| Topic: |
Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus |
| User: |
"The Court Fool" |
| Date: |
14 May 2005 11:16:08 AM |
| Object: |
Kyrgyzstan: Candidate Quits, Russia Likely Loser, Islamists long term winners |
While this should help Kyrgyzstan's internal stability in the short
run, Kulov's taking a backseat to Bakiyev will result in the gradual
transformation of Kyrgyzstan into a pro-U.S. country that will most
likely begin to distance itself from its neighbors Russia and China.
The new regime, however, will be relatively weak, which will lead to
increased instability in the longer run, with drug lords and Islamist
forces vying for power.
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Kyrgyzstan: Candidate Quits, Russia Likely Loser
May 13, 2005 22 36 GMT
Summary
Felix Kulov, a pro-Russian candidate for the Kyrgyz presidency, removed
himself from the running May 13. Kulov's departure means pro-U.S.
incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiyev likely will win re-election. His
election will confirm what began with Kyrgyzstan's "Tulip Revolution"
-- namely, that the Central Asian nation is falling into the U.S.
sphere of influence. This turn of events marks another strategic defeat
for Moscow as it once again shies away from a confrontation in Central
Asia with Washington.
Analysis
One day after receiving his official nomination as a candidate, Felix
Kulov said May 13 that he would not participate in July 10 presidential
elections in Kyrgyzstan. Kulov -- considered pro-Russian -- and leading
political rival, incumbent President Kurmanbek Bakiyev -- considered
pro-U.S. -- struck a deal where Kulov would drop out of the race in
exchange for the post of prime minister in the next Bakiyev
administration.
While this should help Kyrgyzstan's internal stability in the short
run, Kulov's taking a backseat to Bakiyev will result in the gradual
transformation of Kyrgyzstan into a pro-U.S. country that will most
likely begin to distance itself from its neighbors Russia and China.
The new regime, however, will be relatively weak, which will lead to
increased instability in the longer run, with drug lords and Islamist
forces vying for power.
The political pairing of Bakiyev and Kulov as president and prime
minister initially seems unlikely given the divergent political views
of the two. Pro-U.S. Bakiyev represents the Central Asian state's
southern clans, while pro-Russian Kulov comes from the northern clans.
This unlikely pairing of a pro-Western and pro-Russian politician stems
from a desire the two share to bring internal stability to the Kyrgyz
government. It also stems from Kulov's realization that a pro-Russian
stance would not translate into support from Moscow.
The current deal will almost certainly result in Bakiyev's electoral
victory, thanks in large part to the weight of Kulov's political
backing. And it will tip the scales of political power in favor of
Bakiyev, since the presidency carries more power than the premiership
-- though a committee formed recently to prepare for constitutional
reform likely will devolve some power away from the presidency in favor
of Parliament, which could yet become a point of contention between the
two men. In the short run, Kyrgyzstan should remain relatively stable,
since Kulov's presence in the government will at least temporarily
satisfy northern clans and prevent immediate inter-clan clashes within
the country.
Bakiyev's victory, however, will open the door for the United States to
continue its gradual, but firm, penetration into Kyrgyzstan and in turn
gradually weed out Russian influence in the country. With a pro-U.S.
leader in the Kyrgyz presidency, Washington will respond to Bishkek
much in the same way is has responded to Tbilisi and Baku -- with
general aid packages, military grants and visits by top U.S. officials.
These financial, military and political ties will serve as the means
through which Washington exerts its influence over Bishkek. To this
end, a NATO chief will visit Bishkek in several days to offer Western
support to the Kyrgyz military via the Partnership For Peace program.
Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan will begin to fade away as the United
States accelerates its push for influence in the area. Though Kulov
would occupy a government post, he will most likely lack the Russian
support he would need to make use of the minimal power afforded by the
premiership -- for in Kyrgyzstan, it is the president who really
matters now. Putin consistently has refused to challenge U.S. power
directly, and if his behavior during a parallel situation in Ukraine is
any indication of his future actions, Kulov will not see Moscow's
support.
The current U.S. administration, which does not want to see its
potential rival, Russia, become stronger or more influential in its
former domains -- and in fact wants Russia to be weakened to the point
of no geopolitical return -- will facilitate the Russians' fading away.
Washington can pre-emptively check Moscow's power by limiting the
latter's influence to Russia proper and keeping it out of Central Asia.
The U.S. strategy to limit Russian influence represents part of a
long-term strategy and involves a gradual but firm push against Moscow.
Establishing small U.S. military bases in the area and trying to remove
the Russian air base from Kant would represent a means of promoting
this strategy.
Kulov also no longer seeks Russian support because even if he wanted it
-- which he appears not to -- Russian support simply no longer exists.
During the May 9 V-E Day celebration in Moscow, Bakiyev received
Putin's blessing for the upcoming elections with Kulov as prime
minister, according to Kyrgyz and Russian government sources. Kulov no
longer seeks Moscow's support since he feels personally insulted by the
Kremlin's remarks to Bakiyev, and because he recognizes that Moscow's
support could only harm him now given Kyrgyzstan's current political
atmosphere.
Outside the former Soviet Union, a Bakiyev victory will also upset
China, which will recognize the slow U.S. encroachment on its
geopolitical turf. However, Beijing will most likely react indirectly
to increasing U.S. influence in Kyrgyzstan, adopting subtle responses.
Other ramifications of a stronger U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan include
the possibility that the country could become a leading drug-production
and -transit point. Given the Afghanistan experience, which saw a huge
rise in drug production after the United States removed the Taliban
regime, this scenario is hardly out of the question. An increase in
Kyrgyz drug production could significantly impact drug practices in
large markets such as Russia and Europe, not to mention in Kyrgyzstan
itself.
Sources in Kyrgyz government say Bakiyev and people close to him have
links to the Kyrgyz drug mafia. Although these claims cannot be
independently verified, Bakiyev and his associates' origins in
Kyrgyzstan's drug-producing heartland increase the possibility that
Bakiyev established a political friendship with local drug dealers -- a
not unheard of happenstance -- in which the dealers fund candidates,
who in turn help protect the drug market.
Finally, a rise in Islamist protests and rebellions in the country, not
unlike those now seen in Uzbekistan, could constitute a longer-term
consequence of Bakiyev's assumption of power. Potentially -- and
inadvertently -- assisting an Islamist rise, Bakiyev will be taking
over a weaker central government than when he first assumed power. And
Kyrgyzstan's March "revolution" demonstrates how quickly a
democratically elected central power can be overthrown, and these
events lowered the government's authority in the eyes of the people.
Organized groups such as Hizb al-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of
Turkestan -- and perhaps even al Qaeda -- might take advantage of the
now-weakened government to stage protests, as has occurred in
Uzbekistan and Afghanistan, though many of these groups appear to be
weak and disorganized in Central Asia.
Kulov's deal with Bakiyev will not only secure the latter's
presidential victory, but it also will put Kyrgyzstan within the U.S.
sphere of influence. Though the initial results of this political
partnership could help ensure a level of internal stability for
Kyrgyzstan, the possible long-term effects of Bakiyev's presidency --
an angered China, increased drug trafficking, public protests -- could
very well bring about the political instability Bakiyev sought to
avoid.
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