Kyrgyzstan: A Regional Alliance Threatens Washington's Influence
Summary
Kyrgyzstan's ambassador to Russia and its newly elected president both
made comments July 11 indicating that the U.S. air base at Kyrgyzstan's
Manas airport would not be welcome on a long-term basis. This follows
close on the heels of similar announcements in recent days from
Uzbekistan, home to the other U.S. base in the region. These statements
represent concrete signs of the potential impact an invigorated
Shanghai Cooperation Organization will have on U.S. interests in
Central Asia -- and more impacts are likely to come.
Analysis
Kyrgyz Ambassador to Russia Apas Jumagulov said July 11 that the U.S.
Ganci Air Base at Kyrgyzstan's Manas airport would gradually be closed
down. His statement echoes agreements signed at the July 5-6 Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, in which the organization called
for a timetable for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces in Central Asia.
Jumagulov said the SCO's call was appropriate, and he added that
Russia's base at Kant would permanently remain, given the strategic
importance of Bishkek's ties with Moscow. This follows similar
statements made July 7 by the Uzbek Foreign Ministry.
Acting Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, fresh off a presidential
election victory July 10 in which he won more than 88 percent of the
vote, said July 11 that a review of the U.S. presence at Manas would be
one of the first orders of business for his new government. As Stratfor
predicted before the summit, these statements constitute clear
indications that the SCO has broken new ground in establishing its role
in the region and that the group is wasting no time in demonstrating
not only its willingness to resist U.S. influence in the region but
also its unified interest in doing so.
These statements' greatest significance lies in Kyrgyzstan's having
made them. Kyrgyzstan is by far the most pro-United States of the SCO's
current members (which include China, Kazakhstan, Russia, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan, with India, Iran and Pakistan newly accepted as
observers). If the most pro-U.S. country in the group is willing to
tell the United States that it is not welcome in the long term, then
others are likely to take further steps to squeeze Washington's
regional influence.
Bishkek is likely being pressured to some extent by its Central Asian
neighbors -- especially by Uzbekistan, which is now the most anti-U.S.
member of the group, and which has never hesitated to use its status as
the regional hegemon to pressure its smaller neighbors. The real
muscle, however, comes from the SCO's leading players, Russia and
China, which are both eager to push U.S. influence back from their
respective southern and western frontiers. These pressures aside,
though, Bishkek has its own reasons to put its faith in the SCO for the
time being.
Kyrgyzstan's new leaders know they preside over a highly unstable
country in which the potential for clan conflict, the influence of drug
traffickers, the possibility of a counterrevolution and threats of
Islamist militant activity are all increasing. Washington has no desire
to get in the middle of these conflicts, and Bishkek knows this. The
Kyrgyz leadership, however, wants some kind of assurances from outside
powers that they will provide assistance in case the government cannot
maintain stability. The SCO countries are geographically closer to
Kyrgyzstan than the United States, making rapid-response military
deployments far easier, and they are more willing to come to Bishkek's
aid if necessary.
At the SCO summit, members agreed to upgrade the status, powers and
budget of the group's Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure, located in
Tashkent. Permanent representatives of SCO states, high-ranking
security officials, and small staffs will be appointed to serve in the
structure, with the right to make direct recommendations to their
respective governments on joint military reactions to regional security
threats. In other words, the SCO has made it far easier for its member
countries to send troops abroad to help Central Asian governments who
may be grappling with an armed rebellion or an Islamist militant
incursion. Though this falls short of our expectations of the creation
of some kind of dedicated rapid-reaction force, it is indicative of the
greater willingness to send forces abroad that we anticipated.
The statements from Kyrgyzstan compound a rapidly deteriorating
political environment for U.S. military forces in Central Asia.
U.S.-Uzbek relations are now in a deep freeze over the U.S.'s critical
response toward Tashkent's role in the May uprising in Andijan, and
over fears in Tashkent that the regime of President Islam Karimov has
been targeted by Washington for a velvet revolution. Consequently, the
United States has seen its usage rights at the Karshi-Khanabad Air Base
(K2) significantly curtailed by the Uzbek government in recent months.
The United States is in the process of shifting operations away from
K2, and Manas was one of the prime locations to which these operations
would have moved. Washington has been in talks with Bishkek over a more
official expansion of operations at Manas to make up for its troubles
at K2, but with these recent statements, the United States soon could
find itself without a single military base in Central Asia.
Bakiyev said any U.S. withdrawal from the region would be contingent on
stability in Afghanistan, and he put no deadline on a timetable for
withdrawal. But with all of the SCO's members feeling significantly
pressured by Washington in various ways, they will not want to wait too
long. The reluctance of the SCO to demand a deadline for an established
withdrawal timetable, however, indicates a hesitation among all SCO
members -- Russia and China included -- to confront the United States
directly, as they do not feel strong enough for such a showdown. This
leaves a window open for Washington, which has responded that it will
pull its forces from Central Asia when specifically asked to do so.
Thus, it is daring Bishkek and Tashkent to make the direct statement
that neither one wants to make.
While the SCO ratchets up the pressure, Washington will be working
behind the scenes to ensure a longer-term military presence in Central
Asia. U.S. bases in Central Asia have been of vital importance in
support of military and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. With
Afghanistan now more stable, some of these operations can be moved
directly there, but the United States' primary base at Bagram is not
big enough to handle all of the Central Asian operations. If nothing
else, Washington will try to buy some time in Central Asia until it can
work out a deal with the Afghan government to open up new bases there
or to expand space at Bagram; Stratfor predicted several months ago
that Washington would find itself in a position of this kind.
Regardless of the result, however, the SCO summit is turning into a
major political defeat for Washington in Central Asia. The U.S.
military strategy of establishing "lily pad" bases across the globe to
provide forward presences that can quickly be ramped up to make
larger-scale military operations possible looks unlikely to survive in
Central Asia. While the tactical value of the bases is tied to Afghan
operations, they have a broader strategic value in permitting the
United States to project influence regionally against both Russia and
China; their loss would be far greater in strategic terms than in
tactical terms.
The pressure on the U.S. bases is just one indication of a broader
willingness in the region now -- spearheaded by Russia and China
through the SCO -- to challenge U.S. influence and push it back.
Washington is now clearly on the defensive in Central Asia as the SCO
makes its presence known. And more serious challenges to U.S. influence
in the region are likely to come.
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