Occupation forces facing concerted resistance often require about 20
troops per thousand, so if insurgency in Iraq continues to intensify,
suppressing it eventually may require 300,000 troops or more.
Yet the Bush administration did not plan for such a large-scale,
long-serving occupation force, nor did it instruct our military to
train troops for occupation duty -- a task very different from
battlefield combat.
Maintaining public order, guarding civilian reconstruction activities
and rooting out insurgents -- all while respecting the rights of
civilians -- require specific training that has been given to only a
small portion of our troops in Iraq.
To this administration, such training is uncomfortably close to that
needed for peacekeeping operations -- a role that Bush officials
disdain.
If occupation of Iraq stretches into years and the "war on terrorism"
widens even further, Army Reserve and National Guard units will be
called to active service again and again -- an activation rate far
higher than the norm expected by our citizen soldiers, their families
and their communities.
Soon there will be significant problems with recruitment, morale and
retention.
So far, Congress and the American people are only dimly aware of a
crucial decision just ahead due to the new Iraq war:
Either we invest in larger armies trained and ready for long
occupation duty, or we jettison the Bush administration's radical
doctrine of preventive wars and regime change.
From The Star-Telegram, 1/4/04:
http://www.dfw.com/mld/dfw/news/opinion/7631233.htm
Bush's security policy has a high price
By Charles Knight and Marcus Corbin
Special to the Star-Telegram
CAMBRIDGE, Mass. -
Just over a year after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, the Bush
administration published its new National Security Strategy Policy,
giving prominent place to unilateral, preventive wars -- followed by
the dismantling of the leadership and governing structures in targeted
countries.
What this radical new doctrine failed to acknowledge, describe or
discuss was our preparation for the consequences.
Left unsaid is that we would bear the heavy new burdens of protracted
occupation and state building on a massive scale after these
preventive wars.
Instead, the new doctrine reads more like a vision statement than a
strategic plan.
It fails to address how to achieve the administration's stated
objectives in light of real-world constraints: acceptable costs and
consequences.
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I get a strong feeling that the world ain't gonna stand still for many
more Bushie power trips.
Harry
"A country which proposes to make use of modern war as an instrument
of policy must possess a highly centralized, all-powerful executive,
hence the absurdity of talking about the defense of democracy by force
of arms."
Aldous Huxley
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