Kosovo: New War in the Balkans?
November 22, 2005 17 40 GMT
Summary
The current stalemate over Kosovo's status is a perfect example of the
palsied international system. One would think that a province that has
been a de facto international protectorate for more than six years, by
now, would have its status decided; yet the concerned parties in Kosovo
ostensibly cannot perform the necessary tasks. The responsibility for
this impasse rests first on the shoulders of the Kosovar Serbs and
Albanians, who cannot agree, and second on the shoulders of the Contact
Group members -- including the United States -- who dare not impose a
solution.
Analysis
U.N. status envoy Martti Ahtisaari and his deputy Albert Rohan on Nov.
21 began their Balkan trip in the Kosovar capital of Pristina, with the
clear intent of ensuring that status negotiations scheduled for
December in Vienna, Austria, do not fail. However, their visit probably
will have the opposite effect. At this stage it appears Ahtisaari
merely wants to take notice of the contradictory positions at play in
the negotiations rather than come up with a clear plan. A further sign
of the chaos reigning in and around Kosovo is that disagreement exists
both between and among the Albanians and the Serbs.
Two major views have emerged in the Serbian ranks. Serbian Prime
Minister Vojislav Kostunica and Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Draskovic
maintain that "Kosovo-Metohija" must remain part of Serbia. It can
receive more than autonomy but less than independence, and the
inhabitants' minority and property rights must be respected to the
utmost. Hence, the Serbian government prepared a resolution Nov. 15
that was adopted by the Serbian Parliament on Nov. 21.
Also on Nov. 15, Serbian head of state Boris Tadic expounded his own
views during talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Tadic said
Kosovo should be decentralized to create separate Serbian and Albanian
entities within the region and allow Serbs to have a relationship with
Serbia that would be close but regulated by Kosovar institutions.
Earlier, Serbian Vice President Miroslav Labus came forth with a
similar proposal, maintaining that a Serbian enclave should be created
in northern Kosovo and along the Kosovar part of the River Morava.
What the Serb positions have in common is a simple fact: Kosovo must
not, under any circumstances, be allowed to achieve independence.
Here, it must be noted that the international community -- the majority
of U.S. and European politicians involved in this process -- are
striving to extinguish the independent Serbian enclave in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and create a unified state. Hence, it is possible
that Tadic and Labus' proposals are designed to safeguard the existence
of Serbian entities not only in Kosovo but also in Bosnia.
Events during the last few months testify to the uncertainties among
Albanians, too. Though all the Albanians agree that Kosovo must be
independent, in October some radical groups attempted to pressure the
Kosovar Parliament to declare independence immediately. However, as a
result of international pressure -- primarily from Jesen Petersen,
leader of the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo -- on Nov.
17 a public proclamation was issued stating that Kosovar Albanians want
an independent and sovereign Kosovo, and that this position will be
represented during negotiations with Belgrade.
The international community could resolve this predicament --
especially if the major powers represented in the Contact Group (the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy and Russia)
legally sanctioned the de facto protectorate. That would translate into
at least five years of conditional independence for Kosovo, supervised
by the Contact Group and protected by international forces, which would
give the Serbs in Northern Kosovo not only minority rights (a term they
consider an affront in itself) but also the ability to organize
themselves -- inside Kosovo -- as a separate entity.
If the Contact Group members are not ready to impose the solution of
conditional independence as soon as possible, a new war in the Balkans
is almost a certainty. Historical patterns simply are not working:
Neither the Ottoman Empire nor Tito's Yugoslavia can be resurrected.
But a sort of Bismarckian realpolitik -- a protectorate imposed and
supervised by a concert of major powers -- might be worth trying.
Regardless of what path is approached, any removal of international
forces will lead to Albanian-Serb bloodshed. Consequently, the
international community only has two options. First, the Contact Group
could adopt a position of de facto support of Albanian independence.
Such a stance would anger Belgrade, but Belgrade currently lacks the
tools to retaliate effectively (although the Bosnian Serbs would
certainly feel forced to act to protect their own interests). Second,
the Contact Group could simply attempt to extend the existing legal
limbo.
Unfortunately, another bit of Serbia and Montenegro -- namely,
Montenegro -- is champing at the bit to vote on independence itself.
And should Montenegro go, the Kosovar Albanians are certain to not wait
around for the international community to make up its mind. This leaves
just one question in Stratfor's mind: Do the Kosovar Albanians possess
the military fortitude to seize their independence should they not
receive a blank check from the Contact Group?
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