Admit WMD mistake, survey chief tells Bush
Julian Borger in Washington
Wednesday March 3, 2004
The Guardian
David Kay, the man who led the CIA's postwar effort to find weapons of
mass destruction in Iraq, has called on the Bush administration to
"come clean with the American people" and admit it was wrong about the
existence of the weapons.
In an interview with the Guardian, Mr Kay said the administration's
reluctance to make that admission was delaying essential reforms of US
intelligence agencies, and further undermining its credibility at home
and abroad.
He welcomed the creation of a bipartisan commission to investigate
prewar intelligence on Iraq, and said the wide-ranging US
investigation was much more likely to get to the truth than the Butler
inquiry in Britain. That, he noted, had "so many limitations it's
going to be almost impossible" to come to meaningful conclusions.
Mr Kay, 63, a former nuclear weapons inspector, provoked uproar at the
end of January when he told the Senate that "we were almost all wrong"
about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
He also resigned from the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which he was
appointed by the CIA to lead in the hunt for weapons stockpiles,
saying its resources had been diverted in the fight against Iraqi
insurgents.
"I was more worried that we were still sending teams out to search for
things that we were increasingly convinced were not there," Mr Kay
said.
His call for a frank admission is an embarrassment for the White House
at the start of an election year. The defence secretary, Donald
Rumsfeld, has dismissed Mr Kay's assertion that there were no WMD at
the start of the Iraq war as a "theory" that was "possible, but not
likely".
In his state of the union speech in January, George Bush did not refer
to his prewar claims that Iraq was an "immediate threat" but instead
said the ISG had found "weapons of mass destruction-related programme
activities".
Mr Kay, who was formerly a UN weapons inspector, called for the
president to go further. "It's about confronting and coming clean with
the American people. He should say we were mistaken and I am
determined to find out why," he said.
A White House official said it was too early to draw conclusions: "The
ISG is still working, and the commission on this has not even
started."
However, Mr Kay said that continued evasion would create public
cynicism about the administration's motives, which he believes
reflected a genuine fear of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists.
He also said that if the administration did not confront the Iraq
intelligence fiasco head-on it would undermine its credibility with
its allies in future crises "for a generation".
Mr Kay said that he had become convinced there were no WMD to be found
several months ago, before presenting an interim report to Congress
last October saying no stockpiles had been found, but he said the CIA
and the Blair government were nervous about the impact of his
conclusions.
"I think the greatest concern about the report was in London rather
than in Washington. It was a different political issue in London than
it was here," he said, referring to the storm around the death of his
former UN colleague David Kelly.
Mr Kay said he had been expecting Dr Kelly's arrival in Iraq to help
the search for biological weapons programmes, and had spoken to him
shortly before his death. "He never had any doubts about Iraq's
programmes," Mr Kay said.
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| User: "Ex." |
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| Title: Re: Admit WMD mistake,survey chief tells Bush |
03 Mar 2004 09:15:12 AM |
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Why would they do that? They could never pre-emptively protect themselves
again ... say against Iran, Syria, etc
"DaarkSyde" <DaarkSyde@everywhere.com> wrote in message
news:n7qb401q9167qgk3mimvdu583t7lp3g9lu@4ax.com...
: Admit WMD mistake, survey chief tells Bush
:
: Julian Borger in Washington
: Wednesday March 3, 2004
: The Guardian
:
: David Kay, the man who led the CIA's postwar effort to find weapons of
: mass destruction in Iraq, has called on the Bush administration to
: "come clean with the American people" and admit it was wrong about the
: existence of the weapons.
: In an interview with the Guardian, Mr Kay said the administration's
: reluctance to make that admission was delaying essential reforms of US
: intelligence agencies, and further undermining its credibility at home
: and abroad.
:
: He welcomed the creation of a bipartisan commission to investigate
: prewar intelligence on Iraq, and said the wide-ranging US
: investigation was much more likely to get to the truth than the Butler
: inquiry in Britain. That, he noted, had "so many limitations it's
: going to be almost impossible" to come to meaningful conclusions.
:
: Mr Kay, 63, a former nuclear weapons inspector, provoked uproar at the
: end of January when he told the Senate that "we were almost all wrong"
: about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
:
: He also resigned from the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which he was
: appointed by the CIA to lead in the hunt for weapons stockpiles,
: saying its resources had been diverted in the fight against Iraqi
: insurgents.
:
: "I was more worried that we were still sending teams out to search for
: things that we were increasingly convinced were not there," Mr Kay
: said.
:
: His call for a frank admission is an embarrassment for the White House
: at the start of an election year. The defence secretary, Donald
: Rumsfeld, has dismissed Mr Kay's assertion that there were no WMD at
: the start of the Iraq war as a "theory" that was "possible, but not
: likely".
:
: In his state of the union speech in January, George Bush did not refer
: to his prewar claims that Iraq was an "immediate threat" but instead
: said the ISG had found "weapons of mass destruction-related programme
: activities".
:
: Mr Kay, who was formerly a UN weapons inspector, called for the
: president to go further. "It's about confronting and coming clean with
: the American people. He should say we were mistaken and I am
: determined to find out why," he said.
:
: A White House official said it was too early to draw conclusions: "The
: ISG is still working, and the commission on this has not even
: started."
:
: However, Mr Kay said that continued evasion would create public
: cynicism about the administration's motives, which he believes
: reflected a genuine fear of WMD falling into the hands of terrorists.
: He also said that if the administration did not confront the Iraq
: intelligence fiasco head-on it would undermine its credibility with
: its allies in future crises "for a generation".
:
: Mr Kay said that he had become convinced there were no WMD to be found
: several months ago, before presenting an interim report to Congress
: last October saying no stockpiles had been found, but he said the CIA
: and the Blair government were nervous about the impact of his
: conclusions.
:
: "I think the greatest concern about the report was in London rather
: than in Washington. It was a different political issue in London than
: it was here," he said, referring to the storm around the death of his
: former UN colleague David Kelly.
:
: Mr Kay said he had been expecting Dr Kelly's arrival in Iraq to help
: the search for biological weapons programmes, and had spoken to him
: shortly before his death. "He never had any doubts about Iraq's
: programmes," Mr Kay said.
:
:
.
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