| Topic: |
Politics > Politics-USA |
| User: |
"ArKLyte_" |
| Date: |
04 Jun 2004 01:43:39 PM |
| Object: |
The US and Iraq, Iran, Saudi - VERY interesting strategic analysis |
http://www.stratfor.biz/Story.neo?storyId=232680
Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia
STRATFOR
June 03, 2004 2217 GMT
George Friedman
Summary
The United States has clearly entered a new phase of the Iraq campaign
in which its relationship with the Iraqi Shia has been de-emphasized
while relationships with Sunnis have been elevated. This has an
international effect as well. It obviously affects Iranian ambitions.
It also helps strengthen the weakening hand of the Saudi government by
reducing the threat of a Shiite rising in strategic parts of the
kingdom that could threaten the flow of oil. The United States is
creating a much more dynamic and fluid situation, but it is also
enormously more complicated and difficult to manage.
Analysis
The United States has fully entered the fourth phase of the Iraq
campaign. The first phase consisted of the invasion of Iraq and the
fall of Baghdad. The second was the phase in which the United States
believed that it had a free hand in Iraq. It ended roughly July 1,
2003. The third phase was the period of commitment to control events
in Iraq, intense combat with the Sunni guerrillas and collaboration
with the Shia in Iraq and the Iranians. The fourth phase began in
April with the negotiated settlement in Al Fallujah, and became
official this week with the formation of the interim Iraqi government.
The new government represents the culmination of a process that began
during the April uprising by Muqtada al-Sadr -- and Grand Ayatollah
Ali al-Sistani's unwillingness to intervene to stop the fighting and
the kidnappings. Al-Sistani's behavior caused the Bush administration
to reconsider a strategic principle that had governed U.S. strategy in
Iraq since July 2003: the assumption that the United States could not
afford to alienate al-Sistani and the Shiite community and remain in
Iraq.
The problem was that the understanding the United States thought it
had with the Shia was very different from the one the Shia thought
they had with the United States. It would take a microscope to figure
out how the disconnect occurred and how it widened into an abyss, but
the basic outlines are obvious. Al-Sistani believed that by
controlling the Shia during the Sunni Ramadan offensive of
October-November 2003, the Shia had entered into an agreement with the
United States that the sovereign government of Iraq would pass into
Shiite hands as rapidly as possible.
Whether the United States had a different understanding -- or given
its intelligence that the Sunni rebellion had been broken -- the fact
was that by January, the United States was backing off the deal. In
pressing for an interim government selected by the United States and
containing heavy Sunni and Kurdish representation, and by putting off
direct elections for at least a year, the United States let al-Sistani
know that he was not getting what he wanted. Al-Sistani first
transmitted his unhappiness through several channels, including Ahmed
Chalabi. He then called for mass demonstrations. When that did not
work, he maneuvered al-Sadr into rising against the Americans at the
same time as the Sunnis launched an offensive west of Baghdad,
particularly in Al Fallujah. Al-Sistani's goal was to demonstrate that
the United States was utterly dependent on the Shia and that it had
better change its thinking about the future Iraqi government.
Al-Sistani badly miscalculated. The United States did not conclude
that it needed a deal with the Shia. It concluded instead that the
Shia -- including Chalabi and al-Sistani -- were completely
undependable allies. By striking at a moment of extreme vulnerability,
the Shia crippled the U.S. Defense Department faction that had argued
not only in favor of Chalabi but also in favor of alignment with the
Shia. Instead, the CIA and State Department, which had argued that the
Shiite alignment was a mistake, now argued -- convincingly -- that
al-Sistani was maneuvering the United States into a position of
complete dependency, and that the only outcome would be the surrender
of power to the Shia, whose interests lay with Iran, not the United
States. Following the al-Sadr rising, and al-Sistani's attempt to
maneuver the United States into simultaneously protecting al-Sistani
from al-Sadr and being condemned by al-Sistani for doing it, the
defenders of the Shiite strategy were routed.
A fourth strategy emerged, in which the United States is trying to
maintain balanced relationships with Sunnis and Shia, while currently
tilting toward the Sunnis. Al Fallujah is the great symbol of this.
The United States negotiated with its mortal enemy, the Sunnis, and
conceded control of the city to them. What would have been utterly
unthinkable during the third phase from July to March became logical
and necessary in April and May. The United States is now speaking to
virtually all Iraqi factions, save the foreign jihadists linked to al
Qaeda. Al-Sistani has gone from being the pivot of U.S. policy in
Iraq, to being a competitor for U.S. favor. It is no accident that
Chalabi was publicly destroyed by the CIA over the past few weeks, or
that the new Iraqi government gives no significant posts to al-Sistani
supporters -- and that Shia are actually underrepresented.
The United States has recognized that it will not be able to defeat
the Sunni insurgents in war without becoming utterly dependent on the
Shia for stabilizing the south. Since the United States does not have
sufficient force available in either place to suppress both a Sunni
and a Shiite rising -- and since it has lost all confidence in the
Shiite leadership -- logic has it that it needs to move toward ending
the counterinsurgency. That is a political process requiring the
United States to recognize the guerrillas linked to the Saddam Hussein
military and intelligence service as a significant political force in
Iraq, and to use that relationship as a lever with which to control
the Shia. That is what happened in Al Fallujah; that is what is
happening -- with much more subtlety -- in the interim government, and
that is what will be playing out for the rest of the summer.
In essence, in order to gain control of the military situation, the
United States has redefined the politics of Iraq. Rather than allowing
the Shia to be the swing player in the three-man game, the United
States is trying to maneuver itself into being the swingman. Suddenly,
as the war becomes gridlocked, the politics have become
extraordinarily fluid. Every ball is in the air -- and it is the
United States that has become the wild card.
Changes and Consequences
The redefinition of the U.S. role in Iraq has major international
consequences. The U.S. relationship with Iran reached its high point
during the Bam earthquake in December 2003. The United States offered
aid, and the Iranians accepted. The United States offered to send
Elizabeth Dole (and a player to be named later), and this was rejected
by Iran. Iran -- viewing the situation in Iraq and the U.S.
relationship with the Shia, and realizing that the United States
needed Iranian help against al Qaeda -- sought to rigorously define
its relationship with the Americans on its own terms. It thought it
had the whip hand and was using it. The United States struggled with
its relationship with Iran from January until March, accepting its
importance, but increasingly uneasy with the views being expressed by
Tehran.
By April, the United States had another important consideration on its
plate: the deteriorating situation in Saudi Arabia. The United States
was the primary cause of that deterioration. It had forced the Saudi
government to crack down on al Qaeda in the kingdom, and the radical
Islamists were striking back at the regime. An incipient civil war was
under way and intensifying. Contrary to myth, the United States did
not intervene in Iraq over oil -- anyone looking at U.S. behavior over
the past year can see the desultory efforts on behalf of the Iraqi oil
industry -- but the United States had to be concerned about the
security of oil shipments from Saudi Arabia. If those were disrupted,
the global economy would go reeling. It was one thing to put pressure
on the Saudis; it was another thing to accept a civil war as the price
of that pressure. And it was yet another thing to think calmly about
the fall of the House of Saud. But taking Saudi oil off the market was
not acceptable.
The Saudis could not stop shipping oil voluntarily. They needed the
income too badly. That was never a risk. However, for the first time
since World War II, the disruption of Saudi oil supplies because of
internal conflict or external force became conceivable. The fact was
that Saudi Arabia had a large Shiite population that lived around the
oil shipment points. If those shipment points were damaged or became
inaccessible, all hell would break loose in the global economy.
The Iranians had a number of mutually supporting interests. First,
they wanted a neutral or pro-Iranian Iraq in order to make another
Iran-Iraq war impossible. For this, they needed a Shiite-dominated
government. Second, they were interested in redressing the balance of
power in the Islamic world between Sunnis and Shia, in particular with
the Saudi Wahhabis. Finally, they wanted -- in the long run -- to
become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf. Their relationship with
the United States in Iraq was the linchpin for all of this.
The Saudis, having already felt the full force of American fury -- and
now trapped between them and their own radicals -- faced another
challenge. If the U.S. policy in Iraq remained on track, the power of
Iran and the Shia would surge through the region. The Saudis had faced
a challenge from the Shia right after the Khomeni revolution in Iran.
They did not enjoy it, but they did have the full backing of the
United States. Now they are in a position where they faced an even
more intense challenge, and the United States might well stay neutral
or, even worse, back the challenge. If the Shia in Saudi Arabia rose
with the backing of Iran and a Shiite-dominated Iraq, the Saudi
government would crumble.
From the Saudi point of view, they might be able to contain the
radical Islamists using traditional tribal politics and payoffs, but
facing the Wahhabis and the Shia at the same time would be impossible.
The third-phase policy of entente between the United States and the
Shiite-Iranian bloc seemed to guarantee a Shiite rising in Saudi
Arabia in the not-too-distant future.
As U.S.-Iranian relations became increasingly strained during the
winter, the Saudis increased their cooperation with the United States.
They also made it clear to the Americans that they were in danger of
losing their balance as the pressures on them mounted. The United
States liked what it saw in the Saudi intensification of the war
effort, even in the face of increased resistance. The United States
did not like what it saw in Tehran, concerned that the relationship
there was getting out of hand. Finally, in April, it became completely
disenchanted with the Shiite leadership of Iraq.
There were therefore two layers to the U.S. policy shift. The first
was internal to Iraq. The second had to do with increased concerns
about the security of oil shipments from the kingdom if the Iranians
encouraged a rising in Saudi Arabia. The United States did not lighten
up at all on demanding full cooperation on al Qaeda. The Saudis
supplied that. But the United States did not want oil shipments
disrupted. In the end, the survival or demise of the House of Saud
does not matter to the United States -- except to the degree that it
affects the availability of oil.
The United States has to balance the pressure it puts on Saudi Arabia
to fight al Qaeda against the threat of oil disruption. It cannot
lighten up on either. From the American point of view, the right
balance is a completely committed Saudi Arabia and freely flowing oil.
The United States had moved much closer to the former, and it now
needed to ensure the latter. Jerking the rug out from under the
Iranians and the Shia was the U.S. answer.
Oil does not cost more than $40 a barrel because of China. It costs
more than $40 a barrel because of fears that Saudi oil really could
come off the market, and doubt that the complex U.S. maneuver can
work. The obvious danger is an Iranian-underwritten rising in southern
Iraq that spills over into Saudi Arabia. The United States has shut
off its support for such an event, but the Iranians have an excellent
intelligence organization with a strong covert capability. They are
capable of answering in their own way.
The future at this moment is in the hands of Tehran and An Najaf. This
is the point at which the degree of control the Iranians have over the
Iraqi Shiite leadership will become clear. The Iranians obviously are
not happy with the trends that have emerged over the past month. Their
best lever is in Iraq. The Iraqi Shia are aware that the United States
is increasingly limber and unpredictable -- and that it has more
options than it had two months ago. The Iraqi Shia are in danger of
being trapped between Washington and Tehran. It is extremely important
to note that al-Sistani today tentatively endorsed the new government,
clearly uneasy at the path events were taking. Therefore there are two
questions: First, will the Iranians become more aggressive, abandoning
their traditional caution? Second, can they get the Iraqi Shiite
leaders to play their game, or will the old rift between Qom and An
Najaf (the Iranian and Iraqi Shiite holy cities) emerge once again as
the Shia scramble to get back into the American game.
The problem the Americans have is this: Wars are very complicated
undertakings that require very simple politics. The more complicated
the politics, the more difficult it is to prosecute a war. The
politics of this war have become extraordinarily complicated. The
complexity is almost mind-boggling. Fighting a war in this environment
is tough at best -- and this is not the best. What the United States
must achieve out of all of this maneuvering is a massive
simplification of the war goals. This is getting way too complicated.
--
( W W P D ) - What Would Patton Do?
http://www.marianland.com/Patton/PattononTerrorists.gif
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