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30 Oct 2005 10:58:02 PM |
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NUCLEAR IRAN: RACE AGAINST TIME................31/10/5 |
Nuclear Iran: Race Against Time
Ryan Mauro - 10/31/2005
"If one day, the world of Islam comes to possess the weapons currently
in Israel's possession-on that day this method of global arrogance
would come to an end. This is because the use of a nuclear bomb in
Israel will leave nothing on the ground, whereas it will only damage
the world of Islam."
-Former Iranian President Rafsanjani on December 14, 2001.
During the Presidential campaign, Iran became one of the major foreign
policy crisis issues, with both candidates agreeing it's the world's
greatest threat today. While North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, and
the Administration has failed to find any "actual" weapons in Iraq,
Iran is fast at work on its own nuclear arsenal. The world's most
active state sponsor of terrorism will have it's own nuclear bomb in
one or two years. And worse, the actual creation of the fissile
material needed for the bomb is set to begin within months. From this
point, sanctions or bombing raids will be unable to adequately delay
the nuclear program.
Some even claim Iran already has nuclear weapons. The former director
of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional
Warfare, Yossef Bodansky, has claimed just that in his book, "The High
Cost of Peace". Before I quote from that book, please take note that I
lack the ability to confirm these claims (although I have seen these
same details in the overseas press reports over the years). It is
possible that Iran obtained nuclear devices in the late 1980s or early
1990s, but that these devices are unable to be used-the book does not
say if the status of the weapons is known. The book's statements on
Iran's nuclear program are as follows:
"Even before the final Soviet breakup, and while Tehran was beginning
its talks with Beijing, Iranian intelligence operatives were scouring
Soviet Central Asia for weapons, technologies, and nuclear material, in
search of a shortcut to operational nuclear capabilities. In summer
1991, one of these operatives was offered access to nuclear weapons in
Kazakhstan. Tehran dispatched a delegation of senior officials,
including US-educated physicists, who returned convinced that the offer
was genuine. In early September, the Iranian delegation returned to
Kazakhstan to renew negotiations. Their Kazakh interlocutor told them
he was speaking for a group of about twenty-five security, scientific,
and government officials who were willing to obtain the 'atomic bombs'
for Iran. The weapons would come in separate pieces from different
sites throughout Central Asia, but the group would assemble these
pieces into operational weapons. At the same time, the Iranians and
their allies initiated a comprehensive effort to acquire delivery
capabilities-both ballistic missiles and strike aircraft.
These developments boosted Tehran's confidence in its ability to
implement its grand strategic design. As Hashemi-Rafsanjani would put
it later in the year, it had fallen to Iran to acquire nuclear weapons
for the entire region, if only because the Arabs had proved incapable
of doing so. Such weapons would be the key to a rejuvenated and vibrant
Islamic unity. With them, Hashemi-Rafsanjani concluded, it would be
possible to eliminate the Western presence in the Middle East and
liberate Jerusalem....
....In December, the Kazakh deal came to fruitition, and Iran made its
first purchase of nuclear weapons. The deal included two 40-kiloton
warheads for a SCUD-type surface-to-surface ballistic missile; one
aerial bomb of the type carried by a MiG-27; and one 152-mm nuclear
artillery shell. These weapons reached initial operational status in
late January 1992 and full operational status a few months later."[1]
"On October 10, Khameini made an inspection tour of the special
facilities of the Air Force's Eighty Shahid Babai Base in Isfahan,
where Iran's aerial nuclear bomb was stored. Iran intended to use this
bomb in a kamikaze-style attack against a US Navy carrier in the
Persian Gulf. Iran had several North Korean-trained pilots willing to
undertake the mission, all of them with extensive operational
experience, qualified on the latest Soviet aircraft.
Iran's two nuclear warheads were fitted to their ballistic missiles at
Isfahan, although the warheads themselves were usually stored in
Lavizan, in the Tehran area. Khameini also visited these facilities and
discussed the shift of emphasis from indigenous development of missiles
to massive purchases abroad. He emphasized the long-range importance of
developing and producing strategic weapons in Iran; however, he
explained, under certain emergency conditions foreign weapons could be
acquired 'with our pride intact'.
While all this was going on, Tehran was not neglecting its nuclear
arsenal. In the fall of 1992, Iran signed a new deal with officials in
Kazakhstan for the purchase of four 50-kiloton nuclear warheads,
upgraded and adapted to fit on the SSMs purchased from North
Korea...Rahmani confirmed that four warheads had indeed been purchased
but added that their delivery was postponed due to 'a technical
problem'-ensuring clandestine support. The warheads were eventually
shipped to North Korea, where they were optimized for the
soon-to-be-delivered Nodong-1 SSMs."[2]
In October 2002, Debkafile, which apparently has close ties to Israeli
intelligence, reported that they believed that Iran had a "basic"
nuclear bomb do to the assistance of scientists and technicians from
Pakistan, Russia, China and North Korea.[3] Of course, I cannot confirm
if this is true, and there has been little corroboration to support the
claim. However, there is evidence that Iran is discussing the purchase
of North Korean nuclear weapons.
As a close ally of the Communist regime, and the regime's top customer,
such negotiations can be assumed to be occurring. It is understood by
the experts that North Korea first seeks to secure its future by
creating a nuclear deterrent-but once that deterrent is achieved, it is
likely entire nuclear bombs or critical components will be sold for
large amounts of money. The cash-strapped regime's most likely customer
for this is of course, Iran. Should sanctions delay Iran's nuclear
ambitions, or should an attack by Israel or America become imminent, it
is likely that Iran will opt to buy a nuclear weapon. It appears that
the Iranians feel that obtaining such a bomb before the West can take
action will secure the regime from such action.
Both Debkafile and terrorism expert, Michael Ledeen (author of War
Against the Terror Masters) have written articles confirming that
negotiations have been taking place since the first quarter of 2003.
Unfortunately, there is no reporting to confirm or deny if a deal has
been reached. The only thing that can be confirmed is that at the very
least, North Korea is helping Iran in its quest for an Islamic bomb.
Over the summer, the government of South Korea confirmed that teams of
North Korean and Iranian nuclear scientists had several meetings.[4]
The meetings began producing results in August, if the media reports
are to be trusted. Negotiations for the purchase of a Taepo-Dong-2
ballistic missile by Iran were reported to be in their "advanced
stages", probably to be finished in mid-October.[5] The missile gives
Iran the ability to strike mostly anywhere in Europe and Asia. This
caused a media frenzy, and soon reports began filtering out about the
cooperation between the two rogue states.
The mainstream press, particularly in Japan, began finding out the
details of the duo's talks. Among the revelations were that: Korean
military scientists were recently spotted entering suspected nuclear
sites in Iran, possibly to test a nuclear warhead; so many Koreans are
in Iran that a special Caspian Sea resort was made for them;
negotiations for an agreement on the joint development of nuclear
warheads are set to be finished in October; and Iranian nuclear experts
had visited North Korea in March, April and May, possibly to learn how
to keep the program alive despite inspections and internal pressure.[6]
The Bush Administration and Israel apparently believes Iran is not yet
a nuclear power, but will be around 2005. We cannot know the status of
their nuclear weapons capabilities. There are several possibilities:
A: The reports are untrue, and Iran has no nuclear weapon. The main
concern truly is about Iran's plans to produce a nuke on its own.
B: The reports are true, and Iran has nuclear weapons bought abroad.
C: The reports are true, and Iran has bought nukes abroad, but they are
inoperable.
It is anybody's guess which of the possibilities is accurate.
Ever since members of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, an Iranian opposition
group labeled as a terrorist organization (some members are militant,
most are now just attached to the opposition's efforts) disarmed in
Iraq in late May, 2003 and gave intelligence to the US, the pressure on
Iran has built up. The political branch of MEK reported on May 26th
that Iran had two uranium-enrichment facilities west of Tehran, which
operate as "satellite plants" to the larger facility centered at
Natanz. The Iranians reportedly had already installed several
centrifuges at one of the sites. The purpose of the sites, besides to
assist in the nuclear program, is to take over the work of the Natanz
site should it be bombed. The dissidents explained that there were
small, dispersed sites around Iran to prepare for an Israeli or
American air campaign, and they listed 8 businesses used as front
companies to obtain components for the program.[7] They confirmed that
the goal set by Iran was to become a nuclear power in 2005.[8]
It didn't take long for the IAEA to report that Iran was suspected of
violating international treaty, by concealing the import of nuclear
materials and not reporting the construction of sites to process
uranium.[9] From the wealth of information provided by the dissidents,
the United States and Israel agreed that they're window of opportunity
amounted to less than a year, because at the earliest, Iran could begin
producing nukes in the end of the fall of 2004. By the summer of 2004,
the uranium enrichment program will be finished, and therefore,
unstoppable by anything short of regime change. At the end of 2007, the
infrastructure will be large enough and advanced enough to allow for
the production of up to 15 nuclear weapons a year.[10] Eventually, no
air raid would be able to destroy their plans. The facilities were
large in number, were disguised, and dispersed. Some were even hardened
to protect against explosions.[11]
By the beginning of July, the pressure had an impact on the IAEA to
express concern about Iran.
Inspectors stated that they were "puzzled" by Iran's uranium program,
and said they were receiving unsatisfactory answers to their questions
about the activity related to converting imported uranium to enriched
uranium metal. Nevertheless, the IAEA refused to cite Iran as in direct
violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.[12] The IAEA
revelations revealed several things:
- In 1991, Iran imported 1.8 kilograms of uranium, and did not declare
it.
- Traces of UF6 were found in soil samples at Natanz, which indicated
the centrifuges may have already been used.
- Iran was developing sophisticated laser technology that can be used
to enrich uranium. Iran has already converted 400 kg of UF4 into
uranium metal (done in 2000) at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Labs at
the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. UF4, or, uranium tetraflouride, is
a compound that comes from uranium processing. UF6, or uranium
hexafluoride, is another compound that indicates the process of uranium
enrichment. The fact that UF6 was found, and that UF4 can be confirmed
to be converted into metal, is a clear sign of an ongoing nuclear
program.[13]
- The report acknowledged that there were signs that Iran had used UF6
gas bought from China (and not declared) and used it to test four
centrifuges, as part of the plan to make a centrifuge production
facility at Natanz. Inspectors noticed that 1.9 kilograms was missing
from the containers, and may have been used. Iran claims that over the
many years they had the containers, the sealing caps became loose and
the gas evaporated. Further inspection however showed that the caps
fitted perfectly, and there was no way for evaporation to occur.[14]
The Los Angeles Times finished their three-month investigation into the
matter in the first week of August. They confirmed that Iran was trying
to obtain nuclear bombs, had a concealment program to hide it, and was
using the scientists and technology of Russia, China, Pakistan and
North Korea to pursue it. It concluded that several research labs were
hidden, and that one plant was disguised as a watch-making factory in
Tehran. It also mentioned that in June, inspectors were denied access
to two large rooms and barred from testing soil samples at a factory
known as Kalaye Electric Company.[15] The New York Times was also
convinced, stating that Iran appeared to be planning to mine uranium,
convert it to a gas, and transform it into nuclear fuel using
centrifuges. The current array of 1,000 centrifuges was enough to make
one nuke a year. They also opined that the reason Iran was focusing
mainly on using uranium as a nuclear fuel was because using plutonium
requires reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, which requires a reprocessing
plant.[16] Such a plant is believed to be in its infant stages of
construction today. By the end of the month, Iran was forced to admit
that they had foreign assistance in building a uranium enrichment
facility south of Tehran, which the UN evidence indicated was
Pakistan.[17]
This is certainly what Israeli intelligence indicated. Debkafile
reported that in the middle of May, President Musharraf of Pakistan had
dispatched a team of nuclear engineers to Iran with blueprints for the
construction of gas centrifuges, and the team still is in Iran.[18]
On September 8th, the IAEA issued another warning about Iran.
Inspectors had visited an underground uranium enrichment facility at
Natanz that contained approximately 1,000 gas centrifuges,
accommodations for about 1,000 people, and components for up to 50,000
centrifuges. This is the same facility that traces of weapons-grade
uranium was found, which Iran only recently admitted to having once the
dissidents revealed it (the site was denied for the past five years).
Sophisticated equipment to enrich uranium to the level needed for use
in nuclear weapons was found. There were two large halls inside the
site that have the features of a facility used to conduct uranium
enrichment. The halls were 25 feet underground with a concrete barrier
that is eight feet thick, apparently to protect the site from air
assault.[19]
Despite denials, Iran was forced to admit they used nuclear materials
for research and have made uranium metal. There was also concern about
a heavy-water facility at Arak, also kept secret and undeclared until
exiles revealed it. If Iran was simply going for an alternate fuel
supply, there'd be no purpose for a heavy-water facility! The Bushehr
complex is to be run by light-water reactor. But heavy water, with an
extra hydrogen atom, is needed to make plutonium for nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, Israeli intelligence was reporting that Russia had secretly
sold to Iran an advanced AVRII uranium enrichment processor system
installed at Natanz and the super-secret Moallen Kalayeh site.[20] By
the end of the month, Israel warned that Iran would "reach the point of
no return" on its nuclear quest in 1 year. The head of the IAEA also
said that Iran had shopped on black market for components related to a
nuclear program.[21] It was leaked that the major suspected nuclear
sites are at Arak, Natanz, Esfahan, and Kashan. This does not even
include the sites this article has listed.
Due to the failure of Kay's inspection team to find WMD in Iraq, I have
heard several people question the claim that Iran does indeed have a
nuclear program. However, in this case, the program is much more
obviously for weapons, than for an alternative energy source, like Iran
claims. Simple logic disproves these claims, as an alternate energy
source means that the nuclear power industry lacks fuel. If the
industry lacks fuel, why is there a program for a "closed-loop nuclear
fuel cycle"? Another point: If Iran produced its own nuclear fuel, it
will cost two to four times as much as buying foreign nuclear fuel.
The country also is rich in natural gas and oil. There is enough to
take care of its needs for centuries, which is another reason that the
claim that the program is for an alternative fuel source is suspicious.
Besides, it will cost several more times to produce electricity from
uranium than from petroleum.[22]
Iran's nuclear weapons program is huge and complex. The Russian-built
and Russian-managed nuclear reactor at Bushehr is the center of the
complex, and the most critical aspect of it. The reactor will be
activated in late 2004 or 2005, at which time it will be able to
provide the electrical power production required to enrich the uranium
fuel. In May 2003, Iran and Russia finished plans for the delivery of
the first 90 tons of enriched uranium to Iran. Once the uranium is
enriched sufficiently, it can become the fuel used to cause a nuclear
explosion. Talks are already underway for Russia to help with
construction of a second reactor at Bushehr (and up to 6 more by 2018,
but there is no telling what will happen before then).
There are uranium deposits in the Jazd province, which even if they are
quickly depleted for the weapons program (the deposits only contain 50
grams of uranium per every 100 kilograms of uranium), is enough to
produce a few nuclear warheads over the next couple of years. The
complexes used to make the actual weapons are also available, and soon
will be activated.
In 2005, the uranium-separation facility at Erdekan will be activated.
The uranium-concentrate complex around Isfahan will also be activated
at that time, most likely in late 2003 or early 2004. Iran also has
plans to build a uranium-conversion facility and a uranium-enrichment
facility, approximately 150 kilometers from Isfahan, which is believed
to be activated within 1-3 years. Parts of the Isfahan complex are
scientific laboratories which will produce the fuel necessary for
water-cooled reactors, as well as sites to produce the fuel-assembly
cases.
The Iranian program is not limited, and is focused on the creation of a
"close-looped fuel cycle". This means Iran will be able to create its
own fuel for its own nuclear bombs by 2006. Perhaps the scariest thing
about the program is that the United Nations' International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is unable to do much about it. It is obvious
countries like France, Russia, and China will oppose any meaningful
action to stop the program, and most likely will stop any meaningful
sanctions (which could only stall the ultimate result). Under the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran is allowed to produce
highly-enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium, as long as they
are stockpiled at separate facilities, and the UN can inspect the
sites.
At the same time, Iran is permitted to collect the materials and
resources needed to produce the weapons from the fissile materials,
which takes very little time. When ready, Iran can violate the treaty
and kick out inspectors and begin assembling nukes right away (it is
unlikely there will be a collective decisive response to the action in
time to stop Iran from having nukes). Iran can also abide by the rules,
and announce its nuclear plans six months in advance, and count on the
slim chance that the world community will be able to do much about it
in that time.
The race against time has begun. Time is not on our side, and neither
is the international community. Sanctions can extend the time we have
to stop this from occurring, but it is unlikely that Russia, France and
China will allow such sanctions to be put in place. Bombing raids could
extend the time limit, but they are unlikely to succeed in destroying
the program. At best, the results of the program can be delayed for
months. The race against time has begun. The clock is ticking.
========================================================
We Have Been Warned
By U.S. Representative Ron Paul (R-TX)
Watch Ron Paul's speech on video.
Before the US House of Representatives, October 26, 2005
We have been warned. Prepare for a broader war in the Middle
East, as
plans are being laid for the next U.S.-led regime change - in Syria. A
UN
report on the death of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafig Hariri elicited
this
comment from a senior U.S. policy maker: "Out of tragedy comes an
extraordinary strategic opportunity." This statement reflects the
continued
neo-conservative, Machiavellian influence on our foreign policy. The
"opportunity" refers to the long-held neo-conservative plan for regime
change in Syria, similar to what was carried out in Iraq.
This plan for remaking the Middle East has been around for a long
time. Just as 9/11 served the interests of those who longed for changes
in
Iraq, the sensationalism surrounding Hariri's death is being used to
advance
plans to remove Assad.
Congress already has assisted these plans by authorizing the
sanctions
placed on Syria last year. Harmful sanctions, as applied to Iraq in the
1990s, inevitably represent a major step toward war since they bring
havoc
to so many innocent people. Syria already has been charged with
developing
weapons of mass destruction based on no more evidence than was
available
when Iraq was similarly charged.
Syria has been condemned for not securing its borders, by the
same
U.S. leaders who cannot secure our own borders. Syria was castigated
for
placing its troops in Lebanon, a neighboring country, although such
action
was invited by an elected government and encouraged by the United
States.
The Syrian occupation of Lebanon elicited no suicide terrorist attacks,
as
was suffered by Western occupiers.
Condemning Syria for having troops in Lebanon seems strange,
considering most of the world sees our 150,000 troops in Iraq as an
unwarranted foreign occupation. Syrian troops were far more welcome in
Lebanon.
Secretary Rice likewise sees the problems in Syria - that we
helped to
create - as an opportunity to advance our Middle Eastern agenda. In
recent
testimony she stated that it was always the administration's intent to
redesign the greater Middle East, and Iraq was only one part of that
plan.
And once again we have been told that all options are still on the
table for
dealing with Syria - including war.
The statement that should scare all Americans (and the world) is
the
assurance by Secretary Rice that the President needs no additional
authority
from Congress to attack Syria. She argues that authority already has
been
granted by the resolutions on 9/11 and Iraq. This is not true, but if
Congress remains passive to the powers assumed by the executive branch
it
won't matter. As the war spreads, the only role for Congress will be to
provide funding lest they be criticized for not supporting the troops.
In
the meantime, the Constitution and our liberties here at home will be
further eroded as more Americans die.
This escalation of conflict with Syria comes as a result of the
UN
report concerning the Hariri death. When we need an excuse for our
actions,
it's always nice to rely on the organization that our administration
routinely condemns, one that brought us the multi-billion dollar
oil-for-food scandal and sexual crimes by UN representatives.
It's easy to ignore the fact that the report did not implicate
Assad,
who is targeted for the next regime change. The UN once limited itself
to
disputes between nations; yet now it's assumed the UN, like the United
States, has a legal and moral right to inject itself into the internal
policies of sovereign nations. Yet what is the source of this presumed
wisdom? Where is the moral imperative that allows us to become the
judge and
jury of a domestic murder in a country 6,000 miles from our shores?
Moral, constitutional, and legal arguments for a less aggressive
foreign policy receive little attention in Washington. But the law of
unintended consequences serves as a thorough teacher for the slow
learners
and the morally impaired.
a.. Is Iraq not yet enough of a headache for the braggarts of
the
shock and awe policy?
b.. Are 2,000 lives lost not enough to get their attention?
c.. How many hundreds of billions of dollars must be drained
from
our economy before it's noticed?
d.. Is it still plausible that deficits don't matter?
e.. Is the apparent victory for Iran in the Shiite theocracy
we've
created in Iraq not yet seen as a disturbing consequence of the
ill-fated
Iraq regime change effort?
f.. When we have our way with the next election in Lebanon and
Hezbollah wins, what do we do?
g.. If our effort to destabilize Syria is no more successful
than
our efforts in Iraq, then what?
h.. If destabilizing Syria leads to the same in Iran, what are
our
options?
If we can't leave now, we'll surely not leave then - we'll be
told we
must stay to honor the fallen to prove the cause was just.
We should remember Ronald Reagan's admonition regarding this area
of
the world. Ronald Reagan reflected on Lebanon in his memoirs,
describing the
Middle East as a jungle and Middle East politics as irrational. It
forced
him to rethink his policy in the region. It's time we do some
rethinking as
well.
October 28, 2005
Dr. Ron Paul is a Republican member of Congress from Texas.
(In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, this material is
distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest
in
receiving the included information for research and educational
purposes.
Information Clearing House has no affiliation whatsoever with the
originator
of this article nor is Information Clearing House endorsed or sponsored
by
the originator.)
=====================================================
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