MacArthur had the right plan in Korea. Then, the U.S. could have
neutralized China for the foreseeable future. Now, we face certain
future face-downs in the Pacific Rim and in the Persian Gulf region, as
the yellow commie horde visibly and vocally builds and flexes its
miltary muscle. One noted commentator examines the threat ...

=====

"Get Serious About China's Rising Military"

By Dan Blumenthal
The Washington Post
Thursday, May 25, 2006; A29

The Pentagon's annual report to Congress on China's military power,
released this week, reveals that Beijing's buildup has advanced well
beyond what most analysts considered likely just 10 years ago. Some
highlights: The new arsenal of the People's Liberation Army includes
more than 700 missiles deployed opposite Taiwan, a fleet of
sophisticated diesel electric submarines, a growing nuclear submarine
capability and advanced destroyers armed with lethal anti-ship cruise
missiles.

By making the potential cost of any U.S. intervention in the Taiwan
Strait extraordinarily high, Beijing has accomplished its decade-long
goal of establishing a credible military threat to Taiwan -- as well as
a deterrent to the United States. The question is, what next?

The report points to some answers. With a growing dependence on oil
imported from the Middle East and Africa, Chinese strategists are
talking about creating a blue-water navy to secure Beijing's energy
supply lines. The military may be reconsidering its nuclear
"no-first-use policy" and examining ways to secure China's territorial
claims in the South China and East China seas. Simply stated, as
China's military power has grown, so too, it appears, have the
strategic tasks that it may be assigned. This shouldn't be surprising.
Our own history teaches that as a nation's power grows so do its
ambitions.

As if to underscore this point, an official Chinese military journal
recently published an article arguing that Beijing should develop a
military "commensurate with its international status." Since Beijing's
economic and diplomatic interests span the globe, such strategic
thinking can take the People's Liberation Army in some troubling
directions.

For example, Beijing may conclude that relying on the U.S. Navy for the
safety of its energy supplies is too risky, and decide to increase its
naval presence along the expanse between the Persian Gulf and East
Asia. This would make the Chinese navy the first since the Cold War to
compete for sea control with the United States. In addition, there are
numerous disputed territorial claims in the East China and South China
seas that China could settle by military means. Japan and China already
have come close to skirmishing over energy resources in nearby disputed
waters.

Of course, given the opaque character of Chinese military planning and
government decision making, analysts can only speculate as to what
turns the Chinese military buildup will take. It would help if China
were to open up its political system so that we and other regional
powers could get a better handle on the country's long-term ambitions.
But this seems unlikely, at least anytime soon. Indeed, the Pentagon
report notes that secrecy, deception and surprise remain key components
of Chinese strategic practice.

China has already changed Asia's balance of power. It is past time for
America to get serious about deterring the potentially worst sorts of
Chinese behavior and to provide allies in the region with reason for
renewed confidence in the U.S. security umbrella. Unfortunately, we are
only just beginning to grapple with this daunting strategic task.

The latest Quadrennial Defense Review states that China "has the
greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States." The
Pentagon seeks to "shape [China's] strategic choices" and to "dissuade
any military competitor from developing disruptive or other
capabilities that could enable regional hegemony."

The Bush administration has taken some concrete action toward these
ends. An upgraded alliance with Japan will improve our deterrent
posture. The opening of a strategic relationship with India reflects in
part an American desire to ensure that China does not gain hegemony
over South or Central Asia. An increase in the size of the U.S. Navy's
attack submarine fleet in Guam also brings more American capability
into the Pacific. A nascent defense relationship with Vietnam may over
time provide the American military with what it needs most in Asia --
more bases.

But our China policy leaves us a day late and a dollar short when it
comes to the challenge posed by the speed of Beijing's military
buildup. We still have restrictions on relations with Taiwan dating to
the Carter era that make the island more difficult to defend. A
stronger commitment by the Pentagon to developing long-range
surveillance and strike capabilities would make Beijing less confident
that it could use its vast territory as a sanctuary for its missile and
other "disruptive" forces. Upgrading our undersea warfare capabilities
will improve our regional freedom of action.

Washington's largely reactive and tepid response to China's growing
military power is understandable given what is on America's plate at
the moment. And policymakers are still hoping that they can gain
China's cooperation on pressing international security crises. But as
the Pentagon report says, China has been less than cooperative on those
supposed common interests: denuclearizing North Korea and Iran, for
example. A policy seeking to shape China into a responsible global
actor works only if you are willing to recognize when it is not
working. That time may be fast approaching.

The writer is resident fellow in Asian studies at the American
Enterprise Institute. He formerly was senior country director for China
and Taiwan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/05/24/AR2006052402431.html