Pakistan: The Taliban's silent partner
Robert D. Kaplan The New York Times
Published: July 23, 2006
STOCKBRIDGE, Massachusetts Pakistan
When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan five years ago,
pessimists warned that we Americans would soon find ourselves in a
similar situation to what Soviet forces faced in the 1980s. They were
wrong - but only about the timing.
The military operation was lean and lethal, and routed the Taliban
government in a few weeks. But now, just two years after Hamid Karzai
was elected as the country's first democratic leader, the coalition
finds itself, like its Soviet predecessors, in control of major cities
and towns, very weak in the villages, and besieged by a shadowy
insurgency that uses Pakistan as its rear base.
Washington's backing of an enlightened government in Kabul should put
the United States in a far stronger position than the Soviets in the
fight to win back the hinterland. But it may not, and for a good
reason: The involvement of America's other ally in the region,
Pakistan, in aiding the Taliban war machine is deeper than is commonly
thought.
The United States and NATO will not prevail unless they can persuade
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, to help America more than he
has. Unfortunately, based on what senior Afghans have explained in
detail to American officials, Pakistan is now supporting the Taliban in
a manner similar to the way it supported the Afghan mujahedeen against
the Soviets two decades ago.
The Taliban has two leadership cells operating inside Pakistan,
presumably with the guidance and logistical support of local
authorities. Senior lieutenants to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's
supreme leader, are ensconced in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan. From there they direct military operations in
the south-central Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and
Zabul.
Meanwhile, one of the Taliban's savviest military commanders,
Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his sons operate out of Miramshah, the capital
of the North Waziristan Province. From there, they run operations in
Kabul and the eastern Afghan regions of Khost, Logar, Paktia and
Paktika.
Haqqani, who was years ago an American ally in the anti-Soviet
campaign, has also been long suspected of sheltering Osama bin Laden.
He is a crusty warrior with a great deal of credibility in Afghanistan
because 20 years ago, rather than sip tea with journalists like some
other rebel leaders, he was laying siege to Soviet positions.
Meanwhile, in the Pakistani city of Peshawar and the Bajur region, one
finds various headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose Hezb-i-Islami
Party is aligned with the Taliban. Hekmatyar, another former American
ally, runs operations in the Afghan regions of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman,
Nangahar and Nuristan.
These various bases inside Pakistan have assured the Taliban's survival
in the years since a democratic government was established in Kabul.
Having hung on, the Taliban has recently regained much of its strength
- and may now be winning the war of the villages against Karzai.
In Afghan politics, it is the rural heartland that has always been the
pivotal terrain, the place from where the mujahedeen rebellion against
a secularized, Marxist-influenced urban regime was ignited in 1978,
almost two years before the Soviets actually invaded. Less than a
quarter of Afghans live in cities.
In Afghan villages, God and tribe are more tangible than any elected
parliament. Anyone who can provide security and other basic needs - by
whatever means - commands respect.
Since toppling the Taliban in late 2001, the coalition and Afghan
leaders have concentrated too much effort on Afghan cities, many of
whose inhabitants, connected as they are to the outside world, are apt
to support democracy anyway. The war we are now fighting will be won or
lost in the villages.
While officials from Kabul show up in rural areas for regular visits,
the Taliban are setting up permanent presences in them. They are also
importing radical, Pakistan-trained clerics to preach against the Kabul
authorities. While officials from the capital too often speak in
platitudes, the Taliban make concrete offers to protect poppy fields
from eradication.
The drug trade is a particular problem because the United States, given
its domestic policies, must take a stand against it and the government
in Kabul, needing to maintain an upright image with international
donors, must follow suit. Thus, the Taliban is free to use our morality
against both.
The Taliban even have shadow officials for small areas of Afghanistan,
whose top officials live just over the border in Pakistan. Afghan
villagers journey to Pakistan to seek justice for one grievance or
another from these alternative figures.
The situation is tragically simple: The very people we need to kill or
apprehend we can't get at, because they are in effect protected by our
so-called ally, Pakistan. All we can do is win tactical battles against
foot soldiers inside Afghanistan, who are easily replaced.
It isn't that Musharraf is doing nothing. He has deployed troops along
the border that have somewhat cut down on the activities of Haqqani.
Moreover, many of his troops are busy quelling a separatist rebellion
in the border province of Baluchistan.
But he feels himself atop a volcano of fundamentalism. He is among the
last of the Westernized, British-style officers in the national army;
after him come the men with the beards.
The military and Pakistani society are filled with those who do not see
the Taliban as a threat: It is an American problem, and one for an
Afghan government toward which they feel ambivalence. So Musharraf must
walk a fine line. And he must be as devious with us as he is with any
other faction.
Thus Pakistani strategy is to get the Taliban to the point where it can
set up secure leadership bases in remote parts of Afghanistan and move
across the border. Then Pakistan will claim that it is no longer its
problem.
There are two opposing tipping points to watch out for. The first is
the moment the Taliban leadership feels safe in bases inside
Afghanistan and decides it can mobilize to infiltrate and eventually
topple the cities. That is when Bush and Karzai lose. Karzai would need
to form his own private militia, and perhaps cut a deal with Mullah
Omar in order to survive.
The other tipping point is when the Taliban leaders inside Pakistan
feel themselves under so much pressure from the local authorities that
their energy is spent on survival rather than on running operations.
That is when Bush and Karzai win. Unfortunately, this seems less likely
than the first tipping point.
The United States can't reverse this drift without a stronger policy
toward Pakistan. I say this with extreme trepidation. Musharraf, for
all his faults, may still be the worst person to rule his country
except for any other who might replace him. And yet it is necessary to
hold his feet to the fire to a greater extent than we have.
Things have reached the point that it was entirely justified for the
U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, Ryan Crocker, to say this month that the
exiled former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif should be
allowed to return and run against Musharraf. As corrupt as those two
leaders were, we need leverage.
In the end, the battle for Afghanistan will be won in the villages, and
the rules of counterinsurgency will apply. The most vital goals in this
case will be giving the locals a stake in the outcome through
development projects; and providing security through the presence of
coalition troops embedded with Afghan Army units.
Periodic patrols don't cut it. If you live and sleep beside people,
they tend to trust you. You don't win these kinds of wars operating out
of big bases near the capital. Finally, while democracy may be an
abstraction in the Afghan countryside, it can be a powerful
psychological tool if explained in the language of nuts-and-bolts
enticements.
With our help, Karzai's rural representatives must articulate a
strategy of hope and development, and contrast it with the one of
interminable conflict that is all that the Taliban can ultimately
offer.
Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly
and the author of "Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in
Afghanistan and Pakistan."
STOCKBRIDGE, Massachusetts Pakistan
When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan five years ago,
pessimists warned that we Americans would soon find ourselves in a
similar situation to what Soviet forces faced in the 1980s. They were
wrong - but only about the timing.
The military operation was lean and lethal, and routed the Taliban
government in a few weeks. But now, just two years after Hamid Karzai
was elected as the country's first democratic leader, the coalition
finds itself, like its Soviet predecessors, in control of major cities
and towns, very weak in the villages, and besieged by a shadowy
insurgency that uses Pakistan as its rear base.
Washington's backing of an enlightened government in Kabul should put
the United States in a far stronger position than the Soviets in the
fight to win back the hinterland. But it may not, and for a good
reason: The involvement of America's other ally in the region,
Pakistan, in aiding the Taliban war machine is deeper than is commonly
thought.
The United States and NATO will not prevail unless they can persuade
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, to help America more than he
has. Unfortunately, based on what senior Afghans have explained in
detail to American officials, Pakistan is now supporting the Taliban in
a manner similar to the way it supported the Afghan mujahedeen against
the Soviets two decades ago.
The Taliban has two leadership cells operating inside Pakistan,
presumably with the guidance and logistical support of local
authorities. Senior lieutenants to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's
supreme leader, are ensconced in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan. From there they direct military operations in
the south-central Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and
Zabul.
Meanwhile, one of the Taliban's savviest military commanders,
Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his sons operate out of Miramshah, the capital
of the North Waziristan Province. From there, they run operations in
Kabul and the eastern Afghan regions of Khost, Logar, Paktia and
Paktika.
Haqqani, who was years ago an American ally in the anti-Soviet
campaign, has also been long suspected of sheltering Osama bin Laden.
He is a crusty warrior with a great deal of credibility in Afghanistan
because 20 years ago, rather than sip tea with journalists like some
other rebel leaders, he was laying siege to Soviet positions.
Meanwhile, in the Pakistani city of Peshawar and the Bajur region, one
finds various headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose Hezb-i-Islami
Party is aligned with the Taliban. Hekmatyar, another former American
ally, runs operations in the Afghan regions of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman,
Nangahar and Nuristan.
These various bases inside Pakistan have assured the Taliban's survival
in the years since a democratic government was established in Kabul.
Having hung on, the Taliban has recently regained much of its strength
- and may now be winning the war of the villages against Karzai.
In Afghan politics, it is the rural heartland that has always been the
pivotal terrain, the place from where the mujahedeen rebellion against
a secularized, Marxist-influenced urban regime was ignited in 1978,
almost two years before the Soviets actually invaded. Less than a
quarter of Afghans live in cities.
In Afghan villages, God and tribe are more tangible than any elected
parliament. Anyone who can provide security and other basic needs - by
whatever means - commands respect.
Since toppling the Taliban in late 2001, the coalition and Afghan
leaders have concentrated too much effort on Afghan cities, many of
whose inhabitants, connected as they are to the outside world, are apt
to support democracy anyway. The war we are now fighting will be won or
lost in the villages.
While officials from Kabul show up in rural areas for regular visits,
the Taliban are setting up permanent presences in them. They are also
importing radical, Pakistan-trained clerics to preach against the Kabul
authorities. While officials from the capital too often speak in
platitudes, the Taliban make concrete offers to protect poppy fields
from eradication.
The drug trade is a particular problem because the United States, given
its domestic policies, must take a stand against it and the government
in Kabul, needing to maintain an upright image with international
donors, must follow suit. Thus, the Taliban is free to use our morality
against both.
The Taliban even have shadow officials for small areas of Afghanistan,
whose top officials live just over the border in Pakistan. Afghan
villagers journey to Pakistan to seek justice for one grievance or
another from these alternative figures.
The situation is tragically simple: The very people we need to kill or
apprehend we can't get at, because they are in effect protected by our
so-called ally, Pakistan. All we can do is win tactical battles against
foot soldiers inside Afghanistan, who are easily replaced.
It isn't that Musharraf is doing nothing. He has deployed troops along
the border that have somewhat cut down on the activities of Haqqani.
Moreover, many of his troops are busy quelling a separatist rebellion
in the border province of Baluchistan.
But he feels himself atop a volcano of fundamentalism. He is among the
last of the Westernized, British-style officers in the national army;
after him come the men with the beards.
The military and Pakistani society are filled with those who do not see
the Taliban as a threat: It is an American problem, and one for an
Afghan government toward which they feel ambivalence. So Musharraf must
walk a fine line. And he must be as devious with us as he is with any
other faction.
Thus Pakistani strategy is to get the Taliban to the point where it can
set up secure leadership bases in remote parts of Afghanistan and move
across the border. Then Pakistan will claim that it is no longer its
problem.
There are two opposing tipping points to watch out for. The first is
the moment the Taliban leadership feels safe in bases inside
Afghanistan and decides it can mobilize to infiltrate and eventually
topple the cities. That is when Bush and Karzai lose. Karzai would need
to form his own private militia, and perhaps cut a deal with Mullah
Omar in order to survive.
The other tipping point is when the Taliban leaders inside Pakistan
feel themselves under so much pressure from the local authorities that
their energy is spent on survival rather than on running operations.
That is when Bush and Karzai win. Unfortunately, this seems less likely
than the first tipping point.
The United States can't reverse this drift without a stronger policy
toward Pakistan. I say this with extreme trepidation. Musharraf, for
all his faults, may still be the worst person to rule his country
except for any other who might replace him. And yet it is necessary to
hold his feet to the fire to a greater extent than we have.
Things have reached the point that it was entirely justified for the
U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, Ryan Crocker, to say this month that the
exiled former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif should be
allowed to return and run against Musharraf. As corrupt as those two
leaders were, we need leverage.
In the end, the battle for Afghanistan will be won in the villages, and
the rules of counterinsurgency will apply. The most vital goals in this
case will be giving the locals a stake in the outcome through
development projects; and providing security through the presence of
coalition troops embedded with Afghan Army units.
Periodic patrols don't cut it. If you live and sleep beside people,
they tend to trust you. You don't win these kinds of wars operating out
of big bases near the capital. Finally, while democracy may be an
abstraction in the Afghan countryside, it can be a powerful
psychological tool if explained in the language of nuts-and-bolts
enticements.
With our help, Karzai's rural representatives must articulate a
strategy of hope and development, and contrast it with the one of
interminable conflict that is all that the Taliban can ultimately
offer.
Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly
and the author of "Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in
Afghanistan and Pakistan."
STOCKBRIDGE, Massachusetts Pakistan
When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan five years ago,
pessimists warned that we Americans would soon find ourselves in a
similar situation to what Soviet forces faced in the 1980s. They were
wrong - but only about the timing.
The military operation was lean and lethal, and routed the Taliban
government in a few weeks. But now, just two years after Hamid Karzai
was elected as the country's first democratic leader, the coalition
finds itself, like its Soviet predecessors, in control of major cities
and towns, very weak in the villages, and besieged by a shadowy
insurgency that uses Pakistan as its rear base.
Washington's backing of an enlightened government in Kabul should put
the United States in a far stronger position than the Soviets in the
fight to win back the hinterland. But it may not, and for a good
reason: The involvement of America's other ally in the region,
Pakistan, in aiding the Taliban war machine is deeper than is commonly
thought.
The United States and NATO will not prevail unless they can persuade
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, to help America more than he
has. Unfortunately, based on what senior Afghans have explained in
detail to American officials, Pakistan is now supporting the Taliban in
a manner similar to the way it supported the Afghan mujahedeen against
the Soviets two decades ago.
The Taliban has two leadership cells operating inside Pakistan,
presumably with the guidance and logistical support of local
authorities. Senior lieutenants to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's
supreme leader, are ensconced in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan. From there they direct military operations in
the south-central Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and
Zabul.
Meanwhile, one of the Taliban's savviest military commanders,
Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his sons operate out of Miramshah, the capital
of the North Waziristan Province. From there, they run operations in
Kabul and the eastern Afghan regions of Khost, Logar, Paktia and
Paktika.
Haqqani, who was years ago an American ally in the anti-Soviet
campaign, has also been long suspected of sheltering Osama bin Laden.
He is a crusty warrior with a great deal of credibility in Afghanistan
because 20 years ago, rather than sip tea with journalists like some
other rebel leaders, he was laying siege to Soviet positions.
Meanwhile, in the Pakistani city of Peshawar and the Bajur region, one
finds various headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose Hezb-i-Islami
Party is aligned with the Taliban. Hekmatyar, another former American
ally, runs operations in the Afghan regions of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman,
Nangahar and Nuristan.
These various bases inside Pakistan have assured the Taliban's survival
in the years since a democratic government was established in Kabul.
Having hung on, the Taliban has recently regained much of its strength
- and may now be winning the war of the villages against Karzai.
In Afghan politics, it is the rural heartland that has always been the
pivotal terrain, the place from where the mujahedeen rebellion against
a secularized, Marxist-influenced urban regime was ignited in 1978,
almost two years before the Soviets actually invaded. Less than a
quarter of Afghans live in cities.
In Afghan villages, God and tribe are more tangible than any elected
parliament. Anyone who can provide security and other basic needs - by
whatever means - commands respect.
Since toppling the Taliban in late 2001, the coalition and Afghan
leaders have concentrated too much effort on Afghan cities, many of
whose inhabitants, connected as they are to the outside world, are apt
to support democracy anyway. The war we are now fighting will be won or
lost in the villages.
While officials from Kabul show up in rural areas for regular visits,
the Taliban are setting up permanent presences in them. They are also
importing radical, Pakistan-trained clerics to preach against the Kabul
authorities. While officials from the capital too often speak in
platitudes, the Taliban make concrete offers to protect poppy fields
from eradication.
The drug trade is a particular problem because the United States, given
its domestic policies, must take a stand against it and the government
in Kabul, needing to maintain an upright image with international
donors, must follow suit. Thus, the Taliban is free to use our morality
against both.
The Taliban even have shadow officials for small areas of Afghanistan,
whose top officials live just over the border in Pakistan. Afghan
villagers journey to Pakistan to seek justice for one grievance or
another from these alternative figures.
The situation is tragically simple: The very people we need to kill or
apprehend we can't get at, because they are in effect protected by our
so-called ally, Pakistan. All we can do is win tactical battles against
foot soldiers inside Afghanistan, who are easily replaced.
It isn't that Musharraf is doing nothing. He has deployed troops along
the border that have somewhat cut down on the activities of Haqqani.
Moreover, many of his troops are busy quelling a separatist rebellion
in the border province of Baluchistan.
But he feels himself atop a volcano of fundamentalism. He is among the
last of the Westernized, British-style officers in the national army;
after him come the men with the beards.
The military and Pakistani society are filled with those who do not see
the Taliban as a threat: It is an American problem, and one for an
Afghan government toward which they feel ambivalence. So Musharraf must
walk a fine line. And he must be as devious with us as he is with any
other faction.
Thus Pakistani strategy is to get the Taliban to the point where it can
set up secure leadership bases in remote parts of Afghanistan and move
across the border. Then Pakistan will claim that it is no longer its
problem.
There are two opposing tipping points to watch out for. The first is
the moment the Taliban leadership feels safe in bases inside
Afghanistan and decides it can mobilize to infiltrate and eventually
topple the cities. That is when Bush and Karzai lose. Karzai would need
to form his own private militia, and perhaps cut a deal with Mullah
Omar in order to survive.
The other tipping point is when the Taliban leaders inside Pakistan
feel themselves under so much pressure from the local authorities that
their energy is spent on survival rather than on running operations.
That is when Bush and Karzai win. Unfortunately, this seems less likely
than the first tipping point.
The United States can't reverse this drift without a stronger policy
toward Pakistan. I say this with extreme trepidation. Musharraf, for
all his faults, may still be the worst person to rule his country
except for any other who might replace him. And yet it is necessary to
hold his feet to the fire to a greater extent than we have.
Things have reached the point that it was entirely justified for the
U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, Ryan Crocker, to say this month that the
exiled former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif should be
allowed to return and run against Musharraf. As corrupt as those two
leaders were, we need leverage.
In the end, the battle for Afghanistan will be won in the villages, and
the rules of counterinsurgency will apply. The most vital goals in this
case will be giving the locals a stake in the outcome through
development projects; and providing security through the presence of
coalition troops embedded with Afghan Army units.
Periodic patrols don't cut it. If you live and sleep beside people,
they tend to trust you. You don't win these kinds of wars operating out
of big bases near the capital. Finally, while democracy may be an
abstraction in the Afghan countryside, it can be a powerful
psychological tool if explained in the language of nuts-and-bolts
enticements.
With our help, Karzai's rural representatives must articulate a
strategy of hope and development, and contrast it with the one of
interminable conflict that is all that the Taliban can ultimately
offer.
Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly
and the author of "Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in
Afghanistan and Pakistan."
STOCKBRIDGE, Massachusetts Pakistan
When the U.S.-led coalition invaded Afghanistan five years ago,
pessimists warned that we Americans would soon find ourselves in a
similar situation to what Soviet forces faced in the 1980s. They were
wrong - but only about the timing.
The military operation was lean and lethal, and routed the Taliban
government in a few weeks. But now, just two years after Hamid Karzai
was elected as the country's first democratic leader, the coalition
finds itself, like its Soviet predecessors, in control of major cities
and towns, very weak in the villages, and besieged by a shadowy
insurgency that uses Pakistan as its rear base.
Washington's backing of an enlightened government in Kabul should put
the United States in a far stronger position than the Soviets in the
fight to win back the hinterland. But it may not, and for a good
reason: The involvement of America's other ally in the region,
Pakistan, in aiding the Taliban war machine is deeper than is commonly
thought.
The United States and NATO will not prevail unless they can persuade
Pakistan's president, Pervez Musharraf, to help America more than he
has. Unfortunately, based on what senior Afghans have explained in
detail to American officials, Pakistan is now supporting the Taliban in
a manner similar to the way it supported the Afghan mujahedeen against
the Soviets two decades ago.
The Taliban has two leadership cells operating inside Pakistan,
presumably with the guidance and logistical support of local
authorities. Senior lieutenants to Mullah Muhammad Omar, the Taliban's
supreme leader, are ensconced in Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani
province of Baluchistan. From there they direct military operations in
the south-central Afghan provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and
Zabul.
Meanwhile, one of the Taliban's savviest military commanders,
Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his sons operate out of Miramshah, the capital
of the North Waziristan Province. From there, they run operations in
Kabul and the eastern Afghan regions of Khost, Logar, Paktia and
Paktika.
Haqqani, who was years ago an American ally in the anti-Soviet
campaign, has also been long suspected of sheltering Osama bin Laden.
He is a crusty warrior with a great deal of credibility in Afghanistan
because 20 years ago, rather than sip tea with journalists like some
other rebel leaders, he was laying siege to Soviet positions.
Meanwhile, in the Pakistani city of Peshawar and the Bajur region, one
finds various headquarters of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose Hezb-i-Islami
Party is aligned with the Taliban. Hekmatyar, another former American
ally, runs operations in the Afghan regions of Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman,
Nangahar and Nuristan.
These various bases inside Pakistan have assured the Taliban's survival
in the years since a democratic government was established in Kabul.
Having hung on, the Taliban has recently regained much of its strength
- and may now be winning the war of the villages against Karzai.
In Afghan politics, it is the rural heartland that has always been the
pivotal terrain, the place from where the mujahedeen rebellion against
a secularized, Marxist-influenced urban regime was ignited in 1978,
almost two years before the Soviets actually invaded. Less than a
quarter of Afghans live in cities.
In Afghan villages, God and tribe are more tangible than any elected
parliament. Anyone who can provide security and other basic needs - by
whatever means - commands respect.
Since toppling the Taliban in late 2001, the coalition and Afghan
leaders have concentrated too much effort on Afghan cities, many of
whose inhabitants, connected as they are to the outside world, are apt
to support democracy anyway. The war we are now fighting will be won or
lost in the villages.
While officials from Kabul show up in rural areas for regular visits,
the Taliban are setting up permanent presences in them. They are also
importing radical, Pakistan-trained clerics to preach against the Kabul
authorities. While officials from the capital too often speak in
platitudes, the Taliban make concrete offers to protect poppy fields
from eradication.
The drug trade is a particular problem because the United States, given
its domestic policies, must take a stand against it and the government
in Kabul, needing to maintain an upright image with international
donors, must follow suit. Thus, the Taliban is free to use our morality
against both.
The Taliban even have shadow officials for small areas of Afghanistan,
whose top officials live just over the border in Pakistan. Afghan
villagers journey to Pakistan to seek justice for one grievance or
another from these alternative figures.
The situation is tragically simple: The very people we need to kill or
apprehend we can't get at, because they are in effect protected by our
so-called ally, Pakistan. All we can do is win tactical battles against
foot soldiers inside Afghanistan, who are easily replaced.
It isn't that Musharraf is doing nothing. He has deployed troops along
the border that have somewhat cut down on the activities of Haqqani.
Moreover, many of his troops are busy quelling a separatist rebellion
in the border province of Baluchistan.
But he feels himself atop a volcano of fundamentalism. He is among the
last of the Westernized, British-style officers in the national army;
after him come the men with the beards.
The military and Pakistani society are filled with those who do not see
the Taliban as a threat: It is an American problem, and one for an
Afghan government toward which they feel ambivalence. So Musharraf must
walk a fine line. And he must be as devious with us as he is with any
other faction.
Thus Pakistani strategy is to get the Taliban to the point where it can
set up secure leadership bases in remote parts of Afghanistan and move
across the border. Then Pakistan will claim that it is no longer its
problem.
There are two opposing tipping points to watch out for. The first is
the moment the Taliban leadership feels safe in bases inside
Afghanistan and decides it can mobilize to infiltrate and eventually
topple the cities. That is when Bush and Karzai lose. Karzai would need
to form his own private militia, and perhaps cut a deal with Mullah
Omar in order to survive.
The other tipping point is when the Taliban leaders inside Pakistan
feel themselves under so much pressure from the local authorities that
their energy is spent on survival rather than on running operations.
That is when Bush and Karzai win. Unfortunately, this seems less likely
than the first tipping point.
The United States can't reverse this drift without a stronger policy
toward Pakistan. I say this with extreme trepidation. Musharraf, for
all his faults, may still be the worst person to rule his country
except for any other who might replace him. And yet it is necessary to
hold his feet to the fire to a greater extent than we have.
Things have reached the point that it was entirely justified for the
U.S. ambassador to Islamabad, Ryan Crocker, to say this month that the
exiled former Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif should be
allowed to return and run against Musharraf. As corrupt as those two
leaders were, we need leverage.
In the end, the battle for Afghanistan will be won in the villages, and
the rules of counterinsurgency will apply. The most vital goals in this
case will be giving the locals a stake in the outcome through
development projects; and providing security through the presence of
coalition troops embedded with Afghan Army units.
Periodic patrols don't cut it. If you live and sleep beside people,
they tend to trust you. You don't win these kinds of wars operating out
of big bases near the capital. Finally, while democracy may be an
abstraction in the Afghan countryside, it can be a powerful
psychological tool if explained in the language of nuts-and-bolts
enticements.
With our help, Karzai's rural representatives must articulate a
strategy of hope and development, and contrast it with the one of
interminable conflict that is all that the Taliban can ultimately
offer.
Robert D. Kaplan is a national correspondent for The Atlantic Monthly
and the author of "Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in
Afghanistan and Pakistan."
34 They did not destroy the peoples as the LORD had commanded them,
(Pakistan clandestinely backs Taliban/Al Qeada remnants...)
35 But mingled with the nations and imitated their ways.
(...as a means of creating a Greater Pushtunistan...
36 They worshiped their idols and were ensnared by them.
(...ungodly, earth oriented beliefs... radicalism, hate, intolerance)
37 They sacrificed to the gods their own sons and daughters,
(...meaning that Pakistan will become the new center for terrorist
planning and training...)
38 Shedding innocent blood, the blood of their own sons and daughters,
Whom they sacrificed to the idols of Canaan, desecrating the land with
bloodshed.
(...not only will they instigate plots in India, Afghanistan, plots
against world transit systems, etc, but they will also play a mjor role
in backing radical Islamist sympathizers in Palestine...)
39 They defiled themselves by their actions, became adulterers by their
conduct.
40 So the LORD grew angry with his people, abhorred his own heritage.
41 He handed them over to the nations, and their adversaries ruled
them.
(...last three lines are augured to mean that Pakistan's duplicity will
result in a 1979 Iranian revolution in Pakistan, but this time Sunni
led. Pakistan will not not emerge unified from this however, unlike
Iran, but will probably fragment. India will get sucked in once
conflict spills over into Kashmir.)
"His heritage" not only refers to the Jewish people, but all of
mankind, whom he created. Appearently the break down of Pakistan and
India getting involved will have major global reprucussions for world
peace.
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