on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 14)
k. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci
encampment, Abu Ghraib. An SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in
the compound and the MPs used two non-lethal shots to disperse the
crowd, which was successful. No information on findings, contributing
factors, or corrective action has been provided to this investigation
team. (ANNEX 15)
l. (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means into crowd at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Approximately 30-40 detainees allegedly
got into a detainee-on-detainee fight around 1642 in Compound 3 of the
Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG
Matash (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicates that there
was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a non-lethal
crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight, which was successful. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action
has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 16)
m. (U) 17 December 03- Shooting by non-lethal means of detainee from
Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly assaulted
an MP at 1459 inside the Ganci Encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR
was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR
indicated that three detainees assaulted an MP, which resulted in the
use of a non-lethal shot that calmed the situation. No information on
findings, contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided
to this investigation team. (ANNEX 17)
n. (U) 07 January 04- Escape of detainee #115032 from Camp Bucca(310th
MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the hours of 0445
and 0640 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT Kaires
(310th MP Battalion S-3) and CPT Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3)
concluded that the detainee escaped through an undetected weakness in
the wire. Contributing factors were inexperienced guards, lapses in
accountability, complacency, lack of leadership presence, poor
visibility, and lack of clear and concise communication between the
guards and the leadership. (ANNEX 9)
o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950 as well
as the escape and recapture of 5 unknown detainees at the Camp Bucca
Detention Facility (310th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly
escaped around 0300 from Compound 12, of Camp Bucca. An AR 15-6
Investigation by LTC Leigh Coulter (800th MP Brigade, OIC Camp Arifjan
Detachment) concluded that three of the detainees escaped through the
front holding cell during conditions of limited visibility due to fog.
One of the detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and
returned to his holding compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited
through the wire on the South side of the camp and were seen and
apprehended by the QRF. Contributing factors were the lack of a
coordinated effort for emplacement of MPs during implementation of the
fog plan, overcrowding, and poor communications. (ANNEX 10)
p. (U) 14 January 04- Escape of detainee #12436 and missing Iraqi
guard from Hard-Site, Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee
allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An
SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst. NCOIC).
The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to escape by
signing him out on a work detail and disappearing with him. At the
time of the second SIR, neither missing person had been located. No
information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action
has been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 99)
q. (U) 26 January 04- Escape of detainees #s 115236, 116272, and
151933 from Camp Bucca(310th MP Battalion). Several Detainees
allegedly escaped between the hours of 0440 and 0700 during a period
of intense fog. Investigation by CPT Kaires (310th MP Battalion S-3)
concluded that the detainees crawled under a fence when visibility was
only 10-15 meters due to fog. Contributing factors were the limited
visibility (darkness under foggy conditions), lack of proper
accountability reporting, inadequate number of guards, commencement of
detainee feeding during low visibility operations, and poorly rested
MPs. (ANNEX 18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this investigation determined
that there was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of
the detention facilities. Moreover, despite the fact that there were
numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Iraq (in
excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations following these escapes were
simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no
dissemination to other facilities. After-Action Reports and Lessons
Learned, if done at all, remained at individual facilities and were
not shared among other commanders or soldiers throughout the Brigade.
The Command never issued standard TTPs for handling escape incidents.
(AnnexES 5-10, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team)
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION:
(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contains a detailed and referenced
series of recommendations for improving the detainee accountability
practices throughout the OIF area of operations. (U) Accountability
practices throughout any particular detention facility must be
standardized and in accordance with applicable regulations and
international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be
expanded and used to their fullest extent to facilitate real time
updating when detainees are moved and or transferred from one location
to another. (U) "Change sheets," or their doctrinal equivalent must be
immediately processed and updated into the system to ensure accurate
accountability. The detainee roll call or ISN counts must match the
manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure proper
accountability of detainees. (U) Develop, staff, and implement
comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons learned from
this investigation as well as any previous findings, recommendations,
and reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and
understood at the lowest level.(U) Iraqi criminal prisoners must be
held in separate facilities from any other category of detainee. (U)
All of the compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby
MP Soldiers can account for their detainees in real time and without
waiting for their change sheets to be processed. This would also have
the change sheet serve as a way to check up on the accuracy of the
manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS system can be
utilized for this function.(U) Accountability lapses, escapes, and
disturbances within the detainment facilities must be immediately
reported through both the operational and administrative Chain of
Command via a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The SIRs must then be
tracked and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is resolved.
(U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of
Engagement (IROE), and the principles of the Geneva Conventions need
to be briefed at every shift change and guard mount. (U) AARs must be
conducted after serious incidents at any given facility. The
observations and corrective actions that develop from the AARs must be
analyzed by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a
plan of action, shared with the other facilities, and implemented as a
matter of policy. (U) There must be significant structural
improvements at each of the detention facilities. The needed changes
include significant enhancement of perimeter lighting, additional
chain link fencing, staking down of all concertina wire, hard site
development, and expansion of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) . (U) The Geneva
Conventions and the facility rules must be prominently displayed in
English and the language of the detainees at each compound and
encampment at every detention facility IAW AR 190-8. (U) Further
restrict US civilians and other contractors' access throughout the
facility. Contractors and civilians must be in an authorized and
easily identifiable uniform to be more easily distinguished from the
masses of detainees in civilian clothes. (U) Facilities must have a
stop movement/transfer period of at least 1 hour prior to every 100%
detainee roll call and ISN counts to ensure accurate
accountability.(U) The method for doing head counts of detainees
within a given compound must be standardized. (U) Those military units
conducting I/R operations must know of, train on, and constantly
reference the applicable Army Doctrine and CJTF command policies. The
references provided in this report cover nearly every deficiency I
have enumerated. Although they do not, and cannot, make up for
leadership shortfalls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use them to
maintain standardized operating procedures and efficient
accountability practices.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)
(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies,
internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as
appropriate:
(Names deleted)
(ANNEXES 45-91)
REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING
SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP
Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained
in command since that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight
MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR: 115th MP Battalion, 310th MP
Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP Battalion,
530th MP Battalion, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP
Brigade believed they would be allowed to go home when all the
detainees were released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment
Facility following the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003.
At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp
Bucca. Through Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several
thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they
would go home when the detainees were released. In late May-early June
2003 the 800th MPBrigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi
penal system and several detention centers. This new mission meant
Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS when anticipated. Morale
suffered, and over the next few months there did not appear to have
been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem.
(ANNEXES 45 and 96)
3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous
witnesses that soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not
proficient in their basic MOS skills, particularly regarding
internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence
that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to
correct them in any systemic manner other than ad hoc training by
individuals with civilian corrections experience. (Multiple Witness
Statements and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained for
a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu
Ghraib Prison Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur
that units of the 800th MP Brigade did not receive
corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. MP
units did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and
during the post mobilization training, and thus could not train for
specific missions. The training that was accomplished at the
mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company level
with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and
Brigade levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks and law
enforcement training. However, I found no evidence that the Command,
although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific corrections
training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the US
Army Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal
General of the Army, or the US Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76)
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee
detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals
within the Brigade who had civilian corrections experience, including
many who worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their
civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity
with the provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that
a Mission Essential Task List (METL) based on in-theater missions was
ever developed nor was a training plan implemented throughout the
Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81)
6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, that the 800th MP Brigade
as a whole, was understrength for the mission for which it was tasked.
Army Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with
between 7 and 21 battalions, and that the average battalion size
element should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a
time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski and her staff did
a poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was
operated by only one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility
maintains only about 100 detainees, and is also run by an entire
battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)
7. (U) Reserve Component units do not have an individual replacement
system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time, the 800th MP
Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from
active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization.
In addition to being severely undermanned, the quality of life for
Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF) was extremely poor. There was
no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were numerous mortar
attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to
Soldiers and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also
severely overcrowded and the Brigade lacked adequate resources and
personnel to resolve serious logistical problems. Finally, because of
past associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it
appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader
and subordinate relationships. (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness
Statements, and the Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective
communication between the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled
FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the Commander, 800th
MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the FOB. There
was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little
coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two
functions. Coordination occurred at the lowest possible levels with
little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31, 45, and 46)
9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated
by a CJTF-7 Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003.
Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of 205th MI Brigade Commander's
Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility, states
as follows:
3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.
3.C.8. A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE
ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND
IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF)
ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR "SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND FOB
PROTECTION."
Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP
units at Abu Ghraib TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This
effectively made an MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, responsible
for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that facility. This
is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas
assigned to each of these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)
10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10
July 2001 defines Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction
and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area
necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX 42)
"TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or
commands or military capability made available for tasking that is
limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or
maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned
missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to
and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of
combatant commander."
11. (U) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this
investigation, I find that there was little, if any, recognition of
this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th MI Brigade.
Further, there was no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade
clearly informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the
Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the
specific requirements of this TACON relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
12. (U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements
and personal interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP
Brigade continued to function as if they were responsible for the
security, health and welfare, and overall security of detainees within
Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly
behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
13. (U) With respect to the 320th MP Battalion, I find that the
Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely
ineffective commander and leader. Numerous witnesses confirm that the
Battalion S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically ran the battalion on a
day-to-day basis. At one point, BG Karpinski sent LTC (P) Phillabaum
to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approximately two weeks, apparently to
give him some relief from the pressure he was experiencing as the
320th Battalion Commander. This movement to Camp Arifjan immediately
followed a briefing provided by LTC (P) Phillabaum to the CJTF-7
Commander, LTG Sanchez, near the end of October 2003. BG Karpinski
placed LTC Ronald Chew, Commander of the 115th MP Battalion, in charge
of the 320th MP Battalion for a period of approximately two weeks. LTC
Chew was also in command of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp
Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I could find no orders, either suspending or
relieving LTC (P) Phillabaum from command, nor any orders placing LTC
Chew in command of the 320th. In addition, there was no indication
this removal and search for a replacement was communicated to the
Commander CJTF-7, the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th
MP Battalion. Temporarily removing one commander and replacing him
with another serving Battalion Commander without an order and without
notifying superior or subordinate commands is without precedent in my
military career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also reprimanded for lapses in
accountability that resulted in several escapes. The 320th MP
Battalion was stigmatized as a unit due to previous detainee abuse
which occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater Internment Facility
(TIF), while under the command of LTC (P) Phillabaum. Despite his
proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG Karpinski
allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to remain in command of her most troubled
battalion guarding, by far, the largest number of detainees in the
800th MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his duties by
LTG Sanchez, CJTF-7 Commander on 17 January 2004. (ANNEXES 43, 45, and
61)
14. (U) During the course of this investigation I conducted a lengthy
interview with BG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is
included verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was
extremely emotional during much of her testimony. What I found
particularly disturbing in her testimony was her complete
unwillingness to either understand or accept that many of the problems
inherent in the 800th MP Brigade were caused or exacerbated by poor
leadership and the refusal of her command to both establish and
enforce basic standards and principles among its soldiers. (ANNEX 45
and the Personal Observations of the Interview Team)
15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she received no help from the Civil
Affairs Command, specifically, no assistance from either BG John Kern
or COL Tim Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred in Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated that MI personnel had given
the MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. In addition, she blamed
the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, the Company Commander,
CPT Reese, and the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She
argued that problems in Abu Ghraib were the fault of COL Pappas and
LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in charge of FOB Abu Ghraib. (ANNEX
45)
16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her testimony that the
criminal abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) might have been
caused by the ultimate disposition of the detainee abuse cases that
originally occurred at Camp Bucca in May 2003. She stated that "about
the same time those incidents were taking place out of Baghdad
Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at Bucca
plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers, the worst
that's gonna happen is, you're gonna go home." I think it important to
point out that almost every witness testified that the serious
criminal abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) occurred in late
October and early November 2003. The photographs and statements
clearly support that the abuses occurred during this time period. The
Bucca cases were set for trial in January 2004 and were not finally
disposed of until 29 December 2003. There is entirely no evidence that
the decision of numerous MP personnel to intentionally abuse detainees
at Abu Ghrabid (BCCF) was influenced in any respect by the Camp Bucca
cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)
17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated that the 800th MP Brigade S-1, MAJ
Hinzman and S-4, MAJ Green, were essentially dysfunctional, but that
despite numerous complaints, these officers were not replaced. This
had a detrimental effect on the Brigade Staff's effectiveness and
morale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James
O'Hare, appears to lack initiative and was unwilling to accept
responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade
XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by failing to lay out
staff priorities, take overt corrective action when needed, and
supervise their daily functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)
18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find
that the 800th MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and
basic Soldier and Army standards. I specifically found these examples
of unenforced standards:
a. There was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldiers assigned
detention duties. Despite the fact that hundreds of former Iraqi
soldiers and officers were detainees, MP personnel were allowed to
wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours while carrying
weapons. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on their helmets and
soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
c. In addition, numerous officers and senior NCOs have been
reprimanded/disciplined for misconduct during this period. Those
disciplined include; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)
1). (U) BG Janis Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade
Memorandum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7, on 17
January 2004.
2). (U) LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November
2003, for lack of leadership and for failing to take corrective
security measures as ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally
Suspended by BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, 17 January
2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty
3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August
2003, for failure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into
fuel tank); filed locally.
4). (U) MAJ David DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM
General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior
Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; returned to
soldier unfiled.
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November
03, for failing to take corrective security measures as ordered by the
Brigade Commander; filed locally.
5). (U) MAJ Stacy Garrity, Finance Officer, 800th MP Brigade
GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol with an NCO;
filed locally.
6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870th MP Company
Court-Martial Charges Preferred, for Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and
Unauthorized Use of Government Computer in that he was alleged to have
taken nude pictures of his female Soldiers without their knowledge;
Trial date to be announced.
7). (U) CPT Damaris Morales, Commander, 770th MP Company
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August
2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into
fuel tank); filed locally.
8). (U) CSM Roy Clement, Command Sergeant Major, 800th MP Brigade
· GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Janis Karpinski, Commander 800th
MP Brigade, for fraternization and dereliction of duty for
fraternizing with junior enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR
officially filed and he was removed from the CSM list.
9). (U) CSM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August
2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into
fuel tank); filed locally.
10). (U) 1SG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770th MP Company
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 20 August
2003, for failing to properly train his Soldiers (Soldier had
negligent discharge of M-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went into
fuel tank); filed locally.
11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, 800th MP Brigade,
GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003, for
violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming alcohol; filed
locally.
12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
· Two GO Letters of Concern and a verbal reprimand from BG Karpinski,
Commander 800th MP Brigade, for failing to adhere to the
guidance/directives given to him by BG Karpinski; filed locally.
d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert
P. Walters, Jr., Commander of the 165th Military Intelligence
Battalion (Tactical Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy
was enforced by COL Pappas for all MI personnel, and that BG Karpinski
approached COL Pappas to reverse the saluting policy back to a
no-saluting policy as previously existed. (ANNEX 53)
19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the 800th MP Brigade
and the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Iraq had very little
contact during their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG
Karpinski. BG Karpinski claimed, during her testimony, that she paid
regular visits to the various detention facilities where her Soldiers
were stationed. However, the detailed calendar provided by her
Aide-de-Camp, 1LT Mabry, does not support her contention. Moreover,
numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski or LTC (P)
Phillabaum. (Multiple Witness Statements)
20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the
difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of life, the real
presence of mortal danger over an extended time period, and the
failure of commanders to recognize these pressures contributed to the
perversive atmosphere that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention
Facility and throughout the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).
21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I find
that there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the
800th MP Brigade Staff, Commanders, and Soldiers were trained to
standard in detainee operations and proficiency or that serious
accountability lapses that occurred over a significant period of time,
particularly at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were corrected. AR 15-6
Investigations regarding detainee escapes were not acted upon,
followed up with corrective action, or disseminated to subordinate
commanders or Soldiers. Brigade and unit SOPs for dealing with
detainees if they existed at all, were not read or understood by MP
Soldiers assigned the difficult mission of detainee operations.
Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003, I
could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective
training for her soldiers or ensured that MP Soldiers throughout Iraq
clearly understood the requirements of the Geneva Conventions relating
to the treatment of detainees. (Multiple Witness Statements and the
Personal Observations of the Investigation Team )
22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in writing
by LTG Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade. LTG
Sanchez found that the performance of the 800th MP Brigade had not met
the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He found that incidents in
the preceding six months had occurred that reflected a lack of clear
standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade. LTG Sanchez
also cited the recent detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) as the most
recent example of a poor leadership climate that "permeates the
Brigade." I totally concur with LTG Sanchez' opinion regarding the
performance of BG Karpinski and the 800th MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and
the Personal Observations of the Investigating Officer)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski, Commander, 800th MP Brigade be
Relieved from Command and given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred
to in the aforementioned findings:
Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers at theater-level detention
facilities throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for dealing with
detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers had read, understood, and
would adhere to these SOPs.
Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the 800th MP Brigade knew,
understood, and adhered to the protections afforded to detainees in
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as to the
frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
Failing to obey an order from the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan,
regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and
Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of a
subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum.
Failing to take appropriate action regarding the ineffectiveness of
numerous members of her Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and
S-4.
Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of the AARs
and numerous 15-6 Investigation reports on escapes and shootings (over
a period of several months) were properly disseminated to, and
understood by, subordinate commanders.
Failing to ensure and enforce basic Soldier standards throughout her
command.
Failing to establish a Brigade METL.
Failing to establish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiers
throughout the 800th MP Brigade.
Failing to ensure that numerous and reported accountability lapses at
detention facilities throughout Iraq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. Pappas, Commander, 205th MI Brigade, be
given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and Investigated UP
Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intelligence Activities for the
following acts which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew,
understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand, and be removed from the Colonel/O-6 Promotion
List for the following acts which have been previously referred to in
the aforementioned findings:
Failing to properly ensure the results, recommendations, and AARs from
numerous reports on escapes and shootings over a period of several
months were properly disseminated to, and understood by, subordinates.
Failing to implement the appropriate recommendations from various 15-6
Investigations as specifically directed by BG Karpinski.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis and to task
organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC Steven L. Jordan, Former Director, Joint Interrogation
and Debriefing Center and Liaison Officer to 205th Military
Intelligence Brigade, be relieved from duty and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Making material misrepresentations to the Investigating Team,
including his leadership roll at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were properly
trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew,
understood, and followed the protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise soldiers under his direct authority
working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
5. (U) That MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr., S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be
Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May 2003,
for dereliction of duty for failing to report a violation of CENTCOM
General Order #1 by a subordinate Field Grade Officer and Senior
Noncommissioned Officer, which he personally observed; GOMOR was
returned to Soldier and not filed.
Failing to take corrective action and implement recommendations from
various 15-6 investigations even after receiving a GOMOR from BG
Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade, on 10 November 03, for failing
to take corrective security measures as ordered; GOMOR was filed
locally.
Failing to take appropriate action and report an incident of detainee
abuse, whereby he personally witnessed a Soldier throw a detainee from
the back of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald J. Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company, be
Relieved from Command and be given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred
to in the aforementioned findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, be
Relieved from his duties as Platoon Leader and be given a General
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were properly
trained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, be
Relieved from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of
Reprimand for the following acts which have been previously referred
to in the aforementioned findings:
Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating
that he had "never" been admonished or reprimanded by BG Karpinski,
when in fact he had been admonished for failing to obey an order from
BG Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at the holding facility.
Making a material misrepresentation to the Investigation Team stating
that he had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the
320th MP Battalion, and that he personally briefed his Soldiers on the
proper treatment of detainees, when in fact numerous statements
contradict this assertion.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320th MP Battalion knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in
Internment and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) That 1SG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company,
be Relieved from his duties as First Sergeant of the 372nd MP Company
and given a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the following
acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in
Internment and Resettlement Operations.
10. (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand, and receive action under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and understood the
protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting" Tier
1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly trained in
Internment and Resettlement Operations.
Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused
detainees by stomping on their bare hands and feet in his presence.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Contract US Civilian
Interrogator, CACI, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an
Official Reprimand to be placed in his employment file, termination of
employment, and generation of a derogatory report to revoke his
security clearance for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Made a false statement to the investigation team regarding the
locations of his interrogations, the activities during his
interrogations, and his knowledge of abuses.
Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation
techniques, to facilitate interrogations by "setting conditions" which
were neither authorized and in accordance with applicable
regulations/policy. He clearly knew his instructions equated to
physical abuse.
12. (U) That Mr. John Israel,Contract US Civilian Interpreter, CACI,
205th Military Intelligence Brigade, be given an Official Reprimand to
be placed in his employment file and have his security clearance
reviewed by competent authority for the following acts or concerns
which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of the
IROE, which is contrary to several witness statements.
Did not have a secu |
