| Topic: |
Politics > Politics-USA |
| User: |
"Leonard Pulver" |
| Date: |
01 Dec 2003 08:30:51 AM |
| Object: |
State_to_the_rescue of U.S.-wanted Saudi, terror-watch listees |
Saudis reward those officials who were kind to them
while working for the State Department. Scads of former
State Department officials now either work directly for
the Saudis or for organizations that take Saudi
petrodollars.
Little-known incident:
State to the rescue of U.S.-wanted Saudi, terror-watch
listees
by Joel Mowbray
The date was April 24, 2002. Standing on the runway
at Ellington Air Force Base in Houston, the cadre of
FBI agents, Secret Service and Customs agents had just
been informed by law enforcement officials that there
was a "snag" with Crown Prince Abdullah's oversize
entourage, which was arriving with the prince for a
visit to George W. Bush's Western White House in
Crawford, Texas.
The flight manifest of the eight-plane delegation
accompanying the Saudi would-be king had a problem.
Three, to be exact: one person on the list was wanted
by U.S. law enforcement authorities and two others were
on a terrorist watch list.
This had the potential to be what folks in Washington
like to refer to as an "international incident." But
the State Department was not about to let an
"international incident" happen. Which is why this
story has never been written - until now.
Upon hearing that there was someone who was wanted and
two suspected terrorists in Abdullah's entourage, the
FBI was ready to "storm the plane and pull those guys
off," explains an informed source. But given the
"international" component, State was informed of the
FBI's intentions before any action could be taken. When
word reached the Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) bureau,
NEA's reaction was classic State Department: "What are
we going to do about those poor people trapped on the
plane?" To which at least one law enforcement official
on the ground responded, "Shoot them" - not exactly the
answer State was looking for.
State, Secret Service and the FBI then began what
bureaucrats refer to as an "interagency process." In
other words, they started fighting. The FBI believed
that felons were to be arrested, even the Saudi
variety. State had other ideas. Secret Service didn't
really have any, other than to make sure that the three
Saudis in question didn't get anywhere near the
president or the vice president. State went to the mat
in part because it was responsible for giving visas to
the three in the first place. Since it was a government
delegation - where all applications are generally
handled at one time - the names were probably not run
through the normal watch lists before the visas were
issued.
Details about what happened to the three men in the
end are not entirely clear, and no one at State was
willing to provide any facts about the incident. What
is clear, though, is that the three didn't get anywhere
near Crawford, but were also spared the "embarrassment"
of arrest. And the House of Saud was spared an
"international incident." That normally staid
bureaucrats engaged in incredible acrobatics to bail
out three guys who never should have been in the United
States in the first place says a great deal about
State's "special relationship" with the Saudis.
While many critics of the repressive Saudi regime like
to target President Bush and his oil ties as the
culprit of the overly cozy relationship, the roots
actually go much deeper. It's the small favors that are
done every day - decisions made far below the
president's pay grade - that truly define the
relationship.
That is how you can have three Saudis get special
protection, preventing the FBI from doing its job. That
is also how you can have American children kidnapped
from American parents and taken to the desert prison -
and the State Department does nothing to help recover
them.
Though it cannot be said that U.S. diplomats do favors
for the Saudis in the hopes of lucrative payoffs later
on, the Saudis reward those officials who were kind to
them while working for the State Department. Scads of
former State Department officials now either work
directly for the Saudis or for organizations that take
Saudi petrodollars.
The Saudis think it is money well spent. Prince Bandar
bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador the United States,
once said, "If the reputation then builds that the
Saudis take care of friends when they leave office,
you'd be surprised how much better friends you have who
are just coming into office."
Middle East Forum President Daniel Pipes recently
suggested banning former diplomats from receiving Saudi
cash, thereby lessening the pervasive Saudi influence.
It's by no means a panacea, but it seems as good as any
place to start.
Joel Mowbray is the author of "Dangerous Diplomacy:
How the State Department Endangers America's Security".
© 2003, Joel Mowbray.
Posted by Permission
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