"MonsieurStat" <Monsieustat@yahoo.com> wrote in message
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They don't make Viagra like they used to ;-)


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Congressman Jim Leach Says Military Action Against Iran Would Be Unwise
Source: U.S. Department of State
Says increased problems in Iraq, terrorism, global economy could ensue

Republican Congressman Jim Leach of Iowa says the possible use of

military

force by the United States or Israel to eliminate Iran's nuclear
installations would be an unwise course of action.

In a statement released November 24, "The Case for Restraint in Iran,"

Leach

gave a number of reasons for his position.

-- It would complicate U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq. "Any strike on

Iran

would be expected to immediately precipitate a violent reaction in the

Shi'a

part of Iraq, where the U.S. has some support today. With ease, Iranian
influence on the majority Shi'a of Iraq could make our ability to
constructively influence the direction of change in Iraq near hopeless,"
Leach said.

-- It would increase the likelihood of future terrorist operations

against

the United States. "If there exists today something like a one-in-three
chance of another 9/11-type incident or set of incidents in the U.S. in

the

next few years, a preemptive strike against Iran must be assumed to

increase

the prospect to two-in-three," Leach said.

-- It would tempt Iran to destabilize the global economy by restricting

its

oil exports. "And Iran, far more than Osama bin-Laden, has within its

power

the ability not only to destabilize world politics, but world economies

as

well. Oil is, after all, the grease of economic activity, and a

devastating

Iranian-led cutback in supply cannot be ruled out," Leach said.

In place of military action, Leach argued that diplomatic and trade
incentives should be used to encourage a dialogue with Iran.

He suggested that an attempt be made to create a nuclear-free zone in

the

Gulf region to ease Iranian fears "that it may be at a disadvantage in a
conflict with an oil-rich neighbor."

Leach said the United States could hold out the prospect of not only a
normalization of relations in trade but also of a free trade agreement

and

expanded cultural ties.

"Here, it should be stressed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have

been

educated in the United States. The country has strong democratic
proclivities. While the apparatus of democratic governance in extensive,

real

power is controlled by the mullahs. Nevertheless, few societies in the

world

have more potential to move quickly in a democratic direction than

Iran,"

Leach said.

Leach suggested that the United States consider joining the

comprehensive

test ban treaty to demonstrate it commitment to multilateral restraint.

"We simply cannot expect others to restrain themselves when we refuse to

put

constraints on ourselves," Leach said.

Following is the text of Leach's statement:





Statement by Representative James A. Leach The Case for Restraint in

Iran

Before the House of Representatives November 24, 2004

Mr. Speaker:

There are few areas of the world with a more troubling mix of

geopolitical

problems than the Middle East. The irony is that the war in Iraq which

has

consumed so much of our country's political and economic capital may

hold

less far-reaching consequences than challenges posed in neighboring

Middle

Eastern countries.

To the West, the Israeli-Palestinian stand-off remains the sorest point

in

world relations, although new opportunities for reconciliation between

the

two sides have presented themselves in the wake of Yasser Arafat's

passing.

To the East, the sobering prospect of Iran joining the nuclear club

stands

out.

It is this East of Baghdad trauma that I wish to address this afternoon.

In life, individuals and countries sometimes face circumstances in which

all

judgments and options are bad. The Iranian dilemma is a case-in-point.

But it

is more than just an abstract bad-option model because at issue are

nuclear

weapons in the hands of a mullah-controlled society which has actively

aided

and abetted regional terrorists for years.

In reference to recent disclosures of enhanced Iranian efforts to

develop

nuclear weapons as well as missile delivery systems to carry such

weapons,

concerned outside parties are actively reviewing options.

The Europeans have led with diplomatic entreaties; the Israelis, with
requests for the provision by the U.S. of sophisticated bunker-busting

bombs;

American policy-makers, with open-option planning, with neo-con

muscularity

being the principal reported theme.

In the background are references to the 1981 preemptive strike by the

Israeli

Air Force against Iraq's Osirak reactor.

At issue is the question of whether preemption is justified; if so, how

it

should be carried out; and, if carried out, whether intervention would

lead

to a more conciliatory, non-nuclear Iran or whether the effects of

military

action would be short-term, perhaps pushing back nuclear development a

year

or two, but precipitating a new level of hostility against the U.S. and
Israel in Iran and the rest of the Muslim world which could continue for
decades, if not centuries.

Since the American hostage crisis which so bedeviled the Carter
Administration in the late 1970s, we have had a policy of economic

sanctions

coupled with comprehensive efforts to politically isolate Iran.

Four years ago, Sen. Arlen Specter and I invited Iran's U.N. Ambassador

to

Capitol Hill, the first visit to Washington by a high-level Iranian
representative since the hostage crisis.

On the subject of possible movement toward normalization of relations

with

Iran, I told the ambassador that while many would like to see a warming

of

relations, it would be inconceivable for the U.S. to consider

normalizing our

relationship so long as Iran continued its support of Hamas and

Hezbollah.

The ambassador forthrightly acknowledged that Iran provided help to both
these terrorist organizations, but also noted, in what was the most
optimistic thing he said that day, that his government was prepared to

cease

support to anti-Israeli terrorist groups the moment a Palestinian state

was

established with borders acceptable to Palestinians.

For decades in the Muslim world, debate has been on-going whether to

embrace

a credible two-state (Israel and Palestine) approach or advance an
irrevocable push-Israel-to-the-sea agenda. The implicit Iranian

position, as

articulated by the ambassador, is support for a two-state approach, but

if

the U.S. on its own, or Israel as a perceived surrogate, were to attack

Iran,

the possibility that such a compromise can ever become possible

deteriorates.

While angst-ridden, the Muslim world understands the rationale for our
intervention in Afghanistan where the plotting for the 9/11 attack on

the

U.S. occurred. It has no sympathy for our engagement in Iraq, which had
nothing to do with 9/11, but if these two interventions were followed by

a

third in Iran, the likelihood is that such would be perceived in the
vocabulary of the Harvard historian, Samuel Huntington, as an all-out

"clash

of civilizations," pitting the Judeo-Christian against the Muslim world.

In

the Middle East it would be considered a war of choice precipitated by

the

United States. We might want it to be seen as a short-term action to

halt the

spread of nuclear weapons, but the Muslim world would more likely view

it as

a continuance of the Crusades: a religious conflict of centuries'

dimensions,

with a revived future.

If military action is deemed necessary, the U.S. broadly has only three
tactical options: (a) full-scale invasion a la Iraq; (b) surgical

strikes of

Iranian nuclear and missile installations; or (c) a surrogate strike by
Israel, modeled along the lines of Osirak.

The first can be described as manifestly more difficult than our

engagement

in Iraq, particularly a post-conflict occupation. The second presents a
number of difficulties, including the comprehensiveness of such a strike

and

the question of whether all aspects of a program that is clandestine can

be

eliminated. The third makes the U.S. accountable for Israeli actions,

which

themselves are likely to be more physically destructive but less

effective

than the 1981 strike against Osirak.

In thinking through the consequences of military action, even if

projected to

be successfully carried out, policymakers must put themselves in the

place of

a potential adversary. A strike that merely buys time may also be a

strike

that changes the manner and rationale of Iranian support for terrorist
organizations. It may also change the geo-strategic reason for a country

like

Iran to garner control of nuclear weapons.

It is presumed that the major reasons that Iran currently seeks nuclear
weapons relates to: 1) Pride: a belief that a 5,000 year-old society has

as

much right to control the most modern of weapons systems as a younger
civilization like America or its neighbors to the west, Israel, and to

the

east, Pakistan; 2) Power: the implications of control of nuclear weapons

with

regard to its perceived hegemony as the largest and most powerful

country in

the Persian Gulf, particularly with regard to its nemesis, Iraq, which

not

only once attacked Kuwait, but Iran itself using chemical weapons; 3)
Politics: the concern that Israeli military dominance is based in part

on the

control of weapons that cannot be balanced in the Muslim world, except

by a

very distant Pakistan.

The issue of the day from an American perspective is weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), their development and potential proliferation to
nation-states and non-national terrorist groups. The question that

cannot be

ducked is whether military action against Iran might add to the list of
reasons Iran may wish to control such weapons: their potential use

against

the United States. Perhaps as significantly, American policymakers must

think

through the new world of terrorism and what might be described as lesser
weapons of mass destruction, which might be dubbed, "LWMD."

Any strike on Iran would be expected to immediately precipitate a

violent

reaction in the Shi'a part of Iraq, where the U.S. has some support

today.

With ease, Iranian influence on the majority Shi'a of Iraq could make

our

ability to constructively influence the direction of change in Iraq near
hopeless.

And there should be little doubt that in a world in which "tit for tat"

is

the norm, a strike on Iran would increase the prospect of

counter-strikes on

American assets around the world and American territory itself. The
asymmetrical nature of modern warfare is such that traditional armies

will

not be challenged in traditional ways. Nation-states which are attacked

may

feel they have little option except to ally themselves with terrorist

groups

to advance national interests.

We view terrorism as an illegitimate tool of uncivilized agents of

change. In

other parts of the world, increasing numbers of people view terrorist

acts as

legitimate responses of societies and, in some cases, groups within

societies

who are oppressed, against those who have stronger military forces.

If Afghanistan, an impoverished country as distant from our shores as

any in

the world, could become a plotting place for international terrorism,

such

danger would increase manifoldly with an increase in Iranian hostility,
especially if based on an American attack.

If there exists today something like a one-in-three chance of another
9/11-type incident or set of incidents in the U.S. in the next few

years, a

preemptive strike against Iran must be assumed to increase the prospect

to

two-in-three.

And Iran, far more than Osama bin-Laden, has within its power the

ability not

only to destabilize world politics, but world economies as well. Oil is,
after all, the grease of economic activity, and a devastating

Iranian-led

cutback in supply cannot be ruled out.

Given the risk, if not the untenability, of military action,

policymakers are

obligated to review other than military options. One, which has

characterized

our post-hostage taking Iranian policy for a full generation, is

isolation of

Iran. This policy can be continued, but as tempting as it is, there is

little

prospect of ratcheting it up much more, except in ways, such as a naval
embargo on Iranian oil, that would be difficult to garner international
support for and would, in any regard, damage us more than Iran.

The only logical alternative is to consider advancing carrots, without
abandoning the possibility of future sticks, and increase our dialogue

with

this very difficult government.

A proposal that might be suggested is negotiation of a Persian Gulf
nuclear-free zone, which would reduce, although given the high

possibility of

cheating, not eliminate entirely one of the reasons Iran presumably

seeks

nuclear weapons - fear that it may be at a disadvantage in a conflict

with an

oil-rich neighbor. In return, America could offer not only normalization

of

relations in trade but the prospect of a free trade agreement and

expanded

country-to-country cultural ties with Iran.

Here, it should be stressed, hundreds of thousands of Iranians have been
educated in the United States. The country has strong democratic
proclivities. While the apparatus of democratic governance in extensive,

real

power is controlled by the mullahs. Nevertheless, few societies in the

world

have more potential to move quickly in a democratic direction than Iran.

And

just as it is hard to believe that outside military intervention would

lead

to anything except greater ensconcement of authoritarian mullah rule,

the

prospect of a bettering of U.S. relations with Iran implies a greater
prospect of a better Iranian society.

Finally, a note about arms control. If the U.S. wishes to lead in
multilateral restraint, we might want to consider joining rather than
rebuking the international community in development of a comprehensive

test

ban (CTB). All American administrations from Eisenhower on favored
negotiation of a CTB. This one has taken the position the Senate took

when it

irrationally rejected such a ban five years ago. The Senate took its

angst

against the strategic leadership of the Clinton Administration out on

the

wrong issue. This partisan, ideological posturing demands

reconsideration. We

simply cannot expect others to restrain themselves when we refuse to put
constraints on ourselves.

We are in a world where use of force can not be ruled out. But we are

also in

a world where alternatives are vastly preferable. They must be put
forthrightly on the table.

A rational intelligent analysis which will fall on the deaf ears of
war-mongering pin-headed neocons. To hear them urge an attack on Iran,
fret about its nuclear program, and issue daily dire warnings of an attack
on other nations by Iran eerily recalls the hysteria that preceded the
preemptive invasion of Iraq.
Doc