On Fri, 11 Jul 2003 06:02:00 GMT, Jean Guernon
<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

"George Leroy Tyrebiter Jr." a écrit :

On Thu, 10 Jul 2003 04:10:54 GMT, Jean Guernon
<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

"George Leroy Tyrebiter Jr." a écrit :

On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 00:17:25 GMT, Jean Guernon
<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

There is no evidence that they had them in 2002.

Recent press reports - our intelligence evidence about weapons - had
not advanced since inspectors left in 1998. We just assumed that they
kept going - no real evidence. Obviously defectors lie. So what they
said - wasn't credible.

Only in your dreams.

You think the tooth fairy came and flew the WMD out of Iraq?

The evidence that Iraq had WMD in 2002 - was based on POSSIBLE weapons
existing in 1998. After the inspectors had spent years blowing them
up. After Bush in 1991 blew up tons of them. After Clinton bombed and
bombed some more.

And old bio-chem weapons - rot with time. Tick tick tick. At best we
could expect some mustard gas to still be viable - and it's not a WMD.

Around since 1918, not as deadly as napalm.

You can not point to any good evidence that Iraq had WMD in 2002.

It will be - well in 1988 they had a factory which could have produced
X bombs - and we only know for a fact that they destroyed Y bombs, so
maybe they have left X minus Y bombs.

But they've rotted since 1988.

Or you'll say - well we have INDICATIONS that they overstated how many
bombs they used in the Gulf War. But that's only an indication - not
proof. And again - the things rot with time.

Go ahead - try to find some good evidence Iraq had even one WMD in
2002. You'll find - you're in Emperor's New Clothes land - where UN
folks thought that MAYBE there was a factory which made more VX than
they claimed, or France said they had some, or this document does not
match that document from way way back.

Give it a try - you'll be shocked at how weak the evidence is.

Nah, not possible weapons. Actual weapons. They left some undestroyed
there that disappeared. The ones that weren't destroyed are those that
were unaccounted for. They were there in 1998. Now Saddam spoke about
anthrax only one day before the invasion,. He didn't have any intention
until then of disclosing anything.

It is possible that he destroyed them unilaterally a couple of days
before the invasion, when he smelled the coffee, but maybe he shipped
them to Syria. We will find out exactly, don't worry. Those that
participated in that will be found eventually. Or trails will lead to
discovering the truth.

It is not so simple as you say. I suggest you read Blix's Reports. He is
an expert. He knows these were still lethal.

Blix said - weapons not accounted for.

That's - not proof that they exist.

What are you talking about? Blix said they existed before the inspectors
were thrown out.

That's not in his words which I read.

Post his words to the contrary.

You can't.

Sure **IF** he had disposed of them without inviting the UN (while his
country is under sancrtions BECAUSE he didn't, he would do that,
riiiiiiiiight), then they didn't exist. They did exist and there were no
proof he had disposed of them. hell, he started talking about anthrax
only one day before the ultimatum. Was it credible?

Yes they existed.

Blix has things such as - there are indications that Iraq developed
methods in a laboratory in 1989 to preserve VX...and we can't be sure
they destroyed all their VX,,,and maybe they were able to take those
lab technicques that they MIGHT have developed and MAYBE they were
able to put that technique into weapons - so we are going to say that
there are 100 unaccounted for VX shells left over from 1991.

Nah, what he was talking about was existing bio-toxins that were set
aside by the UN but were never destroyed. They suddenly disapeared
during the time he refused the inspectors.

Could be. But the odds are not great.

Evidence for weapons - slim. Iffy. Dubious.

Odds Iraq would use them against us - zero, basically.

Odds Iraq would give them to terrorists - minor. And who cares?
Terrorists will just make their own.

Odds Iraq would give them to terrorists if and only if we attacked
them - not bad.

Odd were much greater than that. Look at what Powell said earlier TODAY
(err thursday at this hour). READ IT:

-----BEGIN-------------------

QUESTION: So can I follow that up -- some British officials apparently
think that what will happen in the end is weapons of mass destruction
will not be found. There may be evidence that Saddam Hussein, before the
war, either hid or destroyed weapons of mass destruction. Is that now
what this administration thinks?

SECRETARY POWELL: No. And I cannot speculate on what an unnamed British
official may or may not have said, or does or does not believe. Let's
start at the beginning. I don't want to take you through the whole
history, but it's instructive.

This is a regime that developed weapons of mass destruction, had them,
used them, and in 1991, when we went to war, and I was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, we were concerned that they would use
those weapons against them -- against us, and everybody knew they had
them.

When the first Gulf War was over, Desert Storm, we found them, and we
destroyed some. And we looked for more. And the U.N. took it over, and
for years the U.N. kept searching for more. And they never were able to
get a full accounting and could not find them all. Resolution after
resolution was passed, agreed to by the entire international community.

In 1998, Saddam Hussein created conditions that caused the inspectors to
have to leave. They were getting close, and they had to leave. President
Clinton was so concerned at time that he bombed. What did he bomb? He
bombed for four days, in Operation Desert Fox, facilities that were
believed to possess or developing or producing weapons of mass
destruction.

The entire international community has felt, over this entire period,
that Saddam Hussein had these weapons, and there was sufficient
intelligence available to all the major intelligence agencies of the
world that they existed. And they do exist. And when we went to the
United Nations last year, when the President spoke to the United Nations
General Assembly last September, he put the charge to the General
Assembly: you have been saying; put the charge to the Security Council
as well, you have been saying for all these years that this is a nation
that has not come clean, here is one last chance.

And in resolution 1441, 15 nations unanimously approved that resolution
that begins with a statement that Iraq is in material breach. So
everybody had reason to believe, good reason to believe -- not figments
of the imagination -- that they had weapons of mass destruction and
had programs to develop more. And if there is anybody who thinks that
Saddam Hussein had ever lost the intent to have such weapons, then I
think that is the most naive view imaginable. And he had the chance to
come clean to the international community; he did not take that chance,
he did not take that opportunity. And the war followed.

And we have now removed a tyrant, a dictator. We have freed people. We
have found the mass graves. We have found -- we are starting to find
evidence that I think will make it clear that there was a more than
adequate justification for this war and more than adequate authority for
it under Resolution 1441.

(...)

QUESTION: Do you think the other intelligence that was involved, has it
stood the test of time? The Niger didn't. Did the other intelligence
that went into that, did

it stand --

SECRETARY POWELL: I think so. The definitive presentation of our
intelligence case, frankly, was the presentation I made on the 5th of
February. I spent an enormous amount of time with many of my colleagues
and with a large part of the top leadership of the CIA, as well as a lot
of the working-level analysts of the CIA, closeted in Langley at CIA
headquarters for four days and three nights -- or it might be four weeks
and three months -- it felt like it. And we were there well into the
night, until midnight, 1:00 a.m. every morning, going over everything.
We had lots and lots of information. The challenge was to get it down to
that which was absolutely supportable and we were confident of.

There were a lot of items of information that I could have used if I had
had three hours or three days. And there were other items of information
that were pretty good, but maybe we didn't have a second, third, fourth
source on, so let's not lead with that.

And the case I put down on the 5th of February, for an hour and 20
minutes, roughly, on terrorism, on weapons of mass destruction and on
the human rights case -- a short section at the end -- we stand behind.
And the credibility of the United States was at stake when that
presentation was put forward. And I spent the afternoon waiting for the
reaction -- not just your reaction, as important as that might be -- but
I wanted to see what the Iraqis were going to do. I was interested to
see what their response was going to be.

And I waited that afternoon and the next morning, I waited to see what
their response was going to be. The first response was predictable: it's
all a bunch of lies -- just as they'd been saying for 12 years, all a
bunch of lies. And then I waited for, okay, hit me on something, attack
some part of the presentation. Well, they're phony intercepts --
nonsense, they're real. I heard the actual -- you heard the voices. And
then the only thing that came up over the next several days was a debate
about one of the pictures I showed, as to whether those were chemical
weapons bunkers or not. And that pretty much was it in the way of a
counterattack.

One item I showed was cartoons of the mobile biological van. They were
cartoons, artist's renderings, because we had never seen one of these
things, but we had good sourcing on it, excellent sourcing on it. And we
knew what it would look like when we found it, so we made those
pictures. And I can assure you I didn't just throw those pictures up
without having quite a bit of confidence in the information that I had
been provided and that Director Tenet had been provided and was now
supporting me in the presentation on, sitting right behind me.

And we waited. And it took a couple of months, and it took until after
the war, until we found a van and another van that pretty much matched
what we said it would look like. And I think that's a pretty good
indication that we were not cooking the books.

And what I keep saying to people is, if that was really a hydrogen maker
for a weather balloon, and I'm Saddam Hussein or the Minister of
Information we all got to know and love so well, that van would have
been pulled out the next orning and they would have tried to blow us out
of the water as they blew up a weather balloon. They didn't, they
couldn't, they never showed -- they brought other vehicles forward; they
never brought that one out.

And so it stood the test of time. It stood the test of time a couple of
weeks ago, when, if you'll go back to the presentation on nuclear
capability and weapons, I said that they had the brainpower, I said they
had the infrastructure, and they've never lost the intention, and they
have hidden components of their program. I talked about the centrifuge.
And I made the point then that there was a difference of opinion about
the centrifuge and let's continue to study it. I didn't use the uranium
at that point, because I didn't think that was sufficiently strong as
evidence to present before the world. And what did we see two weeks ago?
An Iraqi scientist coming forward with a bunch of diagrams and
blueprints and some centrifuge parts that he dug up out of his yard.

And so I think as you let Mr. Kay and the ISG that support the team
that's out there looking at this stuff continue to look, continue to
interview people, continue to pore through all the documents that we
have, I think the case will no longer be in doubt.

-----END------------------------------------

J.

On Fri, 11 Jul 2003 06:02:00 GMT, Jean Guernon
<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

"George Leroy Tyrebiter Jr." a écrit :

On Thu, 10 Jul 2003 04:10:54 GMT, Jean Guernon
<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

"George Leroy Tyrebiter Jr." a écrit :

On Wed, 09 Jul 2003 00:17:25 GMT, Jean Guernon
<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

There is no evidence that they had them in 2002.

Recent press reports - our intelligence evidence about weapons - had
not advanced since inspectors left in 1998. We just assumed that they
kept going - no real evidence. Obviously defectors lie. So what they
said - wasn't credible.

Only in your dreams.

You think the tooth fairy came and flew the WMD out of Iraq?

The evidence that Iraq had WMD in 2002 - was based on POSSIBLE weapons
existing in 1998. After the inspectors had spent years blowing them
up. After Bush in 1991 blew up tons of them. After Clinton bombed and
bombed some more.

And old bio-chem weapons - rot with time. Tick tick tick. At best we
could expect some mustard gas to still be viable - and it's not a WMD.

Around since 1918, not as deadly as napalm.

You can not point to any good evidence that Iraq had WMD in 2002.

It will be - well in 1988 they had a factory which could have produced
X bombs - and we only know for a fact that they destroyed Y bombs, so
maybe they have left X minus Y bombs.

But they've rotted since 1988.

Or you'll say - well we have INDICATIONS that they overstated how many
bombs they used in the Gulf War. But that's only an indication - not
proof. And again - the things rot with time.

Go ahead - try to find some good evidence Iraq had even one WMD in
2002. You'll find - you're in Emperor's New Clothes land - where UN
folks thought that MAYBE there was a factory which made more VX than
they claimed, or France said they had some, or this document does not
match that document from way way back.

Give it a try - you'll be shocked at how weak the evidence is.

Nah, not possible weapons. Actual weapons. They left some undestroyed
there that disappeared. The ones that weren't destroyed are those that
were unaccounted for. They were there in 1998. Now Saddam spoke about
anthrax only one day before the invasion,. He didn't have any intention
until then of disclosing anything.

It is possible that he destroyed them unilaterally a couple of days
before the invasion, when he smelled the coffee, but maybe he shipped
them to Syria. We will find out exactly, don't worry. Those that
participated in that will be found eventually. Or trails will lead to
discovering the truth.

It is not so simple as you say. I suggest you read Blix's Reports. He is
an expert. He knows these were still lethal.

Blix said - weapons not accounted for.

That's - not proof that they exist.

What are you talking about? Blix said they existed before the inspectors
were thrown out.

That's not in his words which I read.

Post his words to the contrary.

You can't.

Sure **IF** he had disposed of them without inviting the UN (while his
country is under sancrtions BECAUSE he didn't, he would do that,
riiiiiiiiight), then they didn't exist. They did exist and there were no
proof he had disposed of them. hell, he started talking about anthrax
only one day before the ultimatum. Was it credible?

Yes they existed.

Blix has things such as - there are indications that Iraq developed
methods in a laboratory in 1989 to preserve VX...and we can't be sure
they destroyed all their VX,,,and maybe they were able to take those
lab technicques that they MIGHT have developed and MAYBE they were
able to put that technique into weapons - so we are going to say that
there are 100 unaccounted for VX shells left over from 1991.

Nah, what he was talking about was existing bio-toxins that were set
aside by the UN but were never destroyed. They suddenly disapeared
during the time he refused the inspectors.

Could be. But the odds are not great.

Evidence for weapons - slim. Iffy. Dubious.

Odds Iraq would use them against us - zero, basically.

Odds Iraq would give them to terrorists - minor. And who cares?
Terrorists will just make their own.

Odds Iraq would give them to terrorists if and only if we attacked
them - not bad.

Odd were much greater than that. Look at what Powell said earlier TODAY
(err thursday at this hour). READ IT:

-----BEGIN-------------------

QUESTION: So can I follow that up -- some British officials apparently
think that what will happen in the end is weapons of mass destruction
will not be found. There may be evidence that Saddam Hussein, before the
war, either hid or destroyed weapons of mass destruction. Is that now
what this administration thinks?

SECRETARY POWELL: No. And I cannot speculate on what an unnamed British
official may or may not have said, or does or does not believe. Let's
start at the beginning. I don't want to take you through the whole
history, but it's instructive.

This is a regime that developed weapons of mass destruction, had them,
used them, and in 1991, when we went to war, and I was Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, we were concerned that they would use
those weapons against them -- against us, and everybody knew they had
them.

When the first Gulf War was over, Desert Storm, we found them, and we
destroyed some. And we looked for more. And the U.N. took it over, and
for years the U.N. kept searching for more. And they never were able to
get a full accounting and could not find them all. Resolution after
resolution was passed, agreed to by the entire international community.

In 1998, Saddam Hussein created conditions that caused the inspectors to
have to leave. They were getting close, and they had to leave. President
Clinton was so concerned at time that he bombed. What did he bomb? He
bombed for four days, in Operation Desert Fox, facilities that were
believed to possess or developing or producing weapons of mass
destruction.

The entire international community has felt, over this entire period,
that Saddam Hussein had these weapons, and there was sufficient
intelligence available to all the major intelligence agencies of the
world that they existed. And they do exist. And when we went to the
United Nations last year, when the President spoke to the United Nations
General Assembly last September, he put the charge to the General
Assembly: you have been saying; put the charge to the Security Council
as well, you have been saying for all these years that this is a nation
that has not come clean, here is one last chance.

And in resolution 1441, 15 nations unanimously approved that resolution
that begins with a statement that Iraq is in material breach. So
everybody had reason to believe, good reason to believe -- not figments
of the imagination -- that they had weapons of mass destruction and
had programs to develop more. And if there is anybody who thinks that
Saddam Hussein had ever lost the intent to have such weapons, then I
think that is the most naive view imaginable. And he had the chance to
come clean to the international community; he did not take that chance,
he did not take that opportunity. And the war followed.

And we have now removed a tyrant, a dictator. We have freed people. We
have found the mass graves. We have found -- we are starting to find
evidence that I think will make it clear that there was a more than
adequate justification for this war and more than adequate authority for
it under Resolution 1441.

(...)

QUESTION: Do you think the other intelligence that was involved, has it
stood the test of time? The Niger didn't. Did the other intelligence
that went into that, did

it stand --

SECRETARY POWELL: I think so. The definitive presentation of our
intelligence case, frankly, was the presentation I made on the 5th of
February. I spent an enormous amount of time with many of my colleagues
and with a large part of the top leadership of the CIA, as well as a lot
of the working-level analysts of the CIA, closeted in Langley at CIA
headquarters for four days and three nights -- or it might be four weeks
and three months -- it felt like it. And we were there well into the
night, until midnight, 1:00 a.m. every morning, going over everything.
We had lots and lots of information. The challenge was to get it down to
that which was absolutely supportable and we were confident of.

There were a lot of items of information that I could have used if I had
had three hours or three days. And there were other items of information
that were pretty good, but maybe we didn't have a second, third, fourth
source on, so let's not lead with that.

And the case I put down on the 5th of February, for an hour and 20
minutes, roughly, on terrorism, on weapons of mass destruction and on
the human rights case -- a short section at the end -- we stand behind.
And the credibility of the United States was at stake when that
presentation was put forward. And I spent the afternoon waiting for the
reaction -- not just your reaction, as important as that might be -- but
I wanted to see what the Iraqis were going to do. I was interested to
see what their response was going to be.

And I waited that afternoon and the next morning, I waited to see what
their response was going to be. The first response was predictable: it's
all a bunch of lies -- just as they'd been saying for 12 years, all a
bunch of lies. And then I waited for, okay, hit me on something, attack
some part of the presentation. Well, they're phony intercepts --
nonsense, they're real. I heard the actual -- you heard the voices. And
then the only thing that came up over the next several days was a debate
about one of the pictures I showed, as to whether those were chemical
weapons bunkers or not. And that pretty much was it in the way of a
counterattack.

One item I showed was cartoons of the mobile biological van. They were
cartoons, artist's renderings, because we had never seen one of these
things, but we had good sourcing on it, excellent sourcing on it. And we
knew what it would look like when we found it, so we made those
pictures. And I can assure you I didn't just throw those pictures up
without having quite a bit of confidence in the information that I had
been provided and that Director Tenet had been provided and was now
supporting me in the presentation on, sitting right behind me.

And we waited. And it took a couple of months, and it took until after
the war, until we found a van and another van that pretty much matched
what we said it would look like. And I think that's a pretty good
indication that we were not cooking the books.

And what I keep saying to people is, if that was really a hydrogen maker
for a weather balloon, and I'm Saddam Hussein or the Minister of
Information we all got to know and love so well, that van would have
been pulled out the next orning and they would have tried to blow us out
of the water as they blew up a weather balloon. They didn't, they
couldn't, they never showed -- they brought other vehicles forward; they
never brought that one out.

And so it stood the test of time. It stood the test of time a couple of
weeks ago, when, if you'll go back to the presentation on nuclear
capability and weapons, I said that they had the brainpower, I said they
had the infrastructure, and they've never lost the intention, and they
have hidden components of their program. I talked about the centrifuge.
And I made the point then that there was a difference of opinion about
the centrifuge and let's continue to study it. I didn't use the uranium
at that point, because I didn't think that was sufficiently strong as
evidence to present before the world. And what did we see two weeks ago?
An Iraqi scientist coming forward with a bunch of diagrams and
blueprints and some centrifuge parts that he dug up out of his yard.

And so I think as you let Mr. Kay and the ISG that support the team
that's out there looking at this stuff continue to look, continue to
interview people, continue to pore through all the documents that we
have, I think the case will no longer be in doubt.

-----END------------------------------------

J.