Georgia: A Swan Song for the Gray Fox of the Caucasus?
November 21, 2003 2337 GMT
Summary
Georgia is locked in an internal conflict over election scandals that,
given time, could escalate into civil war. Although Washington and
Moscow have come down on opposite sides of the issue, they both might
stand by the incumbent president to avoid chaos in Georgia.
Analysis
In the shadow of the ongoing war in Iraq, an important geopolitical
battle is enveloping Georgia. On the surface is an internal power
struggle. Behind the scenes, however, is a tug-of-war between the
United States and Russia for influence over Georgia.
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze on Nov. 20 declared victory in
the Nov. 2 parliamentary elections amid massive protests and
accusations that the polls were rigged. The radical opposition, led by
pro-U.S. nationalists, is demanding Shevardnadze's resignation and
organizing marches on Tbilisi, saying it will not stop until
Shevardnadze is gone. The pro-Russian faction supports the president.
The rival groups already have clashed violently -- par for the course
in Georgia -- during massive rallies. If the crisis is not resolved
quickly, Georgia will face civil war.
Controlling Georgia is important to Washington as a means of curbing
Russian influence. Georgia is the only artery through which it can
pump Caspian energy resources westward, bypassing Russia. By
dominating Georgia, the United States could project its military
forces deep into Russia and the Caspian basin and -- should it leave
Iraq -- Turkey and Iran. It also would allow the superpower to
influence the Russian-Chechen war and block al Qaeda from using
Georgian territory.
Georgia also is important to Moscow since Russia cannot secure its
southern borders unless it controls Georgia. Islamic militants long
have used the porous borders to attack Russia from bases in Georgia.
Moscow also would have a better chance at winning the Chechen war if
the militants were deprived use of the neighboring country. Moscow
needs to dominate Georgia to return Russia's former geopolitical
influence in the Caucasus and Middle East.
Washington: Horse-Trading?
Shevardnadze -- a former Georgian KGB and Soviet Politburo leader --
has ruled since 1992 in a way reminiscent of Soviet totalitarianism
and Asian despotism. Living standards have sunk deeply and corruption
and organized crime have flourished. Still, he became a U.S. ally,
letting in American Special Forces and lobbying for the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline to pass through Georgia. There is a
controversy over whether Shevardnadze received U.S. aid above the
board or by less honest means: Some international and local media
reported that much of the "aid" actually was stolen. Washington did
back Shevardnadze, however, and encouraged him not to cooperate with
Russia. The president consented -- except on the economy, where
Russian gas and other products are vital for the country's survival.
Given Georgia's geopolitical importance, Washington and Moscow cannot
overlook the current scandals and protests. This time, there was no
place for Shevardnadze in either of their plans. While Moscow's lack
of support for him was not a surprise, Shevardnadze doubtless was
shocked to lose U.S. backing.
Washington changed its mind about Shevardnadze for two reasons. First,
a new opposition force -- led by Mikhail Saakashvili, a 40-something
politician -- has emerged and appears prepared to go out of its way to
do Washington's bidding if it comes to power. Second, Shevardnadze is
now so closely associated with corruption and other serious problems
that a continued U.S. alliance with him might erode the U.S. position
in the Caucasus.
Encouraged by U.S. support, the Saakashvili National Movement (SNM)
has led several opposition groups trying to force the president to
declare the movement's victory in the election -- government figures
placed the SNM third -- and resign. Stratfor's sources within the
opposition group say that high-ranking U.S. diplomats and State
Department officials met with SNM leaders to encourage them to
continue with the anti-Shevardnadze campaign. Some U.S.
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) also might have been involved in
Georgia's internal conflict. In particular, Shevardnadze publicly
accused the Soros Foundation of providing organizational and financial
support to the opposition.
Moscow's Choice: Bad… Or Worse
In the November elections, Moscow supported Aslan Abashidze, leader of
the Ajara region and descendant of the ancient rulers of Ajara. The
government said that Abashidze's Revival Party placed second in the
elections. He was forced to choose between supporting either the
first- or third-place winner, because the SNM was dissatisfied with
the results. With Washington's encouragement, it challenged the ruling
party.
The SNM would have taken on Shevardnadze even if it had come in
second. Abashidze had no interest in challenging the leader, however.
While he is not a friend, he knows that the SNM is his true foe
because of dramatic differences in their geopolitical agendas. He also
nurtures the hope that the president one day might make him successor.
He knows that if the SNM won, it would put him down. Abashidze threw
his weight behind the incumbent. He did it at Moscow's urging after
meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in Armenia and top
Russian officials in Moscow.
Though there is no love lost between the Kremlin and Shevardnadze,
Moscow understands that should Saakashvili come to power, Russia would
lose its last footholds in the Caucasus. Stratfor's sources in the
Russian Group of Forces in the TransCaucasus confirm that Russian
troops in two bases in Georgia have been told not to intervene if
Georgians begin shooting each other -- but the mere Russian military
presence will serve as a deterrent for anti-Shevardnadze opposition.
Russia does not want violence to break out, but President Vladimir
Putin above all wants to avoid having the United States accuse him of
interfering in Georgia's internal conflict, which it would frame as
restoring "the wrong side" of the Soviet Empire.
We suspect that if Shevardnadze survives this scandal with Moscow's
support intact, then Moscow's follow-on plan will be to replace him
with Abashidze while Shevardnadze is still in power. Since Abashidze's
Revival bloc came in second ahead of SNM, Moscow might then push the
president to appoint Abashidze as Parliament chairman -- the de facto
presidential replacement. Later, if the radical opposition continues
and the protests turn violent, Moscow could pressure Shevardnadze to
resign and call on Abashidze to lead Georgia.
We are not sure if Shevardnadze -- who hates Moscow -- will follow the
plan. The president could use Abashidze and Moscow during the protests
and then turn away from them when and if a resolution is crafted, like
he did several years ago when the opposition in Tbilisi threatened a
revolution: He approached Abashidze for support, received it, and then
left Abashidze -- and by extension Moscow -- out in the cold with no
compensation. In the end, Shevardnadze -- who has made many u-turns in
his career -- might live up to his nickname, the "Gray Fox of
Caucasus." This time, he might try to get pro-U.S. and pro-Russian
opposition to clash and then cast himself as arbiter for peace.
Moscow's support of Shevardnadze and his intention to cling to power
has made Washington correlate its position. While supporting
Saakashvili, U.S. officials are telling Shevardnadze that Washington
might still back him if he agrees to share power with the pro-U.S.
opposition, for instance appointing Saakashvili, rather than
Abashidze, as Parliament chairman, Stratfor's Georgian government
sources say. They add that Washington at the same time has threatened
to step up pressure on Shevardnadze. U.S. Assistant State Secretary
Lynn Pasko implied this after visiting Shevardnadze and pro-U.S.
opposition leaders, saying that the president should offer major
concessions to the opposition.
If Shevardnadze does not resign in favor of Saakashvili soon,
Washington's follow-on plan would be to instigate a gradual transition
of power to the latter. Slowly bending under U.S. pressure but still
maneuvering to survive, Shevardnadze is offering a compromise: He says
he will convene the new Parliament and work until new elections are
held in the near future. Of course, he plans to hold them no sooner
than he thinks he can win.
Genie Out of the Bottle?
The outcome of the current confrontation, however, might be one
neither Washington nor Moscow expects. If not resolved soon, the
crisis will move Georgia toward civil war. Already there were clashes
-- and the violence is likely to spiral. Encouraged by U.S. support,
Saakashvili intends to push ahead no matter what. Pro-U.S. opposition
sources told Stratfor that Saakashvili feels he has full American
support since the Nov. 20 State Department's announcement of
Washington's deep disappointment with Tbilisi for the fraudulent
elections, accusing pro-Moscow Ajara of falsifying the results.
Saakashvili's people took over one provincial district administration
on Nov. 20, and major clashes between rival supporters could erupt any
moment.
Georgia traditionally resolves political disputes with arms, and the
country is bristling with weapons. Warlords affiliated with
politicians lead dozens of armed groups -- paramilitary, separatist
and criminal among others. They can be called upon easily to crush
political opponents. Georgian media report that Shevardnadze moved
loyal army units and Ajara special units to Tbilisi. Saakashvili says
the Tbilisi police are siding with him, ready to turn arms against the
government.
Modern Georgia seems not to have formed into a united geopolitical
entity since gaining independence. Instead, it has been in constant
wars and conflicts. Georgian guerrillas attack secessionist Abkhazia.
South Ossetia is de facto independent. Abashidze rules Ajara with no
interference from Tbilisi. Chechen militants and drug lords dominate
the Pankisi region. Provinces populated by ethnic Georgians have none
but the most infinitesimal ties to Tbilisi. Politicians use provincial
clans to back their claims on power, often by force; armed supporters
of former President Zviad Gamsakhurdia -- rumored to have been killed
on Shevardnadze's order -- are still around.
In such a volatile region, a small firefight between security forces
and the opposition could spark serious clashes that would pave the way
to civil war.
However unpopular, Shevardnadze seems to be the only thing keeping
Georgia together. Neither pro-U.S. Saakashvili nor pro-Russian
Abashidze could do it. If Washington and Moscow realize this, they
both will back Shevardnadze until the next elections in 2005. If not,
the consequences likely will be dire. Civil war would destroy what
little is left of Georgia and create excellent opportunities for
international Islamic militants to cause havoc in southern Russia by
sending fighters and arms from Georgia to Russia's Muslim-dominated
republics of the North Caucasus. That would turn Chechen war into
Caucasian war.
Civil war in Georgia would greatly endanger the construction of the
BTC pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erserum gas line. Sending U.S. troops to
protect the projects would be difficult because the lines are built
through Ajara and Javaketia, Russia-allied regions. Still, sinking
Georgia in chaos threatens Moscow next door much more than Washington
faraway. So Russia suspects that creating chaos in Georgia to infect
Russia's multi-ethnic south could be Washington's plan. We are not
sure the Russians are correct. But geopolitically, if the Bush
administration wants to weaken other global players, there would be no
better way to make Russia bleed than by helping inflame the Caucasus
through linking the Chechen and Georgia wars. But U.S. ally, oil-rich
Azerbaijan, would catch fire too in that scenario.
We believe that Washington and Moscow likely will do their homework
and decide for the time being to stick by Shevardnadze, while each
pressing him to make a succession choice in their favor. The genie
might be already out of the bottle, however, and violence could easily
tear fragile Georgia apart.
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