Subject: Was America preparing a war for the Gulf oil in 1973?
From:

http://news.independent.co.uk/uk/this_britain/story.jsp?story=477219

Was America preparing a war for the Gulf oil in 1973?
Papers released under the 30-year rule show Britain worried about
Middle East conflict and what to buy for a royal wedding
By Cahal Milmo

01 January 2004

The British Government believed America was preparing for a lightning
war in the Middle East to end the 1973 oil crisis, including an
invasion of Kuwait, documents released today to the National Archives
show.

The Joint Intelligence Committee, the body that acts as the link
between the intelligence services and Downing Street, warned the Prime
Minister, Edward Heath that Washington was planning to seize oil
fields in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Kuwait to secure the Western
economies.

The global economy was in the grip of the crisis caused by the
decision of the Arab world to hike the price of oil exports to the
West and cut production in retaliation for American support of Israel
in the Yom Kippur war. The proposals, based on intelligence gathered
by MI6 and described as "ominous" by No 10. Officials in Whitehall
said the US, fearful that the Arab countries were rapidly realising
the effectiveness of oil as a weapon, was ready to flex its military
muscle in the Middle East without the agreement of its allies.

The plan would entail an airborne assault on strategic targets, the
entire principality of Kuwait, the Saudi oilfields in Dhahran and the
oil-rich emirate of Abu Dhabi, which had announced a total embargo
against the US.

The 22-page JIC document, marked "Secret. UK eyes only", said: "We
believe the American preference would be for a rapid operation
conducted by themselves to seize oilfields."

With what some critics of the American invasion of Iraq might consider
uncanny prescience, the report added: "This might be executed without
any prior consultation of allies. The objects would presumably be to
teach the Arabs a lesson, to assure by physical control an adequate
supplementary supply of oil for US domestic needs, with a good
quantity over for the needs of selected friends and to enable the US
to rid itself of restraints on its policies arising from the oil
embargo."

The report, released under the 30-year rule at the National Archives
in Kew, west London, said American forces would meet few obstacles in
taking Dhahran since it was guarded by "lightly armed" Saudi forces.
But Kuwait was thought to present greater problems for US paratroopers
since there were 100 tanks stationed around the airport.

The intelligence services said all three assaults would have to be
simultaneous to prevent damage to oilfields and attracting a
counter-offensive, not least from Saddam Hussein, who had been
president of Iraq since 1963: "As regards Kuwait in particular, they
[the Americans] could hardly afford to wait long [to bring in
reinforcements] because of the risks of Iraqi or other intervention."

British jitters about American intentions were caused by a
conversation between the American Defence Secretary, James
Schlesinger, and the UK ambassador to Washington, Lord Cromer in
November 1973. In a dispatch to London, Lord Cromer wrote that at the
end of a conversation about the Middle East crisis, Mr Schlesinger
said it was "no longer obvious to him that the United States could not
use force". The ambassador described this as "worrying".

In an analysis with further echoes of events 30 years later, the JIC
warned that rapid American action was likely to be resisted by some of
Washington's key European allies and threatened to split Nato.

The document warned that the timing of any invasion of an
oil-producing country would be vital and Europe would argue for US
policy to be focused elsewhere. "They would feel US pressures should
be applied to Israel rather than the Arabs. Since the US would
probably claim to be acting for the benefit of the West and would
expect the support of allies, deep US/European rifts could ensue," it
said.

The JIC said war would result from a total breakdown in negotiations
over the oil embargo, a possible resumption of fighting between the
Arabs and Israel and intensified oil restrictions. Among the other
options the US was thought to be considering were replacing the rulers
of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Abu Dhabi with "more amenable men" and
using Iran, still under the control of the pro-Western Shah, to stage
an invasion by proxy.

The JIC warned that the Pentagon might ask Britain to stage its own
mini-invasion by using military liaison teams in Saudi Arabia to
sabotage any counter-offensive and send troops to seize airstrips and
oil fields in Abu Dhabi and, "just possibly", Qatar and Bahrain.

But, in a further premonition, the intelligence chiefs warned that an
invasion would set US troops at loggerheads with Iraq. "The situation
following the US intervention in the Gulf would be highly volatile and
difficult to predict. The greatest risk of such confrontation in the
Gulf would probably arise in the Kuwait, where the Iraqis, with Soviet
backing, might be tempted to intervene."