tw a écrit:

"Jean Guernon" <jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote in message
news:dQc9d.39391$223.16387@edtnps89...

Woodswun a écrit:

In article <g1T8d.33111$N%.1108@edtnps84>, Jean Guernon

<jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/index.html

CIA: Saddam intended to make arms if sanctions ended

IOW - the sanctions were working.

Yeah right. They were working just enough to make him keep on preparing
until they stopped. I don't call that working if they were supposed to
definitively rid the country of those things.

Didn't you read the report? The country WAS rid of those things.

Nah it wasn't.

Have you read it?

First, as I say, it wasn't working
because he AS going to restart the programs.

http://www.cia.gov/cia/reports/iraq_wmd_2004/Comp_Report_Key_Findings.pdf
Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime that its strategic intent
was his alone. He wanted to end
sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) when
sanctions were lifted.

Second about your unrelated lie, let's see what they found besides the
fact that the weasels of the UN were helping them of course.

NUCLEAR:

ISG found a limited number of post-1995 activities that would have aided
the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons program once sanctions were
lifted.

The activities of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission sustained some
talent and limited research with potential relevance to a reconstituted
nuclear program.

Specific projects, with significant development, such as the efforts to
build a rail gun and a copper vapor laser could have been useful in a
future effort to restart a nuclear weapons program, but ISG found no
indications of such purpose. As funding for the MIC and the IAEC
increased after the introduction of the Oil-for-Food program, there was
some growth in programs that involved former nuclear weapons scientists
and engineers.

The Regime prevented scientists from the former nuclear weapons program
from leaving either their jobs or Iraq. Moreover, in the late 1990s,
personnel from both MIC and the IAEC received signifi cant pay raises in
a bid to retain them, and the Regime undertook new investments in
university research in a bid to ensure that Iraq retained technical
knowledge.

Chemical

The Regime employed a cadre of trained and experienced researchers,
production managers, and weaponization experts from the former CW program.
• Iraq began implementing a range of indigenous chemical production
projects in 1995 and 1996. Many of these projects, while not
weapons-related, were designed to improve Iraq’s infrastructure, which
would have enhanced Iraq’s ability to produce CW agents if the scaled-up
production processes were implemented.

• Iraq had an effective system for the procurement of items that Iraq
was not allowed to acquire due to sanctions. ISG found no evidence that
this system was used to acquire precursor chemicals in bulk; however
documents indicate that dual-use laboratory equipment and chemicals were
acquired through this system.

ISG uncovered information that the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)
maintained throughout 1991 to 2003 a set of undeclared covert
laboratories to research and test various chemicals and poisons,
primarily for intelligence operations. The network of laboratories could
have provided an ideal, compartmented platform from which to continue CW
agent R&D or small-scale production efforts, but we have no indications
this was planned. (See Annex A.)
• ISG has no evidence that IIS Directorate of Criminology (M16)
scientists were producing CW or BW agents in these laboratories.
However, sources indicate that M16 was planning to produce several CW
agents including sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard, and Sarin.
• Exploitations of IIS laboratories, safe houses, and disposal sites
revealed no evidence of CW-related research or production, however many
of these sites were either sanitized by the Regime or looted prior to
OIF. Interviews with key IIS offi cials within and outside of M16
yielded very little information about the IIS’ activities in this area.
• The existence, function, and purpose of the laboratories were never
declared to the UN.
• The IIS program included the use of human subjects for testing
purposes. ISG investigated a series of key pre-OIF indicators involving
the possible movement and storage of chemical weapons, focusing on 11
major depots assessed to have possible links to CW. A review of
documents, interviews, available reporting, and site exploitations
revealed alternate, plausible explanations for activities noted prior to
OIF which, at the time, were believed to be CW-related.

Biological

The IIS had a series of laboratories that conducted biological work
including research into BW agents for assassination purposes until the
mid-1990s. ISG has not been able to establish the scope and nature of
the work at these laboratories or determine whether any of the work was
related to military development of BW agent.
• The security services operated a series of laboratories in the Baghdad
area. Iraq should have declared these facilities and their equipment to
the UN, but they did not. Neither the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) nor
the UN Monitoring, Verifi cation, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
were aware of their existence or inspected them.
• Some of the laboratories possessed equipment capable of supporting
research into BW agents for military purposes, but ISG does not know
whether this occurred although there is no evidence of it. The
laboratories were probably the successors of the Al Salman facility,
located three kilometers south of Salman Pak, which was destroyed in
1991, and they carried on many of the same activities, including
forensic work.
• Under the aegis of the intelligence service, a secretive team
developed assassination instruments using poisons or toxins for the
Iraqi state. A small group of scientists, doctors and technicians
conducted secret experiments on human beings, resulting in their deaths.
The aim was probably the development of poisons, including ricin and afl
atoxin to eliminate or debilitate the Regime’s opponents. It appears
that testing on humans continued until the mid 1990s. There is no
evidence to link these tests with the development of BW agents for
military use.

Note: They don't call poisonning humans military use, LOL.

Anywhoo, the conclusion is clear:

"Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq’s WMD capability—which was essentially
destroyed in 1991—after sanctions were removed and Iraq’s economy
stabilized, but probably with a different mix of capabilities to that
which previously existed. Saddam aspired to develop a nuclear
capability—in an incremental fashion, irrespective of international
pressure and the resulting economic risks—but he intended to focus on
ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW) capabilities."

If the sanctions worked, this wouldn't be the case. Hence he had to be
removed.

Thanks for allowing the occasion to prove this fact that the invasion
WAS justified, underlying you are an idiot once again.

J.

Gee.

Fnuhh

J.

Quite different from having what Bush was claiming in order to get his

war

going: *active* bio/chem weapons manufacturing, nuclear weapons

program, and

stockpiles of WMDs set to target US interests.

Woods

leigh8bee@optusnet.com.au (Leigh_Bee) wrote in message news:<39cd5fe.0410071434.4b70db93@posting.google.com>...

Jean Guernon <jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote in message news:<dQc9d.39391$223.16387@edtnps89>...

Woodswun a écrit:

In article <g1T8d.33111$N%.1108@edtnps84>, Jean Guernon <jguernon@globetrotter.net> wrote:

http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/index.html

CIA: Saddam intended to make arms if sanctions ended

IOW - the sanctions were working.

Yeah right. They were working just enough to make him keep on preparing
until they stopped. I don't call that working if they were supposed to
definitively rid the country of those things.

Gee.

J.

When has anyone been able to stop, someone doing what they want to,
even if it is WMD? and look at who has used such weapons, better yet
who has them NOW!
Sanctions only hurt the lower eschelons of society, look at Zimbabwe.

Funny bunch of posts, I recently heard a story of Helubja? the famed
gassing of the Kurds, apparently they died of Strychnine which was
used by Iran, collateral damage apparently, but the Saddam tale comes
from the "American Chalabi" Cheney!
LB

While Cheney and Bush have indeed lied,

the fact is that Saddam did
gas Halabja and not Iran.

The US at the time was buddies with Saddam,
and tried to shift the blame for his atrocities onto the Iranians.
Read up on this:

America didn't seem to mind poison gas
Joost R. Hiltermann International Herald Tribune Friday, January
17, 2003
Halabja

AMMAN, Jordan In calling for regime change in Iraq, George W. Bush has
accused Saddam Hussein of being a man who gassed his own people. Bush
is right, of course. The public record shows that Saddam's regime
repeatedly spread poisonous gases on Kurdish villages in 1987 and 1988
in an attempt to put down a persistent rebellion.
.
The biggest such attack was against Halabja in March 1988. According
to local organizations providing relief to the survivors, some 6,800
Kurds were killed, the vast majority of them civilians.
.
It is a good thing that Bush has highlighted these atrocities by a
regime that is more brutal than most. Yet it is cynical to use them as
a justification for American plans to terminate the regime. By any
measure, the American record on Halabja is shameful.
.
Analysis of thousands of captured Iraqi secret police documents and
declassified U.S. government documents, as well as interviews with
scores of Kurdish survivors, senior Iraqi defectors and retired U.S.
intelligence officers, show (1) that Iraq carried out the attack on
Halabja, and (2) that the United States, fully aware it was Iraq,
accused Iran, Iraq's enemy in a fierce war, of being partly
responsible for the attack. The State Department instructed its
diplomats to say that Iran was partly to blame.