Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus > Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids (Which is why I will never go into national security or foreign service fields)
| Topic: |
Science > Prophecies-Of-Nostradamus |
| User: |
"Arnold Holbrook" |
| Date: |
23 Dec 2003 06:54:28 PM |
| Object: |
Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids (Which is why I will never go into national security or foreign service fields) |
Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids
By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
Published: December 23, 2003
ASHINGTON, Dec. 22 — As a special envoy for the Reagan administration
in 1984, Donald H. Rumsfeld, now the defense secretary, traveled to
Iraq to persuade officials there that the United States was eager to
improve ties with President Saddam Hussein despite his use of chemical
weapons, newly declassified documents show.
Advertisement
Mr. Rumsfeld, who ran a pharmaceutical company at the time, was tapped
by Secretary of State George P. Shultz to reinforce a message that a
recent move to condemn Iraq's use of chemical weapons was strictly in
principle and that America's priority was to prevent an Iranian
victory in the Iran-Iraq war and to improve bilateral ties.
During that war, the United States secretly provided Iraq with combat
planning assistance, even after Mr. Hussein's use of chemical weapons
was widely known. The highly classified program involved more than 60
officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who shared intelligence
on Iranian deployments, bomb-damage assessments and other crucial
information with Iraq.
The disclosures round out a picture of American outreach to the Iraqi
government, even as the United States professed to be neutral in the
eight-year war, and suggests a private nonchalance toward Mr.
Hussein's use of chemicals in warfare. Mr. Rumsfeld and other Bush
administration officials have cited Iraq's use of poisonous gas as a
main reason for ousting Mr. Hussein.
The documents, which were released as part of a declassification
project by the National Security Archive, and are available on the Web
at www.nsarchive.org, provide details of the instructions given to Mr.
Rumsfeld on his second trip to Iraq in four months. The notes of Mr.
Rumsfeld's encounter with Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister, remain
classified, but officials acknowledged that it would be unusual if Mr.
Rumsfeld did not carry out the instructions.
Since the release of the documents, he has told members of his inner
circle at the Pentagon that he does not recall whether he had read, or
even had received, the State Department memo, Defense Department
officials said.
One official noted that the documents reflected the State Department's
thinking on Iraq, but did not indicate Mr. Rumsfeld's planning for his
meeting with Mr. Hussein nor his comments on the meeting after its
conclusion.
Mr. Rumsfeld's trip was his second visit to Iraq. On his first visit,
in late December 1983, he had a cordial meeting with Mr. Hussein, and
photographs and a report of that encounter have been widely published.
In a follow-up memo, the chief of the American interests section
reported that Mr. Aziz had conveyed Mr. Hussein's satisfaction with
the meeting. "The Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb.
Rumsfeld's visit," the memo said. "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way
to praise Rumsfeld as a person."
When news emerged last year of the December trip, Mr. Rumsfeld told
CNN that he had "cautioned" Mr. Hussein to forgo chemical weapons. But
when presented with declassified notes of their meeting that made no
mention of that, a spokesman for Mr. Rumsfeld said he had raised the
issue in a meeting with Mr. Aziz.
Lawrence Di Rita, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said on Friday that
there was no inconsistency between Mr. Rumsfeld's previous comments on
his missions to Iraq and the State Department documents.
By early 1984, events threatened to upset the American-Iraqi
relationship. After pleading for a year for international action
against the chemical warfare, Iran had finally persuaded the United
Nations to criticize the use of chemical weapons, albeit in vague
terms.
Pressure mounted on the Reagan administration, which had already
verified Iraq's "almost daily" use of the weapons against Iran and
against Kurdish rebels, documents show. In February, Iraq warned
Iranian "invaders" that "for every harmful insect there is an
insecticide capable of annihilating it." Within weeks, the American
authorities intercepted precursor chemicals that were bound for Iraq.
Finally, on March 5, the United States issued a public condemnation of
Iraq.
But days later, Mr. Shultz and his deputy met with an Iraqi diplomat,
Ismet Kittani, to soften the blow. The American relationship with Iraq
was too important — involving business interests, Middle East
diplomacy and a shared determination to thwart Iran — to sacrifice.
Mr. Kittani left the meeting "unpersuaded," documents show.
Mr. Shultz then turned to Mr. Rumsfeld. In a March 24 briefing
document, Mr. Rumsfeld was asked to present America's bottom line. At
first, the memo recapitulated Mr. Shultz's message to Mr. Kittani,
saying it "clarified that our CW [chemical weapons] condemnation was
made strictly out of our strong opposition to the use of lethal and
incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs." The American officials had
"emphasized that our interests in 1) preventing an Iranian victory and
2) continuing to improve bilateral relations with Iraq, at a pace of
Iraq's choosing, remain undiminished," it said.
Then came the instructions for Mr. Rumsfeld: "This message bears
reinforcing during your discussions."
The American relationship with Iraq during its crippling war with Iran
was rife with such ambiguities. Though the United States was outwardly
neutral, it tilted toward Iraq and even monitored talks toward the
sale of military equipment by private American contractors.
Tom Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive,
said: "Saddam had chemical weapons in the 1980's, and it didn't make
any difference to U.S. policy."
Mr. Blanton suggested that the United States was now paying the price
for earlier indulgence. "The embrace of Saddam in the 1980's and what
it emboldened him to do should caution us as Americans that we have to
look closely at all our murky alliances," he said. "Shaking hands with
dictators today can turn them into Saddams tomorrow."
.
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| User: "Mark Tyme" |
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| Title: Re: Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids (Which is why I will never go into national security or foreign service fields) |
23 Dec 2003 08:16:21 PM |
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Not only did you link to a good source (de-classified national
security documents), there is more that needs to be added to
this story:
The double-dealing began i 1979, with a trip by John Poindexter,
Oliver North and Colin Powell to Iran, to meet with the top Ayatollahs
of Iran. Even though the US had urged Iraq to attack Iran in the
first place, the delegation from the US had a higher purpose.
1. To sell Hawk missiles to Iran, at double the going market
prices, for outdated technology at that. Bush Sr. was choreographer
on the triangle of trade, as follows
2. The profists from the outdated Hawks was used to buy cocaine
in South America. CIA aircraft used it to transport to the US, where
it was converted to crack cocaine, and sold all over the place,
especially in Los Angeles, CA.
3. Profits from the druge sales (after skimming) went to finance the
secret wars in South and Central America to keep Fascist Dictatorship
safe for American oil company interests, and to prevent the rise of
democracy, which might create less-than subservient governments
to the US interests there.
4. This triangle fo trade involved Bush Sr., North, Poindexter,
Powell, Rumsfeld and Bill "I suddenly have a headache" Casey
(DCIA).
5. Not only was this cast of characters (same clowns as now, more
or less) running this "guns for drugs" operation for fun and profit
in Latin America, they were doing something similar in Asia with
some in the Mujahidin and the heroin trade.
6. In 1979, Poindexter, North, Rumsfeld and Power paid a little
visit to Tehran, Iran to ask a favor. At the time, Iran was holding
50 Americans as guests, against their will, until the US freed up
$11 Billion of the Shah of Iran's cash assets frozen in American
banks, ie, "give us back our money, and you get these 50 CIA
dorks back.", etc.
The purpose of the trip, was to cut a deal. Poindexter had a message
from Bush, Sr. "you hold the hostages until the day after Reagan
takes the oath of office, and you'll get your friggin $11 billion
back. Deal?" Khomeini said, "Sure, why not?"
7. Just before that, Jimmy Carter, not part of the Iron Triangle,
attempted a hostage rescue mission. It would have worked, or
at least it would have been one Hell of an attempt, except for
one problem: Bill Casey, Director of the CIA, was loyal to the
Iron Triangle, and arranged with his insiders in the militay, to
sabotage every single aircraft used in that ill-fate rescue mission.
They were crashing into the ground, into each other, and generally
everything went strangely haywire. The Delta Force was in its infancy,
and essentially a CIA special ops group before it became reformed in
the "Rapid Deployment Force" under the mlitary, had no "explanation
why everything any anything that could possibly go wrong on the
rescue mission went completely south. Casey knew, which is one of
the reasons he got a "headache" the day before he was supposed
to testify to the Senate Iran-Contra investigations. Unfortunately,
Casey's "headache" caused him to be found in his office
twitching and convulsing, and ended up a vegetable after that.
All a coincidence, of course.
So Rumsfeld went back, not just in 1984, but again in 1988
to deliver contracts to Iraq so ship biological weapons materials,
chemical weapons technology, and via third-parties and
"contractors", nuclear technologies. Some of these guys
ended up with "altitude sickness", and fell off of hotel
balconies, but of course, just a coincidence.
Rumsfeld in fact, delivered on $4 billion in aid, earmarked to turn
Iraq into the fourth largest military in the world. And the Iron
Triangle's profits surged.
On 23 Dec 2003 16:54:28 -0800, (Arnold
Holbrook) wrote:
Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids
By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
Published: December 23, 2003
ASHINGTON, Dec. 22 — As a special envoy for the Reagan administration
in 1984, Donald H. Rumsfeld, now the defense secretary, traveled to
Iraq to persuade officials there that the United States was eager to
improve ties with President Saddam Hussein despite his use of chemical
weapons, newly declassified documents show.
Advertisement
Mr. Rumsfeld, who ran a pharmaceutical company at the time, was tapped
by Secretary of State George P. Shultz to reinforce a message that a
recent move to condemn Iraq's use of chemical weapons was strictly in
principle and that America's priority was to prevent an Iranian
victory in the Iran-Iraq war and to improve bilateral ties.
During that war, the United States secretly provided Iraq with combat
planning assistance, even after Mr. Hussein's use of chemical weapons
was widely known. The highly classified program involved more than 60
officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who shared intelligence
on Iranian deployments, bomb-damage assessments and other crucial
information with Iraq.
The disclosures round out a picture of American outreach to the Iraqi
government, even as the United States professed to be neutral in the
eight-year war, and suggests a private nonchalance toward Mr.
Hussein's use of chemicals in warfare. Mr. Rumsfeld and other Bush
administration officials have cited Iraq's use of poisonous gas as a
main reason for ousting Mr. Hussein.
The documents, which were released as part of a declassification
project by the National Security Archive, and are available on the Web
at www.nsarchive.org, provide details of the instructions given to Mr.
Rumsfeld on his second trip to Iraq in four months. The notes of Mr.
Rumsfeld's encounter with Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister, remain
classified, but officials acknowledged that it would be unusual if Mr.
Rumsfeld did not carry out the instructions.
Since the release of the documents, he has told members of his inner
circle at the Pentagon that he does not recall whether he had read, or
even had received, the State Department memo, Defense Department
officials said.
One official noted that the documents reflected the State Department's
thinking on Iraq, but did not indicate Mr. Rumsfeld's planning for his
meeting with Mr. Hussein nor his comments on the meeting after its
conclusion.
Mr. Rumsfeld's trip was his second visit to Iraq. On his first visit,
in late December 1983, he had a cordial meeting with Mr. Hussein, and
photographs and a report of that encounter have been widely published.
In a follow-up memo, the chief of the American interests section
reported that Mr. Aziz had conveyed Mr. Hussein's satisfaction with
the meeting. "The Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb.
Rumsfeld's visit," the memo said. "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way
to praise Rumsfeld as a person."
When news emerged last year of the December trip, Mr. Rumsfeld told
CNN that he had "cautioned" Mr. Hussein to forgo chemical weapons. But
when presented with declassified notes of their meeting that made no
mention of that, a spokesman for Mr. Rumsfeld said he had raised the
issue in a meeting with Mr. Aziz.
Lawrence Di Rita, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said on Friday that
there was no inconsistency between Mr. Rumsfeld's previous comments on
his missions to Iraq and the State Department documents.
By early 1984, events threatened to upset the American-Iraqi
relationship. After pleading for a year for international action
against the chemical warfare, Iran had finally persuaded the United
Nations to criticize the use of chemical weapons, albeit in vague
terms.
Pressure mounted on the Reagan administration, which had already
verified Iraq's "almost daily" use of the weapons against Iran and
against Kurdish rebels, documents show. In February, Iraq warned
Iranian "invaders" that "for every harmful insect there is an
insecticide capable of annihilating it." Within weeks, the American
authorities intercepted precursor chemicals that were bound for Iraq.
Finally, on March 5, the United States issued a public condemnation of
Iraq.
But days later, Mr. Shultz and his deputy met with an Iraqi diplomat,
Ismet Kittani, to soften the blow. The American relationship with Iraq
was too important — involving business interests, Middle East
diplomacy and a shared determination to thwart Iran — to sacrifice.
Mr. Kittani left the meeting "unpersuaded," documents show.
Mr. Shultz then turned to Mr. Rumsfeld. In a March 24 briefing
document, Mr. Rumsfeld was asked to present America's bottom line. At
first, the memo recapitulated Mr. Shultz's message to Mr. Kittani,
saying it "clarified that our CW [chemical weapons] condemnation was
made strictly out of our strong opposition to the use of lethal and
incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs." The American officials had
"emphasized that our interests in 1) preventing an Iranian victory and
2) continuing to improve bilateral relations with Iraq, at a pace of
Iraq's choosing, remain undiminished," it said.
Then came the instructions for Mr. Rumsfeld: "This message bears
reinforcing during your discussions."
The American relationship with Iraq during its crippling war with Iran
was rife with such ambiguities. Though the United States was outwardly
neutral, it tilted toward Iraq and even monitored talks toward the
sale of military equipment by private American contractors.
Tom Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive,
said: "Saddam had chemical weapons in the 1980's, and it didn't make
any difference to U.S. policy."
Mr. Blanton suggested that the United States was now paying the price
for earlier indulgence. "The embrace of Saddam in the 1980's and what
it emboldened him to do should caution us as Americans that we have to
look closely at all our murky alliances," he said. "Shaking hands with
dictators today can turn them into Saddams tomorrow."
.
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| User: "Ex." |
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| Title: Re: Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids (Which is why I will never go into national security or foreign service fields) |
23 Dec 2003 07:56:14 PM |
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Saddam coulda saved his ***** this time by invading Iran ... again.
/ex
"Arnold Holbrook" <arnold_holbrook@mailcity.com> wrote in message
news:7e4bfa4a.0312231654.7e556872@posting.google.com...
: Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids
:
: By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
:
: Published: December 23, 2003
:
:
: ASHINGTON, Dec. 22 - As a special envoy for the Reagan administration
: in 1984, Donald H. Rumsfeld, now the defense secretary, traveled to
: Iraq to persuade officials there that the United States was eager to
: improve ties with President Saddam Hussein despite his use of chemical
: weapons, newly declassified documents show.
:
: Advertisement
:
:
: Mr. Rumsfeld, who ran a pharmaceutical company at the time, was tapped
: by Secretary of State George P. Shultz to reinforce a message that a
: recent move to condemn Iraq's use of chemical weapons was strictly in
: principle and that America's priority was to prevent an Iranian
: victory in the Iran-Iraq war and to improve bilateral ties.
:
: During that war, the United States secretly provided Iraq with combat
: planning assistance, even after Mr. Hussein's use of chemical weapons
: was widely known. The highly classified program involved more than 60
: officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who shared intelligence
: on Iranian deployments, bomb-damage assessments and other crucial
: information with Iraq.
:
: The disclosures round out a picture of American outreach to the Iraqi
: government, even as the United States professed to be neutral in the
: eight-year war, and suggests a private nonchalance toward Mr.
: Hussein's use of chemicals in warfare. Mr. Rumsfeld and other Bush
: administration officials have cited Iraq's use of poisonous gas as a
: main reason for ousting Mr. Hussein.
:
: The documents, which were released as part of a declassification
: project by the National Security Archive, and are available on the Web
: at www.nsarchive.org, provide details of the instructions given to Mr.
: Rumsfeld on his second trip to Iraq in four months. The notes of Mr.
: Rumsfeld's encounter with Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister, remain
: classified, but officials acknowledged that it would be unusual if Mr.
: Rumsfeld did not carry out the instructions.
:
: Since the release of the documents, he has told members of his inner
: circle at the Pentagon that he does not recall whether he had read, or
: even had received, the State Department memo, Defense Department
: officials said.
:
: One official noted that the documents reflected the State Department's
: thinking on Iraq, but did not indicate Mr. Rumsfeld's planning for his
: meeting with Mr. Hussein nor his comments on the meeting after its
: conclusion.
:
: Mr. Rumsfeld's trip was his second visit to Iraq. On his first visit,
: in late December 1983, he had a cordial meeting with Mr. Hussein, and
: photographs and a report of that encounter have been widely published.
:
: In a follow-up memo, the chief of the American interests section
: reported that Mr. Aziz had conveyed Mr. Hussein's satisfaction with
: the meeting. "The Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb.
: Rumsfeld's visit," the memo said. "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way
: to praise Rumsfeld as a person."
:
: When news emerged last year of the December trip, Mr. Rumsfeld told
: CNN that he had "cautioned" Mr. Hussein to forgo chemical weapons. But
: when presented with declassified notes of their meeting that made no
: mention of that, a spokesman for Mr. Rumsfeld said he had raised the
: issue in a meeting with Mr. Aziz.
:
: Lawrence Di Rita, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said on Friday that
: there was no inconsistency between Mr. Rumsfeld's previous comments on
: his missions to Iraq and the State Department documents.
:
: By early 1984, events threatened to upset the American-Iraqi
: relationship. After pleading for a year for international action
: against the chemical warfare, Iran had finally persuaded the United
: Nations to criticize the use of chemical weapons, albeit in vague
: terms.
:
: Pressure mounted on the Reagan administration, which had already
: verified Iraq's "almost daily" use of the weapons against Iran and
: against Kurdish rebels, documents show. In February, Iraq warned
: Iranian "invaders" that "for every harmful insect there is an
: insecticide capable of annihilating it." Within weeks, the American
: authorities intercepted precursor chemicals that were bound for Iraq.
: Finally, on March 5, the United States issued a public condemnation of
: Iraq.
:
: But days later, Mr. Shultz and his deputy met with an Iraqi diplomat,
: Ismet Kittani, to soften the blow. The American relationship with Iraq
: was too important - involving business interests, Middle East
: diplomacy and a shared determination to thwart Iran - to sacrifice.
: Mr. Kittani left the meeting "unpersuaded," documents show.
:
: Mr. Shultz then turned to Mr. Rumsfeld. In a March 24 briefing
: document, Mr. Rumsfeld was asked to present America's bottom line. At
: first, the memo recapitulated Mr. Shultz's message to Mr. Kittani,
: saying it "clarified that our CW [chemical weapons] condemnation was
: made strictly out of our strong opposition to the use of lethal and
: incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs." The American officials had
: "emphasized that our interests in 1) preventing an Iranian victory and
: 2) continuing to improve bilateral relations with Iraq, at a pace of
: Iraq's choosing, remain undiminished," it said.
:
: Then came the instructions for Mr. Rumsfeld: "This message bears
: reinforcing during your discussions."
:
: The American relationship with Iraq during its crippling war with Iran
: was rife with such ambiguities. Though the United States was outwardly
: neutral, it tilted toward Iraq and even monitored talks toward the
: sale of military equipment by private American contractors.
:
: Tom Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive,
: said: "Saddam had chemical weapons in the 1980's, and it didn't make
: any difference to U.S. policy."
:
: Mr. Blanton suggested that the United States was now paying the price
: for earlier indulgence. "The embrace of Saddam in the 1980's and what
: it emboldened him to do should caution us as Americans that we have to
: look closely at all our murky alliances," he said. "Shaking hands with
: dictators today can turn them into Saddams tomorrow."
.
|
|
|
| User: "Mark Tyme" |
|
| Title: Re: Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids (Which is why I will never go into national security or foreign service fields) |
23 Dec 2003 10:28:27 PM |
|
|
He could have saved his *****, if he'd come out and said "Hell ya I got
nukes. Bring it it on !"
On Tue, 23 Dec 2003 20:56:14 -0500, "Ex." <Eat.Healthy@Turdmail.com>
wrote:
Saddam coulda saved his ***** this time by invading Iran ... again.
/ex
"Arnold Holbrook" <arnold_holbrook@mailcity.com> wrote in message
news:7e4bfa4a.0312231654.7e556872@posting.google.com...
: Rumsfeld Made Iraq Overture in '84 Despite Chemical Raids
:
: By CHRISTOPHER MARQUIS
:
: Published: December 23, 2003
:
:
: ASHINGTON, Dec. 22 - As a special envoy for the Reagan administration
: in 1984, Donald H. Rumsfeld, now the defense secretary, traveled to
: Iraq to persuade officials there that the United States was eager to
: improve ties with President Saddam Hussein despite his use of chemical
: weapons, newly declassified documents show.
:
: Advertisement
:
:
: Mr. Rumsfeld, who ran a pharmaceutical company at the time, was tapped
: by Secretary of State George P. Shultz to reinforce a message that a
: recent move to condemn Iraq's use of chemical weapons was strictly in
: principle and that America's priority was to prevent an Iranian
: victory in the Iran-Iraq war and to improve bilateral ties.
:
: During that war, the United States secretly provided Iraq with combat
: planning assistance, even after Mr. Hussein's use of chemical weapons
: was widely known. The highly classified program involved more than 60
: officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency, who shared intelligence
: on Iranian deployments, bomb-damage assessments and other crucial
: information with Iraq.
:
: The disclosures round out a picture of American outreach to the Iraqi
: government, even as the United States professed to be neutral in the
: eight-year war, and suggests a private nonchalance toward Mr.
: Hussein's use of chemicals in warfare. Mr. Rumsfeld and other Bush
: administration officials have cited Iraq's use of poisonous gas as a
: main reason for ousting Mr. Hussein.
:
: The documents, which were released as part of a declassification
: project by the National Security Archive, and are available on the Web
: at www.nsarchive.org, provide details of the instructions given to Mr.
: Rumsfeld on his second trip to Iraq in four months. The notes of Mr.
: Rumsfeld's encounter with Tariq Aziz, the foreign minister, remain
: classified, but officials acknowledged that it would be unusual if Mr.
: Rumsfeld did not carry out the instructions.
:
: Since the release of the documents, he has told members of his inner
: circle at the Pentagon that he does not recall whether he had read, or
: even had received, the State Department memo, Defense Department
: officials said.
:
: One official noted that the documents reflected the State Department's
: thinking on Iraq, but did not indicate Mr. Rumsfeld's planning for his
: meeting with Mr. Hussein nor his comments on the meeting after its
: conclusion.
:
: Mr. Rumsfeld's trip was his second visit to Iraq. On his first visit,
: in late December 1983, he had a cordial meeting with Mr. Hussein, and
: photographs and a report of that encounter have been widely published.
:
: In a follow-up memo, the chief of the American interests section
: reported that Mr. Aziz had conveyed Mr. Hussein's satisfaction with
: the meeting. "The Iraqi leadership was extremely pleased with Amb.
: Rumsfeld's visit," the memo said. "Tariq Aziz had gone out of his way
: to praise Rumsfeld as a person."
:
: When news emerged last year of the December trip, Mr. Rumsfeld told
: CNN that he had "cautioned" Mr. Hussein to forgo chemical weapons. But
: when presented with declassified notes of their meeting that made no
: mention of that, a spokesman for Mr. Rumsfeld said he had raised the
: issue in a meeting with Mr. Aziz.
:
: Lawrence Di Rita, the chief Pentagon spokesman, said on Friday that
: there was no inconsistency between Mr. Rumsfeld's previous comments on
: his missions to Iraq and the State Department documents.
:
: By early 1984, events threatened to upset the American-Iraqi
: relationship. After pleading for a year for international action
: against the chemical warfare, Iran had finally persuaded the United
: Nations to criticize the use of chemical weapons, albeit in vague
: terms.
:
: Pressure mounted on the Reagan administration, which had already
: verified Iraq's "almost daily" use of the weapons against Iran and
: against Kurdish rebels, documents show. In February, Iraq warned
: Iranian "invaders" that "for every harmful insect there is an
: insecticide capable of annihilating it." Within weeks, the American
: authorities intercepted precursor chemicals that were bound for Iraq.
: Finally, on March 5, the United States issued a public condemnation of
: Iraq.
:
: But days later, Mr. Shultz and his deputy met with an Iraqi diplomat,
: Ismet Kittani, to soften the blow. The American relationship with Iraq
: was too important - involving business interests, Middle East
: diplomacy and a shared determination to thwart Iran - to sacrifice.
: Mr. Kittani left the meeting "unpersuaded," documents show.
:
: Mr. Shultz then turned to Mr. Rumsfeld. In a March 24 briefing
: document, Mr. Rumsfeld was asked to present America's bottom line. At
: first, the memo recapitulated Mr. Shultz's message to Mr. Kittani,
: saying it "clarified that our CW [chemical weapons] condemnation was
: made strictly out of our strong opposition to the use of lethal and
: incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs." The American officials had
: "emphasized that our interests in 1) preventing an Iranian victory and
: 2) continuing to improve bilateral relations with Iraq, at a pace of
: Iraq's choosing, remain undiminished," it said.
:
: Then came the instructions for Mr. Rumsfeld: "This message bears
: reinforcing during your discussions."
:
: The American relationship with Iraq during its crippling war with Iran
: was rife with such ambiguities. Though the United States was outwardly
: neutral, it tilted toward Iraq and even monitored talks toward the
: sale of military equipment by private American contractors.
:
: Tom Blanton, executive director of the National Security Archive,
: said: "Saddam had chemical weapons in the 1980's, and it didn't make
: any difference to U.S. policy."
:
: Mr. Blanton suggested that the United States was now paying the price
: for earlier indulgence. "The embrace of Saddam in the 1980's and what
: it emboldened him to do should caution us as Americans that we have to
: look closely at all our murky alliances," he said. "Shaking hands with
: dictators today can turn them into Saddams tomorrow."
.
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