"Jimmy Neutron" <jim553@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:p46il0tst4bd71n50ucvuoqr35obvsrf3c@4ax.com...

Trouble is most Bush supporters don't really care about the truth.

Hell, SOME of Bush supporters do, Jimmy!

For example, I enjoy contemplating the following truth, as no doubt you do
also, right Jimmy?

Bush Kerry
June 9 177 227 (50 point lead for Kerry)
June 17 188 227 (39 point lead for Kerry)
August 3 197 227 (30 point lead for Kerry)
August 22 183 203 (20 point lead for Kerry)
August 27 183 193 (10 point lead for Kerry)

http://www.rasmussenreports.com/Electoral%20College%20Projection.htm

"Jimmy Neutron" <jim553@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:p46il0tst4bd71n50ucvuoqr35obvsrf3c@4ax.com...

Trouble is most Bush supporters don't really care about the truth.

Hell, SOME of Bush supporters do, Jimmy!

Why did Kerry Describe Viet-Nam War Veterans
as " War Criminals"? Yes, the Boys that served our
Country in a Foreign Land.

This ***** Accused
them as being Criminals.

in existence back then, this is the Truth.
It is in the Congressional Record.

Subject: Re: Where oh where are Bush's missing military records.
From: "Polish Prince \(Not Bobby Vinton\)"

Country in a Foreign Land. This ***** Accused
them as being Criminals.

in existence back then, this is the Truth.
It is in the Congressional Record.

He is Nauseating. Dispute my claims. Please!
Check it out, If you Dare! I heard his testimony.
His voice and his image, in front of the cameras.

America will know Kerry.

Those that care, will not Vote for this Guy.

"Jimmy Neutron" <jim553@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:p46il0tst4bd71n50ucvuoqr35obvsrf3c@4ax.com...

On Wed, 25 Aug 2004 00:24:35 -0400, "Brian" <brian.s.long@comcast.net>
wrote:

"NotBush2004" <NotBush@WhiteHouse.Gov> wrote in message
news:ntUWc.38666$rP2.36159@hydra.nntpserver.com...

"Brian" <brian.s.long@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:f6ednVOwxupsjbHcRVn-rg@comcast.com...

"NotBush2004" <NotBush@WhiteHouse.Gov> wrote in message
news:z8TWc.37905$rP2.27188@hydra.nntpserver.com...

Missing In Action! Does anyone have proof Bush was at his post on

these

months?

1972: May, June, July, August & September.

1973: February & March.

Where, oh where could they be? Did they trash them? No they tried

that

ploy

once but someone with enough integrity said that was bunk.

It looks like there is 7 mos that Bush was AWOL during the Viet Nam

war.

--
Kerry's Viet Nam Medals

1 - Silver Star
1 - Bronze Star
3 - Purple Hearts

What part of bravery and leadership don't you understand?

Tell us about Bush's medals.

Where are Kerry's medical records? That is the real proof for the

Purple

Hearts and not the citation.

We know Kerry fought in combat in Viet Nam and we know Bush went AWOL

during

the Viet Nam war.

Is it more important to know how Kerry earned his medals or if the
Commander-in-Chief is a deserter?

Both are important. You can't have one without the other. If you really
care about the truth that is.

Trouble is most Bush supporters don't really care about the truth.
Besides what does all this quibble about medals, and the lack of
valor to earn the medals really mean to the millions of civilians who
never served in the armed forces? For most people who just
have a cursory knowledge about the military and war, just simply know
that being present in a combat zone is enough of a demonstration of
valor. Why argue any further over who should or shouldn't get the the
top medals or prize? And as for Bush, he never came close to any
combat zone. For God's sakes, the pathetic ***** couldn't even
make it to national guard duty, but he asks your son or daughter to
be present in a combat zone somewhere in Iraq! Unfortunately, most
Bush/Cheney supporters can't make this logical connection. They must
resort to this illogical disconnect from reality of the present and go
back to Kerry's presence somewhere in Vietnam. Well Kerry wasn't the
one who asked your son or daughter to do that which he was unwilling
to do himself.

Why did Kerry Describe Viet-Nam War Veterans
as " War Criminals"? Yes, the Boys that served our
Country in a Foreign Land. This ***** Accused
them as being Criminals.

For those of you not
in existence back then, this is the Truth.
It is in the Congressional Record. Check it out.

He is Nauseating. Dispute my claims. Please!
Check it out, If you Dare! I heard his testimony.
His voice and his image, in front of the cameras.

America will know Kerry.

Those that care, will not Vote for this Guy.

"Jimmy Neutron" <jim553@hotmail.com> wrote in message
news:p46il0tst4bd71n50ucvuoqr35obvsrf3c@4ax.com...

On Wed, 25 Aug 2004 00:24:35 -0400, "Brian" <brian.s.long@comcast.net>
wrote:

"NotBush2004" <NotBush@WhiteHouse.Gov> wrote in message
news:ntUWc.38666$rP2.36159@hydra.nntpserver.com...

"Brian" <brian.s.long@comcast.net> wrote in message
news:f6ednVOwxupsjbHcRVn-rg@comcast.com...

"NotBush2004" <NotBush@WhiteHouse.Gov> wrote in message
news:z8TWc.37905$rP2.27188@hydra.nntpserver.com...

Missing In Action! Does anyone have proof Bush was at his post on

these

months?

1972: May, June, July, August & September.

1973: February & March.

Where, oh where could they be? Did they trash them? No they tried

that

ploy

once but someone with enough integrity said that was bunk.

It looks like there is 7 mos that Bush was AWOL during the Viet Nam

war.

--
Kerry's Viet Nam Medals

1 - Silver Star
1 - Bronze Star
3 - Purple Hearts

What part of bravery and leadership don't you understand?

Tell us about Bush's medals.

Where are Kerry's medical records? That is the real proof for the

Purple

Hearts and not the citation.

We know Kerry fought in combat in Viet Nam and we know Bush went AWOL

during

the Viet Nam war.

Is it more important to know how Kerry earned his medals or if the
Commander-in-Chief is a deserter?

Both are important. You can't have one without the other. If you really
care about the truth that is.

Trouble is most Bush supporters don't really care about the truth.
Besides what does all this quibble about medals, and the lack of
valor to earn the medals really mean to the millions of civilians who
never served in the armed forces? For most people who just
have a cursory knowledge about the military and war, just simply know
that being present in a combat zone is enough of a demonstration of
valor. Why argue any further over who should or shouldn't get the the
top medals or prize? And as for Bush, he never came close to any
combat zone. For God's sakes, the pathetic ***** couldn't even
make it to national guard duty, but he asks your son or daughter to
be present in a combat zone somewhere in Iraq! Unfortunately, most
Bush/Cheney supporters can't make this logical connection. They must
resort to this illogical disconnect from reality of the present and go
back to Kerry's presence somewhere in Vietnam. Well Kerry wasn't the
one who asked your son or daughter to do that which he was unwilling
to do himself.

Some of the things they have found is the kind of things where you would not
need a large stockpile.

Case Closed!!!! There Are Weapons Of Mass Destruction!!!!!!!!

From the November 24, 2003 issue: The U.S. government's secret memo
detailing cooperation between Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden.

by Stephen F. Hayes
11/24/2003, Volume 009, Issue 11

Editor's Note, 1/27/04: In today's Washington Post, Dana Milbank
reported that "Vice President Cheney . . . in an interview this month
with the Rocky Mountain News, recommended as the 'best source of
information' an article in The Weekly Standard magazine detailing a
relationship between Hussein and al Qaeda based on leaked classified
information."

Here's the Stephen F. Hayes article to which the vice president was
referring.

-JVL

OSAMA BIN LADEN and Saddam Hussein had an operational relationship
from the early 1990s to 2003 that involved training in explosives and
weapons of mass destruction, logistical support for terrorist attacks,
al Qaeda training camps and safe haven in Iraq, and Iraqi financial
support for al Qaeda--perhaps even for Mohamed Atta--according to a
top secret U.S. government memorandum obtained by THE WEEKLY STANDARD.

The memo, dated October 27, 2003, was sent from Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy Douglas J. Feith to Senators Pat Roberts and Jay
Rockefeller, the chairman and vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee. It was written in response to a request from the committee
as part of its investigation into prewar intelligence claims made by
the administration. Intelligence reporting included in the 16-page
memo comes from a variety of domestic and foreign agencies, including
the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Agency. Much of the evidence is
detailed, conclusive, and corroborated by multiple sources. Some of it
is new information obtained in custodial interviews with high-level al
Qaeda terrorists and Iraqi officials, and some of it is more than a
decade old. The picture that emerges is one of a history of
collaboration between two of America's most determined and dangerous
enemies.

According to the memo--which lays out the intelligence in 50 numbered
points--Iraq-al Qaeda contacts began in 1990 and continued through
mid-March 2003, days before the Iraq War began. Most of the numbered
passages contain straight, fact-based intelligence reporting, which
some cases includes an evaluation of the credibility of the source.
This reporting is often followed by commentary and analysis.

The relationship began shortly before the first Gulf War. According to
reporting in the memo, bin Laden sent "emissaries to Jordan in 1990 to
meet with Iraqi government officials." At some unspecified point in
1991, according to a CIA analysis, "Iraq sought Sudan's assistance to
establish links to al Qaeda." The outreach went in both directions.
According to 1993 CIA reporting cited in the memo, "bin Laden wanted
to expand his organization's capabilities through ties with Iraq."

The primary go-between throughout these early stages was Sudanese
strongman Hassan al-Turabi, a leader of the al Qaeda-affiliated
National Islamic Front. Numerous sources have confirmed this. One
defector reported that "al-Turabi was instrumental in arranging the
Iraqi-al Qaeda relationship. The defector said Iraq sought al Qaeda
influence through its connections with Afghanistan, to facilitate the
transshipment of proscribed weapons and equipment to Iraq. In return,
Iraq provided al Qaeda with training and instructors."

One such confirmation came in a postwar interview with one of Saddam
Hussein's henchmen. As the memo details:

4. According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence
officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive
relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The
first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and
al Qaeda was brokered by al-Turabi. Former IIS
deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al]
Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and
1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al
Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit
Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief in a safe
house. The report claimed that Saddam insisted the relationship with
al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a
personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under
scrutiny from foreign probes.

A decisive moment in the budding relationship came in 1993, when bin
Laden faced internal resistance to his cooperation with Saddam.

5. A CIA report from a contact with good access, some of whose
reporting has been corroborated, said that certain elements in the
"Islamic Army" of bin Laden were against the secular regime of Saddam.
Overriding the internal factional strife that was developing, bin
Laden came to an "understanding" with Saddam that the Islamic Army
would no longer support anti-Saddam activities. According to sensitive
reporting released in U.S. court documents during the African Embassy
trial, in 1993 bin Laden reached an "understanding" with Saddam under
which he (bin Laden) forbade al Qaeda operations to be mounted against
the Iraqi leader.

Another facilitator of the relationship during the mid-1990s was
Mahmdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-Iraqi). Abu Hajer, now in a
New York prison, was described in court proceedings related to the
August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as bin
Laden's "best friend." According to CIA reporting dating back to the
Clinton administration, bin Laden trusted him to serve as a liaison
with Saddam's regime and tasked him with procurement of weapons of
mass destruction for al Qaeda. FBI reporting in the memo reveals that
Abu Hajer "visited Iraq in early 1995" and "had a good relationship
with Iraqi intelligence. Sometime before mid-1995 he went on an al
Qaeda mission to discuss unspecified cooperation with the Iraqi
government."

Some of the reporting about the relationship throughout the mid-1990s
comes from a source who had intimate knowledge of bin Laden and his
dealings. This source, according to CIA analysis, offered "the most
credible information" on cooperation between bin Laden and Iraq.

This source's reports read almost like a diary. Specific dates of when
bin Laden flew to various cities are included, as well as names of
individuals he met. The source did not offer information on the
substantive talks during the meetings. . . . There are not a great
many reports in general on the relationship between bin Laden and Iraq
because of the secrecy surrounding it. But when this source with close
access provided a "window" into bin Laden's activities, bin Laden is
seen as heavily involved with Iraq (and Iran).

Reporting from the early 1990s remains somewhat sketchy, though
multiple sources place Hassan al-Turabi and Ayman al Zawahiri, bin
Laden's current No. 2, at the center of the relationship. The
reporting gets much more specific in the mid-1990s:

8. Reporting from a well placed source disclosed that bin Laden was
receiving training on bomb making from the IIS's [Iraqi Intelligence
Service] principal technical expert on making sophisticated
explosives, Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed. Brigadier Salim was observed at
bin Laden's farm in Khartoum in Sept.-Oct. 1995 and again in July
1996, in the company of the Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani
abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti.

9 . . . Bin Laden visited Doha, Qatar (17-19 Jan. 1996), staying at
the residence of a member of the Qatari ruling family. He discussed
the successful movement of explosives into Saudi Arabia, and
operations targeted against U.S. and U.K. interests in Dammam, Dharan,
and Khobar, using clandestine al Qaeda cells in Saudi Arabia. Upon his
return, bin Laden met with Hijazi and Turabi, among others.

And later more reporting, from the same "well placed" source:

10. The Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti,
met privately with bin Laden at his farm in Sudan in July 1996.
Tikriti used an Iraqi delegation traveling to Khartoum to discuss
bilateral cooperation as his "cover" for his own entry into Sudan to
meet with bin Laden and Hassan al-Turabi. The Iraqi intelligence chief
and two other IIS officers met at bin Laden's farm and discussed bin
Laden's request for IIS technical assistance in: a) making letter and
parcel bombs; b) making bombs which could be placed
on aircraft and detonated by changes in barometric pressure; and c)
making false passport [sic]. Bin Laden specifically requested that
[Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed], Iraqi intelligence's premier explosives
maker--especially skilled in making car bombs--remain with him in
Sudan. The Iraqi intelligence chief instructed Salim to remain in
Sudan with bin Laden as long as required.

The analysis of those events follows:

The time of the visit from the IIS director was a few weeks after the
Khobar Towers bombing. The bombing came on the third anniversary of a
U.S. [Tomahawk missile] strike on IIS HQ (retaliation for the
attempted assassination of former President Bush in Kuwait) for which
Iraqi officials explicitly threatened retaliation.

IN ADDITION TO THE CONTACTS CLUSTERED in the mid-1990s, intelligence
reports detail a flurry of activities in early 1998 and again in
December 1998. A "former senior Iraqi intelligence officer" reported
that "the Iraqi intelligence service station in Pakistan was Baghdad's
point of contact with al Qaeda. He also said bin Laden visited Baghdad
in Jan. 1998 and met with Tariq Aziz."

11. According to sensitive reporting, Saddam personally sent Faruq
Hijazi, IIS deputy director and later Iraqi ambassador to Turkey, to
meet with bin Laden at least twice, first in Sudan and later in
Afghanistan in 1999. . . .

14. According to a sensitive reporting [from] a "regular and reliable
source," [Ayman al] Zawahiri, a senior al Qaeda operative, visited
Baghdad and met with the Iraqi Vice President on 3 February 1998. The
goal of the visit was to arrange for coordination between Iraq and bin
Laden and establish camps in an-Nasiriyah and Iraqi Kurdistan under
the leadership of Abdul Aziz.

That visit came as the Iraqis intensified their defiance of the U.N.
inspection regime, known as UNSCOM, created by the cease-fire
agreement following the Gulf War. UNSCOM demanded access to Saddam's
presidential palaces that he refused to provide. As the tensions
mounted, President Bill Clinton went to the Pentagon on February 18,
1998, and prepared the nation for war. He warned of "an unholy axis of
terrorists, drug traffickers, and organized international criminals"
and said "there is no more clear example of this threat than Saddam
Hussein."

The day after this speech, according to documents unearthed in April
2003 in the Iraqi Intelligence headquarters by journalists Mitch
Potter and Inigo Gilmore, Hussein's intelligence service wrote a memo
detailing coming meetings with a bin Laden representative traveling to
Baghdad. Each reference to bin Laden had been covered by liquid paper
that, when revealed, exposed a plan to increase cooperation between
Iraq and al Qaeda. According to that memo, the IIS agreed to pay for
"all the travel and hotel costs inside Iraq to gain the knowledge of
the message from bin Laden and to convey to his envoy an oral message
from us to bin Laden." The document set as the goal for the meeting a
discussion of "the future of our relationship with him, bin Laden, and
to achieve a direct meeting with him." The al Qaeda representative,
the document went on to suggest, might provide "a way to maintain
contacts with bin Laden." Four days later, on February 23, 1998, bin
Laden issued his now-famous fatwa on the plight of Iraq, published in
the Arabic-language daily, al Quds al-Arabi: "For over seven years the
United States has been occupying the lands of Islam in the holiest of
places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its
rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning
its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the
neighboring Muslim peoples." Bin Laden urged his followers to act:
"The ruling to kill all Americans and their allies--civilians and
military--is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any
country in which it is possible to do it."

Although war was temporarily averted by a last-minute deal brokered by
U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, tensions soon rose again. The
standoff with Iraq came to a head in December 1998, when President
Clinton launched Operation Desert Fox, a 70-hour bombing campaign that
began on December 16 and ended three days later, on December 19, 1998.

According to press reports at the time, Faruq Hijazi, deputy director
of Iraqi Intelligence, met with bin Laden in Afghanistan on December
21, 1998, to offer bin Laden safe haven in Iraq. CIA reporting in the
memo to the Senate Intelligence Committee seems to confirm this
meeting and relates two others.

15. A foreign government service reported that an Iraqi delegation,
including at least two Iraqi intelligence officers formerly assigned
to the Iraqi Embassy in Pakistan, met in late 1998 with bin Laden in
Afghanistan.

16. According to CIA reporting, bin Laden and Zawahiri met with two
Iraqi intelligence officers in Afghanistan in Dec. 1998.

17. . . . Iraq sent an intelligence officer to Afghanistan to seek
closer ties to bin Laden and the Taliban in late 1998. The source
reported that the Iraqi regime was trying to broaden its cooperation
with al Qaeda. Iraq was looking to recruit Muslim "elements" to
sabotage U.S. and U.K. interests. After a senior Iraqi intelligence
officer met with Taliban leader [Mullah] Omar, arrangements were made
for a series of meetings between the Iraqi intelligence officer and
bin Laden in Pakistan. The source noted Faruq Hijazi was in
Afghanistan in late 1998.

18. . . . Faruq Hijazi went to Afghanistan in 1999 along with several
other Iraqi officials to meet with bin Laden. The source claimed that
Hijazi would have met bin Laden only at Saddam's explicit direction.

An analysis that follows No. 18 provides additional context and an
explanation of these reports:

Reporting entries #4, #11, #15, #16, #17, and #18, from different
sources, corroborate each other and provide confirmation of meetings
between al Qaeda operatives and Iraqi intelligence in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. None of the reports have information on operational details
or the purpose of such meetings. The covert nature of the relationship
would indicate strict compartmentation [sic] of operations.

Information about connections between al Qaeda and Iraq was so
widespread by early 1999 that it made its way into the mainstream
press. A January 11, 1999, Newsweek story ran under this headline:
"Saddam + Bin Laden?" The story cited an "Arab intelligence source"
with knowledge of contacts between Iraq and al Qaeda. "According to
this source, Saddam expected last month's American and British bombing
campaign to go on much longer than it did. The dictator believed that
as the attacks continued, indignation would grow in the Muslim world,
making his terrorism offensive both harder to trace and more
effective. With acts of terror contributing to chaos in the region,
Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait might feel less inclined to
support Washington. Saddam's long-term strategy, according to several
sources, is to bully or cajole Muslim countries into breaking the
embargo against Iraq, without waiting for the United Nations to lift
if formally."

INTELLIGENCE REPORTS about the nature of the relationship between Iraq
and al Qaeda from mid-1999 through 2003 are conflicting. One senior
Iraqi intelligence officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah,
"said that the last contact between the IIS and al Qaeda was in July
1999. Bin Laden wanted to meet with Saddam, he said. The guidance sent
back from Saddam's office reportedly ordered Iraqi intelligence to
refrain from any further contact with bin Laden and al Qaeda. The
source opined that Saddam wanted to distance himself from al Qaeda."

The bulk of reporting on the relationship contradicts this claim. One
report states that "in late 1999" al Qaeda set up a training camp in
northern Iraq that "was operational as of 1999." Other reports suggest
that the Iraqi regime contemplated several offers of safe haven to bin
Laden throughout 1999.

23. . . . Iraqi officials were carefully considering offering safe
haven to bin Laden and his closest collaborators in Nov. 1999. The
source indicated the idea was put forward by the presumed head of
Iraqi intelligence in Islamabad (Khalid Janaby) who in turn was in
frequent contact and had good relations with bin Laden.

Some of the most intriguing intelligence concerns an Iraqi named Ahmed
Hikmat Shakir:

24. According to sensitive reporting, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national
(Shakir) facilitated the arrival of one of the Sept 11 hijackers for
an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Jan 2000). Sensitive reporting
indicates Shakir's travel and contacts link him to a worldwide network
of terrorists, including al Qaeda. Shakir worked at the Kuala Lumpur
airport--a job he claimed to have obtained through an Iraqi embassy
employee.

One of the men at that al Qaeda operational meeting in the Kuala
Lumpur Hotel was Tawfiz al Atash, a top bin Laden lieutenant later
identified as the mastermind of the October 12, 2000, attack on the
USS Cole.

25. Investigation into the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000 by
al Qaeda revealed no specific Iraqi connections but according to the
CIA, "fragmentary evidence points to possible Iraqi involvement."

26. During a custodial interview, Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi [a senior al
Qaeda operative] said he was told by an al Qaeda associate that he was
tasked to travel to Iraq (1998) to establish a relationship with Iraqi
intelligence to obtain poisons and gases training. After the USS Cole
bombing in 2000, two al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq for
CBW-related [Chemical and Biological Weapons] training beginning in
Dec 2000. Iraqi intelligence was "encouraged" after the embassy and
USS Cole bombings to provide this training.

The analysis of this report follows.

CIA maintains that Ibn al-Shaykh's timeline is consistent with other
sensitive reporting indicating that bin Laden asked Iraq in 1998 for
advanced weapons, including CBW and "poisons."

Additional reporting also calls into question the claim that relations
between Iraq and al Qaeda cooled after mid-1999:

27. According to sensitive CIA reporting, . . . the Saudi National
Guard went on a kingdom-wide state of alert in late Dec 2000 after
learning Saddam agreed to assist al Qaeda in attacking U.S./U.K.
interests in Saudi Arabia.

And then there is the alleged contact between lead 9/11 hijacker
Mohamed Atta and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague. The
reporting on those links suggests not one meeting, but as many as
four. What's more, the memo reveals potential financing of Atta's
activities by Iraqi intelligence.


The Czech counterintelligence service reported that the Sept. 11
hijacker [Mohamed] Atta met with the former Iraqi intelligence chief
in Prague, [Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir] al Ani, on several occasions.
During one of these meetings, al Ani ordered the IIS finance officer
to issue Atta funds from IIS financial holdings in the Prague office.

And the commentary:

CIA can confirm two Atta visits to Prague--in Dec. 1994 and in June
2000; data surrounding the other two--on 26 Oct 1999 and 9 April
2001--is complicated and sometimes contradictory and CIA and FBI
cannot confirm Atta met with the IIS. Czech Interior Minister
Stanislav Gross continues to stand by his information.

It's not just Gross who stands by the information. Five high-ranking
members of the Czech government have publicly confirmed meetings
between Atta and al Ani. The meeting that has gotten the most press
attention--April 9, 2001--is also the most widely disputed. Even some
of the most hawkish Bush administration officials are privately
skeptical that Atta met al Ani on that occasion. They believe that
reports of the alleged meeting, said to have taken place in public,
outside the headquarters of the U.S.-financed Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty, suggest a level of sloppiness that doesn't fit the pattern of
previous high-level Iraq-al Qaeda contacts.

Whether or not that specific meeting occurred, the report by Czech
counterintelligence that al Ani ordered the Iraqi Intelligence Service
officer to provide IIS funds to Atta might help explain the lead
hijacker's determination to reach Prague, despite significant
obstacles, in the spring 2000. (Note that the report stops short of
confirming that the funds were transferred. It claims only that the
IIS officer requested the transfer.) Recall that Atta flew to Prague
from Germany on May 30, 2000, but was denied entry because he did not
have a valid visa. Rather than simply return to Germany and fly
directly to the United States, his ultimate destination, Atta took
pains to get to Prague. After he was refused entry the first time, he
traveled back to Germany, obtained the proper paperwork, and caught a
bus back to Prague. He left for the United States the day after
arriving in Prague for the second time.

Several reports indicate that the relationship between Saddam and bin
Laden continued, even after the September 11 attacks:

31. An Oct. 2002 . . . report said al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret
agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members
and provide them with money and weapons. The agreement reportedly
prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq. The
report also said that al Qaeda members involved in a fraudulent
passport network for al Qaeda had been directed to procure 90 Iraqi
and Syrian passports for al Qaeda personnel.

The analysis that accompanies that report indicates that the report
fits the pattern of Iraq-al Qaeda collaboration:

References to procurement of false passports from Iraq and offers of
safe haven previously have surfaced in CIA source reporting considered
reliable. Intelligence reports to date have maintained A that Iraqi
support for al Qaeda usually involved providing training, obtaining
passports, and offers of refuge. This report adds to that list by
including weapons and money. This assistance would make sense in the
aftermath of 9-11.

Colin Powell, in his February 5, 2003, presentation to the U.N.
Security Council, revealed the activities of Abu Musab al Zarqawi.
Reporting in the memo expands on Powell's case and might help explain
some of the resistance the U.S. military is currently facing in Iraq.

37. Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close
al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with
Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with
the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air
missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive
reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be
activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his
operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent
months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure
operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in
preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi's procurements
from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the
U.S. or its allies elsewhere.

38. According to sensitive reporting, a contact with good access who
does not have an established reporting record: An Iraqi intelligence
servic