North Korea: A Revision Points to Future Missile Exports
May 04, 2005 18 36 GMT
Summary
South Korea identified the missile North Korea tested May 1 as a
modified SS-21 -- a short-range mobile ballistic missile -- rather than
an anti-ship Silkworm variant as was suspected earlier. The generally
accepted assumption, shared by Stratfor, that North Korea had tested a
Silkworm on May 1 based on range, location and past history, highlights
the dangers of groupthink in intelligence. That North Korea tested an
SS-21 rather than a Silkworm carries little additional strategic impact
-- in either case, the test primarily constituted a political
statement. Nevertheless, the new information does offer additional
insight into North Korea's missile development program and points to
possible future export prospects.
Analysis
An official with the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) told his
nation's National Assembly on May 4 that on May 1, North Korea tested a
KN-02, a North Korean variant of a Soviet-designed SS-21 Scarab
short-range surface-to-surface missile. Initial reports from Japan,
South Korea and the United States had suggested that Pyongyang had
tested a North Korean Seersucker variant of the Silkworm anti-ship
missile on May 1, something Stratfor also believed at the time.
The general assumption, also held by Stratfor, that the North Koreans
had tested a Silkworm based on range, location and past history,
highlights the dangers of groupthink in intelligence. While the overall
strategic impact of the test remains the same whether North Korea
launched a Scarab or a Silkworm -- since the test still represents more
of a political statement than a military experiment -- the exercise
offers additional insight into North Korea's missile development
program and points to possible future export prospects.
North Korea has tested Silkworm variants -- part of its standard
coastal defense systems -- several times, conducting at least four
tests in 2003 and at least one in 2004. These tests were carried out
primarily from bases in South Hamgyong province, on the East Sea.
Pyongyang carried out its May 1 test in the same province, not far from
Hamhung, South Hamgyong's capital. North Korea has several naval bases
along its east coast, many armed with Silkworms. The range of the
missile tested May 1 also lines up with the North Korean Silkworm
variant -- as well as with the KN-02 Scarab variant.
While historical and contextual evidence, in addition to statements
from regional officials and analysts, suggested a Silkworm test on May
1, it always is dangerous to jump to conclusions and follow the herd --
something of which Stratfor also was guilty in this instance. Stratfor
consistently balances the need for speed in analyzing breaking events
and the need to wait for additional information. We stand by our
initial assessment of the test's significance, but always seek to
provide continuous updates as situations unfold. And we are ready to
admit mistakes when they occur.
In retrospect, Pyongyang made clear in March that it planned to resume
surface-to-surface missile testing when it declared the end of its
self-imposed missile moratorium, which had stood for years. While
political considerations (as well as a desire not to reveal too much
about its capabilities or lack thereof) kept Pyongyang from testing any
medium- or long-range missiles, such as the Nodong and Taepodong
ballistic missiles, the Scarab test represented a good compromise
allowing North Korea to send a political message on a missile without
fundamentally altering the perception of the regional balance of power.
The compromise worked given that the KN-02 Scarab variant only has a
range of about 75 miles, and therefore cannot threaten Japan or the
United States as a longer-range missile test would have.
Also in hindsight, it appears Washington knew what type of missile
Pyongyang tested, even if it did refrain from sharing that information
with its allies in Seoul and Tokyo. In a May 1 CNN interview, White
House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, responding to reports of the North
Korean missile test, said, "The North Koreans have tested their
missiles before -- they've had some failures." The latter comment was
apparently in reference to a failed North Korean test of a KN-02 in
April, which the South Korean JCS official also mentioned to the
National Assembly days after the May 1 test.
The United States apparently told Japan of the missile test before it
told Seoul, leaving the South Korean government simply to confirm
Japanese media reports. That neither Japan nor South Korea could
readily detect the test themselves in a timely manner will certainly
lead both to step up their plans for their own satellite surveillance
systems for the region, as neither are confident of receiving timely
information from the United States, nor of getting the complete picture
from Washington.
A final aspect of the test bears noting. While North Korea sells Scud
variants, and even its Nodong technology, those missiles offer little
practical use for most countries, instead serving as symbolic show of
strength or as a deterrent. But the KN-02 is a mobile, fairly accurate
truck-mounted missile capable of carrying a variety of warheads,
including high explosives, anti-personnel fragmentation with multiple
bomblets, anti-radar and electromagnetic pulse variants, and tactical
nuclear warheads. The first two capabilities likely are the only ones
the North Koreans -- or for that matter, any nation outside the former
Soviet Union -- could make use of. But while a Nodong is a symbolic
weapon, a mobile KN-02 is a very useful weapon on the battlefield and
something North Korea might consider selling.
Pyongyang reportedly received its first SS-21s and their launchers from
Syria in 1996, and since then it has worked to improve the SS-21s'
range, payload and guidance systems by reverse engineering. The missile
is small -- less than eight yards -- and therefore easy to transport to
prospective customers. In December 2003, a North Korean cargo ship
bound for Yemen was briefly detained and found to be carrying missiles
to Yemen. Washington has since stepped up its Proliferation Security
Initiative, largely to stem the flow of weapons to and from North
Korea. But with its moratorium off and Pyongyang seeking cash, putting
the KN-02 on the market clearly is not far away, despite U.S. attempts
to prevent the transfer of such weapons.
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