What's Happening Around Iran
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13902
by Ian Bremmer 03-26-2007
The intensified military buildup in the Persian Gulf
poses dangers for escalation, both inadvertent and
deliberate, around the Iran crisis. Last week's
Iranian decision to surround a British naval vessel
and seize 15 British sailors and marines directly
increases tensions in the Iran conflict (around both
the nuclear issue and Iran's intervention in Iraq).
It's possible, though unlikely, that the British
sailors were inadvertently in Iranian territory;
though certainly the patrols around Iraqi offshore
terminals and shipping lanes routinely bring British
naval vessels right to the edge of Iranian
territorial waters. (The Iraqi sea lane is quite
narrow in the area of the conflict with some 200
meters of navigable water in Iraqi territory.)
Whatever the case, the well-orchestrated Iranian
"surround and seizure" had been planned for some
time. It strikes me as a response to the United
States holding of Iranian diplomats taken in Irbil
several months ago-a deliberate and carefully
calibrated escalation, with very limited risk for
an outbreak of hostilities. Hence the extraordinary
and high-level Iranian military presence quickly
marshaled to the scene.
The timing of the event was surely intentional, a
provocation right before the Security Council was to
vote on further sanctions against Iran. The decision
could only have been taken with the approval of
Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei. President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would not have been allowed to
take the lead on such a decision. The move further
confirms that Tehran is not looking for a
"diplomatic out." rather it is sending a message to
the international community that Iran is prepared
for a fight if necessary and that its only remaining
options are increasingly unpalatable.
The Iranian decision to take British (rather than
American) soldiers suggests that Tehran does not
intend to release the troops immediately (though
certainly they will remain safe and well looked
after), but rather to use them as leverage for
negotiations with British diplomats. The lack of
direct channels of negotiations between Iran and
the United States would have precluded this option
with U.S. soldiers and could have led to significant
retaliation against Iran. The most likely next step
is for Iran to demand the release of its captured
diplomats, and conceivably of its government
property, in Iraqi territory. That's an unlikely
outcome. The incident has the capacity to
significantly cool British willingness to support
efforts at continued negotiations with Iran on the
nuclear conflict, as well as end Iranian
participation in the broader "contact group" with
the United States and Britain (among others) on Iraq.
And both Britain and the United States will now step
up their military presence along the edge of Iran's
territorial waters, with more frequent and
larger-scale patrols. That will heighten the risk of
military miscues but reduce the likelihood of any
surprise Iranian naval presence.
If anything, the United States and Britain took
advantage of the Iranian move to push up the vote on
a second resolution against Iran at the Security
Council. The sanctions remain extremely limited. And
as I've suggested above, they will have no effect on
Iranian decision-making. Still, it's worth noting
that supreme leader Khamenei last week expressed
Iranian intentions to proceed with "illegal" nuclear
activities following any further "illegal" sanctions
enacted against Iran. The importance of that
statement, given IAEA documentation that Iran's
nuclear program is progressing, is that it provides
greater justification for broader provocative moves
against the Islamic Republic and plays into the
Israeli argument for the need for an attack.
I still see Israeli security concerns as the most
significant driver of likely military action. A
series of Israeli war drills last week, including
simulated missile attacks on Israeli urban centers
and on the main Tel Aviv power station, are
particularly noteworthy.
A final point. The Congress continues to push a
broad spectrum of legislation against Iran, with
strong bipartisan support. The most recent proposal
from the Senate brings Russia into the fray,
threatening to end WTO cooperation with any country
found to be engaging in rather ill-defined "nuclear
cooperation" with Iran. Like other similar measures
in Congress, this one seems likely to pass-if in
amended form. At the least, it threatens one of the
few remaining areas of strong U.S.-Russian
collaboration-civilian nuclear programs to purchase
spent Russian nuclear fuel.
Back in the January/February issue of The National
Interest, I wrote:
The United States is going to face a number of
challenges and disappointments over the next two
years-Iran, Iraq, North Korea, China and Russia,
among others. The first reaction of many U.S.
politicians is to be confrontational. Easing
tensions with rogue states and with countries
perceived to be opposing U.S. policies will not
win the president points with those who prefer
a muscular strategy. But decisions need to be
made on the basis of long-term U.S. interests,
not short-term sound bites.
Good advice to be following now.
Ian Bremmer, a contributing editor to The National
Interest, is president of the Eurasia Group.
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=13902
--
Jeffrey Blankfort on Washington DC's
subservience to the Israel Lobby:
http://xymphora.blogspot.com/2006/11/blankfort-interview.html
illuminating full interview with Jeffrey Blankfort:
http://bleiersblog.blogspot.com/2006/11/jeffrey-blankfort-my-years-of-middle.html
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