IRAQ: House to House Fighting
April 8, 2004: Fighting continued in Fallujah, with the marines
holding nearly half the city, and inflicting over a hundred casualties
on the armed Iraqis. The marines are using a combination of tanks,
aircraft and infantry to advance against the Iraqis defending from the
tightly packed, low rise (one or two story) housing that covers most
of the city. There are numerous different groups resisting the
marines, so there is no coordinated resistance. The criminal gangs
appear to be the best organized. The gangs of Fallujah, like many
Sunni Arab criminal organizations, proved resistant to Saddam's
attempts to destroy them, so Saddam made a deal with the gangs, and
got a cut of their loot. The former Saddam military and secret police
people have formed anti-American (and sometimes criminal gangs, which
causes tension with the existing gangs.) There are also groups of Arab
nationalists (whose philosophy seems to be "better to be a slave under
another Arab than to be free through the efforts of a non-Arab) and
Islamic radicals. This lack of centralized organization makes it
harder for the marines, as killing off one group does not have an
immediate effect on the others. However, killing the resisting Iraqis
does have an effect on others. The number of Iraqi gunmen is
diminishing as Iraqis note that the marines kill all who fight them,
and the marines are not taking nearly as many casualties as the
Iraqis.
American troops have arrested over a hundred Arabs trying to cross the
Syrian border to join the fighting against American troops.
The al Sadr Shia militia that have taken control of towns and
neighborhoods from Baghdad to Basra. These militias are not well
organized, nor do they have very effective leadership. American and
coalition troops are arresting and killing the Sadr men who are armed
and resisting. The Sadr followers have little military training (or if
they do, it doesn't show) and poor organization. Sadr is trying to get
more Shia to join the fight. But this becomes more difficult as more
Iraqi fighters are killed fighting the better armed and organized
coalition troops.
The Iraqi police and security troops have been a disappointment. With
few exceptions, they refused to oppose armed Sunni Arabs in Fallujah
or Shia areas in the south. This was expected from the security
troops, who are basically security guards. The police, although they
received training, were recruited locally. So if a local strong guy
gathers together enough armed men, the local cops will back off. This
is a vestige of the Saddam era, where the police were basically
security guards, which the heavy duty terrorism was performed by
various secret police, pro-Saddam militias and intelligence
organizations. Coalition troops are able to use the security troops
and police and the current fighting, putting the Iraqi forces in
charge of security in areas that have been pacified.
The annual rotation of new American troops relieving those who have
already served a year has been halted, and experienced units held
until the current unrest in Fallujah and Shia areas is over.
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