Russia's Ties to the Americas: A New Player in Town
December 29, 2003 2210 GMT
Summary
Russia is seeking closer ties with key South American countries --
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. Moscow wants to
expand trade and investment with them, but it also wants to build
geopolitical alliances with key powers that view the United States as
an adversary.
Analysis
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's recent ten-day trip to five
South American countries and Cuba highlights the importance Russian
President Vladimir Putin has assigned to building strong commercial
and diplomatic relationships in what many U.S. policymakers
historically have viewed as Washington's backyard.
Moscow sees Latin America generally as promising for Russian exporters
and investors. However, Putin appears particularly interested in
building stronger relations with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and
Venezuela. This makes sense for several reasons.
These five countries are important global exporters of agricultural,
mineral and energy commodities. Traditionally, they also have been
South America's largest markets for imported manufactures and consumer
goods, although Venezuela's economy contracted in 2002 and 2003
because of its unresolved political crisis.
At $5.6 billion in 2002, Russia's trade with Latin America was a
fraction of the $250 billion in U.S. trade with the region. However,
Moscow believes that Russian trade could easily triple in the next
three years. This would still be very small in comparison with U.S.
trade volumes, but for Russia, it would represent a significant gain.
Putin also seeks closer relations with these countries for
geopolitical reasons. His pro-Western leanings are driving closer
relations with the United States and the European Union, but Putin
doesn't really trust them -- nor should he, for that matter. As a
result, even as Moscow looks to improve relations with Western powers,
it also wants to develop alliances with key regional powers such as
India and South Africa, in addition to South America.
From Moscow's perspective, South America's key players are Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela. These governments are the
region's strongest advocates of a new global model for international
relations. They support a reformed United Nations in which a
restructured and expanded Security Council would sit atop a pyramid
sustained by multi-polar alliances. This expanded Security Council
would include new permanent members such as Brazil, India and South
Africa. Moscow shares this vision of U.N. reorganization -- primarily
to rein in Washington's unilateralist tendencies.
Ivanov said in Buenos Aires, "No state, however strong, is capable of
sorting out world problems on its own, so the appeal for
multilateralism has nothing to do with anti-Americanism." Rather, he
added, "Moscow's proposal is that this is the approach best geared to
meeting the interests of the United States."
For their part, these governments also are keen to develop closer ties
with Russia. This was made clear by the invitation they extended to
Ivanov to participate in the Mercosur custom union's Dec. 16
presidential summit in the Uruguayan capital of Montevideo. No senior
officials in the Bush or Clinton administrations received similar
invitations.
Brazilian President Luiz Inacio "Lula" da Silva perceives Moscow as a
valued ally in his efforts to secure a permanent seat for Brazil on a
restructured U.N. Security Council. Argentine President Nestor
Kirchner sees Russia as a promising market for the country's
agricultural commodities exports, and as a source of new foreign
direct investment at a time when Argentina remains a pariah with its
traditional creditors because it has not seriously moved to
restructure about $100 billion in defaulted debt.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez sees in Putin a natural ally against
what he perceives as Washington's hegemonic pressures on Latin America
generally, and the Andean region particularly. Chavez also wants
stronger ties with Russia's military and with Russian oil firms to
encourage investment in Venezuelan oil ventures.
Brazil is the key to Moscow's South American strategy. Brazil is
Russia's second largest trading partner in the Western Hemisphere,
after the United States. Russian trade with Brazil will total about
$1.8 billion in 2003, with some Brazilian economists forecasting a
rise to nearly $6 billion by 2006.
Ivanov said in Brasilia that joint commercial opportunities exist to
improve booster rockets, remote sensing technologies and
telecommunications satellites. He also offered Russian assistance in
developing Brazil's nuclear industry, a high priority for da Silva's
government. Moscow also wants to sell military equipment to Brazil:
Ivanov stressed that Russian investors are interested in jointly
developing Brazilian facilities to produce at least 24 multi-role
SU-35 Flanker jet fighters. Da Silva's government is shopping for new
fighters in a deal worth more than $700 million.
A Russian-Brazilian alliance might surface at the United Nations
shortly after Brazil occupies a temporary Security Council seat on
Jan. 1. Since taking office a year ago, da Silva has presided over a
more assertive tone in Brazil's foreign policy. For example, the
Foreign Ministry successfully blocked the United States and the
European Union at the World Trade Organization's meeting in Cancun in
September 2003. In November, it blocked the U.S. trade agenda again at
a summit in Miami of the Western Hemisphere's trade ministers. Under
da Silva, Brazil also has taken a stronger interest in other regional
issues, such as opposing the U.S.-led military offensive in Colombia
against rebel and drug-trafficking groups.
Da Silva also has reached out to India, South Africa and
Portuguese-speaking African countries. Brazil's relations with China
also have grown rapidly during his tenure, driven mainly by swelling
Chinese demand for Brazilian commodities.
Given da Silva's assertive style in foreign policy, it is likely that
Brazil will make itself heard on a broad range of issues within the
Security Council -- including Iraq and the Middle East. Many of
Brazil's positions will dovetail with Moscow's and frequently differ
from Washington's.
Da Silva also will seek Russian support on issues important to Brazil
-- winning a permanent U.N. Security Council seat, or pushing the
United Kingdom to transfer its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands
to Argentina. Ivanov pledged during his South American trip that
Moscow supports these goals. Da Silva likely will test that pledge in
the coming year.
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